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Prologue 
 While research and writing-up of this thesis was completed months 
before the recent events in İstanbul and other major cities in Turkey broke out, 
the reader of this manuscript will realise that, if anything we were not caught by 
surprise, albeit the extent, the intensity and speed of the events were somewhat 
unexpected. As I document in this thesis, the AKP has successfully utilised a 
pro-rights and pro-EU discourse in order to ascend into power in 2002. This 
discourse coupled with its highly successful economic agenda (a continuation of 
the IMF programme and an economic mentality that dates back to the early 
1980s) allowed the party to associate itself with a highly extrovert, business-
minded and export-oriented lower-middle class of inner Anatolia, socially 
conservative and economically liberal who saw in the AKP's pro-EU policies the 
prospect for greater economic profit and a replacement of the old elites. Hence, 
as it is documented in this thesis, the AKP was able to forge a broad alliance of 
supporters (from liberal-minded pro-EU segments of the society that wanted to 
limit the military's intervention in public life to more socially conservative 
lower-middle class entrepreneurs of inner Anatolia) that helped the party to 
consolidate its power by winning the 2007 elections. Yet, as the research 
uncovers, AKP's pro-rights discourse has gradually faded and a more 
authoritarian image has started to appear. As it is demonstrated, this gradual shift 
towards more authoritarian policies was accelerated after the 2010 referendum 
when the AKP managed to extend its grasp not only over the presidency but also 
over the military, the judiciary and the press (the pillars of the old guard, the 
Kemalist, secular elites that formed the core of the old regime). In fact, this 
thesis documents a sharp break from AKP's pro-EU and pro-rights agenda which 
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has now been removed from the party's top priorities. In light of these changes, it 
is not a coincidence nor a surprise that the AKP's social engineering policies that 
aspired to impose its conservative worldview on Turkish society (what we call 
the feedback effect of AKP's consolidation process) were met with increasing 
resentment and discontent by the segments of the society that felt excluded by 
AKP's rhetoric. It is exactly this diverse group of people and civil society, that 
cuts across the traditional cleavages of Turkish politics and includes a wide 
range of very different segments of civil society (from ethnic and religious 
minorities to secularists and liberals) that has taken to the street to protest against 
the AKP's growing intervention in their lifestyles as a part of AKP's vision for 
society. And while things are still pretty uncertain, it is quite premature for 
someone to make a sensible prediction about whether those events will signal 
the beginning of the end for AKP's dominance in Turkish political life, this 
thesis can certainly offer a systematic and analytical framework that will aid the 
reader to understand and analyse the evolution of the party-system and of 
political competition in Turkey in the near future.  
4
th
 June, 2013. 
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Abstract 
This thesis concerns the current ruling party, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi - Justice and Development Party) in Turkey.  Its aim is to examine the 
emergence and consolidation of the AKP, as well as to determine whether or not 
this has shaped the evolution of the party system in Turkey. This research draws 
on a qualitative research approach, through interviews with 36 key informants 
from political parties, NGOs, grassroots organizations and through gathering 
data in the literature produced by parties and other statutory and voluntary 
agencies, as well as through the collection of descriptive statististics related to 
socio-economic structures, migration, occupational categories, macroeconomic 
indicators and collections of election surveys.  
The finding reveal that the AKP did not emerge as an Islamist party, but because 
of its promises of economic stability and growth, and of further integration into 
the EU and USA-led global order. The thesis shows that more so than its 
religious discourse, the AKP’s electoral success was based on the party’s 
adapting a hybrid, progressive and pro-EU position during its first tenure in 
government. Second, this research demonstrates how the political conjuncture up 
to 2002 and long-term economic factors provided favourable circumstances for 
the AKP’s emergence. 
The study’s findings also reveal that the consolidation of the AKP is mainly 
attributable to its economic and social agenda, and the utilization of the public 
purse and other state resources (e.g. social and health care benefits) as a means 
of catering for its target constituencies. In addition, they demonstrate that once 
AKP’s consolidation was completed (2010) the party’s discourse gradually 
became more conservative and nationalist, giving way to more authoritarian 
policies. Nonetheless, as long as economic performance and conditions remain 
unchanged, the AKP continues to appeal to its social base. Consequently, this 
thesis demonstrates that the gradual drift in Turkish society towards moderate 
Islamic and traditional values was not the main factor in the AKP’s rise to 
power. Rather, this shift can be viewed as the feedback effect of the 
consolidation of the AKP process into societal structures and norms. Hence, this 
work highlights the AKP’s impact on the structure of the party-system and the 
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role of its policies in transforming Turkish society. Lastly, this study contributes 
to the foundation upon which further research on Turkish politics and the party 
system can continue, by exploring the dual effect of the AKP’s ruling tenure:  
factors leading to the AKP’s emergence and its feedback into Turkish society 
and politics.  
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Introduction  
Background  
          In 2008, I obtained my MA in International Political Economy with a 
thesis on “Islamic Revivalism in Turkey and its Challenge to Secularity: 1950 to 
Present”. This research afforded a number of insights into the causes of the 
contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revival in Turkey – one of the most 
secular countries in terms of the legal and constitutional basis of its political 
institutions. It also prompted me to further this research in the framework of a 
Ph.D thesis, entitled “The Emergence and Consolidation of the AKP and its 
Impact on Turkish Society and Politics”. 
              The rise of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and 
Development Party), in Turkey through channels of democracy, as a political 
party with Islamic roots, was an event without precedence in the Islamic world. 
However, the AKP did not emerge out of blue. Rather, its emergence was the 
outcome of a long process of socio-economic transformation in Turkish society, 
especially since the 1980s, through population movements from rural peripheral 
areas to urban centres. Together with socio-economic transformation, it was also 
a result of a long political rupture between the secularist state and religious 
groups. 
 This process began in 1923 with the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey upon the foundation of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. It attained 
intensity in the second half of the 20
th
 century with the adoption of multi-party 
system. 
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  Throughout the multi-party system era (i.e. from 1950 to the present) in 
Turkey, Islamist parties
1
 began to be established in the late 1960s, and for the 
first time, an Islamist party, the MSP, was represented in parliament as a result 
of the legislative elections of 1973. After a decade without political 
representation, the Islamist party RP (Refah Partisi - Welfare Party) obtained 
unexpected success at the local and legislative elections of 1994 and 1995 
respectively. Nonetheless, given the strong praxis of secularism in Turkey, the 
RP was closed in 1998, as it did not meet the requirements of the secular state. 
The closure of the RP and subsequently of its successor party, the FP (Fazilet 
Partisi - Virtue Party), gave rise to a reformist movement led by some members 
of these parties who established a new party, the AKP in 2001. The AKP 
emerged as the victor, with a moderate and democratic discourse and pro-EU 
stance, following the legislative elections of 2002. It then went on to reproduce 
this victory nearly ten years later, in 2011, to form a majority government. 
Indeed, a series of circumstances such as a shaky period of coalition 
governments and economic crises made people look for a new start (Çavdar 
2008b, p.346-347).  The decision of a rather broad segment of the voting 
population to elect a party with Islamic roots appeared as a case worthy of closer 
consideration.   
 In addition to analysing the AKP’s emergence, the nature of its 
consolidation over the course of its three successive government tenures (2002-
2007; 2007-2011; 2011-to present) is another issue of importance for my 
research. The AKP government achieved a particularly successful economic 
                                                     
1
 e.g. MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi - National Order Party); the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi - 
National  Salvation Party) 
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performance, and also implemented a series of socio-economic policies in areas 
such as social assistance and health care that directly addressed the needs and 
aspirations of the electorate. These achievements also ensured the success of the 
AKP in all municipal and legislative elections during the period 2002 to present. 
The party also succeeded in placing the military under control and demilitarizing 
the political structures. On the other hand, some policies that the AKP initiated 
during its second and particularly third tenure appear to disclose a thus far 
concealed Islamic agenda. This has led to a deep polarization between the AKP 
government and its supporters on the one hand, and secular and Alevi segments 
of the society on the other, and has strengthened the conviction of the latter that 
the AKP plans to shape Turkish society in line with its Islamic worldview. The 
AKP government’s recent policies on issues such as freedom of expression, 
freedom of media, human rights, ethnicity, law and order, foreign policy and 
education are also attracting increasing criticism.  Thus, the possible long-term 
effects of the AKP’s ruling period on the Turkish society and political party 
system have been another topic of priority for me. In this regard, I have focused 
on issues of secularism, religion and the conservative worldview of the AKP in 
order to demonstrate the deepening cleavages in society which run along the 
secularism-Islam (anti-secular) and Alevi minority-Sunni majority axis (Toprak 
et al, 2009, p. 23). These tensions in Turkish society that have sharpened with 
the emergence of the AKP (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009) illustrate the 
importance of analyzing this party and its tenure in office in the context of its 
future impact on Turkish society and politics.  
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 Given its achievements, the AKP has already become a source of 
inspiration in the Islamic world and a focus of interest for Islamic, western and 
Turkish scholars, media and political observers. Moreover, the AKP’s tenure 
continues presently, and is thus a kind of an ongoing political experiment, the 
outcome of which is not yet known. As is generally the case in politics, nobody 
can predict whether such a phenomenon ends up in disappointment or takes 
place as a success story in history. Recent changes in the discourse and policies 
of the AKP make its future course unpredictable, and all the more worthwhile to 
follow. 
Rationale for the Study  
 My rationale for the study and analysis of the AKP’s emergence, 
consolidation and significance in Turkish society and politics is based on the 
uniqueness of the subject matter. The AKP can be said to be unique since it 
acceded to power as a political party with Islamic roots via the channels of 
democracy in a secular state. Besides, its transformation from an Islamic party 
into a party with a moderate, democratic and pro-West discourse and its 
acceptance within secular circles and the state (albeit with reservation, if not 
suspicion) made the AKP unique within Turkish as well Middle East politics. 
Furthermore, the AKP’s performance in liberating Turkey from military 
tutelage, through progressive constitutional amendments, attracted the attention 
of both national and international scholars and observers.  
 Through this doctoral research, I intend to contribute to the literature by 
investigating as a case study the impact of political developments and socio-
economic factors on the emergence of the AKP and the counter-impact of its 
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emergence on Turkish society and political development. There are a number of 
existing works related to the AKP, Turkish politics and the party system in 
Turkey.  
 Recently, Turkish politics, society and the AKP have been analyzed 
rigorously. Yavuz (2003; 2006; 2009) explores the evolution of Islamist parties 
in Turkey and the AKP’s first tenure in power. Similarly, Hale and Özbudun 
(2011) make a more updated analysis of the AKP's tenure and examine the AKP 
from both political and sociological angles. Furthermore, Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu (2009) look in detail at how society has rushed towards 
“conservatism, traditionalism and parochialism” over the last two decades. By 
making an empirical analysis, based on a 2006 survey, they decode the guiding 
forces of current Turkish society.  
 My main hypothesis on the AKP’s emergence is that the AKP did not 
come to power as an Islamist political party; indeed it attracted a majority of 
voters from various strata due to its promises of economic stability and growth 
as well integration into the global economic order as favoured by the USA and 
its allies. I will prove this by analyzing various factors which underpinned the 
emergence of the AKP in 2002.  
 Moreover, my second hypothesis is that the AKP did not consolidate its 
ruling power because of its religious discourse rather because or because of its 
strong social policies during its ruling tenure.  To prove this hypothesis, I 
analysed different social policy areas and their impact on the consolidation of 
the AKP’s tenure.  
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 Lastly, my third hypothesis is that the consolidated AKP’s response into 
Turkish society was based on its spreading of its conservative agenda on various 
areas. In order to confirm my hypothesis, I examined the feedback of the AKP 
into Turkish society by investigating tensions AKP’s conservative worldview 
had caused in society. 
Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 The main aim of this study was to investigate the emergence and 
consolidation of the AKP within Turkish politics, to analyze the reasons behind 
these developments and explain their significance for Turkish politics and 
society. 
Therefore, I intended to: 
i. examine the emergence and consolidation of the AKP and determine 
whether or not this has shaped the party system in Turkey; 
ii. assess whether the emergence of the AKP reflects changes which have 
taken place in Turkey’s social structure; 
iii. Consider whether the AKP’s entrenchment in the Turkish party system 
has, in turn, impacted on the on-going socio-economic changes which 
are taking place in the country. 
In addition, by the end of this investigation, the following objectives will have 
been attained: 
i. The construction of a socio-demographic profile (disaggregation of 
electorate according to gender, age, occupational category and 
geographical distribution) of the AKP’s electoral base; 
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ii. an analysis of the evolution of Turkey’s economic base and the effects of 
this evolution on Turkey’s social structure, and how the structural social 
changes have translated into support for the AKP;  
iii. An assessment of the influence of different pressure and interest groups 
(NGOs, trade unions, employers’ organizations etc.) on the rise and 
success of the AKP; 
iv. An evaluation of the impact of specific economic and political 
conjunctural developments (e.g. economic crises) at the turn of the 
millennium which led to the success of the AKP in the 2002 and 2007 
legislative elections; 
v. An analysis of the impact and significance of the AKP in Turkish society 
and Turkish party system between 2002 and present.  
Research Questions  
My thesis aims to answer the following key questions: 
i. What changes in the structures of Turkish society explain the emergence 
and electoral success of the AKP? 
ii. To what extent did long, medium and short-term economic factors 
contribute to the rise of the AKP?  
iii. To what extent did the political conjuncture of the early 2000s help the 
AKP to succeed electorally in 2002? 
iv. Is the establishment of the AKP in Turkish politics an indicator of the 
long-term restructuring of the Turkish party system?  
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v. Does the entrenchment of the AKP in Turkish politics since 2002 
represent a shift from secularism towards conservatism and religion in 
Turkey? 
 These questions were answered through an analysis of research data and 
through the review of the literature on key theories of political parties and party 
systems, voting behavior theories and Turkish society. After this rigorous 
literature review on these keys approaches used to analyse Turkish society and 
politics, I deduced a general theoretical framework in order to guide my 
research. As seen above in research objectives, my research has a dual side, 
which tackles both dynamics of Turkish society and politics, party system in 
Turkey. As a consequence, I opted for two main theoretical models to guide my 
research and influence my choice of method. Thus, the general theoretical 
framework being based on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage structure and 
centre-periphery approach (Shils, 1961; Mardin, 1973; Kahraman, 2008).  I 
deduced the former by investigating key theories on party systems and parties; I 
considered the Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure as a suitable for 
analyzing Turkish party system, since Lipset and Rokkan emphasize on the 
importance of social divisions and their reflection into the party system. 
Therefore, I opted for Lipset-Rokkan’s structure, rather than other scholars such 
as Duverger (1964); Sartori (1976) who emphasize institutional and competition 
factors. Furthermore, I have also considered a more update version of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s cleavage structure (Gallagher et al., 2005), in order to reinforce the 
theoretical framework when Lipset-Rokkan’s structure becomes insufficient for 
explaining Turkish dynamics and their translations into the party system. 
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 The latter is deduced from reviewing main analytical frameworks which 
have been used for the analysis of Turkish society. As a result of this literature 
review, I deduced the centre-periphery relations model which was initially 
developed by Shils (Shils, 1961, p.117; Shils, 1975, p.3). The scholar who 
incorporated Shils’s work on centre-periphery model into Turkish politics was 
Mardin (1973, pp.183-184). I adopted Mardin’s model on centre-periphery 
model but with the recent adoption by Kahraman (2008) who took further 
Mardin’s model by referring to both Gramsci and Gramsci’s class analysis 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp.202-205, p.366). Kahraman’s (2008) recent adoption was 
suitable to the analysis of Turkish society since he took into the recent dynamics 
in Turkish society since 1980s by developing further Mardin’s centre-periphery 
relations. 
Terminology 
 Before moving on to the chapter summaries, the following terms and 
their definitions need to be taken into account, in order to understand the context 
in which I use them. 
Social stratum/strata denote different social layers existing within a society. 
Within my research, I use this term in order to name different social groups 
(depending on their occupational categories). Therefore, I have used this term 
from the perspective of Max Weber, who denotes that social stratifications are 
not a matter of class or political position but they are based on status.  Within 
this thesis, I define the different types of strata which include upper strata, 
intermediary strata, and lower strata.   
25 
 
Anatolia is a geographical term which comprises the mainland of Turkey. In 
geographical terms, except for İstanbul and three other provinces (namely 
Edirne, Kirklareli, Tekirdag), Turkey is situated in Anatolia. Within the thesis, I 
use this term in order to highlight the Anatolian cities which obtained high 
growth rates after economic developments of 1980s.    
Anatolian Capitalists (Anatolian Tigers/Devout Bourgeoisie/Islamist 
bourgeoisie/Islamic Calvinists)  are terms which are used in order to refer to 
the remarkable growth rates obtained by  small and medium enterprises,  situated  
in some specific Anatolian cities after the economic liberalization of 1980s  
(Demir, Toprak and Acar, 2007).  Within this thesis, I use the terms Anatolian 
capitalists and Anatolian capital, since there is a great deal of controversy in 
other terms e.g. bourgeoisie and also some of them are used by some media 
commentators e.g. Islamic Calvinists. 
Thesis Structure: Chapter Summaries 
 This thesis comprises five chapters, in addition to the introductory and 
concluding chapters. Chapter 1 seeks to answer my first research question on 
how the political conjuncture, up to 2002, influenced the emergence of the 
AKP in 2002. It commences with an exploration of Turkey’s historical and 
political background from 1923 onwards. In addition, through this 
exploration, it identifies the expression of key cleavages found within Turkish 
society (i.e. centre-periphery, state-religion, left-right, Kurdish-Turkish) 
through the different political parties which make up the Turkish party system. 
 Chapter 2 comprises a review of the literature, outlining the theories 
related to parties, party systems and approaches to voting behaviour, as well as 
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the incorporation of such theories by scholars into Turkish political scientific 
enquiry. In addition, it reviews the theories and approaches used to analyse 
Turkish Society, in order to highlight how the particular dynamics of Turkish 
society prevent a straightforward application of western theories to the Turkish 
context. Moreover, this chapter reviews recent country studies on Turkey and 
Turkish politics and specifically the AKP.  
 Chapter 3 explains my chosen methodology. I present my reasons for 
adopting a qualitative approach, and outline my epistemological position in 
relation to my research. This is followed by a presentation of my methods of 
data collection, which include in-depth, semi-structured interviews, archival 
research and the gathering of quantitative data produced by private polling 
agencies and state institute of statistics. I also discuss some of the problems of 
data collection encountered during the fieldwork, as well as the strategies I 
adopted to overcome the barriers.  
 Chapter 4 answers the research questions, which ask how changes in the 
structures of Turkish society explain the emergence and electoral success of the 
AKP. Chapter 4 is organized according to four main chronological periods 
(1923-1950; 1950-1960; 1961-1980 and 1980 to the present). Each period is 
characterized by the main economic programmes in place, societal changes and 
developments in the party system. In addition, I demonstrate how the emergence 
of intermediary strata since the 1980s, in Turkish society, contributed to the 
emergence of the AKP as an electoral force in 2002. I provide a detailed account 
of how different strata of Turkish society strengthen the social bases of the AKP.  
Moreover, I discuss how conjunctural events in the economy impacted the 
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AKP’s emergence in 2002.In so doing, I emphasize that the AKP did not come 
to power as a result of its Islamic discourse and/or Islamic roots, but because a 
newly formed audience was attracted to its pro-west agenda which appeared to 
sit comfortably with its moral framework inspired by Islam.  
 Besides, Chapter 5 focuses on the response of the AKP to its social base 
through its social policies and its rights-based political discourse. The AKP used 
social policies to address the needs of its social base when the economic 
developments failed to prove sufficient in covering their needs. This chapter 
therefore investigates the AKP’s policies relating to women and gender (e.g. 
equality policies in employment) and to health and welfare (e.g. increases in 
social benefits for disadvantaged groups; marketisation of the health system) in 
order to demonstrate how they contributed to the party’s political consolidation 
and entrenchment in Turkish society.  
 This chapter also examines the rights-based discourse of the AKP and 
how the AKP appealed to a broad range of ideological groups in society which 
in turn contributed to its electoral victory in the second legislative elections of 
2007. Following an analysis of the AKP’s political discourse, Chapter 5 
demonstrates how the Gülen Movement in particular has contributed to the 
AKP’s success and at the same time infiltrated the state bureaucracy.
 Finally, this chapter answers one of the key research questions of this 
thesis relating to the consolidated AKP’s counter-impact on Turkish society and 
the Turkish party system in the long-term. 
 To conclude, my analysis of the AKP may be seen as original, since I did 
not consider the AKP from one single perspective; rather, I looked at its 
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emergence and consolidation, as well as its counter-impact on society. Thus, the 
usage of multiple angles for analysis of the AKP lends originality to the thesis. 
Moreover, this thesis contributes to knowledge of Turkish politics, the party 
system and the AKP by demonstrating that the AKP emerged due to its promise 
for economic stability, rather than as an Islamist or religious discourse.  I also 
contributed to existing knowledge by demonstrating that  AKP’s consolidation 
occurred as a consequence of its social policies (e.g. health care; social 
assistance) targeting the lowest strata of society.  
 As a consequence, the originality of my thesis lies in its comprehensive 
treatment of the AKP by looking at factors which underpinned its emergence 
and its consolidation.  The analysis of AKP’s responses to Turkish society and 
the party system is a further original element. Such a dual analysis (emergence 
and feedback effect) is strengthened by the insights gained from the literature on 
Turkish politics and Turkish society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Acronyms 
 
AGİAD Anadolu Genç İş Adamları Derneği - Anatolian Young Businessmen 
Association 
AIHM   Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi - European Court of Human Rights 
AKP     Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party 
AM       Anayasa Mahkemesi - Constitutional Court 
ANAP   Anavatan Partisi - Motherland Party 
AP        Adalet Partisi - Justice Party (Est.14.10.1973 - Closure.16.10.1981) 
 
Bağ-Kur Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ile Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar 
Kurumu - Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Self-
Employed 
BDP       Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi - Peace and Democracy Party 
BP/TBP Birlik Partisi/Türkiye Birlik Partisi - Unity Party/Unity Party of Turkey  
    (Est.17.10.1966 - Closure.16.10.1981)  
BQ     Bloc Québécois - Quebec Bloc 
BTP       Büyük Türkiye Partisi - Great Turkey Party (Est.20.05.1983 -
Closure.30.05.1983) 
 
CDA       Christen Democratisch Appèl - Christian Democratic Appeal  
CDU       Christlich Demokratisch Union Deutschlands - Christian Democratic 
Union of Germany 
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
CGP       Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi - Republican Reliance Party 
(Est.29.01.1971 - Closure. 16.10.1981) 
CHP      Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People’s Party (Est.09.09.1923 - 
Closure.16.10.1981; Est. 09.09.1992 - to the present) 
CKMP   Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi - Republican Peasants’ Nation Party 
(Est.16.10.1958 - Closure 09.02.1969) 
CMP     Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi - Republican Nationalist Party 
(Est.10.02.1954 - Closure.16.10.1958)  
CU         Christen Unie - Christian Union 
 
DC          Democrazia Cristiana - Christian Democracy 
DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi - Democratic People’s Party (Est.24.10.1997 - 
Closure.March 2003) 
Demokratik Parti Democratic Party (Est.18.12.1970 - Closure.04.05.1980) 
DİB        Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı - Presidency of Religious Affairs 
DİSK     Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of 
Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey 
DP          Democrat Parti - Democrat Party (Est.07.01.1946 - 
Closure.29.09.1960) 
DPT        Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı - State Planning Organization 
DSP        Demokratik Sol Parti - Democratic Left Party 
DTP        Demokratik Toplum Partisi - Democratic Society Party 
(Est.09.11.2005 - Closure.11.12.2009) 
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DYP       Doğruyol Partisi - True Path Party (Est.23.06.1983 -
Closure.28.05.2007) 
 
EC         European Community 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
EDP     Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi - Egality and Democracy Party 
ES        Emekli Sandığı - Government Employees Retirement Fund 
EU        European Union 
 
FP        Fazilet Partisi - Virtue Party (Est.07.12.1997 -  Closure.22.06.2001) 
FGM Fethullah Gülen Movement 
 
GP/CGP Güven Partisi - Reliance Party (Est.12.05.1967 - Closure.29.01.1971) 
GATT General Aggreement of Tariffs and Trade 
GP       Genç Parti - Young Party 
 
GYV Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Derneği - Journalists and Writers’s Foundation 
 
HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi - People’s Democratic Party (Est.11.05.1994-
Closure.13.03.2003) 
HAK-İŞ Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Real 
Trade Unions 
HP         Hürriyet Partisi - Freedom Party (Est.20.12.1955 - Closure.24.11.1958) 
HP         Halkçı Parti - Populist Party (Est.20.05.1983 - Closure.17.08.1985) 
HSYK Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu - High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors 
 
ILO      International Labour Organization 
IMF      International Money Fund 
ISI        Import-Substitution Industrialization  
 
İSMEK İstanbul Büyükşehir Meslek ve Eğitim Kursları - İstanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality Vocational Training Courses 
İŞHAD İş Hayatı ve Dayanışma Derneği - Association for Solidarity in Business 
Life 
İTO İstanbul Ticaret Odası  - İstanbul Chamber of Commerce 
 
KCK    Kürdistan Topluluklar Birliği - Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan 
KEİG   Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi- Women’s Labour and Employment 
KİT      Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsü - State Economic Enterprise  
KDV    Katma Değer Vergisi - Value Added Tax 
KPSS Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza - Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union 
KSGM Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for the Status 
and Problems of Women 
KYK Kredi ve Yurtlar Kurumu - Credit and Dormitories Foundation 
 
LDP Liberal Democrat Party (in Japan)  
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MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
MBK Milli Birlik Komitesi - National Unity Committee (Est.27.05.1960-
Closure.25.10.1961) 
MC   Milliyetçi Cephe - Nationalist Front 
MDP Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi - Nationalist Democracy Party 
(Est.16.05.1983-Closure.04.05.1986) 
MGK Milli Güvenlik Konseyi - National Security Council 
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - National Movement Party 
MİT Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı - National Intelligence Organization 
MNP Milli Nizam Partisi - National Order Party (Est.26.01.1970 - 
Closure.20.05.1971) 
MP Millet Partisi - Nation Party (Est.July 1948 - Closure.27.02.1954) 
MSP Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party (Est.11.10.1972-
Closure.16.10.1981) 
MÜSİAD Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği - Independent 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen's Association 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NP Nasionale Party - National Party (in South Africa)  
 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHAL Olağanüstü Hal - State of Emergency 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers’ Party  
PNV Partido Nationalista Vasco - Basque Nationalist Party (in Spain) 
PR     Proportional Representation 
 
RP Refah Partisi - Welfare Party (Est.19.07.1983 - Closure.16.01.1998) 
RTÜK Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - Radio Television Supreme Council  
 
SCP Serbest Cumhuriyetçi Fırka - Liberal Republican Party (Est.12.08.1930 - 
Closure.17.11.1930) 
SETA Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı - Foundation for 
Political, Economic and Social Research 
SGK Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu - Social Security Institution 
SHP Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti - Social Democratic Populist Party 
(Est.03.11.1985 - Closure.18.02.1995) 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
SNP Scottish National Party   
SODEP Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi - Social Democracy Party (Est.06.06.1983 - 
Closure.03.11.1984 
SODEV Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı - Social Democracy Foundation 
SP     Saadet Partisi - Felicity Party  
SPK Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu - Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
SSK Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - Social Insurance Institute 
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SYDTF Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Teşvik Fonu - Social Solidarity 
Fund 
SYDV Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı - Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Foundation 
SYGM Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for 
Social Assistance and Solidarity 
 
TBMM   Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - Grand National Assembly of Turkey  
TCF       Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Fırka - Progressive Republican Party 
(Est.17.11.1924 - Closure.03.06.1925) 
TEB       Türk Ekonomi Bankası -Turkish Economy Bank 
TEPAV Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı - Economic Policy 
Research Foundation of Turkey 
TESEV Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı - Turkish Economic and 
Social Studies Foundation 
TİP       Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkey’s Workers’ Party  
(Est.13.02.1961 - Closure.21.07.1971; Second Establishment.1975 - 
Closure.16.10.1981) 
TOBB Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği - Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey 
TRT Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu - Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation 
TTB Türk Tabipleri Birliği - Turkish Medical Association 
TUSKON Türkiye İş Adamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Turkish 
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists 
TÜRK-İŞ Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish 
Trade Unions 
TÜSİAD Türk Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği - Turkish Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association 
TÜİK/TUIK Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu -Turkish Statistical Institute 
 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
 
YÖK Yükseköğretim Kurulu - Council of Higher Education  
YDP Yeniden Doğuş Partisi - Rebirth Party   
YTP Yeni Türkiye Partisi - New Turkey Party 
 
WB World Bank 
WTO World Trade Organization 
WWHR Women for Women’s Human Rights 
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Glossary  
 
Abant Platform: The Abant Platform was established in order to discuss 
dogmatic issues which have not been discussed in Turkish political life. 
Throughout this platform, the main principle is based on the democracy’s 
strengthening throughout “differences being in dialogue”.Throughout this Abant 
platform, various workshops are being organized in order to discuss various 
topics such as the Kurdish problem, Islam and Secularism, military coups (Gülen 
movement, 2009). 
Adil Düzen:  The “Just Order” program was the state-centred Islamic project 
which intended to establish a powerful state and extensive welfare programme 
(Yavuz, 2003, p.24 and p.221). 
Adil: Just, egalitarian 
Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları:  Family and Guidance Offices  
Alevi: Alevi belief whose membership was determined by descent which was 
known formerly as Bektaşi and Kızılbaş. Alevi belief combines Anatolian folk 
Shi’ism with Sufi elements of the Bektaşi sect. They represent 15% to 20% of 
Turkey’s population. However, the Alevi cemaat is ethnically diverse: Turkish, 
8-9 millions; Kurdish, 2-3 millions; and Zaza Alevi-Dersimli, 1 million.  
Atatürkçülük: same as Kemalism 
Aydınlar Ocağı: Intellectuals Hearth. 
 
Bag Law/Bag Bill: amending several laws at the same time. 
Balyoz Harekatı - Sledgehammer coup plan: It is the name of an alleged Turkish 
secularist military coup plan in order to overthrown the elected government of 
Turkey (in 2003) (Bal, 2010).  
Başak Sanat Vakfı - Başak Culture and Art Foundation: “It aims to carry out 
various activities to discover, support and promote artistic abilities of poor 
and/or low-paid young people and to eliminate difficulties they face in building 
their personal capacity. It is also aimed at orienting young people to be more 
productive in taking part in the social life as healthy individuals and engaging in 
scientific research in the field of culture and art” (Başak Sanat Vakfı, 2011). 
Başbabanlık: Prime Ministery 
 
Cemaat: Congregation or assembly usually of a religious community. 
Cemevleri: Alevi places of worship  
Cumhuriyet Mitingleri: Republican Rallies  
 
Danıştay:  The Council of the State 
Derin Devlet - Deep-State: “The deep state is Turkish shorthand for a faceless 
faction inside the Turkish state that has, some claim, held the reins of real power 
throughout the republic's 84-year history. The deep state is held to be based in 
the army, but closely linked with MIT (the national intelligence service), the 
judiciary, and (since the 1960s) the mafia” (Freely, 2007). 
 
Ergenekon case: Allegedly, Ergenekon is the name of a criminal “deep-state” 
organization with connections to state security structures and the army. In the 
indictment drawn up by the state prosecutor, this organization was accused of 
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being involved in political crimes, murders and conspiracies with the aim to 
destabilize the AKP government (Jenkins, 2009, p.10). 
Force migration is a term which is used to explain “anyone who is internally 
displaced or who is forced to leave his/her place of settlement, a new life is an 
“obligation” ” (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6).  The forced migration also emphasizes 
that internal displacement occurring due to concerns for national security in 
Turkey thereby it was more than an obligatory displacement; it was a 
displacement by use of force (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6). 
 
Gecekondu: Squatter house established without proper permissions 
Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı: Chief of Staff of the Republic of Turkey 
Green Card: Green Cards are health care entitlements are issued to Turkish 
citizens who are not unable to pay for their health services. In order to be 
entitled to the green card, they have to declare their revenues in a detailed way 
(Kısa and Younis, 2006, p.766). 
Grey Wolves: Youth groups of the extreme nationalist party. 
Gülen Hareketi: Fethullah Gülen Movement 
 
Hak ve Özgürlükler: Fundamental rights and freedoms 
Halk Evleri: “People’s Houses were initially local educational establishments for 
disseminating Kemalist message in provincial towns” (Zürcher, 2003b, p.233). It 
was closed down many times in 1950, 1980. Currently, instead of a Kemalist 
message, the Halk Evleri has a more socialist approach advocating people’s 
social rights (such as rights for housing, education; health; woman; disabled; 
environment and labour rights) (Halk Evleri, 2011). 
Hatip: Orator; in Islam a preacher/imam who delivers the Friday sermon 
 
İmam: Prayer leader in Islam. 
İmam Hatip Lisesi - Imam Hatip High Schools: In Turkey a secondary education 
institution where a government employed imam or hatip is trained.  Originally 
they were founded to raise hatips. 
İş-Kur: Turkish Employment Agency 
İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik Reformu: Social Security Reform 
 
Kemalist: Being a follower of Mustafa Kemal’s ideology.  His ideology was 
based on republicanism; populism; secularity; revolutionism; nationalism and 
statism.   
Kemalizm/Kemalism: The Republic of Turkey was established under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After the establishment of the Republic, 
again under his leadership, many reforms regarding modernization and 
secularization of the state were adopted. The establishment of Republic and 
reforms were based on six fundamental principles (which are republicanism; 
populism; laicism; revolutionism; nationalism and statism). Later on, these six 
principles were considered as pillars of the Kemalism (Akşin, 1999, pp.3-7). 
Köy Enstitüleri - Village Institutes: Schools that existed between 1945 and1954 
in Turkey.  They were established in the framework of a rural development 
project and served as co-educational boarding schools. 
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Medrese: theological school attached to a mosque. Medreses were closed down 
and  the  education became uniform under guidance of the Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education) based on the Tevhid-i Tedrisat 
Kanunu (Law of Uniform Education) of 3
th
 March 1924. This was one of the 
main reforms and aimed at fight against illiteracy and education of the nation. 
Milli Görüş: National Vision. The Milli Görüş was the ideological stance of the 
MSP, and was expressed as an ideology, which was developed by those 
advocating independence from the West and focus on economic development 
with a moral emphasis referring to Islam (Mert, 2007, p.108). 
Mürit: follower of a sect/an order. 
 
Nakşibendi: Nakşibendi Order belongs to the Sufi tradition of Islam. This 
tradition focuses on the disciplining the appetite (nefs) by educating the believer 
about the nature and function of the different faculties of the soul, from the 
sensual to the spiritual. Its roots came from Turkistan where the founder of the 
order Bahaeddin Nakşibend of Turkistan was born (1490).  
At the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, the order became the most 
large and influential Islamic order. During the war of Independence, it had a 
great impact on the mobilization of people. However, during the modernization 
period, the Republican elites closed these Sufi lodges. Their closure enhanced 
the radical side of the order and they became rebellious: (Şeyh Said) Sheik Said 
rebellion (1924) and Menemen rebellion (1930).  
Nakşibendi İskenderpaşa cemaati: It is İskenderpaşa branch of Nakşibendi 
Order. 
Net migration rate: Difference between the numbers of immigrants and 
emigrants at the midterm of a time interval (usually annual) per thousand 
inhabitants. 
Nur (Light) Mouvement: It aims to move from an oral-based tradition to one of 
print culture. 
Nurcu (or in plural Nurcular): The number of adherents of the Nur movement.   
 
Parti teşkilatı: party organization  
Positive list defines drugs that are reimbursed by public funds (positive list) 
(Nguyen-Kim et al., 2005). 
Post-modern coup d’état”: In Turkey, it is used as a memorandum given by the 
military to a ruling government to denote its do’s and don’ts.  The military 
claims that this is a legal right given to it by the legislature after the 1982 
Constitution (Demir, 2007; Washington Times, 2005). 
 
Said-i Nursi: (1876-1960) Said-i Nursi is a Muslim Sunni theologian who 
stressed the importance of orthodox doctrine as well as the importance of 
science and technology (Shankland, 1999, p.199; Kurtz, 2005, p.373). 
Sosyal Yardımlar ve Primsiz Ödemeler Kanunu: Social Assistance and Welfare 
Payment Law  
Süleymancı: the Neo-Nakşibendi Sufi Order 
Sünni: Sunni  
 
Tam Gün Yasası: The full-time employment law. 
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Tarikat: Religious order; sect. 
Teşkilat: Organization. 
Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu: Law for initiating investments in industry. 
Tevekkül: Loyalty and resignation to God. 
Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu: see medrese. 
Türk-İslam Sentezi: Turkish Islam synthesis. 
 
Unconsecrated: all things which are not dedicated to as sacred purpose 
 
Vakıf: Religious/charitable foundation, usually created by an endowed trust fund 
 
Yargıtay:   The Supreme Court 
Yeni Teşvik Yasası ve Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi: New Enhancement Law and 
National Employment Strategy 
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Chapter 1 Historical and Political Background in Turkey 
1.1 Introduction  
 This chapter aims to answer one of my proposed research questions in 
terms of how far the political conjuncture of the early 2000s helped the AKP 
to succeed electorally on 13
th
 November 2002. First, in order to answer this 
research question, I consider the changes in the political party system since 
the establishment of Republic of Turkey, 1923. From a chronological 
perspective, it is evident that the party system has been significantly impacted 
by three military interventions that took place in 1960 (27
th
 May), 1971 (12
th
 
March) and 1980 (12
th
 September) respectively, causing rupture to the system. 
There were also dominant party systems and coalition governments that 
affected the party system. Therefore, I have analysed 1992-2002 as a separate 
period, due to the predominance of coalition governments. 
 Second, the historical changes within party system have been fed by 
the existing cleavage structures, which are mainly related to centre and 
periphery. Within my research, I am interested in a political party leaning 
towards Islam and its impact on the Turkish party system. For this reason, the 
focus on the cleavage structure, especially that which is based on religiosity 
(see discussion of church-state cleavage in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.2) has 
helped to provide a sociological understanding of the evolution of the Turkish 
party system by investigating these cleavages (e.g. Islamist - secularist). 
 Through this historical approach and cleavage-structure model, this 
background chapter aims to provide an understanding of how the Turkish 
political party system has evolved in line with the transformation of cleavage 
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structure and how these developments have impacted on the formation of pro-
Islamic parties, and particularly the emergence of the AKP in 2002. 
1.2 The Single-Party Regime: 1923 - 1946  
 After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the single-
party regime was administrated by the political party called the CHP 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People’s Party). The CHP, as the 
single party governing the young republic, was responsible for formulating its 
principles that were compiled under the concept of Kemalism.
2
 The CHP’s 
main plan was to create a modern and secular nation while adopting Western 
political norms. The founder of the party was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Since 
this period, the CHP has considered itself the founder and defender of the 
Republic and Republican values. 
 During the first decades of the single-party regime, many reforms for 
the sake of modernization were implemented, such as the adoption of the 
Latin alphabet; a change in call to prayer from Arabic to Turkish; adoption of 
the Christian calendar; integration of religious schools into the National 
Education System (Burdy and Marcou, 1995, p.13). In addition, 
modernization included the promotion of the political and the social status of 
women
3
 (Ahmad, 1993, p.89).  
                                                     
2
 Kemalism: The Republic of Turkey was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. After the establishment of the Republic, again under his leadership, many reforms 
regarding modernization and secularization of the state were adopted. The establishment of 
Republic and reforms were based on six fundamental principles (which are republicanism; 
populism; laicism; revolutionism; nationalism and statism). Later on, these six principles were 
considered as pillars of the Kemalism (Akşin, 1999, pp.3-7). 
http://www.unaturkey.org/dergiler-bulletins/38-say-02-number-02-october-1999-/58-the-nature-
of-the-kemalist-revolution-.pdf 
3
 Women obtained the vote and equal citizenship during the period 1930-1934 (Çavdar, 2008a, 
pp. 368-369).  
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 Furthermore, religion was strictly separated from the state affairs in 
1937 and placed under the control of the secular state (Berkeş, 1998, p.19). 
This constitutional principle of state secularity in Turkey has existed until 
today, and remains indisputable. Due to strict secular rules and praxis 
implemented within the single-party regime, religious activities continued to 
be undertaken in a silent and submerged manner (Yavuz, 2005, p.88).  
 During this period, the regime was administrated by the CHP. 
Nevertheless, there were two attempts, in 1924 and 1930 respectively, to shift 
to a multiparty system. First, in 1924, a party opposing the CHP, called the 
TCF (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Progressive Republican Party), was 
established. Following its establishment, the groups which were against 
modernization attempts, state-controlled religion and exclusive emphasis on 
Turkish as the national language formed the social bases of the TCF. As the 
TCF provoked both religious and Kurdish rebels (especially from the 
Nakşibendi sect) who threatened national unity and secularization attempts, 
the party was closed down within six months of its establishment (Yavuz, 
2005, p.79). As compared to the CHP’s programme, the TCF advocated 
liberal economy and religious values and assumed a distant stance with regard 
to the republic (Zürcher, 2003, p.148). 
 Later in 1930, another oppositional party called the SCF (Serbest 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Liberal Republican Party) was established. The 
increasing economic burden due to the 1929 economic depression, together 
with increasing opposition against the CHP, favoured the establishment of the 
SCF which advocated liberalism in terms of ideology and right-wing political 
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ideology in terms of party position. However, the SCF increased the self-
confidence and audacity of radical Muslims who supported it as a means of 
expressing their discontent with the CHP’s modernization and secularisation 
programmes.   Indeed, following the establishment of the SCF, the Radical 
Muslims under the leadership of a Nakşibendi sheikh dared to kill a young 
reserve officer, who had the mission to suppress their fundamentalist revolt. 
Immediately after this event, the party was closed. Moreover, this event 
demonstrated that the new state ideology and reforms were not yet sufficiently 
incorporated into society and the fundamentalist circles were looking for an 
opportunity to challenge the young republic (Yavuz, 2005, p.80; Lewis, 2006, 
p.474; Mardin, 2007, pp.178-179). 
 Furthermore, the events of the early Republican era reflect the initial 
cleavages within Turkish politics and society. The first cleavage is based on 
the division between religious circles and the secularist state and the second 
one is based on the Unitarian state and ethnically distinct groups (mostly 
Kurdish people). Since the Republican era, these cleavages have impacted on 
the development of the political party system and they will be highlighted 
throughout this chapter. During the Republican era, the oppositional parties, 
such as the TCF and SCF reflected the non-secularist side of the cleavage 
whereas the CHP represented the secularist and Unitarian state. 
 During this single-party regime, the cleavages were not only 
exacerbated by secularisation and modernization, but also by the CHP’s 
economic policies. At the time of the establishment of the Republic, Turkey 
did not yet have a record of industrialization like that of the Western 
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countries, which had already accomplished their industrial revolutions in the 
19
th 
century. Turkey had, in addition, lost her capitalist class which used to be 
made up to a great extent of Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities 
(Mehmet, 1998, p.129). 
 Therefore, during the history of the early Republic, that is, from 1923 
until early 1980s, the Turkish nation-state tried to create its own capitalist 
class through state-driven policies. The CHP’s state-driven policies were 
approved neither by the TCF, nor by the SCF that advocated economic 
liberalism.  
 Furthermore, the state-driven policies of the CHP were impacted by 
the Second World War period. During the War, Turkey had to maintain a big 
army in case of any war threats (Sever, 1997, p.47). Austerity measures taken 
during war time negatively influenced all the social groups from big land 
owners or industrialists down to farmers and industrial workers (Pamuk, 2009, 
p.189). 
At the beginning of the Republic, the interests of the bureaucrats and 
commercial classes coincided. After a certain point, especially after the end of 
the war, the intersection of their interests broke down. The commercial classes 
realized that the bureaucratic intervention had to be eliminated in order to 
implement more efficient economic policies (Özbudun, 2000, p.20). The 
commercial classes wanted a different political voice from the CHP for 
implementing the economic policies that they favoured. 
 In addition to the increasing opposition from the side of commercial 
classes, another development seemed to make change more urgent. After the 
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Second World War, which favoured multi-partyism, the CHP government had 
started initiatives for Turkey’s membership of the NATO4 (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization) which required that Turkey adopt a Western-style multi-
party democracy (Özbudun, 2000, p.20). Consequently, the government 
allowed for the establishment of a multi-party system (Özbudun, 2000, p.19). 
 The multi-party system was inaugurated in 1946, and this was 
followed by the first competitive legislative elections in the history of Turkish 
political parties, giving the DP (Demokrat Parti - Democrat Party) 62 
parliamentary seats out of 467. However, open voting and a secret grading 
system used in these elections caused big tensions and became a source of 
political dispute in the following years (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.13-14). The period 
1946-1950 may be considered as a transitional period to the democratic 
political system. A liberal and moderate group within the CHP that came to 
power during this period changed the electoral law by adopting secret ballot 
and open grading system (Çavdar 2008b, pp.14-15). At the end, this 
transitional period resulted in the electoral victory of the Democrat Party in 
1950 (Özbudun, 2000, p.17). In the 1950’s elections that were held on 14th 
May 1950, the CHP got only 39.9% and the DP in turn got 53.3% of the votes 
(Özbudun, 2000, p.75).   
        In summary, the one-party era (1923 - 1950) was characterized by the 
efforts of the CHP as the government party to implement radical reforms for 
the modernization of the country and to consolidate the established unitary 
and secular nation state. These efforts were approved by the majority of the 
                                                     
4
 Turkey joined NATO in 1952 (Sever, 1997, p.99). 
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population, but opposed by the religious and ethnic circles. These oppositions 
resulted in divisions in society that corresponded to the two classical 
cleavages that are associated with the creation of nation states: centre-
periphery and church-state cleavages. In addition to these cleavages, a 
division of statism versus liberalism also emerged in terms of the adopted 
economic policies.  
1.3 The Two-Party System: 1950 - 1960 
 Thus, in 1950 a political party other than the CHP came to power for 
the first time in the Republican history; and this occurred only four years after 
the establishment of the multi-party system. When the results of the elections 
of the following decade (1950-1960) are taken into account, the presence of a 
predominantly two-party system is observed since the third parties
5
 did not 
attain sufficient power to exert influence on the legislative or electoral 
developments (Sayarı, 2002, p.11).  Therefore, it is more reasonable to name 
this decade a two party-system period. 
 The DP’s programme was similar to those of previous parties such as 
the TCF and the SCF that advocated liberalism and right-wing ideology. 
Hence, the existing cleavages continued, and during the two-party system era; 
however, they now found expression in political parties such as the CHP and 
the DP within the party system. Both religious groups
6
 (the Nakşibendi; the 
                                                     
5 
1950 Elections: DP: 53.3% (408 deputies); CHP: 39.9% (69 deputies); MP (Millet Partisi - 
Nation Party) and Independents: 4.8% (1 deputy)  (Çavdar, 2008b, p.20) 
1954 Elections: DP (490 deputies); CHP (30 deputies); CMP (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi - 
Republican Nation Party) (5 deputies) and Independents (2 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.48) 
1957 Elections: DP (424 deputies); CHP (178 deputies); CMP (4 deputies) and HP (Hürriyet 
Partisi - Liberty Party) (4 deputies) ((Çavdar, 2008b, p.69) 
6
 Religious groups: the followers of both the Nur movement (followers of religious leader 
called Said-i Nursi) and the followers of Nakşibendi Tarikat (brotherhood) (Yavuz, 2003, 
p.152; Yavuz, 2003, p.133-134). 
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Nurcu groups) and Kurdish groups (the aşirets7) found the opportunity to 
express themselves within the DP. The DP not only attracted those peripheral 
groups but also urban business interests because of its promises of liberal 
economic policies. Therefore, the CHP continued to reflect the centralist and 
authoritarian nation state, whereas the DP became the voice of both the 
periphery and urban business. 
 Due to its diverse social base, the DP implemented multifaceted 
policies; on the one hand, it targeted urban businesses through mechanisms 
enhancing entrepreneurship (Buğra, 2010, p.177). On the other hand, the DP 
tried to please its peripheral social base. Therefore, strict secular rules became 
looser to an extent and Islam more visible. The change in the call to prayer 
from Turkish to Arabic; the tolerance for Said-i Nursi
8
 and permission to 
publish his banned works illustrate this fact (Yavuz, 2003, p. 61; Mert, 2007, 
p.40; Voll, 1999, p.246). By properly addressing the needs and anticipations 
of its social base, the DP obtained a great victory in both the 1954 and 1957 
parliamentary elections (Sayarı, 2002, p.11). 
 In addition, the DP attempted to keep in line with the secular state and 
the military forces in order to secure its regime. Two cases exemplified this 
fact. First, in 1959, the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not allow the 
entombment of a prominent Nakşibendi sheikh in the garden of the Fatih 
mosque in İstanbul. Second, the DP government did not give to religious 
leader Said-i Nursi, freedom of entry to Ankara in fear of a very strong 
reaction from the secular state (Yavuz, 2005, p.91). 
                                                     
7
 Aşiret: big tribal owners especially Kurdish  
8
 Said-i Nursi is a religious leader who stressed the importance of orthodox doctrine as well as 
the importance of science and technology (Shankland, 1999, p.199; Kurtz, 2005, p.373).  
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 Despite such attempts of keeping in compliance with the secular state, 
the intervention of the military forces was not prevented in 1960. The DP was 
closed down due to its anti-secular activities that were considered as a threat 
to the Republic (Yavuz, 2005, p.91; Mardin, 2003, p.218; Özbudun, 2000, 
p.31). 
 The reason behind the overthrow of the DP was not only due to its 
closeness to religious circles, but also due to the urban industrialists’ and 
organized working class’s dissatisfaction with the DP. The industrialists were 
discontent with the incoherent policies that resulted in budget deficit and high 
inflation. Therefore, they asked for more planning in the economy. On the 
other hand, in the late 1950s, the organized working class was badly affected 
by high inflation and deprived of any right to strike and to express their 
discontent with the DP. As a result, the urban industrialists and working class, 
together with the civil and military bureaucratic groups, cooperated to form an 
urban coalition of resistance (Sunar, 2004, p.126; Özbudun, 2000, p.32).  
 Following the coup d’état of 1960, members of the DP were 
prosecuted and the Prime Minister and two ministers of the DP government 
sentenced to death at the Military Court (Yavuz, 2005, p.93). 
 From 1960 until the mid-2000s, military interventions and memoranda 
(1971; 1980 and 1997) impacted on the development of the political party 
system in Turkey. After the military intervention of 1960, the military 
declared Kemalism as its main ideology. Therefore, it found the legitimacy to 
intervene into the parliamentary system, in case of a likely threat to the secular 
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and Unitarian Turkish state from the side of Islamic revival, ethnic conflict or 
any political turmoil (Yavuz, 2005, p.94).  
1.4 Fragmentation of the Multi-party System between the Military 
Intervention of 1960 and Memorandum of 1971 
 The period 1960-1971 was characterized by the constitution that was 
adopted after the military intervention of 1960. The new constitution’s 
democratic elements drastically influenced the party system of this decade 
(Sayarı, 2002, p.12). In addition to the constitutional change, the electoral 
system which used to be based on plurality formula was revised. After its 
revision, the proportional representation (PR) was adopted (Kalaycıoğlu, 
2002, p.59). As a result of the electoral revision, the elections of 1961 had a 
more representative side than in the previous decade. Therefore, this period 
can be considered as a genuine multi-party system since the third parties
9
 
began to be more effective within the political party system.  
 The military intervention of 1960 had resulted in the closure of the DP. 
Nevertheless, some of the members of the DP gathered and established the AP 
(Adalet Partisi - Justice Party) which carried the legacy of the DP (Mardin, 
2007, p.123). The first elections of this period were held in 1961, and the AP 
                                                     
9
 Increase in the number of parties: 
1961: AP (Adalet Partisi - Justice Party) (158 deputies); CHP (173 deputies); CKMB 
(Cumhuriyet Köylü Millet Parti - Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (54 deputies) and YTP 
(Yeni Türkiye Partisi - New Turkey Party) (65 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.114) 
1965: AP (240 deputies); CHP (134 deputies); CKMP (11 deputies); MP  (Millet Partisi - 
Nation Party) (31 deputies); TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkey’s Workers’ Party) (14 
deputies); YTP (19 deputies) and Independent deputies  (1 deputy)  (Çavdar, 2008b,  p.152) 
1969: AP (256 deputies); CHP (143 deputies); BP (Birlik Partisi - Unity Party) (8 deputies): 
CGP (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi - Republican Reliance  Party) (15 deputies); MP (6 
deputies); MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - Nationalist Movement Party) (1 deputy); TIP 
(2 deputies); YTP (6 deputies) and Independent deputies (3 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, 
p.160) 
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took an important share of the vote even though the CHP became the majority 
party of the elections (Sunar, 2004, p.114). The CHP got 36.7%, whereas the 
AP gained 34.8% of the total votes. 
One of the first reasons behind the AP’s high percentage of votes in 
the first elections after the military intervention was that the envisioned 
coalition between the army and urban industrialists for the post-coup d’état 
period did not happen, in spite of favourable conditions. In this context, as 
soon as the party system resumed its usual situation in 1961, the clientelist-
populist AP managed to build an alliance with the urban business and rural 
middle classes and to emerge as the dominant governing party of the Second 
Republic
10
 (Buğra, 2010, p.192; Sunar, 2004, p.128) 
 Despite all its attempts to eradicate the DP, the military faced, with the 
rise of the AP, a popular reaction to its intervention of 1960. Even though 
many people were discontent with the setbacks of the socio-economic policies 
of the DP government that had followed an increasingly suppressive course in 
the later stages of its tenure, the majority of the society did not approve the 
intervention and the trial process of the DP members. Therefore, the AP’s 
votes were to a great extent due to the electoral base’s reaction towards the 
hegemony of the bureaucracy-military coalition (Yavuz, 2005, p.95).  
 The 1960s were characterized by constitutional change.  The military 
intervention, which was launched by the MBK (Milli Birlik Komitesi - 
                                                     
10
 The second republic was the period which started after the 1960 military interventions and 
finished as a result of the military intervention of 1980 (Zürcher, 2008, p.351). 
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National Unity Council),
11
 introduced a new constitution in order to limit any 
government’s attempts to push for a radical societal transformation and to 
ensure basic rights and freedoms (Sunar and Toprak, 2004, p.110). In 
addition, these new guarantees provided a freer atmosphere for both social 
organizations and political parties (Yavuz, 2005, p.95).  
 Furthermore, this constitutional reform influenced the development of 
social cleavages and their translation into the party system. When this period 
is taken into account in terms of cleavages, the main cleavage between the 
nation-state and the peripheral forces continued to translate into the party 
system in terms of the opposition the CHP-AP duality. As with the DP, the AP 
took a stance against the Republican period and the modernization process. In 
addition, its discourse on identity referred to religious and historical motifs 
through right-wing nationalism, as opposed to the CHP’s emphasis on secular 
national values (Mert, 2007, p.25).  
 Nonetheless, this existing cleavage’s translation into the party system 
did not continue in the same way during the second half of 1960s, since the 
amended constitution permitted the development of new cleavages and thus to 
emergence of new political parties. The emergence of the extreme-right 
parties (nationalist and religious) in this period was due to this liberal 
constitution, but, in part, also to the anti-communist stance of the state
12
 
(Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p.164; Criss, 2002, p.482). As the subject of my 
                                                     
11
 The MBK comprised 38 top officers and their leader was the General Cemal Gürsel. They 
were responsible for the intervention. It functioned as the governing body until the elections of 
1961(Çavdar, 2008b, p. 85). 
12
 As a result of Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952, Turkey took an anti-communist stance 
(Sever, 1997, p.99 ; Criss, 2002, p.473 and p.482). 
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thesis is the Islamic-leaning AKP, I will focus on the pro-Islamic political 
parties rather than nationalist parties in this chapter.  
 Previously, the religious circles used to translate their political 
expression into the DP and the AP. However, now in this relatively liberal 
political environment, the religious circles attempted to establish their own 
party. Erbakan, a former professor of engineering, assumed the task to 
accomplish this deed. As a member of the AP and, at the same time, of the 
Nakşibendi İskenderpaşa cemaati, Erbakan used to oppose the AP’s economic 
policies that involved only urban and big industrialists and ignored small-
sized firms (Ahmad, 1993, p.144). 
 Because of his opposition, the AP did not allow him to become the 
president of the TOBB (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği - Union of 
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey),
 despite Erbakan’s success 
in the presidency’s elections and the support of provincial entrepreneurs for 
him (Teazis, 2011, p.11). This incident prompted him to break up with the AP. 
Subsequently, encouraged by the leader of the İskenderpaşa cemaati, he 
published the ideology of Milli Görüş13 (National View) and founded the 
Islamist group of the same name in 1969, and established the MNP (Milli 
Nizam Partisi
  
-  National Order Party) in 1970 (Yavuz, 2005, p.281). Initially, 
the MNP did not obtain the chance to be represented at the parliamentary 
level, but it is worth mentioning that it was the very first political party with a 
pro-Islamist agenda in the history of Turkish party system. In addition to the 
Nakşibendi community’s support for the MNP, the Nur community also 
                                                     
13
 The Milli Görüş was the ideological stance of the MSP, and was expressed as an ideology, 
which was developed by those advocating independence from the West and focus on economic 
development with a moral emphasis referring to Islam (Mert, 2007, p.108). 
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initially supported the MNP. Nevertheless, the MNP and the Nur community 
fell out and the latter continued to support the AP (Sunar and Toprak, 1983, 
p.170; Yavuz, 2005, p.55).   
 The liberal constitution of 1961 not only helped the burgeoning 
nationalist and Islamic political parties, but influenced the development of 
left-wing political parties (Kongar, 2011, p.630). The socio-economic 
dynamics since 1950s such as agricultural mechanization, employment 
opportunities in the cities and the rural exodus had influenced the creation of 
an urban labour class. Nonetheless, this labour class had been unable to 
express itself politically, especially during the late 1950s since it had been 
deprived of the right to strike, to demonstrate and any other means of 
organized expression of resistance during the DP government (Sunar, 2004, 
p.127). As in the case of the formation of the MNP, this liberal atmosphere of 
the 1960s resulted in the institutionalization of the trade union, labour 
organizations and associations. 
The establishment of the left-wing organizations subsequently gave 
rise to the formation of the TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkey’s Workers 
Party) in 1961 and its electoral success in 1964.  For the first time in the 
Turkish political party history, a socialist party was represented in parliament.  
 In addition, during the development of both new right-wing parties and 
left-wing parties, their grassroots organizations were remarkably active. From 
time to time, there were clashes between left and right ideological groups 
which resulted in fights and demonstrations in streets, in particular after the 
eruption of the 1968 student riots. In the late 1960s, this social and political 
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agitation continued with an increasing intensity.  The strong anti-communist 
stance of right ideological groups was based on the perception of communism 
as atheism and a great threat to the state.  In the same period, the AP came to 
government after succeeding in both elections of 1965 and 1969. In the early 
1970s, the AP could no longer deal with the worsening social agitation. 
Consequently, in 1971, the military issued a memorandum accusing the 
government of not establishing law and order in the country. 
 As a result of this memorandum, law and order were established 
through a “non-partisan government of technocrats” led by a “neutral” prime 
minister who had been advised by the military to resign beforehand from his 
party, the CHP (Özbudun, 2000, p.33). This government remained in office 
until 1973 without suspending parliament (Criss, 2002, p.480; Özbudun, 2000, 
p.33). As the new government adopted an oppressive approach against the 
left-wing groups, parties and organizations, the government received support 
from extreme right parties (Ahmad, 1993, p.149). Due to the anti-left 
approach of the new government, the left-wing TIP was dissolved. The MNP 
was also dissolved according to the Law on the Organization of Political 
Parties which prohibited the usage of religion for political aims (Sunar and 
Toprak, 1983, p.165). 
            In summary, the 1960s, aside from the last few years, and the student 
riots of 1968, were relatively calm. There were not yet too many open 
confrontations, and not at the level of violence that was to be observed in the 
following decade. Economy that thrived throughout the decade also accounted 
for the somewhat politically stable situation.  
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  The constitution of 1961 enabled the emergence of a democratic 
environment in Turkey. This gave rise to the establishment of parties that also 
found accession to parliamentary representation. The traditional parties, the 
AP and the CHP, continued to dominate the parliament. However, the political 
spectrum was expanded so as to include the left and right extreme parties. 
Consequently, the left-right cleavage that now emerged provoked left-right 
conflict. The church-state cleavage, in turn, received a new dimension with 
the establishment of the first Islamist party in Turkey.   
1.5 Continued Fragmentation and the Beginning of Coalition Governments 
between 1973 and 1980 
             The period between 1973 and 1980 differed in many ways from the 
1960s. It was characterized by both international
14
 and domestic crises, which as 
serious challenges, constrained the governments that took office in these years. 
To begin with, these coalition governments had their own intrinsic problems, but 
they also had to deal with severe economic and political crises.  Moreover, the 
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 The international conjuncture, in turn, produced two main challenges. First, the 1973 oil crisis 
broke out as the Arab members of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
proclaimed an oil embargo as a reaction to the US aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War 
(Richards and Waterbury, 1996, p.58; Yavuz, 2005, p.285).  
This decision resulted subsequently in exuberant increases in oil prices that brought the 
economical progress in Turkey as an oil importing country to an abrupt halt. A huge deficit in 
the balance of payments gave rise to the exhaustion of foreign currency reserves and ever 
increasing inflation rates. With the collapse of economy in 1977, the government was urged to 
ask for the IMF aid (Zürcher, 2008, pp.385-386).  
 A second aggravating international event was the Cyprus crisis that, as to be explained below, 
broke out in 1974 and resulted in the following years in Turkey’s diplomatic isolation and 
exposure to the US-imposed embargo of arms (Zürcher, 2008, pp.396-397). The Cyprus crisis 
increased Turkey’s expenditures enormously and worsened its economic crisis further. The 
economic crises were definitely one of the main reasons of the political destabilization (Ahmad, 
1993, pp. 175-177). 
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period was characterized by continuation, and even an increase of fragmentation 
within the party system.
15
  
 However, there was an important change. As a result of the 1973 
elections, the extreme-right wing parties (nationalist and Islamist parties) that 
emerged as the continuation of their predecessors of the late 1960s now began to 
be represented at the parliamentary level.  The abolished MNP was regrouped as 
the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party) in 1972 (Sunar and 
Toprak, 1983, p.165). Its ideological stance was formulated in the 
aforementioned Milli Görüş. 
 The TIP also ceased to exist after 1971. However, the TIP-initiated left-
wing movement continued under the CHP, which moved further to the left due 
to a change in both its leadership and ideology. The TIP’s dissolution and 
support for the CHP played an important role in increasing the latter’s votes. In 
addition, Kurdish and Alevi groups also supported the new CHP, due to its new 
centre left-wing ideology (Yavuz, 2005, pp.98-99; Ahmad, 1993, p.167). Thus, 
although the official discourse of the party was centre left-wing, it now entailed 
fractions that were further left. 
 The ideological change in the CHP, together with the emergence of new 
parties, reflected the expression of changing social cleavages within the party 
system. For example, the cleavages which used to exist between the state and 
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 1973 Elections: AP: 29.8%; CHP: 33.3%; DP (Demokratik Parti - Democratic Party): 11.9%; 
MHP: 3.4%; MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party): 11.8%; BP: 1.1% and 
Independents: 2.8% (Çavdar, 2008b, p.231). 
1977 Elections: AP: 36.9%; CHP: 41.4%; CGP: 1.9%; DP: 1.8%; MHP: 6.4%; MSP: 8.6% and 
Independents: 2.5% (Çavdar, 2008b, p.247). 
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periphery (religious and ethnic groups) took a new form in the polarized division 
between left and right (Zürcher, 2008, pp.380-381). 
 The existence of new parties and the ideological change of the CHP 
reflected the changing cleavages within society. The ethnically distinct groups 
(Kurds); non-Sunni religious sects (Alevis) and working class found the left 
ideology as a suitable approach to express their views on the prevailing political 
turmoil and social dynamics of the 1970s.  
 In the 1970s, this left-right cleavage translated into the party system with 
the MSP’s relative success as an Islamist party and with the CHP’s electoral 
success as a centre left-wing party. The elections of both 1973 and 1977 
favoured the AP (1973: 29.8% and 1977: 36.9%) and the CHP (1973: 33.3% and 
1977: 41.4%) (Çavdar, 2008, pp.210 and 231), the MSP obtained 11.8% of the 
votes and took its place in the parliament as a third party after the AP and the 
CHP (Ahmad, 1993, p.159). Despite the high electoral score of both the CHP 
and AP, neither of them obtained enough votes to form a majority government, 
and a coalition with the need for the assistance of small parties became an 
inevitable outcome. 
 As a result of inter-party negotiations, the CHP and the MSP established 
a coalition in 1974 (Yavuz, 2005, p.283) and an optimistic political atmosphere 
prevailed at the beginning of that year due to the initiation of a moderate 
programme of government
16
 (Ahmad, 1993, p.163). However, the positive 
political atmosphere created by the coalition government was undermined by the 
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 The programme included an amnesty for those who had previously been found guilty of 
political offences; the intelligentsia and the workers (Ahmad, 1993, p.163). 
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Turkish military intervention of Cyprus which took place in July 1974 following 
a coup in Cyprus that was promoted by the military junta in Greece. 
  Following the intervention, the CHP’s popularity increased significantly 
(Yavuz, 2005, pp.283-284). In contrast, the MSP neither support the 
intervention, nor approved of the CHP’s increasing popularity (Ahmad, 1993, 
p.167).  Consequently, it began to undermine the coalition by deliberately acting 
against it. Following the tensions with its coalition partner, the CHP tore up the 
coalition agreement as the party believed that its recent popularity could see the 
CHP win possible early elections (Çavdar, 2008b, p.242; Yavuz, 2005, pp.283-
284).  
 However, early elections did not favour the CHP as predicted. Instead, 
the AP scored well and established a coalition government of right-wing parties, 
which was called “First Nationalist Front” (Çavdar, 2008b, p.242). The 
predominant right-wing ideology of this government encouraged the armed 
aggression of extreme nationalists, and their attacks on Kurds and Alevis led to a 
severe increase in civil disturbances and street fights between left and right 
opponents. The main party of the coalition government, the AP, was unable to 
deal with the rising, violent ethnic and ideological massacres which resulted in 
the AP leader’s resignation and thereby in the legislative elections of 1977 
(Yavuz, 2005, pp.284-285).  
The legislative elections of 1977 took place under the shadow of violent 
events
17
  (Ahmad, 1993, p.169). Before the legislative election, a rapprochement 
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 These were initiated by some shots on the crowds and aggravated by the following harsh 
actions of the security forces during the Labour Day celebrations on 1
st
 May 1977. These events 
that were allegedly planned and executed by the Counter Guerrilla caused over 30 casualties 
(Ahmad, 1993, p.169). 
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occurred between the CHP and the labour union DISK (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Union). 
The CHP’s rapprochement with labour unions resulted in a significant increase 
in the votes of the CHP (41.4% of votes) and its rise as the first party again. 
Despite its success, the CHP did not get the overall majority, and could not 
establish a majority government on its own. This prompted the AP to launch the 
Second Nationalist Front which resulted in the penetration by nationalist groups 
into various ministries during the AP’s tenure. As in the case of the First 
Nationalist Front, the government’s predominantly right-wing ideology resulted 
in an enormous increase of armed assaults groups (Çavdar, 2008b, p.245).  
 Following the failure of the Second Front government, a new coalition 
government was established under the leadership of the CHP, and had the 
participation of the resigned deputies of the AP, independent deputies and 
deputies of two minor parties (Ahmad, 1993, pp.170-171; Özbudun, 2000, p. 
40). Once again, however, the CHP’s success in establishing coalition 
government was not enough to deal with the aggravated armed assaults and 
terrorist attacks organized by MHP-affiliated and other extreme-right groups. In 
particular, the political turmoil which provoked the Alevi-Sunni conflict and 
which resulted in hundreds killings of Alevis severely stranded the CHP 
government (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.248-249; Ahmad, 1993, pp.172-173). The Alevi-
Sunni
18
 divide thus emerged as a new political cleavage (Zürcher, 2008, pp.380-
381). 
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 The two communities were distant to each other throughout the history in Turkey. But 
atrocities on Alevis had almost only been committed by the state. However, as the Alevis 
assumed politically a left-orientated stance, they became the new target of the right-extreme 
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 The CHP, therefore, failed to repeat its electoral success in 1979s. The 
AP came out once again as the first party in the by-elections of 1979. Although 
the CHP put pressure on the AP to jointly establish a coalition government, the 
latter refused and instead preferred to form a minority government with the 
support of the MSP, thus remaining in power until the military intervention of 
1980 (Özbudun, 2000, p.40; Yavuz, 2005, p.285). The failure of the two to come 
to an agreement in the pending presidential election aggravated the existing 
political turmoil (Özbudun, 2000, pp.42-43).   This chaotic period in the Turkish 
political history ended with the military intervention of 12
th
 September 1980. 
           In summary, as mentioned in the introductory remarks of this section, the 
Turkish economy fell into deep crisis due to the international conjuncture during 
the 1970s. This was in itself sufficient for a political destabilization of a country. 
However, the economic crisis was joined by a number of domestic factors that 
aggravated political developments and shaped the political party landscape of 
the country.  
          In this respect, of prime importance was the establishment of the Islamist 
and nationalist parties in the late 1960s. Each of these parties found a rather 
strong social base that enabled them to access parliamentary representation. On 
the other, these parties received those votes that would have otherwise gone to 
the AP. Thus, their emergence prevented the AP from getting the majority of 
votes necessary for establishing a strong one party-government. 
              The CHP with its new leader and ideology was without doubt the 
prominent political party of this decade. But out of some reason, it also steadily 
                                                                                                                                              
wing that had mostly member’s Sunni origin (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.249-250; Zürcher, 2008, 
pp.380-381). 
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fell short of the necessary majority vote. Moreover, the CHP’s rise in the 
political arena, its close connections with labour unions and the support it 
received from the Alevis, Kurds and left-wing circles, i.e. the TIP was apparently 
perceived as a threat by the state. A left-orientated party was barely tolerated by 
the Turkish state and its NATO allies in those days of the Cold War. Their 
concerns about a possible deviation of Turkey’s course towards the socialist 
block likely contributed to the violent conflicts that occurred at that time. Turkey 
had to be kept at any cost in the Western alliance.  Thus, under the influence of 
external and domestic factors, the left-right divide became in the 1970s the main 
cleavage in Turkey. 
1.6 The Three-Year Military Regime: 1980 - 1983  
The intervention of the 12 September 1980
19
 was followed by a whole 
line of oppressive measures, i.e., abolishment of the parliament, closure of 
political parties, detention of people, trials, executions, and prohibition of every 
kind of democratic activity.  
 Following this military intervention, democracy was not to be established 
until 1983. In 1982, the junta allowed a new constitution to be adopted 
(Özbudun, 2000, p.58). As compared to the previous constitution of 1961, the 
1982 Constitution restricted the nation’s free voting rights and the right to 
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 The military intervention of 1980 differed in many respects from the intervention of 1960. The 
latter was a rather spontaneous revolt of mainly middle-rank cadres of the army against the DP 
government for the reasons explained above, under the section 1.2. Aside from the severe 
traumatisation of society by tribunals and the execution of the DP leaders, it left behind at least a 
democratic constitution (Çavdar, 2008b, p.270; Çavdar, 2008b, p.110; Kongar, 2011, p.199; 
Zürcher 2008, p.388). 
The military coup of 1980 was, in turn, the last step of an apparently insidiously designed 
scheme that was systematically executed by the general staff. The army had been for years 
inefficient in getting the ongoing armed conflict under control despite its full authority due to the 
martial law (Zürcher, 2008, p.401). However, the violence stopped immediately after the 
intervention. Thus, the military now strangely gained credit for restoring law and order in the 
country and placing blame on the civil government it overthrew  (Zürcher, 2008, pp.405-406).  
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establishing civil society associations. Its aim was allegedly to guarantee law and 
order in the country, but in reality was to create an apolitical society. It also 
provided the junta members with immunity against any future prosecution and 
the president great powers. This new constitution worked together with a new 
state programme which aimed to depoliticize the coming generations of citizens 
restricting freedom of speech and political participation (Yılmaz, 2009, pp.54-
56).  
 The military also transformed the Higher Education system
20
  into an 
apolitical institution under the control of the president, since it regarded the 
universities as the main centres of ideological conflict in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Szyliowich, 1994, p.154). In spite of all the efforts in the following years, 
Turkey could not dispose of this constitution until today. 
 Furthermore, this period was characterized by a rise in state-supported 
political Islam since the military government saw Islam as a remedy for the 
existing ideological and ethnic problems (Yavuz, 2005, p.100). To do this, it 
introduced the Turkish-Islam synthesis as the new state ideology, which has 
affected state policies and education to this day. By adopting this approach, the 
military government claimed to promote the unification of nationalist and 
religious movements in the country (Akın and Karasapan, 1988, p.18; Öniş, 
1997, pp.749-750).  In addition, the Turkish-Islam ideology
21
 
22
 has moved the 
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 Thus, all political activities were prohibited, and university staff and students allegedly 
involved previously in such activities were dismissed and/or detained. The universities were 
brought under the control of YÖK (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu - Council of Higher Education), as 
established in the framework of the 1982 Constitution (Freely, 2012, p.57; Zürcher, 2008, 
p.403). 
21
Turkish-Islam ideology: It aimed to “combat communism and left ideologies the military 
attempted to strengthen the role of Islam” (Rabase and Larrabee, 2008, pp.37-38). It was 
initiated by a group of conservative scholars (Aydınlar Ocağı/Intellectuals’ Hearth). The main 
idea was an attempt to reconcile nationalism with Islamic values (Ümmetçilik-Milliyetçilik). 
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political atmosphere of the country closer to the right-wing of the political 
spectrum (Mert, 2007, p.32).  
 On the other hand, the military government strictly followed the 
economic programme that had been already adopted before the intervention (24
th
 
January 1980 Economic Decisions) (Ahmad, 1993, p.183). This was obvious 
because the technocrat minister who was in charge of economy in the military 
government was also the progenitor of the neoliberal economy programme, 
approved on 24
th
 January 1980. Indeed, this programme became decisive in the 
establishment of neoliberal economy in Turkey.  
In summary, the third military intervention was far more than an 
intervention with its agenda on re-structuring of social, cultural, political and 
economic systems of the country. It primarily aimed at the eradication left-wing 
movement in Turkey. However, that was one of the two main aims. The other 
hidden aim was to create an apolitical, obedient and above all devout society, 
with Islamic values. The following legislative activities of the military 
government served these ends. The constitution of 1982 was an anti-thesis to the 
constitution of 1961; it replaced the state ideology of Kemalism with the 
Turkish-Islam synthesis. In short, the society was subjected to social engineering 
so as to ensure the alliance of Turkey, in line with the Cold War concept of the 
NATO because Islam was regarded at that time as a remedy against communist 
expansion.    
                                                                                                                                              
“The military by fusing Islam and Turkish nationalism hoped to create a more homogeneous and 
less political Islamic community and thus to insulate the population from the influence of left-
wing ideologies” (Rabase and Larrabee, 2008, pp.37-38). 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG726.pdf 
22
 Under the rule of 1980s, religious education was made a compulsory subject in all schools.  
Qu’ran courses were opened and state controlled more and religious education was promoted 
(Eligür, 2010, p.125).    
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1.7 The Restoration of Democracy: 1983 - 1992  
After three years, the military government allowed the transition to a 
civil
23
 government. This transition in 1983 was under the military government’s 
strict control.  The military government allowed only 3 parties out of 17 new 
established parties to compete in the legislative 1983 elections. Since the 
previous parties had been closed and their leaders banned from political activity, 
new parties had to be founded in 1983 (Yavuz, 2005, p.108).   
 At the elections of 1983, the ANAP (Anavatan Partisi - Motherland 
Party) took the majority of votes (45.1%) and became the main party until the 
early 1990s (Kaynar et al., 2007, pp.174-175 and 181). From the beginning of its 
term of office, the ANAP opportunistically supported the military’s ideological 
stance, as its success was based on the dissolution of the other parties. It 
managed to gather members of the dissolved closed parties irrespective of which 
direction.  
 Thus, it claimed to have reconciled four different political tendencies: 
social democracy, nationalism, conservatism and liberalism. Due to its hybrid 
ideology, it took the opportunity to address the corresponding constituencies and 
came into prominence as a mass political at both the 1983 and 1987 elections.  
The charismatic leader of the ANAP, Turgut Özal, remained in the absence of 
the banned political leaders without a serious political challenge. 
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 The military had allegedly acted in line with its traditional mission of intervening in case of a 
likely threat to the secular Unitarian Turkish state as in the previous intervention of 1960 and 
1971 (Yavuz, 2005, p.94) Now, since the threat was eliminated, it could step back to its own 
mission claiming that the army had never been in aspiration of civil power (Kongar, 2011, 
p.330). Whether this was the only reason for this decision is not known. However, it is likely that 
external pressures and exigencies from the side of NATO allies and European also accounted for 
this decision and the acceleration of the return to civil government.  
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 As compared with previous right-wing parties which had conservative 
and nationalistic characteristics, the ANAP’s predominant ideology was similar 
to that of the DP and the AP, that is, it cherished conservative/religious values 
and advocated liberal economy. This conservative character helped the ANAP to 
keep close ties with the cemaats such as Nakşibendi and Nur (Mert, 2007, p.55). 
Furthermore, the leader of Nakşibendi tarikat Mehmet Zahid Kotku, a former 
advisor to Özal, strongly supported the ANAP’s liberal and market-based 
economic agenda (Yavuz, 2005, p.191).  
 Regarding the economic agenda, the ANAP government adhered 
consistently to the 24
th
 January Economic Programme, which helped the 
liberalization of Turkish economy. Consequently, this decade witnessed the 
burgeoning of SMEs
24
 which had not been able to develop in the previous 
decades (Uslaner, 2006, p.391).
25
 The export-led growth model contributed to 
the development of provincial entrepreneurs as new opportunities emerged for 
them (Gümüşçü, 2010, p.5). The ANAP government’s most important 
contributions were the economic liberalization reforms and its support for 
provincial entrepreneurs.  
 On the other hand, in implementing the liberal economic agenda, the 
ANAP government did not prevent any concomitant increase in corruption, 
featherbedding or favouring clientelistic networks in take-over auctions (Yenal, 
2010, p.137). Towards the end of the 1980s, the economy began to falter 
severely with the doubling of inflation and the reduction of purchasing power of 
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 For more details related to the impact of economic liberalization on the SMEs, please see 
Demir, Acar and Toprak (2004). 
25
 (Özaslan, 2005, p.122)  
http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2005-03-TREUrelations/TPQ2005-3-ozaslan.pdf 
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people, and in particular, of disadvantaged classes. The increase in inflation
26
 
especially overshadowed the ANAP’s initially successful projects.  
 In addition to the economic recession of late 1980s, the removal of 
restrictions on banned political leaders affected the votes of the ANAP at the 
elections of 1989 (Tanör et al., 2011, p.81). Moreover, once the political leaders 
of the 1970s had resumed their political rights, each leader established a new 
party. For instance, the ex-leader of the AP established a new party called the 
DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi - True Path Party). The ex-leader of the MSP 
established the RP (Refah Partisi - Welfare Party). On the left of the political 
spectrum, two new left parties were established as the CHP was not re-
established until 1995. These new parties were the DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti - 
Democratic Left Party)
27
 and the SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti - Social 
Democratic Populist Party) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.274). The establishment of new 
parties under political leaders of the 1970s caused fragmentation within the party 
system, and significantly diminished the ANAP votes in the elections of 1989. 
 As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the state ideology had 
moved in this period closer to the right.  Concomitantly, the eradication of the 
left ideology had occurred at two different stages. 
 First, organizations with left-wing ideology (e.g. labour unions; trade 
unions; associations) had ceased to work properly, due to the arrest of their 
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 The so-called election economy in 1987, that is, expenditures to address the voters, in part 
accounted for an increase in inflation. On the other hand, the influx of foreign credits that had 
first boosted imports, investments and economy had later on given rise to a large external debt 
stock; repayments of credits and their interests also constrained the economy, and this was also 
reflected in an increase in inflation rates (Zürcher, 2008, p.412; Yenal 2011, pp.134-141). 
27
 Ex-leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit established the new political party DSP (indeed Bülent 
Ecevit’s wife established the DSP as the ban on the leader of Bülent Ecevit had been removed up 
until  1989) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.278). The CHP was established in 1992 with its own original 
name (CHP) in 1992 (Bilâ, 2008, pp.329-330). 
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respective leaders and members; the suspension of their activities; or due to their 
complete closure. Consequently, the suppression of political expression at the 
associational level broke the link between the left-wing parties and civil society 
organizations (Özbudun, 2000, p.59). Thus, it weakened their organizational 
framework and the grass roots organizational level of parties. As a result, this 
weakness in organizational framework resulted in the inability of left-wing 
parties to reach the masses that had migrated from the rural areas out of 
economic and political reasons. In the 1960s and 1970s, the left had been able to 
understand the needs of newcomers to cities through its labour organization and 
associations. In the 1980s, due to the lack of this official network, the deprived 
masses fell into hands of informal networks; e.g. Islamist circles.  
 Second, the entrenchment of right-wing ideology was facilitated due to 
the establishment of the Turkish-İslam synthesis that prepared the ground for the 
growth of political Islam through the opening of numerous new İmam-Hatip 
high schools and Islamic associations. The shift towards right-wing ideology 
was fed by the neoliberal economic agenda which increased income inequality 
between poor and rich. As a result, in Turkey, political Islam usurped the role of 
the left-wing that once used to be the voice of the poor (Zürcher, 2003, p.304). 
 The entrenchment of right-wing ideology at both political institutional 
and organizational level; the electoral failure of the ANAP in 1989 due to 
structural issues (e.g. removal of the ban of party leaders) in the political system; 
and the ANAP’s inability to deal with a worsening economy and corruption 
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scandals
28
  resulted in the rise of the RP in early 1990s and its electoral victory 
at the 1994 local elections (Mert, 2007, pp.129-130; Öniş, 1997, pp.756-757).  
To conclude, the discontinuity imposed by authoritarian regimes, e.g., 
military governments, but also periods of dictatorships, leave behind wounds in 
the political party system that are not so easily healed in the following recovery 
periods. Such periods of transition are, in general, characterized with weak, 
intimidated civil society, top-down created parties, electoral volatility and loss of 
party allegiance of voters (Markus, 1998, p.3). As explained above, all these 
features seemed to hold for the period under the ANAP governments (1983-
1992). This hybrid party was the product of military intervention, and after the 
re-emergence of the closed parties, it disintegrated because its constituting 
fractions went back to the parties of their own ideology. This might be 
interpreted as the continuation of the existing cleavages and party ideologies, 
despite the military intervention.  
In addition, a socio-political environment suitable for the rise of political 
Islam had been promoted by the military. These changes in party landscape 
would be considered to be the main reasons behind the formation of Islamist-
secularist cleavage in the 1990s.  
1.8 Coalition Government and Emergence of the AKP: 1992 - 2002 
The decade between 1992 and 2002 witnessed the electoral victory of a 
pro-Islamic party, the RP, for the first time in the history of the Turkish political 
party system. However, the RP’s tenure did not last long, since it was suppressed 
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 The left parties (e.g. the SHP) did not become successful during the local elections of 1994. Its 
failure was due to its corruption scandals during its term in office (1989-1994) (Çavdar, 2008b, 
p.328). 
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as a result of the 1997 post-modern coup d’état.29 In addition, the political party 
system of this decade was characterized by coalition governments up until the 
emergence of the AKP in 2002.  
 The first half of the 1990s was marked by the local elections of 1994, 
which resulted in the RP’s victory, while the ANAP lost its leading position and 
gave way to the RP (Mert, 2007, pp.129-130). The RP’s electoral victory in the 
two metropolitan cities of İstanbul and Ankara demonstrated the replacement of 
both the left and right-wing political parties by political Islam (Yavuz, 2005, 
pp.289-290 and p.310). In this economically and socially turbulent environment 
of the early 1990s, the RP’s “adil”30 and “temiz”31 discourses which advocated 
welfare assistance and moral principles of the charity led it to reach the 
disadvantaged social strata living in the squatter areas of those metropolitan 
cities. In these urban areas, tradesmen, craftsmen and new migrants with low 
incomes and no social security constituted the social base of the RP (Bakırezer 
and Demirer, 2010, p.158).  
The RP’s strongest point was not its Islamist discourse, but its ability to 
reach the masses by means of grassroots organizations and to establish solidarity 
networks and social services campaigns through municipalities (Bakırezer and 
Demirer, 2010, p.158). As a result of the launch of solidarity relations and social 
campaigns, the RP succeeded in establishing concrete links with deprived social 
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 “Post-modern coup d’état” in Turkey is used as a memorandum given by the military to a 
ruling government to denote its do’s and don’ts.  The military claims that this is a legal right 
given to it by the legislature after the 1982 Constitution (Demir, 2007; Washington Times, 
2005). 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/02/28/siy106.html 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jun/25/20050625-104911-
8659r/?page=all#pagebreak  
30
 Adil: just; egalitarian 
31
 Temiz: clean 
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strata (e.g. through strong neighbourhood links, woman branch and youth 
branch) (Yavuz, 2005, pp.289-290 and p.310). Furthermore, these concrete links 
remained unchanged, despite the changes in the party’s institutional framework 
(e.g. RP’s closure).  
 The RP’s success in the local elections of 1994 was followed by its 
victory in the legislative elections of 1995. The main reason behind the success 
of the RP at parliamentary level was “its cross-coalition of winners and losers of 
economic reform”. The “winners” were the peripheral segment of the capitalist 
class that was formed by SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) (Gülalp, 2001, 
p.444). This rising bourgeoisie benefited from process of globalization as a 
result of export-driven and free-market economy (Öniş, 1997, pp.748- 749). 
Nevertheless, its exclusion from the traditional, long-established elite class drew 
them to the RP (Öniş, 1997, pp.748 -749).  
 In addition, the transformation of the RP from a marginal political party 
into a significant political movement was a phenomenon paralleled by the 
growing power of Islamic business in the Turkish economy and society in the 
1990s. To be more specific, the rise of the RP reflected the growing aspirations 
of the Anatolian capitalists, which wanted to consolidate its positions in society 
and to achieve elite status, as well as to obtain a greater share of public resources 
(Öniş, 1997, p.760). 
 On the other hand, the “losers” represented the masses which had 
suffered from economic liberalization and now believed in the RP’s “Adil 
düzen”32 programme as a remedy to their socio-economic ills (Öniş, 1997, 
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 Adil düzen: The “Just Order” program was the state-centred Islamic project which intended to 
establish a powerful state and extensive welfare programme (Yavuz, 2003, p.24 and p.221).  
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pp.748-749). This alliance between the “winners” and “losers” constituted a 
challenge “towards both the left and right-wing political parties of the 
established secular political order” (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-749). Therefore, the 
electoral victory of the RP led to a decrease in the votes of both left and centre-
right parties. 
 When this decade is examined from the perspective of social cleavage 
structures, the predominant left-right cleavage appears to have become obsolete, 
and to have given place to the secular-Islamist cleavage. In the political arena, 
this cleavage was played out with the left-wing parties defending secularism, 
whereas the RP principally supported Islamists. 
 In addition, left and right divisions gave way to another cleavage 
between secularists and Islamists. In the 1980s, the right-wing ideology was fed 
significantly from the international setting of the post-Cold war, where the 
political Islam became predominant in the Middle East. Therefore, while the left 
ideology lost its strength on the ideological ground, the right ideology began to 
be characterized by political Islam (Zürcher, 2008, p.416). As a result of this 
dual ideological transformation, in the late 1990s, left-right division led to a new 
cleavage between Islamists and secularists (Zürcher, 2008, pp.418-419 and 
pp.424-425).  
This cleavage took different forms in the early 1990s when the Kurds, 
who were allied to left-wing parties in the 1970s and 1980s, attempted to 
establish their own political parties, and as a result, gave birth to a new cleavage: 
that of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish ethnic groups began to 
establish their own political parties (e.g. HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi - 
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People’s Democracy Party) instead of being represented by left-wing political 
parties. However, in the 1990s, those parties advocating Kurdish nationalism did 
not manage to gain representation in parliament due to the 10% electoral 
barrier.
33
 In addition, in the early 1990s, the division between Kurds and Turks 
became more apparent due to the ongoing armed conflict between the Turkish 
army, and since then, it has continued with a rising intensity (Zürcher, 2008, 
pp.452-457).  
The deepening of the cleavages related to ethnicity and religiosity, 
together with the constitution of 1982, led to the fragmentation of the electorate 
and, thereby, of the party system
34
 (Başlevent, Kırmanoğlu and Şenatalar, 2004, 
p.310). Thus, in spite of the RP’s electoral success (21%), this did not suffice in 
establishing a majority government and ended up in making a coalition 
agreement
35
 with the DYP (Kongar, 2011, pp.274-275).    
The DYP-RP coalition government did not please the MGK (Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu - Army’s National Security Council), which disapproved of the 
RP’s radical policies and practices against secularism. Hence, at its meeting on 
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 In order to be eligible for the electorate elections a party should get 10% out of 100 % of the 
votes. 
34
1995 Elections: The ANAP: 19.7% (132 deputies); the CHP: 10.7% (49 deputies); the DSP: 
14.6% (76 deputies); the DYP: 19.2% (135 deputies) and the RP: 21.4% (158 deputies) (Çavdar, 
2008b, p.331).  
35
 As mentioned in 1.5, in 1970s, there were four main political parties that remained steadily in 
the parliament. Three of them were right-wing parties (the AP, the MSP and the MHP) and the 
fourth was the left-wing CHP. There were also two parties that emerged by splitting of some 
dissident fractions from the CHP and the AP, but they could not survive long. In 1990s, 
however, due to the 10% electoral barrier, there was no representation of small parties (with 
votes less than 10%). For example the CHP remained out of parliament in legislative elections of 
1995 (Kongar, 2011, p. 270).  
Moreover, even parties such as the CHP (in 1999 legislative elections) and the MHP (in 1994 
legislative elections) remained out of the parliament because of this restriction (Kongar, 2011, 
p.270; Bilâ, 2008, p.357). Besides, the HADEP remained also under the 10% election barrier 
(Kongar, 2011, p.307).  
These results showed clearly that the 10% barrier imposed by the military government (Özbudun 
2002) with the pretext of establishing a stable parliamentary party system did not render the 
anticipated results, as soon as the political restrictions were lifted in 1987.  
http://www.konrad.org.tr/index.php?id=366 
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28
th
 February 1997, the MGK issued a list of directives that the leader of the RP 
was obliged to sign (Kongar, 2011, pp. 285-286). At the same time, the MGK 
cooperated with the AM (Anayasa Mahkemesi - Constitutional Court of Turkey) 
which launched a case requesting the RP’s closure. As a result of the court’s 
decision, the RP was closed down in 1998 (Akarca and Tansel, 2007, p.638; 
Stepan, 2000, p.51). However, despite the RP’s closure, the parliament was not 
suspended. Therefore, the process which started under the directives of the MGK 
was called a “post-modern” coup, as it was carried out quietly behind the scenes. 
The 1997 post-modern coup d’état impacted severely on the political and 
economic conjuncture up to 2002, which resulted in the AKP’s emergence.  
  As seen above, from the first military intervention in 1960 until this 
post-modern memorandum (1960; 1971; 1980 and 1997), the military 
interventions and memorandums
36
 impacted the development of political party 
system in Turkey. After the military intervention of 1960, the military has 
considered the Kemalism as its main ideology. Therefore, in the case of Islamic 
revival,   ethnic conflict or any political turmoil which threatens the secular and 
Unitarian Turkish state, the military has found legitimacy to intervene in 
parliamentary politics (Yavuz, 2005, p.94).  
                                                     
36
 The history of the Turkish political parties has been rich in military interventions and their 
variety.  Aside from the two conventional interventions of 1960 and 1980, there has been a coup 
by memorandum in 1971, a post-modern coup in 1997 and as to be explained below e-
memoranda in 2007.  The last three can actually be designated as “light” interventions because 
they have not aimed at dissolution of the parliament and/or changes in legislation, but rather at 
overthrowing the government. As aforementioned, the clauses in the constitution of 1961 have 
been the reference for the following interventions, providing the necessary legitimacy (Yavuz, 
2005, p.94).  
The aim of the post-modern memorandum was directly the RP and as the deputy general staff of 
that time formulated, “the fine adjustment of politics” in the country (Birand, 2012). This 
statement holds for the other two memoranda as well.  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/15-years-ago-today-we-smashed-into-a-wall-while-fine-
tuning-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=14787&NewsCatID=405 
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Following the post-modern coup d’état, the members of the closed RP 
went through a learning process (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.474) and its leaders and 
members realized that votes for the extreme-right parties had increased as a 
result of dissatisfaction with the centre-right parties (Yeşilada, 2002, p.74). This 
fact led them to an awareness of the necessity for a more moderate party 
ideology and political tactics if they wished to reach a broader voter base (Öniş, 
2010, 264; Yavuz, 2005, p.335). 
 As part of this moderate agenda, and as a means of seeking 
accommodation with the established secular system, they considered moving 
closer to Western style party and state institutional democracy on the one hand 
and EU membership on the other hand (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.475). This ideological 
change was adopted by the successor political party to the RP, the FP (Fazilet 
Partisi
 
- Virtue Party) which adopted a party programme emphasizing western 
democracy, human rights and freedoms (Öniş, 2004, p.8).  
 However, the change in the discourse of the FP was not enough to satisfy 
the requirements of the constitutional court and this time, the FP was closed 
down because it was thought to be still too anti-secularism. The court decision 
was based on the entrance of an FP deputy to the parliament with an Islamic 
headscarf following the elections of 1999 (Atacan, 2005, p.188; Yeşilada, 2010, 
pp.62-63). 
 The closure of the FP did not solve problems related to the rise of 
political Islam, but it did contribute to a transformation in the positions of the 
political Islamists and led to their reconciliation with and their integration to 
globalization processes. This, in turn, first influenced the emergence of a 
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reformist branch within the FP and later the establishment of the AKP in 2001 
(Uzgel, 2010, p.12). The FP’s main ideological stance (Milli Görüş) continued to 
be expressed within the party called the SP (Saadet Party
 
- Felicity Party) (Dağı, 
2005, p.29). In terms of discourse, even though the SP had a less reformist 
approach than the AKP, both claimed to support Turkey’s potential EU 
membership in anticipation that this membership would contribute to the 
development of human rights in Turkey (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.479).   
 In addition to the political implications, the post-modern memorandum 
impacted on the support given to the Islamist parties by the Islamist provincial 
capitalists. As a result of the 28
th 
February 1997 decisions, the SPK (Sermaye 
Piyasası Kurulu - Capital Market Boards of Turkey) made 131 official 
complaints and launched a campaign against the Anatolian capitalists began 
(Teazis, 2011, pp.121-122). Consequently, the Islamic holdings faced severe 
restrictions which prevented them from entering into state auctions,  thereby 
taking share from privatization pie (Doğan, 2010, p. 299).  
 During the closure processes of the RP and the FP in the years 1998 and 
2001, the relationship between the RP/FP and the Anatolian capitalists was thus 
constrained. The military knew that the Anatolian business circles were the main 
financial source of Islamist parties. Therefore, as mentioned above, the military 
brought them under pressure, and restricted the activities of their representative 
association, the MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği - 
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association). Thus, the Anatolian 
entrepreneurs realized that they could not reconcile with the state and take part 
in processes such as globalization with the RP’s vision (Uzgel, 2010, p.17).  
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 Therefore, they looked for an alternative political movement which 
would not be in conflict with the state and the EU and Western democratic 
values. The reformist group that emerged in the RP/FP now presented such a 
solution. The troika of this reformist group, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah 
Gül and Bülent Arınç, the so-called late group of the “Milli Görüş”, having 
adopted a pro-Western stance and pro-globalization were received with 
enthusiasm and supported by the Anatolian capitalists (Kuru, 2005, p.272). The 
Islamist bourgeoisie, in some respect, contributed to the transformation of the 
Islamists/Islamist parties. The reformist group also gained the support of the 
Gülen Movement, a very powerful Islamic network that also advocated the 
principles of moderate Islam and neoliberal market economy (Kuru, 2005, 
pp.272-273).  
On the other hand, the reformist movement that broke up with the 
National Vision ideology did not want to limit its supporter groups to provincial 
capitalists and religious circles. Instead, it aimed to reach a broader group in 
order to further the transformation of state-civil society complex. The liberal 
intellectuals and the NGOs
37
 also received the moderate Islamists with 
compliance, as they saw the AKP as a tool to minimize the state’s dominance 
and speed up integration into the EU (Uzgel, 2010, p.38). These circumstances 
promoted a rapid organization of the reformist group, resulting in the 
establishment of the AKP in 2001. 
The AKP also managed to get to its side the strong grassroots networks 
of the RP/FP at the local administration level through municipalities (Bakırezer 
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 The liberal intellectuals played an important role on the formation of new political party. On 
the other hand, the TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve Işadamları Derneği - Turkish Industrialist and 
Businessmen’s Association) played a role in the background (Uzgel, 2010, p.27). 
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and Demirer, 2010, p.158). The RP’s success in the 1994 local elections had 
continued to exist despite its closure. For instance, despite the FP’s decrease of 
votes in the legislative elections of 1999, the FP’s votes at the local elections of 
the same year increased (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, p.158). This successful 
social help framework for underprivileged people that operated through the local 
administrations was now inherited by the AKP. Therefore, the strong 
mobilization and networks at the local administrations level also contributed to 
the AKP’s electoral success as well (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, p.159; Öniş, 
2006, p.130).  
 Finally, the emergence of the AKP in 2002 was the product of the pre-
2002 political and economic conditions, in particular severe economic crises of 
2000 and 2001 (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.346-347). These economic crises had 
influenced whole segments of Turkish society, not only the disadvantaged 
masses, but also all the strata: “rich, poor, educated, uneducated, urban and 
rural” (Öniş, 2006, pp.130-131).  
 In such a desperate economic context, the AKP’s party programmes, 
with its emphasis on social justice as well as neoliberal economic policies, 
attracted not only the disadvantaged masses but also business groups which had 
been looking for stability in both economy and politics and importantly, room 
for carrying out business without any state intervention (Öniş, 2006, p.130; 
Özcan and Yavuz, 2007, p.131). 
 In the legislative elections of 2002, the electorate punished all the parties 
that took part in either the outgoing or still earlier coalition governments that had 
been in office since the late 1990s. The AKP obtained 34.2% of the votes 
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(equivalent to 363 deputies), which resulted in a new period in the Turkish 
political party system, as well as Turkish society (Sayarı, 2007, p.198).     
         A decade of coalition governments and a fragmented party system was 
over. The main (single) opposition party had become the CHP with 19.4% (178 
deputies); the independents followed with 1% (9 deputies) (Sayarı, 2007, p.198).   
Due to the 10% electoral barrier within the party system, 45.3% of the voters 
had failed to be represented in the parliament (based on an interview with a 
high-ranking representative of the TÜSİAD (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1)).  
         An analysis of the votes revealed that the AKP had come out of the 
legislative elections of 2002 not as an Islamist party but as a centre-right 
political party (Yavuz, 2005, p.348). Obviously, the AKP would not have 
obtained such a capacity to attract votes, had it only relied on its main religious 
base and not attempted to reach the masses (Öniş, 2010, p.266). 
1.9 The AKP and the Dominant-Party System: 2002 - 2011 
 Following the legislative elections of 2002, the AKP continued to 
implement the previous government’s programme38 which resulted in 
stabilization and consolidation in the country’s economy. The AKP government 
also made efficient use of rather suitable international financing facilities for 
emerging market economies and of the world economy that had gained a 
momentum and entered a process of further expansion in the early 2000s 
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 The AKP was in a rather fortunate position to have found such a good economic programme at 
its disposal. The programme was actually the product of the fundamental economic reforms 
implemented by the previous coalition government formed by the DSP, the MHP and ANAP in 
1999 (Öniş, 2010, p.270). This government had also courageously implemented the initial 
demanding political reform packages related to EU membership. However, their political 
achievement was overshadowed by chronic inflation, economic recession and the very severe 
economic crises of 2001 and 2002 (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.346-347). Actually, these problems had 
been the outcome of the inconsistent policies of 1990s. However, the electorate had not taken 
notice thereof and punished the coalition government in the elections of 2002. The credit for 
implementing the programme in turn only went to the AKP.  
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(Uygur, 2010, p.7; Macovei, 2009, p.10). However, the AKP government does 
deserve credit of having made the best of these circumstances with very efficient 
governance and strict fiscal discipline that helped to bring the chronic high 
inflation under control and attain sustainable economic growth.  
 In addition to its neoliberal agenda, the AKP presented itself as a 
conservative democratic party with a neoliberal market economy agenda. The 
AKP emphasized its difference from the RP/FP’s party tradition; rather, it 
advocated its ideological position as a conservative democracy (Çıtak and Tür, 
2008, p.462).
39
  
 With this new ideological stance, the AKP followed the EU membership 
process and continued to implement reform packages that were aimed at 
integrating Turkish legislation into EU legislation. It adopted a strong pro-EU 
stance and discourse of human rights and democracy. It also lifted the OHAL 
(Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği - Regional Governorship of State of Emergency) 
that had been in effect for almost two decades.
40
 This decision was important for 
the Kurdish citizens who suffered significantly from antidemocratic policies of 
the governorship and increasing security problems (TESEV, 2008, p.22).
41
  
 Moreover, the AKP’s attempts to gain EU membership and to remove 
military tutelage from the government were appreciated by liberal journalists 
and policy makers. These efforts were finally rewarded by initiating formal 
negotiations with the EU in 2005.  However, the AKP’s relations with the EU 
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 By stressing on its ideological position, the AKP aimed to demonstrate its distinction not from 
the RP/FP but also from the previous centre-right political parties (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, p.462). 
40
 The date of lifting the OHAL is 30
th
 November 2002 (Hürriyet Archive, 2002) 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=112742 
41
 TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı - The Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation) 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/5b5a17ea-c2db-4d25-ad8f-
54652eff2c80/Kurt%20Sorunu%20Cozum%20icin%20Yol%20Haritasi.pdf 
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soured in 2006 because “the EU Council froze the opening of eight chapters over 
Turkey’s rejection to open its ports and airports to Greek vessels and aircraft” 
(Avcı, 2011, p.412). Countries such as France, Germany, Greece and Cyprus 
have rejected opening of various other chapters
42
. Currently, the AKP 
government has moved to a “passive activism towards the EU, and is making a 
significant effort to remain in the negotiations” (Avcı, 2011, p.419).  
 Following the first tenure in government, the AKP’s popularity was 
tested during the presidential elections in 2007. As has been pointed out, with 
the constitution of 1982, the president was endowed with unusually legislative, 
executive powers.
43
  Moreover, he symbolizes the secular republic. In 2007, the 
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 Another source of disappointment for the AKP was the confirmatory decision of the EHRC on 
the issue of headscarf ban (Aydın and Aydın, 2004). 
http://bianet.org/english/english/38027-echr-rules-for-turkish-headscarf-ban 
43
 Article 104 Duties and Powers of the President of the Republic 
a) Those  relating to legislation: 
“to deliver, if he or she deems it necessary, the opening address of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly on the first day of the legislative year, to summon the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly to meet, when necessary, to promulgate laws, to return laws to the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly to be reconsidered, to submit to referendum, if he or she deems it necessary, 
legislation regarding amendment of the Constitution.  
to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment in part or entirety of certain provisions of 
laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content, to call new 
elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly”. 
b) Those relating to executive functions: 
“to appoint the Prime Minister and to accept his or her resignation, to appoint and dismiss 
Ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister, to preside over the Council of Ministers or to 
call the Council of Ministers to meet under his or her chairmanship whenever he or she deems it 
necessary, to accredit representatives of the Turkish state to foreign states and to receive the 
representatives of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey, to ratify and promulgate 
international treaties, to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces 
on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish 
Armed Forces, to appoint the Chief of the General Staff, to call the National Security Council to 
meet, to preside over the National Security Council, to proclaim martial law or state of 
emergency, and to issue decrees having the force of law, in accordance with the decisions of the 
Council of Ministers under his or her chairmanship, to sign decrees, to remit, on grounds of 
chronic illness, disability, or old age, all or part of the sentences imposed on certain individuals, 
to appoint the members and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council, to instruct the State 
Supervisory Council to carry out inquiries, investigations and inspections, to appoint the 
members of the Higher Education Council, to appoint rectors of universities” (Anayasa, 2001, 
pp.35-36). 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_RE
PUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf 
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AKP’s nomination of Abdullah Gül for the presidency was not approved by the 
CHP, the constitutional court and the military (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.120).  
 Moreover, the general staff manifested the discomfort with the e-
memorandum that was published in the general staff web site on 27th April 2007 
(Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.120). The fact that this memorandum was published 
online brought this new term to the political terminology. The e-memorandum 
was one of the first major challenges to the AKP’s consolidation. However, the 
AKP overcame this challenge through its resolution and immediate call for early 
legislative elections, which resulted in a clear victory for the party.  
 Thus, the AKP obtained 46.5% of the votes (341 deputies), exceeding its 
electoral victory of 2002 (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.130). As it will be 
demonstrated in next chapters (4 and 5), this success was clearly the outcome of 
economic stability (e.g. decrease of inflation, fiscal discipline, sustainable 
economic growth and establishment of TL as a valuable currency) and 
efficiently initiated social policies (reforms within health care system, social 
security as well as housing projects) launched in the AKP’s first tenure.   
 In the legislative elections of 2007 (22
th 
July 2007), for the first time in 
Turkish political history, a Kurdish political party DTP (Demokratik Toplum 
Partisi - Democratic Society Party) was successful in  becoming represented in 
parliament. Instead of entering into the elections as a party, the DTP managed to 
by-pass the electoral barrier with independent deputies.
44
 The CHP obtained 
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 Compared with the previous low representation in the parliament in the previous legislative 
term after the elections of 2007, 87% of voters were represented (Bulut, 2007). 
http://www.e-akademi.org/makaleler/nbulut-2.htm 
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20.9% (112 deputies), the MHP gained 14.3% (71 deputies) and independents
45
 
3.63% (25 deputies) (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.130). Thus, in 2007, the AKP 
consolidated its position within the party system.  
 Following the legislative elections of 2007, Abdullah Gül was re-
nominated and elected in August 2007 as the president in the new elected 
parliament, despite the CHP’s boycott of the election. Moreover, the AKP 
further counter-challenged the army’s e-memorandum which stopped it from 
contesting the presidency in April of that year, by calling a referendum
46
 on the 
direct election of the president by Turkish voters. The referendum was carried 
with 68.95% of voters in favour of reform of the presidency.  
 The year of 2008 was also a challenging year for the AKP, because of the 
constitutional court’s closure case against the AKP (Sevinç, 2010, p.264). 
However, unlike its decisions of the 1990s, the constitutional court did not vote 
for the closure of the AKP.  
             Furthermore, in 2010, the AKP obtained a majority vote in the 
parliament to amend the constitution of 1982. The AKP government put this 
parliamentary decision to a referendum in order to get the electorate’s support 
for legitimating the amendment. The referendum
47
 held on 12
th
 September 2010 
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  20 out of 25 independent deputies were the Kurdish Representatives (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, 
p.130). 
46
 Until 2007, the President was elected by parliament. The 2007 referendum proposed a number 
of reforms to the presidency apart from election of the president by direct popular vote. The 
other reforms consisted of reducing the presidential term from 7 years to 5; holding general 
elections every 4 years instead of 5; and reducing the quorum needed for the parliamentary 
decisions 284 (İkinci, 2007). 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/oct2007/turk-o06.shtml  
47
 The amendments included clauses for further extending economic and social rights, as well as 
individual freedoms; abolishment of the legal protection of the coup leaders of 1980. The 
changes under the heading judicial reforms in turn were strongly opposed by the CHP (Head, 
2010). They brought higher courts under polity control, since their compositions was to be 
determined mainly by presidential appointments. Finally amendments allowed every citizen to 
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resulted in the approval of the constitutional amendment by the majority of the 
society. This referendum was also a test for the third legislative elections, which 
were held in 2011 (Cameron-Moore, 2010).
48
 The AKP once again successively 
increased its votes and obtained 49.9% of the votes; followed by the CHP 
(26%); the MHP (13%) and independents (Kurdish votes) (6.6%) (Çarkoğlu, 
2011, p.48; Esen and Ciddi, 2011).
49
 Thus, as of 2011, the party system was split 
into two parts: the AKP and the others.    
1.10 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have given a historical account of political processes that 
resulted in the emergence of the AKP. As a pro-western, conservative democratic 
political party with Islamic roots, the AKP is the first of its kind in the world.  Its 
emergence and then consolidation in the Turkish political party system is, at the 
same time, an example of how special circumstances can lead to a unique historical 
development. 
 Here, not only its founders’ proved to be decisive in its emergence; but also 
the socio- economic and historical environment as well as conjectural developments 
at the turn of the century played a significant role.  It is of importance to note that 
this event occurred in Turkey, a secular state, in which some socio-economic 
structures of the Ottoman Empire remain preserved. The Anatolian entrepreneurship 
is such a structure, with a tradition that has roots deep in history.  A devout, yet 
                                                                                                                                              
file a petition with the Constitutional Court (Secretariat General for European Affairs, 2010, p.10 
and pp.34-39).  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11263302 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_amendments.pdf 
48
 (Cameron-Moore, 2010) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/13/us-turkey-referendum-idUSTRE68B01120100913 
49
 (Esen and Ciddi, 2011) 
http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/10/turkey%E2%80%99s-2011-elections-an-emerging-
dominant-party-system/ 
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open minded group of businessmen, the “so-called” Anatolian capitalists, advocated 
adopting a free-market economy in the country.  Hence, they became one of main 
supporters that enabled the AKP to emerge, as the party included a neoliberal 
economy agenda in its programme.   
Another traditional structure which the AKP made use of the system of 
religious grassroots organizations and solidarity networks, all originating from the 
Ottoman era, which  helped the AKP to gain  connections with the disadvantaged 
segments of the society.  This system had already been extended by the AKP’s 
predecessors, and the RP and FP were inherited by the AKP. 
With a particular programme that emphasized democracy, human rights, 
neoliberal market economy and pro-western stance, the AKP was, if not fully 
accepted, at least tolerated by the secular state.  Conjectural developments were also 
helpful.  The country that had just come out of two severe economic crises and had 
a decade of economic recession behind it saw in the AKP a chance of a new start.  
Not least, the EU desired that a potential member had political stability and a 
government which would share the same values with the community.  The AKP’s 
founders made use of these circumstances very efficiently in establishing, 
promoting and consolidating their party. 
Centre-periphery and state-church type cleavages also contributed to the 
AKP’s emergence, which in some respects was a synthesis of the dialectic between 
the fronts of these cleavages.  Thus, not only did the dynamics of the Islamist parties 
that preceded the AKP play a role, but also the guidance of the secular state.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that Islam was deliberately promoted by the Western world 
during the Cold War in order to contain the expansion of communism.  
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Nevertheless, this policy gave rise after the Cold War to the emergence of 
radicalism in many places in the Islamic world. Despite the same kind of promotion, 
the political party system in Turkey produced, in the AKP’s example the very anti-
thesis of radicalism and violence. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
  In this research, I will pursue my analysis of the AKP in the framework 
of the Turkish party system. To this effect, a review of the theories related to 
party systems is a requisite. To do so, I first plan to look at parties and the way 
that the competetive, institutional and socio-historical factors frame party 
ideology. Then, in examining theories related to the party system, I take into 
account Ware’s (1996) classification of the party system, according to the three 
main factors above. Taking into account these factors, I briefly discuss the 
relevant theories as well as the way that they have been developed by various 
scholars 1950s. This part of the literature review helps to make a link between 
the development of Turkish party system and the main party system models.  
 Second, I consider the main factors that influence the voting behaviour, 
and how the latter produces voting patterns. I categorize these factors under four 
main groups: economic, retrospective, sociological and socio-psychological. 
These sets of factors have been the subject of extensive studies. This part, 
similar to the party system models, is important in discussing party 
developments from the point of view of voters. I have looked at various factors 
which can be relevant to the voting behaviour of Turkish voters.  
          Third, I review the empirical studies that have made use of these different 
theories of voting, in order to analyse Turkish voting patterns, the Turkish party 
system and Turkish parties. These studies fall into four groups, on the basis of 
economic, retrospective, attitudinal and geographical characteristics. I will also 
consider empirical work on the cleavage structure in Turkey. 
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 Fourth, I discuss country studies on Turkey and Turkish politics that 
have been published since the emergence of the AKP in 2002. I review these 
studies from a historical perspective of modernization, secularism, democracy, 
and/or political Islam. This part helps to investigate the reasons behind the 
emergence of the AKP as well its impact on the society and politics from 
different angles.  
 Following this review of Turkish politics, I elaborate on the theories and 
the dual models mainly used by Turkish scholars in their analysis of Turkish 
society. I pursue a chronological approach, rather than one based on the changes 
that Turkish society has undergone during the Republican period.  The 
subsequent survey of work on the emerging Islamist bourgeoisie and economy 
will finally be followed by my review of non-scholarly literature on voting 
patterns and behaviour (pre-election polls; post-elections commentary reports) 
and the reports of international NGOs on important policy areas (gender; welfare 
and EU accession process of Turkey). Finally, I will continually appraise this 
information in the context of the emergence and consolidation of the AKP.  
2.2 Traditional Political Science Theories and Political Parties 
2.2.1 Spatial Competition and Party Ideology 
 This approach attempts to explain voting behaviour in terms of social 
choice
50
 theory. In the related theory of spatial competition,
51
 Downs (1957) as 
cited in Ware (1996) elucidates how the politicians, aspiring to get elected, 
position themselves “near the set of policies favoured by the median voter”. 
Similarly, party ideologies are positioned along the lines of main cleavages: that 
                                                     
50
 It belongs to the theory of microeconomics. For more information, see Arrow (1962) 
51
  For more information, see Hotteling (1929) 
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is, in a somewhat similar way to the set of policies favoured by the median voter. 
The idea of the political spectrum that comprises the left-wing; the right-wing 
and the intermediate positions illustrates such a positioning (Ware, 1996, p.18).  
 This can be linked to the Turkish party spectrum of 1970s. The Turkish 
political party spectrum of 1970s may exemplify the arrangement of the parties 
along the left-right axis: the CHP (centre left), the AP (centre right), the MHP 
(nationalist) and the MSP (Islamist) as extreme-right. In this system, the CHP 
and the AP were the parties favoured by the majority (or the median voter).  
               Contrary to the spatial competition theory of Downs (1957), who has 
taken into account a single ideological spectrum, Budge et al. (1987) as cited in 
Ware (1996) have extended the impact of “one dimension relating to economic 
issues with a dimension on lifestyle/personal values” (Ware, 1996, p.20). 
2.2.2 Institutional Approach to Party Ideology 
 The institutional approach considers the parties as institutions which are 
based on deep-rooted beliefs and values (Ware, 1996, p.21-22). The 
differentiation of party ideologies and actions is thus based on their origins, and 
not their positions within a spatial dimension. This is arguably a deterministic 
approach, favoured by the school of political sociology, which is inclined to 
conceive of institutions, and parties, as products of environmental constraints, 
and to underestimate their autonomy (Marcus, 1998, pp.1-2). The school of 
political institutionalism, in turn, is inclined to give the primacy of politics 
directly to institutions and to “the actors’ logic” (Marcus, 1998, p.2).   
 Thus, party ideology is not “merely an aggregation of the policy 
preferences of its members, but an institution or force that governs the party 
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programme by appealing to the norms, values and beliefs of its members” 
(Hindman, 2006, p.8). The institutional approach thus enables a more 
appropriate comparison of party ideologies than the spatial model, as it views 
party ideologies as distinct entities rather than mere references on a spectrum 
political preferences and stances (Hindman, 2006, p.5). 
           Klaus von Beyme (1985, p.23), who developed the above approach, has 
provided a classification of European political parties based on this version of 
party ideology. He classifies nine major party groups or “familles spirituelles”52 
which can be seen in European democracies (Beyme, 1985 cited in Ware, 1996, 
p.22). Ware (1996) investigates whether party families are still sharply 
differentiated from each other. He concludes that except in the United States, all 
liberal democracies have parties from more than one ‘family’ (Ware, 1996, 
p.45). In each case, party differences have their roots in the political and socio-
economic history of these countries. 
 A more recent classification categorizes 15 party “species” into their 
proper “genera” on the basis of three criteria: 1. the nature of party organization 
(e.g., elite- or mass-based); 2. the programmatic orientation of the party (e.g., 
ideological or clientele-orientated); 3. pluralistic (democratic) versus proto-
hegemonic (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p.167).
53
  
                                                     
52
 These nine major groups are as follows: liberal and radical parties; conservative parties; 
socialist and social democratic parties; Christian democratic parties; communist parties; agrarian 
parties; regional and ethnic parties; right-wing extremist parties and ecology movement (Klaus 
von Beyme, 1985 cited in Ware, 1996, p.22). 
53
 Gunther and Diamond (2003) refer to von Beyme’s overview of the emergence of European 
political parties on the basis of their ideological and programmatic orientations and its 
resemblence to theirs. However, they point to “the organizational features and behavioral 
characteristics that (they additionally) regard as of considerable importance” (Gunther and 
Diamond, 2003, p.196).  
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2.3 Traditional Theories of Political Party Systems 
 Ware (1996) classifies party systems according to three main sets of 
features: these are sociological; institutional and competitive features (Ware, 
1996, p.8; Appendix Part A, Table 1). 
2.3.1 Party Systems: Sociological Factors 
 The role of sociological and environmental factors has already been 
mentioned above. The theories of the party system, on the basis of sociological 
factors, aim to explain political phenomena mainly in terms of the social events 
that trigger them. However, as also mentioned before, explanations of political 
events from a purely sociological angle disregard the role of institutions in 
socio-political developments (Ware, 1996, pp.8-9). 
2.3.1.1 Almond’s Approach 
 Ware (1996) argues that the usage of the sociological factors for political 
analysis became important in the 1950s for two reasons. First, both Marxists and 
non-Marxists scholars considered “class as the primary cleavage in 
industrialized societies” (Ware, 1996, p.185). Second, a typology of party 
systems was formulated by Almond (1956) based on sociological concepts 
(Almond, 1956 as cited in Ware, 1996, p.185).  
 Almond (1956) grouped political party systems under four main 
categories: “the Anglo-American groups54; the Continental European groups55; 
the pre-industrial, or partially industrial political systems outside the Euro-
American area and the totalitarian political party systems” (Almond, 1956 as 
                                                     
54
 This includes some members of the British Commonwealth of countries ” (Almond, 1956 as 
cited in Ware, 1996, p.185). 
55
This excludes the Scandinavian and Low Countries which possess similar characteristics as the 
Anglo-American ones ” (Almond, 1956 as cited in Ware, 1996, p.185). 
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cited in Ware, 1996, p.185). He derived this typology from the Weber-Parsons 
tradition in social theory (Ware, 1996, p.185). Hence, he was using a Weberian 
concept of class rather than a Marxist one. 
 Almond’s classification was based on sociological concepts. It defined 
the political system in terms of how institutions and norms affect citizens’ voting 
behaviour (Almond, 1956, pp.392-393). His model was a simplified scheme, 
comprising the most common, but not all political systems (Almond, 1956, 
pp.392-393). The classification may not hold in our time, but the tools are still 
relevant for our modern classification of political system. In particular, his 
description of the Continental European system displays features which have 
resemblance to the Turkish system. Thus, it is based on a fragmented political 
culture, political subcultures of diverse origins with divisions such as semi-
secular and anti-secular, left and right (Almond, 1956, p.406).   
2.3.1.2 Cleavage-structure 
 In a similar way to Almond, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) made use of 
Talcott Parsons’s four-fold scheme56 as a starting point in developing their four 
dimensions of cleavages. As a result of the transformation of Talcott Parsons’ 
concept, they obtained their scheme from four types of conflict: centre-
periphery; state-church; land-industry and owner-worker (Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967, p.47).  
 
 
                                                     
56
 The four-function scheme was based on the “four basic dilemmas of orientation in the roles 
taken by actors in social systems: (on the categorization of situational objects) universalism vs. 
particularism; performance vs. quality; (on the attitudes to objects) specificity vs. diffuseness; 
affectivity vs. neutrality” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.7).  
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 Centre-Periphery 
 This type of division is the result of the previous centuries’ impact on 
European countries (especially the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The 
main debate in this conflict between centre and periphery centres on the choice 
of religion and language was made by society (Ware, 1996, p.186).  
 According to the cleavage concept, the centre-periphery dualism 
demonstrates the struggle between the centre of society (composed of the ruling 
elite (e.g. bureacrats; military officials) which aims to create the nation-state and 
the periphery which comprises ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct 
groups that resist against the homogenization of the country for the sake of 
creating a nation-state (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.14). The tension arises also 
from the resistance of conservatives and liberals against state administrative 
centralization and cultural standardization (both in terms of religion and 
language) (Caramani, 2007, p.321). Consequently, this type of cleavage gives 
impetus to the emergence of political parties that represent the centre versus the 
periphery. They advocate either a centrist state ideology or translate demands 
based on religious or ethnic divisions.
57
  
 State-Church 
 The idea of the conflict between the State and the Church draws its 
inspiration from the French Revolution of 1789 which resulted in a closer 
relationship between the state and its citizens. As a result, the state began to 
control its citizens by assuming the responsibility of education that was 
conceived until that time within the scope of authority of the church. Since the 
                                                     
57
 For instance, Caramani illustrates her view with reference to the SNP (Scottish National Party)  
UK, the BQ (Bloc Québécois) (Canada) and the PNV (Partido Nationalista Vasco - Basque 
Nationalist Party) in Spain (Caramani, 2007, p.321). 
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state represented at the same time secularity, the division between the church 
and the state deepened and, in the course of time, turned into a division between 
religious and secular voters (Ware, 1996, p.187).  
 In the European context, there was no typical way in which the nation-
state was established, given the differences between European countries. The 
ways in which Scandinavia and Britain dealt with the problems arising from this 
type of cleavage were not the same as those in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. In turn, France, because of its national Revolution of 1789 and 
subsequent radical break from the Church, represented a very particular case 
(Ware, 1996, p.186). In conclusion, the church-state cleavage resulted in the 
emergence of parties which addressed the voters on either side of this divide.
58
  
 Land-Industry 
 While the cleavage between the state and church was predominantly a 
conflict that influenced the development of parties with distinct ideologies and 
electorates, the new conflict which arose in the nineteenth century during the 
Industrial Revolution was due to differences between agricultural and industrial 
                                                     
58
 Parties that have emerged on the basis of the state-church devide are common in the 
Continental European party system  as pointed out by Almond (1956), as exemplified by the 
parties that deliberately indicate their religious background in their names. (See for examples the 
CDU (Christlich Demokratisch Union Deutschlands - Christian Democratic Union of Germany)  
in Germany and DC (Democrazia Cristiana - Christian Democracy) in Italy or   CDA (Christen 
Democratisch Appèl - Christian Democratic Appeal)  or CU (Christen Unie - Christian Union) in 
Holland (Parties and Elections in Europe, 2012). 
 http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ 
These are the parties to which the AKP makes reference whenever it is reminded of its Islamic 
origin. On the other hand, the CHP, as the founder party of the Republic of Turkey, has been 
identified with the state. This feature of being the founder of a state makes the CHP a unique 
case. The CHP can  perhaps be compared in this respect with the KPSS (Kommunisticheskaya 
Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza - Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The latter is known as the 
founder of the world’s first socialist state (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
1939). http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/HCPSU39.pdf  
The CHP’s state party character has changed in the 1970s with its adoption of social democratic 
stance. In Chapter 1, further information was provided over these parties and other political 
parties as well as their origins.  
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interests, and the main reason for conflict
59
 was the rise of agricultural tariffs 
and “the freedom for industrial enterprises” (Ware, 1996, p.187). For instance, 
for Britain, the interests of agriculture and industry came together in long-term. 
However its variant, in the form of urban-rural divisions continued to be a 
serious problem during the 20
th
 century for the most of Europe (Ware, 1996, 
p.187).   
 In short, social (in particular, center-periphery, state-church and left-
right) cleavages have given rise to the emergence of a myriad of political parties 
in the course of the last two hundred years in Continental Europe. It may be 
claimed that since the beginning of the multiparty system, nearly the same social 
cleavages have led to the emergence to a variety of political parties also in 
Turkey. 
 Employer-Worker 
 The last social cleavage, according to the Lipset-Rokkan, is based on the 
owner-worker relationship. They consider the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the 
most critical event in the evolution of this cleavage since it gave rise to two new 
distinct lines of the cleavage, each with its own direction: one of them became 
committed to an international revolutionary movement and the other one to the 
national polity (Ware, 1996, p.188). The parties which arose from this conflict 
were communist parties, some with an internationalist and others with a 
nationalist outlook. 
 The more moderate expression of the owner-worker cleavage in political 
parties was the rise of Socialist parties (or the so-called labour movement 
                                                     
59
 due to compromise approach on the tariff on corn products.  
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parties) in European countries, following the beginning of industrialization 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.21).  
 Following on from these four types of cleavages, it is important to gain 
an insight into their expression within political party systems. Lipset and Rokkan 
take into account these four conflicts in society and link them to the 
development of political party systems. They claim that at the end of the 19
th
 
century and at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, once (male) citizens obtained 
the vote, the existing cleavages (especially long-established ones) began to be 
reflected in the emergence of different parties (Ware, 1996, p.188).  
 Moreover, they conclude that social conflicts shaped the political parties 
more than political institutions (such as electoral system). Consequently, they 
argue that the different political party systems and related electoral systems may 
be explained by taking a sociological rather than an institutional approach 
(Ware, 1996, pp.188-189). 
 More recently, Gallagher et al. (2005) have analysed social cleavages and 
their relationship to the development of the political party system. In their work, 
they revise the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure and point out three 
requirements in order to update the definition of a ‘cleavage’ (Gallagher et al., 
2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373).  
 The first of these requirements places emphasis on distinctiveness. 
Cleavages have to be based on distinctive aspects in terms of key social 
characteristics, (i.e., culture, ethnic and/or social background, status, and 
religion). According to the second requirement, the members of cleavage groups 
should be aware of their collective identity; in other words, they should behave 
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and act collectively, i.e., farmers, workers, Catholics, women’s movement. Third 
requirement stipulates an institutional formation (e.g. “a political party, a trade 
union, a church or some other body” (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 
2006, p.373)) that brings together individuals  in a group positioned on either 
side of a specific cleavage (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373). 
2.3.2 Party Systems: Institutional Factors 
 Some political scientists argue that in comparison to sociological factors, 
institutional factors carry significantly more weight in the development of party 
systems and moreover that political events are interceded by the institutional 
setting in which they occur (Ware, 1996, p.9). For instance, Duverger points to 
the influence of institutional factors, in the form of electoral systems, on the type 
of party system which emerges. He derives his argument from the institutional 
impact that Britain’s electoral system had on the development of its two-party 
system (Ware, 1996, p.190). Thus, “the simple-majority single-ballot system 
favours the two-party system” (Duverger, 1964, p.217). Duverger conceives of 
this factual relationship as a consequence of two effects: a mechanic effect and a 
psychological effect. 
 First, the single ballot, majoritarian electoral system works in favour of 
parties which obtain  the majority of votes, and against parties which take fewer 
votes (mechanical effect) (Dunleavy et al., 2008, p.3). Second, voters are 
psychologically orientdrawn towards parties that get more votes since they do 
not want to waste their votes (Dunleavy et al., 2008, p.3). In the example of the 
Turkish political party system, this argument (Duverger’s law) holds only for the 
multi-party system during period 1950-1960. During this period, the electoral 
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law provided for plurality voting. As a result, the three elections of this decade 
(1950; 1954 and 1957) resulted in a two-party system (dominated by the DP and 
the CHP) (Sayarı, 2002, p.11). When the electoral law was changed, electoral 
results changed as well, impacting on the structure of the party system.   
 In addition to the law on single-majority voting and two-party system, 
Duverger put forward another argument according to which “proportional 
electoral systems tend to enhance multi-partyism” (Duverger, 1964, p.245). 
Compared to Duverger’s law, this second argument is mostly considered as a 
hypothesis by Riker (1982) since proportional representation (PR) does not give 
the same conclusive results in different party systems.  
  Thus, Duverger’s hypothesis is not applicable to all cases in the Turkish 
political party system. For instance, after the adoption of proportional 
representation in 1960, the number of parties in the Turkish parliament increased 
considerably. However, in the 1980s, an electoral barrier of 10% which worked 
to counter the effects of PR, aimed to reduce the number of parties and prevent 
minority parties, was introduced. In the 1990s, contrary to Duverger’s 
hypothesis, proportional representation, despite the electoral barrier, gave rise to 
multi-partyism (Sayarı, 2002, p.28). Similarly, the elections of 2007 held under 
proportional representation, despite the continuation of the 10% barrier, also 
resulted in multi-partyism. When Riker (1982) criticizes Duverger’s hypothesis, 
he asserts that multi-partyism is indispensable, due to regional politics. The 
results of the 2007 elections marked the entrance of Kurdish deputies from the 
South-East region into the parliament, and seemed to support Riker’s (1982) 
counter-argument to Duverger’s hypothesis, at least in the Turkish case. 
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Like Riker (1982), Sartori (1976) also criticized Duverger on the basis 
that Duverger’s law and hypothesis show only extreme cases to be consistently 
true.   Sartori asserts that except in some extreme cases, real world situations 
exist somewhere between plurality and pure proportional representation systems. 
Therefore, he suggests “two intermediate arrangements - the majority premium 
and the clause of exclusion
60
 -” to match them to the real world (Sartori, 1976, 
pp.98-99). 
2.3.3 Party Systems: Competition Factors 
 The third factor of ‘competition’ is considered to be an alternative to the 
institutional factor. The party systems classified according to competition factors 
differ from those classified according to institutional factors, in that they are 
analysed solely in relation to the institutions that express and foster party 
competition. Above all, the competition approach can be applied to the liberal 
democratic regimes. Individual political parties as institutions begin to compete 
with other parties, and thereby, the party system reflects this logic of 
competition (and co-operation of parties) (Ware, 1996, p.9).   
These competitive interactions within the party system are also 
pinpointed by Sartori with his analysis on party fragmentation and the 
ideological distance held by parties within a system. The party fragmentation 
variable depends on the number and relative size of parties in legislatures, and 
the latter represents the ideological distance betwee parties in terms of left-right 
division (Ware, 1996, p.168; Appendix Part A, Table 2). According to Sartori’s 
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 “The clause of exclusion, or Sperrklausel, consists of establishing a threshhold for admission 
to representation. Thus while majority premium aims at encouraging maxi-fractions and at 
rewarding the larger fractions, the clause of exclusion aims at eliminating the minifractions” 
(Sartori, 2005, p.88).  
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model, the lower the party fragmentation, the smaller the ideological distance, 
the greater the tendency towards two-partyism. In the reverse case, there will be 
polarized multi-partyism (Sartori, 2005, pp.154-158).
61
 When party 
fragmentation and ideological distance are between two extremes, the party 
system tends towards moderate multi-partyism (Sartori, 2005, pp.154-158). 
Moreover, when party fragmentation is high but ideological distance is small, 
the party system is called segmented multi-partyism (Ware, 1996, p.168; 
Appendix Part A, Table 2).   
When Sartori’s model is applied to the Turkish political party system, as 
pointed out in the chapter 1, the party system of 1960s up to 1980s may be seen 
to have had a more moderate side; hence the party system was called the 
moderate party system (Esmer, 2002a, p.2). In 1975, “the political and economic 
crisis deepened in Turkey” due to increasing social conflict (Sayarı, 2002, p.14). 
Thus, this reflected into party system and the party system moved progressively 
from moderate multi-partyism to polarized pluralism or polarized multi-
partyism.  
 In the 1990s, the party system obtained a more polarized position. As 
pointed out in Chapter 1, at the legislative elections of 1995, the pro-Islamist 
party, the RP, took an important number of votes (Tachau, 2002, p.43). The 
fragmentation within the party system was high, according to Rae Index. The 
parliametary fragmentation was 0.83 and fragmentation in terms of votes was 
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 In polarized multipartyism, there is polarization between left and right parties where the centre 
is weakened due to lack of alternatives.  
Polarized multipartyism (pluralism) is a situation in multi-party (or also two-party) system in 
which moderate views is replaced by highly polarized view that make the system dysfunctional 
(Sartori, 2005, p.88). 
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0.77 (Özbudun, 2000, p.77).
62
 Hence, the fragmentation was high. In addition, 
the ideological distance was high at the elections of 1995, since both secular and 
pro-Islamist parties existed at the same time within the party system.  Thus, the 
party system of 1990s was a polarized multi-partyism, without a dominant party 
(Esmer, 2002a, p.4) 
2.4 Approaches to the Analysis of Voting Behaviour 
 In this section, I will consider the main factors that influence the voting 
behaviour by relating them to Turkish voting behaviour. It is important to review 
these theories in order to analyse the voting behaviour of the Turkish voters 
since in chapter 4, links between voting behaviour theories and Turkish voters 
will be analysed. 
2.4.1 Voting: Economic Factors 
 The impact of the economy as one of the core reasons that influence 
one’s voting behaviour has been discussed and analysed thoroughly by scholars 
(Lipset et al., 1954; Downs, 1957; Converse, 1958 cited in De Graaf, 
Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999).  
   In addition, when the economy affects political behaviour, it means that 
one’s rational expectations and forward-looking position result in one’s political 
decisions. Therefore, the economic theory of political behaviour is considered as 
a rational choice theory in the literature. Voting, according to economic factors, 
is based on self-interested and rational characteristics. Therefore, according to 
economic voting behaviour, “people vote for the party whose policies will bring 
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 According to the Rae index, the more the value approaches to 0; it means dominant party 
system. If the value approaches to 1, it means that each seat represents one party. If there are two 
parties and they obtain equal number of seats then it means that the fragmentation index is close 
to 0.50 (Özbudun, 2000, p.77). 
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them the greatest utility in the future” (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, 
p.999).  
 As mentioned before, the factors affecting voting behaviour overlap each 
other, and this overlap can be seen as an impact of the rational and self-
interested political behaviour on class voting. According to this logical link, it is  
claimed that “class voting can be explained on the grounds that people in lower 
social classes have an interest in redistributive policies, which are typically 
espoused by left-wing parties, while the members of higher social classes have 
an interest in opposing such policies" (De Graaf Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, 
p. 999). 
 Rational choice voting may also be observed in the Turkish political 
system. Business circles and petite bourgeoisie have traditionally been the 
supporters of centre-right (or right-wing) parties on the basis of their free-market 
policies. The farmers also vote for right-wing parties because of the subsidies 
provided by them. On the other hand, the labour class has, in general, voted for 
the CHP on the basis of the social democratic stance that it adopted in 1970s and 
accordingly policies aiming at an equitable distribution of resources. 
2.4.2 Voting: Retrospective Factors 
 Voting behaviour may also be based on previous socio-economic gains 
or losses which have happened under the rule of an incumbent party (Hazama, 
2006, p.3). Even though retrospective voting includes economic elements, it 
cannot be considered as economic voting behaviour (Hazama, 2006). Since the 
economic voting analysis is not backward looking, it is considered as rational 
voting behaviour (Lockerbie, 2008, p.4). As a result, I consider the retrospective 
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voting behaviour as a separate group. The retrospective voting model was 
originally developed by Fiorina (1981) as cited in Hazama (2006). In this model, 
he takes American national election data from 1956 to 1976 and shows that 
retrospective estimations “not only had a direct effect on voting decisions but 
also an indirect effect on party identification, concerns with issues and future 
expectation”  (Fiorina, 1981 cited in Hazama, 2006, p.16). 
  This model is exemplified in the Turkish political party system by the 
situation of the CHP, which is seen as associated with all setbacks of the one 
party regime (1923-1950) and in part with thoses of the 1970s. This has been 
(and is) exploited by the competing parties (and now deliberately by the AKP) 
for discrediting the CHP of today in people’s minds. Retrospective voting also 
contributed to the ANAP - the DSP - the MHP government’s defeat in the 
legislative elections of 2002 (Hazama, 2006, p.2) (see also section 2.4.3.1).   
2.4.3 Voting: Socio-Psychological Factors  
 Harrop and Miller (1987) distinguish three models of voting: 
psychological, economic and sociological. However, in the literature on voting 
behaviour, expressive voting behaviour which reflects one’s expression of 
political identity through interaction with others, exists (Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice, 1985, p.9). As expressive voting involves both attitudinal and 
sociological characteristics, I consider it as voting behaviour according to socio-
psychological factors.  
 The attitudinal characteristics can demonstrate one’s developing ties of 
identification with political parties. These ties are various; they can be economic 
if voters consider that a specific party represents their economic interests. 
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Voters’ attitudes originating from religion, ethnicity and ideology can affect 
their political behaviour too (Campbell et al., 1960). 
  In the literature on voting behaviour, there exist different voting 
behaviour models which are based on those attitudinal characteristics. Anderson 
(1998) develops the protest-voting model, which demonstrates the dissatisfaction 
with the old parties where drastic changes in social and economic conditions 
prevail. Protest-voting involves economic voting and also psychological reaction 
of voters to parties associated with economic crises (Anderson, 1998 cited in 
Ayata and Ayata, 2002, p.137).  
          Closely related to protest-voting, Lipset’s relative deprivation hypothesis 
illustrates the tendency of voters towards extreme-right wing parties, due to the 
voters’ unfavourable socio-economic conditions (Lipset, 1960, pp.63-64). The 
common point between protest-voting and relative deprivation hypothesis is the 
change in the attitudes of voters towards established, mainstream political parties 
and their shift towards extreme-right parties and other parties for which they 
have not voted before. In addition, both the models demonstrate that the 
worsening of the economy is the main reason behind their changing political 
behaviour.  
 A fairly good example of the overlapping effects of mechanisms on 
voting behaviour is provided by the devastating defeat of the coalition parties, 
the ANAP, the CHP and the MHP; in the legislative elections of 2002, following 
the economic crises of 2000 and 2001. In these elections, aside from 
aforementioned economic interests, retrospective evaluation and protest 
motivation Lipset’s deprivation reaction also seems to have played a role. That 
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the AKP, a brand new party with Islamist roots, came out of these elections with 
victory strongly supports Lipset’s deprivation hypothesis. Moreover, the 
outcome of the 2002 elections indicates that voting behaviour is a complex, 
multifactorial phenomenon that can only be explained in terms of the actions of 
different interrelated mechanisms.    
2.4.4  Voting: Sociological Factors  
 Voting, according to sociological factors, is mostly based on class and 
links the social class of individuals to their voting behaviour. Western 
democracies and politics have been analysed in terms of class-based voting 
behaviour. Lipset (1960) claims “that politics is the democratic translation of the 
class struggle” (Lipset, 1960 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99). 
Moreover he argues that “during the post-world war II period, in Western 
industrialized nations, there is a positive relationship between a person’s class 
position and this individual’s ‘right’ wing preference. One current explanation 
for this is “economic self-interest” (Lipset, 1960 cited in De Graaf and Ultee, 
1990, p.110).  
  As with Lipset (1960), Pulzer’s study of British politics (1968) argues 
“that class is the basis of British politics while all else is embellishment and 
detail” (Pulzer, 1968 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99). Similarly, 
Butler and Stokes (1974) from their analysis of the 1964 and 1966 British 
parliamentary elections argue that the most important factor affecting party 
commitment was the notion of class (Butler and Stokes, 1974 cited in Evans, 
Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99).  
102 
 
 Contrary to these scholars defending a class-based approach, Crewe et al. 
(1977) and Dunleavy (1979) assert that the class notion has lost its strength, due 
the class dealignment which implies weakening in the correlation between social 
class and voting behaviour (Crewe et al., 1977 and Dunleavy, 1979 cited in 
Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, pp.99-100).  
 As with Crewe et al. (1977) and Dunleavy (1979), Rose and McAllister 
(1986) argue that class dealignment results in a change in the social psychology 
of the voter, who in turn bases his/her political vote on current issues and 
government performance rather than on the basis of traditional allegiances (Rose 
and McAllister, 1986 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, pp.99-100). 
Franklin (1985) also considers that the decline of class resulted in a radical 
change such as the Liberal Party in 1974 (Franklin, 1985 cited in Evans, Heath 
and Payne, 1991, p.100).    
 Crewe et al. (1977), Franklin (1985) and Rose and McAllister (1986) 
base their arguments of class dealignment on sociological explanations through 
which they claim that “sociology of class; rising living standards and the spread 
of affluence” has taken away working class values (Evans, Heath and Payne, 
1991, p.100). Besides, they assert that together with the decline in the class 
allegiance, upward social mobility has destroyed class solidarity. Thus, it has 
resulted in emergence of more individualistic and self-interested voters (Evans, 
Heath and Payne, 1991, p.100).  
 On the other hand, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) and Heath and Evans 
(1988) consider the decline in class-based voting as a political phenomenon that 
is due to changes in electoral strategies of the main parties (e.g. targeting 
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different social groups) which have undermined the class-based voting 
behaviour (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986 and Heath and Evans, 1988 cited in 
Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.100). 
 In the literature on class-based voting behaviour, there are also works 
which take into account the relationship between one's current social class and 
one’s voting behaviour, by considering mainly social mobility. As a general 
concept, class position affects political preference, and a person has a tendency 
to vote similarly to other people occupying the same class position (Clifford and 
Heath, 1993, p.51). Nonetheless, people are socially mobile and they can change 
their voting behaviour according to upward and downward mobility. Lipset and 
Bendix (1959) argue that “although the upwardly mobile tends to conform to the 
patterns of their class of destination, the downwardly mobile tends in contrast to 
retain the patterns of their class of origin” (Lipset and Bendix, 1959 cited in 
Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).   
 As a result, they illustrate their argument by asserting that “majority of 
the men who rise to middle-class status become politically conservative (more in 
America than in Europe but still a majority on both continents), while a large 
minority of those who are reduced to working-class status in the United States, 
and a majority of men mobile downward in Europe, remain adherents of 
conservative movements” (Lipset and Bendix, 1959 cited in Clifford and Heath, 
1993, p.51).   
 It is argued that the main reason behind this asymmetry is the 
downwardly mobile desire to return to the higher class, and thus retain the 
values and behaviour patterns of their class of origin, whereas the upwardly 
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mobile are assimilated (more readily in American than in Europe, but to some 
extent in both continents) into the social networks and culture of their class of 
destination (Lipset and Bendix, 1959 cited in Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).  
 Moreover, Weakliem (1992) links this social mobility and voting 
behaviour to the theory of status according to which “the greater social prestige 
of the higher classes [which] leads both downwardly and upwardly mobile 
people to seek to follow higher class behaviour” (Weakliem, 1992 cited in 
Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).  
2.4.5 Voting: Geographical Characterics 
 The literature on voting behaviour looks at “what a person is”. Electoral 
geographers look at voting choices from geographical angle and link voting 
choices to where a person lives (Taylor and Johnston, 1979; O’Loughlin, Shin 
and Talbot, 1996). Similarly, Agnew (1996, p.132) argues that “the role of place, 
or the hierarchical-geographical context”, is critical in understanding this 
connection and analysing the differences that appear between one location and 
another” (Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002, pp.115-116).  
 Geographical characteristics can hardly be appraised without considering 
ethnicity, religion, culture and history of the population living in a certain 
region. The so-called electorate maps of Turkey illustrate this relationship rather 
nicely. By way of illustration, the AKP is seen in the legislative election map of 
2011, in 66 out of 81 provinces as the victorious party.  
 However, the remaining 15 provinces reveal a distinctive distribution. 
Thus, seven out of these provinces are located as a block in Turkey’s south east 
corner where the Kurdish party; the BDP, was the winner.  Seven other 
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provinces where the CHP was the winner are in turn located along the Aegean 
coast and in Thrace (or European part of Turkey). These western and coastal 
provinces are populated by the most western-minded, secular and affluent 
segments of Turkish society. These societal segments are mostly constituted by 
the descendents of individuals who had to flee from their home countries in the 
Balkans during the Balkan Wars or of those who came from Greece and settled 
in these regions in the framework of the 1923 Population Exchange between 
Greece and Turkey (Zürcher, 2008, pp.243-245). A single province in Eastern 
Turkey right within the AKP dominated block, Tunceli, also voted for the CHP. 
The Alevi votes accounted for the CHP’s electoral success in this province.63   
2.5 Studies on Voting Patterns, Voting Behaviour, Turkish Party System 
and Turkish Parties 
2.5.1 Empirical Work on Voting Patterns and Behaviour  
2.5.1.1 Empirical Work on Economic Voting Behaviour 
 After 2002 legislative elections in Turkey which followed the economic 
crisis of 2001, Turkish voting behaviour has been comprehensively analysed 
from an economic angle. Analysing the 2002 parliamentary elections, Çarkoğlu 
(2002) find out that at the elections of 2002, AKP voters are more religious, 
young and are shantytown dwellers that do not support EU membership. 
Başlevent et al. (2005) investigate specifically the relationship between party 
preferences and economic voting. They present similar arguments to Çarkoğlu’s 
(2002). As a result of their investigation, they assert that the electoral base of the 
AKP is formed by the relatively younger males who had been negatively 
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influenced by economic developments. Those who are against EU membership 
and against the abolition of the death penalty are more likely to vote for the 
AKP. Moreover, they claim that economic voting exists in Turkey in the sense 
that incumbent parties are punished.                
  Furthermore, Çarkoğlu (2008) looks at Turkish voters’ preferences in 
the election of 2007 concerning the question of ideology versus economic 
pragmatism and he attempts to find out which of these competing influences 
carries the most weight among Turkish voters. In his analysis, he looks at the 
voting preferences according to centre-periphery relations. From the centre-
periphery angle, he considers the centre as the old elites of the Republic that are 
less religious and socio-economically better off and the periphery as the rural 
and conservative masses of the society. Using the framework of centre-periphery 
relations, he analyses the 2007 parliamentary elections, adopting a quantitative 
approach and using logistic regression. 
 As a result of his investigation, Çarkoğlu (2008) finds out that younger  
voters tend towards the AKP whereas older ones towards the opposition parties. 
He also asserts that women are more likely to vote for the CHP and not for the 
MHP. While keeping the ceteris paribus, women tend to vote for the AKP rather 
than to vote for the MHP. Thus, MHP fails in attracting women to its party.  
 Regarding education level, Çarkoğlu (2008) finds out that education is an 
imporant indicator to differentiate party constituencies. Keeping all the variables 
constant, groups with lower education levels tend to vote for the AKP whereas 
groups with higher educational levels tend to vote for the CHP and the MHP.  
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 Furthermore, regarding Alevism, he mentions that it is not significant 
variable in looking at non-demographic variable. On the other hand, Kurdishness 
seems to keep away votes from the CHP and the MHP and it orients voters 
towards more independent deputies. Çarkoğlu (2008) adds that the fact that 
Kurds are not attracted to the CHP and the MHP does not mean that they are 
necessarily attracted to the AKP. Çarkoğlu (2008) finds that the AKP’s 
constituency is more attracted by favorable economic conditions than ideological 
tendencies. Çarkoğlu (2008) considers that the economic voting behaviour of the 
AKP’s constituency has positive implications for Turkish democracy since the 
AKP attracts 47% of the electorate due to its economic agenda. Hence, the AKP 
does not mobilize its constituency around a core ideology. In other words, he has 
a rather sceptical position towards AKP’s ideological repositioning especially 
towards conservatism (e.g. headscarf in public sphere). 
 While Çarkoğlu’s works (2002, 2008) take into account specific 
elections, Akarca and Tansel (2006) carry out a longitudinal analysis of 
elections. By taking examining Turkish parliamentary and local election results 
between 1950 and 2004 (25 Turkish elections), they find out that “Turkish voters 
take into account governments’ performance but they do not look back beyond 
one year”. They also realize that Turkish voters “seem to vote strategically” 
especially in local and parliamentary by elections” (Akarca and Tansel, 2006, 
p.77).  
 As with Akarca and Tansel (2006), Genç et al. (2005) examine the period 
1950-1991. Compared to Akarca and Tansel, they analyse in the specific impact 
of economic conditions at the time of particular elections (the so-called voter’s 
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myopia) and their results demonstrate that the Turkish electorate is not myopic 
and does keep the socio-economic and socio-political incidents that occurred 
during the ruling periods of previous governments in memory despite successive 
governments’ attempts at influencing elections. Hence, Turkish voters are not 
influenced by short-term issues, and do not have a narrow minded position when 
it comes to elections.  
 In a more recent work, Akarca and Tansel (2007) look at 1995 
parliamentary elections by adding the impact of the shift of the votes from the 
incumbent party due to economic reasons and the impact of the location (urban-
rural) and conservatism on the parliamentary elections.  
 Moreover, Başlevent and Akarca (2008) looked at voting patterns from a 
different angle; they investigated how inter-party vote movements affected the 
elections of 2002. By looking at the inter-party movements, they studied how 
voters in 2002 transferred their choices from the incumbent parties to the AKP. 
While analysing inter-party movements, they examined whether or not 
demographic factors and/or economic factors contributed to the shifts from 
incumbent parties to the AKP. They use regression methods andfind that, during 
the 2002 elections, the electorate punished the previous coalition governments 
due to corruption allegations and poor economic performance. In the 2002 
elections, they found that the “AKP captures almost all of the votes for the 
former FP, about half of those of the ANAP, the DYP and the MHP, two-fifths 
of those of the DSP and one-fifth of those of the CHP” (Başlevent and Akarca, 
2008, p.10).  Similar to Çarkoğlu (2008), they argue that AKP’s non-Islamic 
discourse attracted various segments of society around the AKP. Similar to 
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Çarkoğlu (2008), Başlevent and Akarca (2008) attempt to make predictions 
regarding the future discourse of the AKP and the party leader Erdoğan. Thus, 
they claim that the more economic, pragmatic discourse and the less ideological 
position discourse of Erdoğan would play a greater role in this regard.  Hence, 
they too are more sceptical regarding the party leader’s future discourse. 
 In more recent work, Başlevent and Akarca (2010) applied the same 
methods for the analysis of the 2007 elections. In their paper of 2010, they found 
that Turkish voters are voting according to economic factors. In addition to 
economic votes, they find out that “less educated voters of most parties, pro-EU 
supporters and males of the pro-Islamist SP and the relatively rich of the pro-
Kurdish party constituted new supporters of the AKP” (Başlevent and Akarca, 
2010, p.9).  
 As a consequence of their work, they have also tested the rational voter 
hypothesis through which voters are voting for the party which will bring the 
most utility in the near future.  
2.5.1.2 Empirical Work on Retrospective Voting Behaviour 
 Hazama’s (2006) work on retrospective voting merits a mention. 
Contrary to the existing literature on rational voting behaviour which takes into 
account the future as a reference point, Hazama (2006) investigates the impact of 
retrospective voting on electoral outcomes. His initial hypothesis was that in 
emerging democracies retrospective voting plays a more important role than 
cleavage voting. To do this, he uses a logit model in order to discuss 
retrospective voting.
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 He looks at the parliamentary elections of 2002 and investigates whether 
prospective evaluation was more important than evaluation of the party for the 
household and/or national economy and other socio-political conditions. Hazama 
(2006, p.15) concludes, “Evaluation of the past was more important than the 
evaluation of the future for the household economy. Evaluation of the future was 
more important than evaluation of of the past for the national economy”. 
2.5.1.3 Empirical Work on Voting Behaviour according to Attitudinal 
Characteristics   
 Another important approach to voting behaviour is linked to Turkish 
voters’ attitudinal characteristics such as ideology, religiosity, sectarian division 
and ethnicity. A number of scholarly works seek to understand how these 
characteristics influence the Turkish voting behaviour. 
Mardin (1973) argues that where the centre-periphery cleavage is 
concerned, the centre votes for liberal/left-wing parties, whereas the periphery 
prefers conservative/right-wing parties. Ergüder (1980-1) shows that the more-
religious voters supported the AKP, while the CHP was favoured by less 
religious voters and ethnic groups (Mardin, 1973; Ergüder, 1980-1 cited in 
Özcan, 1999, p.507). Kalaycıoğlu (1994) indicates that “while type of settlement 
and socio-economic status have a weak impact, gender, formal education and 
religiosity have a critical role in determining party preference” (Kalaycıoğlu, 
1994 cited in Özcan, 1999, p.507).  
Regarding class as a determinant of electoral behaviour, Özbudun and 
Tachau (1975) argue that in Turkey, modernization catalyses class conflict 
which results in class-based voting (Tachau, 1975 cited in Özcan, 1999, p.507).  
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Ayata (1993) as cited in Özcan (1999, p.507) considers “class and religion as the 
major determinants of electoral behaviour in Turkey”. However, Kalaycıoğlu 
(1994) shows that politics do not work along social class lines, since owing to 
the  “decline of support for centre-right and centre-left parties, there is a trend of 
radicalization which increases as one moves from western to eastern regions” 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 1975 cited in Özcan, 1999, p.507).  
Çarkoğlu (2005) investigates the Alevis’ party choices and assesses 
(through empirical research) the repercussions of the sectarian Alevi-Sunni 
divide
64
 in Turkish politics. Çarkoğlu (2005) finds that given religiosity has a 
prominent impact on party preferences, and this means that highly religious 
voters will tend to vote for parties which are predominantly Sunni. On the other 
hand, parties that advocate secular norms will mostly attract Alevis. Thus, his 
arguments reveal that in the political arena, the secular-pro-Islamist cleavage is 
also linked to the Alevi-Sunni divide. 
Çarkoğlu (2007) analyses Turkish voters’ behaviour on a left–right 
ideological spectrum and examines the nature of the left-right cleavage in the 
Turkish context. He finds that the scale used for measuring the left-right 
dimension does not reflect a “fine-tuned grading”,  but instead, he categorizes 
“determinants of self-placements on a conventional one-to-ten left-right scale”  
according to left, centre and right (Çarkoğlu, 2007, p.253). 
He further argues that even though the scale does not give exact results, 
there is a consistency regarding the nature of the L-R dimension. Thus, “the left 
attract tolerant, democratically oriented, progressive change-seekers with low 
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religiosity, some degree of economic complaints, and a low level of 
interpersonal trust, while the right is more trusting, happy but conservative, 
religious, and seeks maintenance of the status quo with some degree of 
authoritarianism and lack of tolerance” (Çarkoğlu, 2007, p.268).  
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) investigate the impact of religiosity 
and protest behaviour
 
in Turkish election. A noteworthy conclusion to this work 
is that Islam in Turkey strives for power through conventional channels of 
political participation; religiosity exerts a moderating, dampening effect on 
protest potential. Thus, protest is expressed through votes and not through 
actions (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, pp.83-113). 
Contrary to their previous work, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) takes a more macro 
approach to Turkish voters’ behaviour by examining how Turkish voters are 
drawn towards political parties based on their parents’ party political choices, 
religiosity, ethnicity and economic satisfaction. In this work, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) 
adopts a logistic binary regression and finds that ideology appears to play an 
important role for the psychological orientation of voters who are attached to the 
CHP as compared with the AKP or the MHP.  He further argues that party 
identification does not seem to work for the AKP since there is a confusion 
about its antecents. Thus, the AKP does not represent a specific centre-right 
party that existed in the 1960s or in the 1970s. He also argues that because of the 
same confusion, “the AKP does not represent the previous centre-right parties to 
the electorate; it is considered to be a right-wing political party bringing together 
a coalition of conservative-traditional Sunni Islamic voters on the one hand with 
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the liberalization of the economy in market capitalism on the other” 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, pp.311-312). 
 In addition to the impact of ideological, religious and sectarian values on 
voting, I consider the deprivation factor as part of the attitudinal characteristics 
since it has important outcomes for behaviour and attitudes in terms of political 
choice. In section 2.4.3, the relative deprivation factor was mentioned as a part 
of Lipset’s deprivation hypothesis. In studies on Turkey, Akgün (2002) uses 
Lipset’s hypothesis in order to analyse voting behaviour in respect of nationalist 
political parties in Turkey. He compares nationalist parties with Islamist parties. 
He first compares the discourse of both parties (the RP and the MHP) according 
to their ideologies, their perceptions of the Kurdish problem, religiosity and 
foreign relations. Then, using correlation analysis, Akgün argues that “old 
middle-class voters (self-employed small business people, farmers, artisans and 
craftsmen) tend to be radicalized by the general process of concentration and 
centralization
65
 and by specific economic crises”. 
  Contrary to Akgün (2002), Εsmer (2002) finds that the deprivation 
factor is less effective than the ideology factor. Esmer (2002a and 2002b) looks 
at the impact of location (urban or rural/an area with positive or negative 
migration), level of education, degree of conservatism and religiosity on 
elections.  Esmer tests two main hypotheses (protest vote and rise in Islamism 
hypotheses). Through his analysis, he finds that ideology, here related to the rise 
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in Islamism, contributed to the outcome of three elections in the 1990s (1990, 
1995, and 1999).  
2.5.1.4 Empirical Work on Voting according to Geographical Location  
 Turkish voting behaviour has also been analysed according to voters’ 
geographical location. Özcan (1999) takes into account voting preferences in 
İstanbul. He draws attention to the importance of previous voting preferences 
and religious attitudes on the general elections of 1987 and local elections of 
1989. Compared to Özcan (1999), Çarkoğlu and Avcı (2002) examine party 
politics over time (1950-1999). In addition, they explore party politics by 
emphasizing ideological party families and geographical voting. As a result, they 
identify geographical regions with different ideological tendencies. Çarkoğlu 
and Avcı (2002) extend the work on the relationship geographical regions and 
ideological tendencies and find in line with Turkey’s electoral maps (see above 
2.4.5 and Appendix Part F, Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) a differentiated geographical 
distribution of votes. Regional factors play a greater role in electoral support for 
the CHP, the BDP (the former DTP) the MHP than for the AKP (Turkey’s Local 
Elections of 2009, 2009).
66
  
 2.5.1.5 Empirical Work on Voting along Lines of Social Cleavages    
 In addition to the analysis of voting patterns, the relationship between 
cleavage structures and political development has been thoroughly investigated 
in the literature. The driving theoretical framework for these works has mainly 
been Lipset-Rokkan’s four axes of conflict. Many scholars suggest changes to 
the Lipset-Rokkan four-fold cleavages model. Kitschelt (1992) argues that the 
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four axes of conflict fail to give a sound explanation to the political development 
of Eastern and Central European countries. Therefore, he suggests a three-fold 
model which is based on negotiations over the preservation of status quo. His 
model is formed by three cleavages: (1) libertarian/cosmopolitan politics versus 
authoritarian politics; (2) political redistribution (equality of living conditions 
across individuals) versus market allocations (liberal free-market agenda); and 
(3) universal citizenship versus particularistic citizenship. Throughout this three-
fold model, he considers that this ‘status quo’ model is more suitable for 
political systems that have not been fully established (Kitschelt, 1992 cited in 
West, 2005, p.502).   
 Moreover, Kitschelt (1992) bases his argument on the lack or weakness 
of social cleavages in these countries. He offers, based on his considerations, a 
political party system comprising, “liberal parties (secularism, tolerance, civil 
liberties, mild decommunization, free-market orientation, cosmopolitism and 
integration with the West); christian-national parties (authority, social order, 
collective morale, hard decommunization, populist corrections of market 
legitimacies and national authonomy); and post-communist parties or social 
democrate parties (liberalist concern for social libertanianism, mild support for 
economic populism” (Kitschelt, 1992, cited in Hristova, 2010, p.3). Kitschelt’s 
arguments, however, do not seem to hold for the situation in Hungary, due to its 
“over-implification and lack of differentiation” (Markus, 1998, p.7). Similarly, 
his thesis “according to which economic liberalism in post-communist societies 
are accompanied by political liberalism (double liberalism) has only partially 
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been confirmed in the case of the Republic of Macedonia” (Hristova, 2010, 
p.12).  
  On the other hand, Secor (2001) makes adjustment to both the Lipset-
Rokkan model and the Kitscheld cleavage model for a different analysis of the 
Turkish parliamentary elections of 1995. Through this adjustment, he splits 
cleavages into four categories: (1) Western versus Eastern orientation; (2) 
secularism versus Islamism; (3) collectivism versus pluralism and 4. market 
economy versus political redistribution of resources (Secor, 2001 cited in West, 
2005, p.503). Secor uses this approach in order to analyse the Turkish political 
system.  
 Compared to Secor (2001), Hazama (2003) uses three social cleavages 
which are represented by Sunni religiosity as opposed to secularism, Kurdish 
ethnicity as opposed to Turkish nationality and Alevi sectarism as opposed to 
Sunni religiosity. He investigates the relationship between the social cleavages 
and electoral support by using the model to analyse type of voter volatility and 
swing in votes (Bartolini and Mair, 1990 cited in Hazama, 2003, pp.362). 
Hazama (2003, pp.378-379) concludes that despite the intervention 1980, 
repeated elections after the transition to democratic regime have strengthened the 
ties between the political parties and and cleavage groups and reduced electoral 
volatility. Thus, he assumes that social cleavages and the party system seem to 
come together in Turkey.
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2.5.2 Work on Parties and Party Systems 
2.5.2.1 Work on Party Systems: Historical Approaches  
 Özbudun (1981) provides general information on the Turkish political 
party system, especially by looking at its historical evolution.  Tachau (2000) 
considers the evolution of Turkish political parties since the beginning of the 
multi-party system in terms of the impact of social changes on society. Tachau 
(2000) attempts to predict the future of democracy in Turkey. He argues that 
there are still risks regarding the role of the military but considers that the fact 
that there has not been a military  intervention in the last two decades to be a 
good sign. Regarding Turkish voters and their aspirations, he argues that 
peasants and the urban lower classes are aware of competitive elections as a 
powerful tool in order to express their socio-economic needs and economic 
interests.  
 Tachau (2002) discusses party fragmentation between 1961 and 1999, 
arguing that the parliaments between 1990 and 2002 had a high level of 
fragmentation since the proportion of votes going to the largest parties declined, 
along with their number of seats in the parliament (Tachau, 2002, p. 42). As a 
conclusion, he asserts that these fragmented coalition governments could not 
produce effective economic and social policies, thus, it led to an increase in 
dissatisfaction among voters. 
 Sayarı (2002) mainly discusses the evolving party system in Turkey, 
providing an historical account of the Turkish party system by referring to 
fragmentation in the party system. An article by Sayarı (1973) highlights the 
significance of fragmentation and polarization as in the Turkish party system at 
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the beginning of 1970s. Later, Sayarı (2002) argues that developments in the 
Turkish party system reveal both fragmentation and polarization that have had 
opposite effects on governmental changes in predominant party systems. Sayarı 
(2002) offers three assumptions about the future of Turkish political parties. 
First, that the AP gets further power within the party system; second, that the 
party system will become more competitive due to increases in CHP votes; and 
third, that the political party system will be interrupted by military intervention.  
Sayarı (2007) examines the impact of the 2002 parliamentary elections on 
the Turkish party system. He discusses whether, upon the AKP's emergence, a 
two-party system will replace past coalition and minority governments. After 
examining the changes regarding the party system, he discusses the possibilities 
for its future development. Similar to Sayarı (1973), Sayarı (2007) attempts to 
make a prediction regarding the future of the party system in Turkey. He stresses 
the emergence of a bi-polar party system in which only two parties—the AKP 
and the CHP—win seats in the parliament. He makes a further prediction 
regarding the future of the party system in Turkey. He argues that due to the 
asymetrical powers between the CHP and AKP, there is a higher chance for the 
continuation of single-party majority governments. As a second option, he 
considers the risk of having coalition governments in the case of increased 
fragmentation.  
In addition, depending on the distribution of seats among parties, he also 
predicts coalition governments of the CHP and other small parties in order to 
prevent the AKP from further entrenching its position in Turkish politics. 
Özbudun (2000) examines the democratic experience of Turkey from an 
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institutional angle. He examines the impact of military interventions, changes in 
the party system and constitutional changes on the democratization process in 
Turkey.  
2.5.2.2 Work on Elections and Party Organizations 
 İncioğlu (2002) attempts to find out if there is a parallel between local 
elections and legislative elections in Turkey by looking at the local elections of 
1994 and 1999 and at the legislative elections of 1995 and 1999. Through her 
investigation, she shows how voting behaviour has evolved in local elections 
and whether or not it differs from that occurring at parliamentary elections. 
 Sayarı (1978) examines party membership and the educational level of 
party members in regional and local party organizations in order to find out the 
main features of Turkish political party organizations. 
 Yeşilada (2002b), meanwhile, considers how party organization and 
electorate remained intact in the RP/FP despite the change in party in the years 
1997 – 2001. He claims that the general political shift towards right and 
weakening of centre-right parties have contributed to the RP/FP retaining voters’ 
strong allegiance. In addition, the deferrence of RP/FP voters towards the party 
leadership, i.e., N. Erbakan, initially played an important role in retaining their 
commitment. However, as Erbakan was banned from politics and the new 
leadership that took charge of the FP turned out weak, the reformist movement 
obtained the chance to grow fast, and establish the AKP. He asserts that these 
three reasons significantly improved the prospects of the renewed party to inherit 
the strong institutional order and constituence base of the RP/FP’s. 
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 Kalaycıoğlu (2002a) investigates the ANAP's party organization, its 
rhetoric of four strands, its charismatic and its place within the party system. He 
highlights the reasons behind the decrease in the ANAP's votes at the end of 
1990s.                             
 As with his previous work Yeşilada (2000b), Yeşilada (2002a) 
investigates how, despite the closure of Islamist parties, the organizational 
structures of dissolved parties and political elite groups remain intact by taking 
into account the RP/FP tradition.
68
 He looks at the party leadership, 
organizational strategies and tactics of the Islamist parties (the FP) to reach his 
conclusions. He concludes that the weakness in party adaptation occurred 
especially in terms of their party leader. He argues that due to lack of a strong 
leader in the FP, the reformists could establish their own party.  
2.6 Country Studies on Turkey and Turkish Politics  
2.6.1 Country Studies on Turkey 
 Recently, there has been an increase in the country studies on Turkey. 
Most of these studies focus on the AKP, Islam, democracy, secularism in 
Turkey. It is necessary to review this literature on country studies in order to 
understand how my stance related to the AKP is original.  
 Among this relevant literature, Yavuz (2003) considers the evolution of 
Islamist political parties from the perspective of the development of Islamic 
movements (Nur movement; Nakşibendi Sufi Order) in Turkey. In addition, he 
highlights how the Islamic movements have found expression in the political 
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 RP/FP tradition: As pointed out in the contextual chapter, the pro-Islamist party RP advocating 
Milli Gorus was closed down in 1997 as a result of the post-modern memorandum. Later on, the 
FP was established by asserting a more reformist stance than the FP. However, later on in 2002, 
the FP was closed down too. As both of them advocated Milli Görüş it is called the RP/FP 
tradition. 
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sphere since the beginning of the multiparty system in the 1950s. For instance, 
he analyses the Nakşibendi movement and how it influenced the formation of 
the MNP and the MSP in the 1970s.  Moreover, he demonstrates how the ANAP 
was approved by the Nur movement in 1980s. Lastly, he links the emergence of 
the AKP in 2002 to the transformation within the Islamist movements, especially 
the Nur movement (or in other words the Gülen Movement). Throughout his 
book, he argues that social movements can be useful agents for a more 
democratic and pluralistic society.  
 Furthermore, in conducting his analysis, he does not overlook Islamic 
parties’ discourse that focuses on economic issues and problems in Turkey (e.g. 
development of small-medium-size provincial business owners in the Anatolian 
provincial cities and the petite bourgeoisie in the larger cities due to the 
economic liberalization of the 1980s). 
 He further highlights how, throughout the 1990s, this Anatolian 
bourgeoisie used its economic power for other purposes such as in the political 
arena (e.g. the MÜSİAD, the RP as a political party) and social arena (e.g. 
education, media).  Hence, the main argument of Yavuz (2003) regarding is that 
the emergence of the AKP is a consequence of the growth of Islamic social 
movements as a protest against the authoritarian and secular state since the 
beginning of the multi-party system in Turkey, in 1950.  
 As compared to Yavuz, my main argument is not based on the impact of 
Islamic social movements on the AKP’s emergence; instead, I consider the 
emergence of the AKP as a result of changes in socio-economic structures 
especially since the 1980s. In addition, in terms of theoretical framework, Yavuz 
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(2003) adopted an amalgam of three approaches (essentialist; contextualist and 
constructivist) for his analysis of Islamic social movements and their political 
repercussions. Instead, I adopt the cleavage structure of Lipset-Rokkan (1967) as 
the underpinning theoretical framework. I locate the AKP on this four-fold 
cleavage structure and analyse further the AKP’s emergence and consolidation 
within the party system.  
 In his edited book, Yavuz (2006) gives an account of the AKP's first 
tenure of government from two main angles: first, ideological (which includes 
an examination of the AKP’s identity) and second, the policy-based angle.  He 
examines the military-civil society relationship; the economic, gender, and 
foreign policies of the AKP. In considering Yavuz (2006), it is important to look 
at Öniş (2004), which is cited by Yavuz (2006). Similar to various empirical 
works mentioned above, he argues that the corrupted centre-right parties of the 
1990s, the economic crisis of 2001 and the AKP’s EU discourse contributed 
directly to the emergence of the AKP. Similar to Öniş (2004), I argue that the 
main driving force was the economic crisis of 2001. However, I further 
demonstrate that the driving factor for its victory is not only the economy pre-
2002, but also also socio-economic changes which have impacted the whole of 
society since the 1980s.  
 I analyse the social changes from 1923 until 2010 in order to demonstrate 
how things have evolved in society and in order to demonstrate differences 
between social strata in the 1920s and social strata in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While keeping the longitudinal analysis as long as possible, my thesis provides a 
broader perspective since it demonstrates how social changes reflected into the 
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political arena over time. For instance, if the AKP existed in 1950, it would not 
have made such a difference to society because the majority of society was 
agrarian and their aspirations and their needs were completely different than the 
new intermerdiary strata of 2002.  
 In addition, it is also important to add that Öniş’s work focuses only on 
the emergence of the AKP. As compared to Öniş (2004) and other articles cited 
in Yavuz (2006), I extend my historical analysis further and I discuss the two 
terms of the AKP (2002-2007) and (2007-2011). Thus, this comprehensive 
analysis gives a broader picture of the ruling tenure of the AKP. While Öniş 
(2004) points out that the EU would be a positive anchor for Turkey’s 
democratic and economic development, in my thesis, I demonstrate that the AKP 
government has lost its momentum regarding the negotiations after 2007.  
 As with Yavuz (2006), Hale and Özbudun (2011) make a more updated 
analysis on the AKP's tenure and examine the AKP from both political and 
sociological angles. They provide an analysis of the AKP's ideological agenda, 
its social basis and the party's performance in public policy, political reform and 
cultural, economic and foreign policies. In their analysis, I want to emphasize 
their discussion related to the AKP’s social bases and highlight how it differes 
from my analysis. They trace the social bases of the AKP back to previous 
Islamist parties’ social bases, looking respectively at the social bases of the 
MNP, MSP and RP in order to understand the AKP’s social bases. However, 
they look at voting behaviour according to attitudinal factors (e.g. conservatism, 
religious practices, ethnicity, secularism) rather than the socio-economic 
characteristis of the social bases.  As compared to Hale and Özbudun (2011), I 
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did not look at the attitudinal characteristics of the electorate because my initial 
point was the changes in socio-economic structures and how they impacted upon 
social stratification in Turkey. Hale and Özbudun (2011), similar to Yavuz 
(2003), overlook the impact of the emerging intermediary strata in Turkey since 
they do not consider the AKP’s emergence as a sociological phenomenon.   
 Yavuz (2009) carefully investigates the first tenure of the AKP (2002-
2007), focusing on the secularism-democracy axis. While doing this 
investigation, Yavuz (2009) deals with various issues such as political 
participation, economy, foreign policy, the Kurdish question and the sovereignty 
of civilian government. As compared to Yavuz (2009), I look at the AKP’s 
rights-discourse during both ruling tenures of the AKP (2002-2007; 2007-2011). 
This longer historical approach provides strength to the analysis since the AKP’s 
second ruling tenure was completely different than its first one when various 
factors (e.g. civil-military relations, control of media, Kurdish and Alevi 
initiatives)  are taken into account. In addition, if the third ruling tenure is 
considered, it will be observed how authoritarian the AKP government has 
become since 2011.   
 Aside from Yavuz (2003, 2006, and 2009), Hale and Özbudun’s (2011) 
works which adopt specifically a party-based approach, Cizre (2007) in turn 
focuses on the phases that the AKP’s political discourse has undergone. She first 
analyses the AKP's initial reformist
69
 discourse with emphasis on fundamental 
rights during its first three years in office; then she demonstrates how the AKP's 
reformist discourse has shifted to an inward-looking conservative and nationalist 
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 AKP’s reformist discourse is based on its pro-Western, pro-EU and democratization. As it will 
be demonstrated in chapter 5, the AKP made necessary amendments which were required by the 
Copenhagen criterion. 
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position. Cizre (2007), in her analysis of the AKP stresses mostly the impact of 
the international context, such as US policies; the relationship with the EU as 
well as the global forces of Islam. She brings an international outlook to the 
AKP’s changing political discourse. As compared to Cizre’s (2007) international 
level analysis of the AKP, I focus on the internal dynamics, the rights discourse 
and the EU discourse of the AKP.  The main stance of Cizre (2007) is similar 
to that of Hale and Özbudun (2011); they view the AKP phenomenon as a 
democratization of Muslims and a new political formation against the Kemalist, 
secularist regime. However, in their stance, they omit the way in which Turkish 
society has evolved, especially since the 1980s; the way in which society has 
developed new aspirations and new demands and the way in which the AKP has 
answered those needs. For instance, Hale and Özbudun (2011) and Yavuz and 
Cizre (2007) omit the impact of social policies through which the AKP has 
consolidated itself by targeting its main constituency’s core needs. Thus, my 
main contribution to the existing literature is to go beyond this monolithic 
analysis of the AKP from its emergence until its consolidation in 2007 by 
looking at both the AKP itself and its constituency.  
 Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) make a broader analysis of political 
parties and elections and investigate the democratic process since the beginning 
of the multi-party system. Moreover, in the light of the Islamic-leaning AKP’s 
ten-year tenure, scholars question which way Turkish society will go in the 
future.
70
 They predict that Turkish society in voting terms will move further 
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 The alternatives can be considered as two extremes like secular, western-style democracy and 
a country which is governed by Shar’ia law. In these two extremes, Turkey has become a more 
conservative during the AKP’s ten-year tenure. Similarly, people wished a country governed by 
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towards the right on the axis of ideology. In my thesis, I look at the impact of the 
AKP’s entrenchment into Turkish politics and how it will impact the longer-term 
restructuring of the party system. I first look at the structural changes in society 
under the cleavage structure. Then, I attempt to predict the structuring of the 
party system. Thus, as compared to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007), I look at 
the issue from a party-system perspective.  
 Furthermore, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) look in detail at how 
society has rushed towards “conservatism, traditionalism and parochialism” over 
the last two decades. By making an empirical analysis, based on a 2006 survey, 
they try to decode the guiding forces of current Turkish society. As compared to 
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009), the main driving point in my thesis is the 
impact of the structural factors together with the conjunctural factors on the 
emergence of AKP. Similar to their work, I also discuss how the entrenchment 
of AKP’s position in Turkish society represents a shift from secularism to 
conservatism. However, as compared to their positive stance, I take an 
interpretive epistemology in order to analyse this religiosity-secularism 
cleavage. 
2.6.2 Studies on Turkish Politics 
 In addition to country studies on Turkey, there are various works on the 
historical development of Turkish politics and modernization in Turkey. As I 
have used them in writing the contextual chapter, I will refer to this chapter for 
further details. In short, Ahmad (1977 and 1993) examines Turkish politics by 
emphasizing democratization attempts and military interventions. Zürcher 
                                                                                                                                              
Shar’ia law decreased from 21% in 1999 decreased to 7% in 2008 (Hürriyet, 2006). 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/5477351.asp 
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(2008) provides a broad account of Turkey from the end of the 18th century up 
until the beginning of the 21st century by investigating modernization and 
democratization attempts. As with Ahmad (1993) and Zürcher (2008), Çavdar 
(2008a and 2008b) provides an account of Turkish political history (19
th
 century 
up to 2007) by emphasizing on the attempts for democratization and the military 
obstacles. Kalaycıoğlu (2005) looks at the historical evolution of Turkish politics 
by taking into account both socio-economic change (e.g. urbanization; 
industrialization; migration to cities) and political factors (e.g. relations between 
military and civilian governments to control the state).  
 Tanör et al. (2011) examine the history of Turkey in terms of political 
events, economic history and left-wing, Islamist and nationalist movements.  
 In addition to the history of Turkish politics, works on individual Turkish 
parties have been of importance in order to grasp the evolution of Turkish parties 
in the period 1923 – 2010. Kaynar et al. (2006) provide a detailed history of 
political parties since the Republican era (1923-2010), by giving useful 
information on all parties’ establishment, closure, percentage vote and number 
of seats. Mert (2007) looks at the history of the centre-right in Turkey. She 
analyses numerous centre and extreme right-wing political parties, including 
nationalist and Islamist parties. Her analysis presents useful information on the 
similarities and differences between the parties examined. 
2.7 Turkish Literature on the Structure of Turkish Society and Political 
Islam  
 The way in which Turkish society is analysed/should be analysed has 
been an important and controversial subject since the beginning of the Republic 
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(1923). Kongar (2008) explains the different approaches to the analysis of 
Turkish politics and society in his book called Social Change in Turkey (2008). 
It is important to look at it for my thesis since it demonstrates main theories used 
for the analysis of Turkish society. Since I investigate the changes in social 
structures of the AKP as a research question, it is crucial to review theories 
related to the Turkish society.  
2.7.1 Analysis of Turkish Society: Application of Western Theories and 
Models to Analysis of the Turkish-Ottoman Society up to 1980s 
 Turkish society is the heir to that which existed during the Ottoman 
Empire. Therefore, for a thorough analysis of Turkish society, it is argued that 
one needs to look at its past; i.e. Ottoman society (Kongar, 2008, p.318). The 
analysis of Turkish-Ottoman society has been undertaken using two main 
approaches. The first approach considers that the development of the Ottoman 
social structure was similar to the development of Western societies. The main 
scholar using this approach was Kıray (1969) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.323).  
 The second approach considers Ottoman social structure as an original 
variety, distinct from its Western European counter parts. The scholars who have 
adopted this point of view are Mardin (1968); Sencer (1969); İnalcık (1970); 
Divitçioğlu (1971); Cin (1978); Berktay (1980), Kılıçbay (1982) as cited in 
Kongar (2008, p.324). As scholars who adopt the second approach are unable to 
differentiate the Turkish-Ottoman example from the classic western class 
development models, they apply specific dual models to their analysis, as will be 
mentioned below (Kongar, 2008, p.325).  
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 These dual models are based on the division between the state and the 
people. During the first years of the Republic, this duality continued as a 
division between rulers and the ruled. Mardin (1973) considers the division in 
terms of a centre-periphery dichotomy. The centre is constituted by the state and 
its representatives, while the periphery is formed by the rest of society (notables, 
rural masses, merchants, tradesmen) (Kongar, 2008, p.320).  
 Furthermore, Karpat (1973) emphasises this dual model and claims that 
during the creation of the nation-state, there was a need for a proper leader and 
his representatives who formed the statist/ruling groups. It is important to 
mention that this group was different from the middle-class existing in the 
Western European societies (Karpat, 1973 cited in Kongar, 2008, p.320). 
 Similarly, Kongar (1985) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.321) explains his 
own dual model which is composed of two fronts: the statist/elitist front and the 
traditionalist/liberal front. The former represented authority and had an elitist 
and statist approach, whereas the latter represented defenders of the religion, 
Islam and the Ottoman tradition (Kongar, 2008, p.321). In the 1970s, due to 
shifts which had taken place in Turkish society (e.g. migration to big cities), 
scholars began to analyse Turkish society from two different angles: the 
ecological (spatial) angle and the class angle (Kongar, 2008, p.326). I will 
discuss spatial and class in turn and then, move to more recent literature.  
 First, ecological analysis is also referred to as a spatial analysis in 
relation to the rural-urban space occupied by shanty towns. Ozankaya’s work on 
the political structure of villages (1971) and Sencer’s work (1971) focus on rural 
areas (using a combined ecological and class approach) and are considered as the 
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main works on rural social structure (Ozankaya, 1971; Sencer, 1971 cited in 
Kongar, 2008, p.330). Tonguç’s analysis (1967) as cited in Kongar (2008, 
p.333), in turn, is considered as a good assessment of the Village Institutes (Köy 
Enstitüleri), schools that existed between 1945 and 1954 in Turkey. They were 
established in the framework of a rural development project, and served as co-
educational boarding schools.  
 In addition, the ecological approach takes into account the division 
between urban and squatter areas. One of the main works on urbanization is that 
of Yavuz et al. (1973) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.331). Kongar points out that 
there is a considerable  work on urbanization and city squatters such as  Gökçe 
(1971) on the youth living in city squats and Erder’s (1982) work on squatting 
(Gökçe, 1971; Erder, 1982 cited in Kongar, 2008, p.331). 
 Kongar argues that squatting is often mentioned in the literature on 
urbanization; the main reason for this is related to the high level of movement of 
populations in urban squatter areas, which reflects their disclosure to social 
change (Kongar, 2008, p.329). In previous decades, social networks in squatter 
areas helped newcomers “to find land and construct ‘gecekondus’ and also 
access informal income opportunities, and ultimately to integrate into urban 
settings (Buğra and Keyder, 2003). 
 The second reason is that the analysis of Turkish society was an 
important issue in the 1970s, due to increasing dynamics such as migration to 
urban areas from rural areas. In the literature, no appropriate analysis of Turkish 
society from a class-based approach has been conducted (Kongar, 2008, p.329). 
Nevertheless, some studies emphasize social structure from the perspective of 
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class development (Kongar, 2008, p.333). These studies have been conducted by 
Cem (1970), Özgür (1972), Yerasimos (1974, 1975, and 1976), Gevgilili (1981) 
and Avcıoğlu (1973) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.333). 
2.7.2 Recent Turkish Literature on the Analysis of Turkish Society: 1980 
to the present 
 While the analysis of Turkish-Ottoman society was based on dual models
 
due to its difference from West European societies, it is argued that Turkish 
social structure began to change after 1950 and that a class structure similar to 
that of western societies began to emerge. As a result, the usage of class analysis 
of society became possible (Kongar, 2008, p.340). The changes in Turkish 
society have continued with greater intensity since 1980 as Turkey entered a 
phase of radical transformation in both demographic and socio-economic terms. 
Given this dynamic society, models and theories for societal analysis also 
changed. Below, I review recent literature, while focusing on the dual centre-
periphery model. 
  Mardin’s centre-periphery (1973) approach has been a key in analysing 
Turkish politics in the 1970s. As mentioned in 2.6.1, Mardin’s centre-periphery 
approach demonstrated the division between the centre and the rest of society. 
Throughout the Ottoman legacy, this division in society was quite distinctive. 
Later, during the first modernization period of the 19
th
 century, attempts to 
modernize and secularize the state made this separation deeper. As a result, the 
centre found a suitable environment to flourish, whereas the masses found 
themselves isolated in their conservative milieu (Mardin, 1973). Contrary to 
Mardin, Boratav (2005) states that the ruling class, in terms of the centre, 
132 
 
received greater status than normal. Instead, he asserts that the ruling class is 
formed by civil servants, therefore, they have to be analysed from a class-based 
analysis.  
 Despite the debate on the model for analysis, the centre-periphery 
relations model still retains its importance. In addition, in the recent literature, 
Kahraman (2008) suggests another approach to Mardin’s centre-periphery 
relations. He refers to the centre as the historical bloc (army officials, 
intellectuals and bureaucrats) which has played a great role in modernizing the 
state from the 19
th
 century to 1950. In his analysis, he refers to Gramsci’s 
concept of ‘historical bloc’ (1971) which is used as a tool to explain the 
formation of historical coalitions between different actors to achieve different 
gains (Kahraman, 2008, p.123).  
 Kahraman’s revised version of the centre-periphery approach is 
important, as he takes into account socio-economic and political changes since 
the 1980s. He asserts that due to the dynamic structure of Turkish society, 
centre-periphery relations have to be examined. In addition, he refers to 
Gramscian class analysis, in order to explain the rise of new economic and 
political classes (Kahraman, 2008, p.139). 
  In consequence, he elaborates on the basic centre-periphery model by 
adding two sub-concepts: ‘the periphery at the centre’ and ‘the centre at the 
periphery’. The former (the periphery at the centre) seeks to explicate the 
cleavages between people living in the centres of big cities and people living in 
the shanty towns around the centres of big cities (e.g. İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, 
Antep and Mersin). The latter (the centre at the periphery) refers to the new 
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devout/religious bourgeoisie, which has emerged in the provincial cities since 
the 1980s and which has become a new centre at the periphery of the Turkish 
nation-state (Kahraman, 2008, p. 187 and p.235). 
 In addition, he seeks to explain the differences and the similarities behind 
these new sociological blocs: the periphery at the centre and the centre at the 
periphery. He emphasizes changing patterns outside of the historical bloc for 
instance; recently, the periphery (both the periphery at the centre and the centre 
at the periphery) has begun to be represented politically by the AKP. 
 In addition to Kahraman, Tuğal’s (2009) analysis of the AKP is worthy 
of mention. He looks at the AKP’s term in office in the light of Gramsci’s 
‘passive revolution’ notion, and concludes that the AKP has contributed to the 
“free-market”/neo-liberal economy’s deep entrenchment in society. In addition, 
through its conservative and pro-Islamic discourse, the AKP has gained the 
support of a unique segment of society (‘the Islamist/conservative’) which has 
been against neoliberal economy. As a result, the existing system has absorbed 
the capitalist economic model and the neoliberal economic model. 
2.7.3 Studies on the Emerging Devout Bourgeoisie and on the 
Development of Turkish Society and Economy 
 Due to huge changes in Turkish society, recent literature has focused on 
the rise of the Islamist bourgeoisie in the 1990s.  Öniş (1997) has considered the 
emerging devout bourgeoisie as an economic class which has benefited from the 
1980’s economic policies. He considers this class as winners of the 
liberalization, arguing that they were the main supporters of the RP in 1990s. 
Similar to Öniş, Gülalp (2001) investigates the social basis of the RP. These 
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studies on the RP have been important, as the social basis of the RP is similar to 
that of the AKP. 
 In more recent literature, İnsel (2003), Demir et al. (2004) and Yavuz 
(2006) argue that the emerging Anatolian capitalists is related to the 
transformation of political Islam, and thereby the AKP's emergence. Considering 
the AKP as an actor of neo-liberal transformation, Uzgel (2010) argues that the 
Islamist bourgeoisie has been a catalyst for the transformation of political Islam 
in Turkey. Gümüşçü (2010) specifically analyses the Anatolian bourgeoisie in 
her work. In addition, as a non-scholarly research, ESI (European Stability 
Initiative) in 2005 analysed the Islamist bourgeoisie and named it as Islamist 
Calvinists due to both their hard work and their religious lives.  
 As with the above authors, Teazis (2011) argues that the emerging 
Islamist capitalists have contributed to the emergence of the AKP.  However, he 
looks at the AKP's evolution from its historical roots, and demonstrates how the 
AKP’s rise marked a break in the Republican ideology which had been dominant 
since 1923. In addition, he uses a theoretical framework based on Marx's 
historical philosophy and Weber's sociological teachings. Contrary to scholars 
who argue that the Islamist bourgeoisie has been an important factor in society, 
economy and politics, Buğra and Savaşkan (2010) take a more critical approach 
towards the emergence of the Islamist bourgeoisie. They evaluate the economic 
impact of this Islamist bourgeoisie, and question how strong it is within the 
economy. They conclude that despite the improvements in Islamist bourgeoisie, 
the main big industrialists and businesses still remain powerful.  
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 In addition to studies on the Islamist bourgeoisie, this thesis relies on 
studies which look at the Turkish economy and society from a historical angle. 
Pamuk (2009) and Yenal (2010) give a historical account of the Turkish 
economy since the end of the Ottoman Empire up until the current decade.  They 
provide useful material which allows one to understand the changing economic 
policy landscape over time; for instance the period 1930-1950 is characterized 
by state-oriented policies. Mehmet (1998) compares two different countries, 
Turkey and Malaysia, from the perspective of their economic evolution. The 
latter constitutes a useful source of information on the main economic 
breakthrough periods in Turkey (e.g. Turkish statism of the 1950s; import-
substitution of 1960s etc.). Koç (2010) examines the working class in Turkey, 
taking into account labour unions, legal changes, and socio-economic changes. 
He uses a chronological approach. 
  Compared to previous works, Kongar (2011) gives a historical account 
of the societal structure of Turkey since the end of the Ottoman Empire. While 
looking at the importance of the socio-economic transformation, he takes into 
consideration both political and historical changes.  
 In this section, I demonstrated how Turkish society is currently analysed 
in Turkish scholarly literature. Mainly dual-models such as centre-periphery 
have been used, since a class-based analysis fails to fit the Turkish society. I 
have looked at those theories in order to understand changes in social structures 
in Turkey. Therefore, I have looked at theories from the Republican era to the 
present, in order to find out the suitable theoretical framework.  
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2.8 Non-scholarly Literature on Turkish Society, Economy, and Politics 
 In addition to the scholarly literature on Turkish politics and Turkish 
society, I have used an important amount of non-scholarly work. For the analysis 
of changes in Turkish socio-economic structures, I have collected reports from 
various research organisations.  For example, a 2002 pre-election survey by 
A&G Araştırma (Research) looks at the evolution of the distribution of votes 
from 1999, as well as voter profiles (A&G Araştırma, 2002). The pre-election 
survey results relate to voter expectations about Turkey’s future. Similarly, a 
2007 pre-parliamentary election survey examines voter profiles according to 
education; occupational category and geographical region (A&G Araştırma, 
2007a).   
 A further report, commissioned by a left-wing political party
71
  (A&G 
Araştırma, 2010) looks at voter profiles, and categorises them as nationalist, 
secular, religious and Kemalist (Atatürkçü
72). In addition, it presents voters’ 
opinions on the global economic crisis of 2009, the ruling party’s performance 
and on lead media headlines of January 2010. Finally, the report investigates 
voters’ political tendencies according to family party orientation or party 
tradition.  
                                                     
71
 The DSP: the Left-wing political party.  
72
 Kemalist (Atatürkçü) is an individual who adopts and advocates the six founding principles of 
the Republik: republicanism, nationalism, statism, secularism, revolutionalism, and populism. 
Since these are at the same time the principles of the state-founding party CHP, a Kemalist is 
normaly also a member or adherent of the CHP. A Turkish nationalist in turn regards Islam as 
part of the Turkish identity. This is the fundamental difference between them, since the 
Kemalists are strict secularists. The Turkish nationalists are the members or adherents of the 
MHP. 
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 Furthermore, Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık73 (Konda Research and 
Consultancy) have also conducted similar surveys. The Konda Araştırma carried 
out a detailed pre-election survey before the 2007 elections, through which they 
identified voting according to gender, age, education, household size, 
employment, income and place of residence (Konda Research, 2007). Moreover, 
they looked at changes in voting patterns between the elections of 2002 and 
2007. In addition, I have used Ağırdır’s  (2007a) commentary on the finding of 
Konda’s pre-election survey of 2007. In further work, Ağırdır (2007b) makes a 
broad analysis of Turkish politics after the elections of 2007, which he 
considered as mould-breaking.  
 In addition to surveys on voting and voter profiles, further research 
reports have dealt with related subjects such as that of deprived shanty town 
dwellers. For example, one report demonstrates the demographic characteristics 
of shanty town residents, their political preferences, lifestyles, values and 
opinions on Turkish politics (Ağırdır, 2008).  
The Turkish Institute of Statistics also produces important survey data 
among which data on provincial social indicators (TÜİK, 2004) and national 
census data (e.g. 1980, 1990 and 1995) has proved useful (TÜİK website).   
 While surveys have provided invaluable empirical data, other non-
scholarly sources of information include reports and policy papers published by 
international organisations such as the World Bank and the UNDP, political 
parties and various Turkish state agencies. For example, the World Bank reports 
on gender policies and the position of women in Turkey (Acar et al., 2003) and 
                                                     
73
 Konda Araştırma also provided to me the raw data of the survey conducted in 2007. In chapter 
4 and 5, I made some regressions to prove my evidences.  
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on the Turkish labour market (World Bank, 2006); a policy paper, in 
collaboration with the Turkish state planning agency, (World Bank, 2009a); or a 
UNDP report on new poverty and Turkey’s changing welfare regime (Buğra and 
Keyder, 2003) have been used to inform chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 Similarly, another policy paper on Issue Histories Turkey discusses the 
evolution of equality policies from a historical angle
74
 (Acar et al., 2007). 
 Furthermore, reports and works prepared by foreign research centers 
have also been used in the writing of this thesis. For instance, the Pew Research 
Centre’s Global Attitudes Project on Muslim views worldwide was helpful in 
understanding Turkish views on various topics as compared with views from 
other Muslim-majority Countries (namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, 
Turkey and Pakistan) (PewResearchCenter, 2012). The International Policy 
Analysis Unit’s work on Turkey’s attempts at EU accession has also helped in 
understanding EU processes and issues relating to the European economy, social 
interest groups (minorities, women, civil society organizations, trade unions, and 
media) and political landscape (Aslan, 2006).   
2.9 Conclusion 
 The literature on parties, party systems and voting behaviour has 
revealed that there are different theories and models which can be applied to the 
Turkish party political system and voting. Certain theories are also helpful in 
making sense of why Turkish voters have decided to vote for the AKP since 
2002 and how the AKP has consolidated itself within the party system. 
Empirical works on voting patterns in Turkey and party politics have contributed 
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 Institute for Human Sciences Vienna QUING (Quality in Gender and Equality Policies) 
139 
 
to the reinforcement of my arguments related to AKP’s emergence and 
consolidation. Furthermore, country studies on Turkey demonstrate how the 
literature on Turkey and the AKP has increased in parallel to the interest in 
Turkish politics amongst Western and Turkish scholars, media and political 
observers. The presence of a ‘pro-Islamic’ government party that possesses 
hybrid socio-economic characteristics pursues new approaches in Turkish 
foreign policy, and more importantly, displays rather impressive performances 
that very likely account for this increase in interest. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction  
 This thesis investigates both the development of the Turkish political 
party system and the changes in the socio-economic structures which have 
worked in favour of the ruling AKP. Therefore, the research approach is 
underpinned by two different theoretical models. Within this dual-theoretical 
framework, I have adopted a qualitative methodology to guide my research 
process. In order to elaborate my research process, I first discuss this supporting 
theoretical framework.  I then clarify my research strategy in detail, by including 
ontological and epistemological positions. Afterwards, I present my research 
methods which are based on in-depth interviews; archival research and analysis 
of quantitative data. I also discuss the data collection process, data analysis and 
the problems I encountered during the data collection process. Lastly, I look at 
the ethical considerations. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework, Research Strategy and Research Orientations 
3.2.1 Theoretical Framework and Research Strategy 
 The process of data collection, analysis and interpretation needs a 
framework to be designed in order to complete the objectives of the study. For 
my project, I have not chosen a unique theoretical paradigm to lead my research, 
due to differentiation among research objectives. However, I have adopted two 
main theoretical models to guide my research and influence my choice of 
method. In Chapter 2, I looked at the literature on the main political parties and 
the scholarly work on Turkish society and politics, as one of the aims of this 
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study is to investigate the impact of both political developments and socio-
economic factors in analysing the emergence and success of the AKP. I draw 
upon two theoretical models from this literature to guide my research strategy 
and methods. 
 Consequently, the general theoretical framework is based on both the 
cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and the centre-periphery relations 
(Shils, 1961; Shils, 1975; Mardin, 1973 and Kahraman, 2008).  
 The former theory is deduced from Talcott Parsons’ paradigm of societal 
changes (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, pp.7-10). When the Parsonian paradigm is 
traced back further, it is seen that Parson used a thoroughly Weberian class 
analysis in his works (Tribe, 2007, p.222). 
 The latter, the centre-periphery relations theory, was initially developed 
by Shils (1961, p.117; Shils, 1975, p.3). Mardin (1973, pp.183-184) was inspired 
by Shils’s work on centre-periphery and adopted it as a tool to analyse Turkish 
politics and society. In recent times, Kahraman (2008) further took into 
consideration Mardin’s centre-periphery approach by referring to both Gramsci 
and Gramscian class analysis (Gramsci, 1971, pp.202-205, p.366, p.377 and 
p.418). Furthermore, he expanded the concepts related to the centre-periphery 
relations, in order to incorporate the recent dynamics in Turkish society into his 
model. As with the cleavage structure’s roots, the centre and periphery relation 
also has its roots in Weber’s class analysis.  
 Moreover, when the cleavage-structure (Lipset and Rokkan) and centre-
periphery relations model are traced back in terms of theoretical lines, it is 
observed that both of them originate in the Weberian class approach. The two 
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models mentioned above underpin the mainly qualitative methodology of this 
research. Below, my intent is to develop these theoretical models, explain how 
they function in my study and how they influenced my choice of method. 
3.2.1.1 Lipset and Rokkan’s Cleavage Structure and the Development of 
the Turkish Party System 
 Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure is well suited to answer the 
research questions relating to the impact of the general political conjuncture of 
the early 2000s on the electoral victory of the AKP.  
 Political developments in late Republican era up to the present have been 
shaped by the dynamics and tensions between numerous political parties (e.g. 
left-wing vs. right-wing; Turkish nationalist vs. Kurdish minority nationalist; 
pro-Islamist vs. secular). Therefore, the theoretical framework for these research 
questions rests on a theory demonstrating the evolution of the political party 
system, rather than a party theory which relates to a single party (e.g. spatial 
competition; institutional party approach to ideology (Ware, 1996, p.18 and 
p.21).  
 As mentioned earlier in the first section of Chapter 2 (2.1), the main 
theories on the political party system are classified by Ware (1996) according to 
sociological, institutional and competition factors. Among these three main 
theories of the development of political party systems, Lipset and Rokkan argue 
that social conflict shapes political parties rather than political institutions, and 
therefore they claim that the explanation of different political party systems and 
related electoral systems is possible only through a sociological approach (Ware, 
1996, pp.188-189).  
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 This cleavage structure emphasises the importance of sociological factors 
suits the analysis of political developments in Turkey. In particular, because 
Turkey has not yet reached the same stage of economic and political 
development as western democracies, I argue that Turkish political 
developments have been mostly led by the dynamics of society or through the 
social cleavages in terms of the Lipset-Rokkan theory. Consequently, I consider 
that the suitable theoretical model for the analysis of political developments, as 
well as the analysis of the AKP, is the Lipset-Rokkan’s cleavage structure.  
 As was pointed out in detail in 2.1, the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure 
is based on the four divisions which are respectively centre-periphery; state-
church; land-industry and owner-worker
75
. I incorporated them into my research 
frame in order to investigate both political developments in Turkey and analyse 
the AKP within the Turkish political party system Below, I discuss how I 
incorporated these four cleavages into the Turkish political party system. I 
started this discussion first with centre-periphery division, and then I looked at 
the state-church one. Third, I moved to the land-industry, and lastly I looked at 
the employer-worker cleavage.   
 First, conflict in terms of centre-periphery divisions is created in order to 
demonstrate the struggle between the centre of Turkish society which favours 
the nation-state
76
 on the one hand, and ethnically, linguistically or religiously 
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 Owner-worker: I considered that the term employer would be much more suitable than the 
word ‘owner’. Therefore, as compared to literature review chapter 2, I will use the word 
“employer” while incorporating it into Turkish party system.  
76
 Nation-State: It is also important to mention the national bourgeoisie during this nation-state 
making process. In the early Republican era, State  supported business circles in order create its 
own national bourgeoisie (Der Spiegel, 2008; Insel, 2012) 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-orhan-pamuk-i-m-for-europe-
democracy-and-freedom-of-opinion-a-584586-2.html 
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distinct groups (periphery) which resist the homogenization
77
 of the country on 
the other hand. Even though this cleavage is developed as a tool to explain 
European party systems (Ware, 1996, p.186), it is possible to apply it in the 
Turkish context. First of all, following the establishment of the Republic in 
1923, Turkey’s political system implemented numerous reforms aiming to 
standardize language, religion and education in order to control sub-national or 
peripheral units. The exclusive emphasis on Turkish as the national language of 
the country; the unification/centralization
78
 of the school system and the 
imposition of state-controlled religion
79
 illustrate these attempts to homogenize 
the country.  
 In addition, the introduction of reforms during the period 1922-1937 
were conceived by the Kurdish minority as a threat to its linguistic and cultural 
differences and by religious circles as to their freedom of expression and practice 
of religion.  
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1098420&CategoryI
D=98 
In addition, during the nation-state process, different groups of the centre which are mainly 
bureaucracy; intellectuals and military formed the so-called bloc “historical bloc” (Kahraman, 
2008). Kahraman (2008) also asserts that the bloc did not last smoothly throughout history.  
77
 Ware (1996) emphasizes the homogenization of the country when he analyses the centre-
periphery division of Lipset-Rokkan. Throughout homogenization, this means cultural 
homogenization and the ethnic assimilation of the country. As a result, the minorities should not 
use their own languages. The different sects such Alevis should not practice their own religious 
rituals, but only the Sunni-Islam  
78
 centralization/unification:  After the establishment of Republic, the religious schools 
(“medreses”) were closed down and  the  education became uniform under guidance of the Milli 
Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education) (formerly Maarif Vekaleti (Ministry of 
Education), based on the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (Öğretim Birliği Yasası) (Law of Uniform 
Education) of 3th March 1924. This was one of the main reforms and aimed at fight against 
illiteracy and education of the nation. 
79
  State-controlled religion: After the establishment of Republic in 1923, religious activities in 
public began to be subordinated under the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious 
Affairs) that appoints preachers (“imams”) and other religious officials as state personnel. 
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 The conflict in terms of language and religion is a useful frame in which 
to explain political developments in Turkey while taking into account the feed-
back effect of problems related to religion and ethnicity into political party 
system. However, as I consider the religion issue with state-church cleavage, this 
cleavage is mostly useful tool to explain the impact of minority groups (e.g. 
Kurdish) on the AKP’s electoral victory. 
 Second, the state-church cleavage emerged due to conflict between State 
and Church which existed in Western European countries. This conflict 
demonstrates a parallelism with the confrontation between the centrist state and 
religious circles. Hence, I am using the western conception of state-church 
cleavage to explain the traditionally Kemalist state and the religious groups in 
Turkey.  
 Ware points out that after the 1789 Revolution in France, the French 
state, over a period of time, imposed the duty of loyalty of the citizens to the 
state and therefore it spent an incredible effort in educating citizens in a way 
which achieved a secular state system. Similarly, the Turkish state has imposed a 
secular education system through which the aim was to control the relationship 
between the nation-state and the individual citizen (Ware, 1996, p.187; Burdy 
and Marcou, 1995, p.13). As mentioned before in chapter 1, the Republic of 
Turkey was established in 1923. Later, in 1937, religion was strictly separated 
from state affairs and was put under the control of the secular state (Berkeş, 
1998, p.19). 
 Even though the predominant religion in Turkey is Islam rather than 
Christianity, the political divisions between the state and Islam are likely to 
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mimic the state-church cleavage of the West. The commonality between the 
Church and Islam can be explained by looking at Durkheim’s theory of religion 
and conflict (Giddens, 1971, p.107). Durkheim argued that the Church was not 
only related to the western societies, but to any society, since all the religions are 
composed of ritual prescriptions and prohibitions which enforce a radical 
separation between what he called the profane (i.e. anything that is 
unconsecrated
80
, impure and not concerned with religious purposes) and the 
sacred (all that is worthy of respect, reverence and related to religious purposes).  
 In accordance with Durkheim’s theory, the state-church cleavage 
structures political developments in Turkey related to the tension between the 
secular and pro-Islamic groups, especially after the emergence of the AKP in 
2002. Therefore, this cleavage can be used to analyse and understand the pro-
Islamic past of the AKP, the electoral success of the AKP and its conservative 
world view. 
  A further important division is the land-industry division. While relating 
this conflict to the Turkish context and how it impacts  on the Turkish political 
party system, it is important to mention that Turkey has never had a post-
industrialist period, and has never had a stable political party system either. This 
has led some scholars to point out that there is no close correlation between 
economic development and the development of the Turkish party system (Ayata, 
2002, p.138). 
  However, industrialist groups, irrespective of whether they are state-
supported or are beneficiaries of economic liberalization (like in the 1980s), 
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  Unconsecrated: all things which are not dedicated to as sacred purpose. 
147 
 
have had  an impact on the creation and/or development of liberal oriented 
parties (e.g. creation of the state bourgeoisie with the help of the CHP (from the 
1923-1950); the DP and its liberal oriented policies (1945-1960) or the pro-
Islamic parties such as the RP, the FP and the AKP (i.e. the rise of new 
Anatolian capitalists
81
 since 1980s) (Keyder, 1989, p.97; Kahraman, 2008, 
pp.233-234).  
 In consequence, Ayata’s argument cannot be entirely accepted, since 
there was to be a close mutual relationship between the Turkish political parties 
and the economic development. Therefore, I utilize the land-industry cleavage in 
order to understand the impact of economic development on political parties in 
Turkey and as political party systems’ contribution to industrialist or landed 
interest groups.   
 Furthermore, while making this link, I take into account a definition of 
cleavage developed by Gallagher et al. (2005). Their definition of cleavage 
emphasizes the distinctiveness of the group, common conscience and 
institutional existence (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373). 
 The last two notions (common conscience and institutional existence) 
make most sense in the Turkish context. The interest groups’ awareness of their 
                                                     
81 Throughout the research, I have witnessed different words to explain the Anatolian capitalists. 
First of all, the name “Anatolian” is used to identify these Capitalists, since these business and 
industrial circles are mostly located at the inner Anatolia and at Anatolian provincial cities (Map 
on Appendix Part F, Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). Hence, the majority of them are not located at the 
metropolitan cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Adana. In addition, as compared to other 
scholars Gümüşçü (2010) and Yavuz (2010), I have not used the term “bourgeoisie” in order to 
qualify the capitalist groups. However, since there is still on-going discussion Pamuk (2009); 
Buğra (2010) and İnsel (2012) on the usage of term bourgeoisie, I have used the term 
“Anatolian/Provincial Capitalists” to qualify these new business and industrial circles at the 
provincial areas. Moreover, some scholars such as Gümüsçü (2010) used the adjective “devout” 
in order to differentiate them from the big businessmen and industrialists of metropolitan cities 
who have secular and modern lifestyles.  
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common belonging can be seen in the rise of the devout/provincial bourgeoisie 
in Turkey. Among the variable of this cleavage (land and industry), I solely took 
into account the pressure groups which are related to the industry and I did not 
look at the land side. I chose only the industry divide because I considered the 
industrial pressure groups, as a more important group in the country as compared 
with the pressure groups related to the land or agriculture. As a consequence, the 
political and institutional expression of their place in this specific cleavage 
(industry) is considered in the establishment of the AKP. 
 The final cleavage is that between owners and managers of land/industry 
and workers. In Turkey, the factors which have influenced the conversion of the 
employer-worker cleavage into political parties are not similar to those prevalent 
in European countries. First of all, the establishment of left-wing parties is based 
neither on an industrial revolution, nor on the growth of a working class.   The 
creation of worker strata or classes is not based on a class bottom-up process.  
 As Kongar points out, in Turkish politics, the Left was built up in a 
rather artificial way (Kongar, 2011, p.635). Therefore, the declining path  of the 
Left parties and the shift of the votes from the Left to the Right parties after the 
military  intervention of 1980 is not surprising, since the Left had been 
previously built from a top-down approach through political efforts and 
ideological guidance. As will be seen in the chapter 4, the State itself supported 
the establishment of trade unions and associations for workers in the 1960s 
(Kongar, 2011, p.635) 
 In consequence, the class of workers and peasants in Turkish society has 
never had a great impact on the economic system which was originally 
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dominated by the bureaucrats and the corporatist bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989, 
p.107). In addition, the Left has been structured through political orientation, and 
not through a labour movement. Therefore, the employer -worker cleavage does 
not fit the Turkish context, and does not explain the development of the political 
party system in Turkey very well.  
 On the other hand, this cleavage makes more sense with Lipset’s relative 
deprivation hypothesis, which illustrates the tendency of voters towards extreme 
right-wing parties due to the voters’ unfavourable socio-economic conditions 
(Lipset, 1960, pp.63-64; Akgün, 2002, p.31). Even though the AKP cannot be 
considered as an extreme right party, this hypothesis suitably explains the voting 
behaviour of the disadvantaged masses. These disadvantaged masses living in 
the squatter areas of the metropolitan cities have predominantly voted in favour 
of the AKP.  
 Under the guidance of this theoretical model, namely Lipset-Rokkan’s 
cleavage structure model, I adopted qualitative research methods for the 
collection of data. The qualitative methods that I used are those of semi-
structured, in-depth interviews and archival research, and are designed to 
achieve my research objectives related to the impact of the political conjuncture 
on the electoral success of the AKP. In addition to this main cleavage structure 
model, Gallagher et al’s recent definition of cleavage and Lipset’s relative 
deprivation hypothesis are used as supporting concepts. 
 This fourfold theoretical model guided my choice of methods, and 
directed the sample of and recruitment of interviewees and the types of archives 
to be consulted. Firstly, I used the centre-periphery relations cleavage as a tool to 
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explain the impact of minorities (Kurdish in Turkish context) on the AKP’s 
electoral success. For this reason, I selected interviewees who were able to give 
information on the Kurdish problem (e.g. representative of the BDP in İstanbul 
and representative of the AKP in Diyarbakır).  
 As pointed out in chapter 1, since the 1980s, the Kurds have had more 
identity-based claims. Thus, the Kurdish problem was mostly based on the 
restriction of use of Kurdish and education in Kurdish; on their demands for 
lifting of these restrictions, for cultural rights and more autonomy from the 
Turkish State. Regarding Kurds’ main voting behaviour, when the last decade is 
taken into account (2002-2011) their main preference has been either the AKP or 
BDP.   
 As a  consequence, my main questions to these members of the AKP 
members from South-eastern region (e.g. Diyarbakır) was how/why Kurds 
voting behaviour have shown differences  according to the regional 
characteristics (e.g. metropolitan cities vs. South-Eastern region). The main 
themes I hoped to discuss were the economy and socio-economic issues 
impacting Kurds’ voting behaviour. For the members of the BDP, my main 
questions were related to the democratization during the AKP’s tenure and how 
they have found AKP’s democratic initiative for Kurds. I hoped to discuss 
themes such as democratization, minority rights and pro-EU discourse of the 
AKP with these interviewees.  
 Secondly, I made use of the state-church cleavage in order to investigate 
the pro-Islamic past of the AKP and its effect on the electoral success of the 
AKP. Thus, I identified key informants as the representative of the SP, the 
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representatives of the CHP (woman; youth branch) and the representatives of the 
AKP (local; headquarter; youth; women branches). During my interviews with 
these key informants, I hoped to get answers related to the questions on the 
emergence of the reformist branch within the FP after the closure of the FP in 
2001 and questions on the differences/similarities between the AKP and its 
RP/FP.  
 Thirdly, I incorporated the land-industry cleavage to explain the impact 
of political and economic interest groups on the emergence of the AKP. I 
identified key informants as the representative of NGOs
82
 and trade unions
83
. 
The themes I discussed with them were the AKP’s general economic policies; 
the AKP’s relationship with the Anatolian capitalists and the AKP’s relations 
with the EU.  
 Fourthly, I considered the employer-worker cleavage as a way to explain 
the deprived masses’ tendency to vote for the AKP. Thus, I recruited 
interviewees from NGOs which are located in the city squatter areas of the 
metropolitan cities. As mentioned in the theoretical framework above, I did not 
consider the employer-worker cleavage in order to discuss the relationship 
between workers and employers during the AKP’s tenure. Therefore, I did not 
make interviews with trade unions to investigate this cleavage but mostly to 
understand the land-industry. As a result, I asked to representatives of trade 
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 NGOs: The NGOs I have chosen were the TÜSİAD, the TOBB, the MÜSİAD and the İTO 
(İstanbul Ticaret Odası - İstanbul Chamber of Commerce) (even though they were called as 
NGOs, they were established by the main political and economic interest groups) and the 
representatives of some companies and banks (such as Eczacıbaşı, TEB (Türkiye Ekonomi 
Bankası  -  Turkish Economy Bank). 
83
 The trade unions were the DİSK (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - The 
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey) and the HAK-İŞ (Hak İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions). 
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unions questions on the AKP’s neo-liberal economic agenda, its social policies 
and its relations with the EU. 
 Furthermore, the cleavage structure guided another stage of qualitative 
method, namely the archival research method. For instance, the state-church 
cleavage guided the choice of types of documents; in this regard, I looked for the 
party programmes; party brochures of the pro-Islamic parties and secular parties. 
Details of this archival research will be presented in the section on methods 
further below.  
3.2.1.2 The Centre-Periphery Relations Model, Evolution of Turkey’s 
Social Structure and Development of the AKP 
 Of the four cleavage models presented above, I used the centre-periphery 
relations model in order to achieve the objectives of this study related to the 
impact of changes in the social structures of Turkey and short-term and long-
term economic factors in the emergence and electoral success of the AKP. 
 As mentioned earlier in section 2.2, Kahraman (2008) expanded both 
centre and periphery concepts which are parts of Lipset and Rokkan’s overall 
cleavage model by taking into account socio-economic dynamics in Turkey 
since 1980s. He developed two new concepts, namely ‘the periphery at the 
centre’ and ‘the centre at the periphery’. By extending this social structure 
scheme, Kahraman took into account the dynamic structures specific to Turkish 
society.  
 Consequently, this extended version of the centre-periphery relations 
model reflects three main current categories of Turkish society: ‘the centre’; ‘the 
centre at the periphery’ and ‘the periphery at the centre’ (Kahraman, 2008, 
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pp.176-178). The centre symbolizes the bureaucrats, the intellectuals and the 
army officials who guided the modernization and secularization of Turkey since 
the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Kahraman calls this coalition “the 
historical bloc” by referring to Gramsci’s historical bloc84 concept (Gramsci, 
1971, pp.202-205 cited in Kahraman, 2008, p.124).  
 In addition, Kahraman considers the ‘centre at the periphery’ as the 
devout Anatolian bourgeoisie and the ‘periphery at the centre’ as the masses 
which live in the city squatter areas of the metropolitan cities (Kahraman, 2008, 
pp.174-177). Thus, the development of ‘centre at the periphery’ is due to 
industrial development while the ‘periphery at the centre’ has developed due to 
migration from outlying areas into cities. 
 This three-fold social structure picture was used in order to explain the 
changes in socio-economic structure in Turkey and the reflection of these 
changes in the AKP’s electoral success. I used Kahraman’s conceptual schema 
to guide my research process for two reasons. Firstly, Kahraman took into 
account recent social dynamics in this analysis of Turkish society. For instance, 
when he identified the centre at the periphery as composed of the devout 
bourgeoisie, he did not disregard the impact of the liberal economic policies of 
1980s on this recently emerged bourgeoisie.  
                                                     
84
 Gramsci’s concept of historical block: “An historical bloc refers to an historical congruence 
between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class 
forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and 
coherence to its constituent elements. Moreover, for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders 
must engage in conscious planned struggle. Any new historical bloc must have not only power 
within the civil society and economy, it also needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives 
that build on, catalyze and develop its political networks and organization – not political parties 
such” (Gill, 2002, p.58; Gramsci, 1971, p.137). 
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 Secondly, the way he approached the centre-periphery relations is more 
linked to sociological and geographical divisions. For instance, he argued that 
the initial division between centre and periphery was based more on an 
ideological/political separation. For instance, as pointed out in chapter 2, Mardin 
(1973) and other scholars who adopted a dual approach, considered this division 
between centre and periphery as a division between ruling elites and rest of 
society. Hence, the ruling elites administrated the state whereas the rest of 
society did not have any involvement in those state issues. Moreover, as 
compared to the ruling elites’ secularist side, peripheral circles that were pious 
practiced their religion. 
  However, he then went on to argue that after the 1990s, this division 
became a geographical and sociological division (Kahraman, 2008, p.226 and 
p.232). In consequence, the ‘centre at the periphery’ covered mostly the inner 
Anatolian capitalist whereas the ‘periphery at the centre’ covered the lower 
strata at the squatters of the metropolitan cities and big cities.   
 Based on Kahraman’s scheme, I used a qualitative research method 
(including analysis of quantitative data and in-depth interviews) in order to 
achieve my research objectives. Initially, I investigated the changes in Turkey’s 
socio-economic structures by five chronological periods (1923-1950; 1950-
1960, 1960-1980; 1980-1992 and 1992-2002). After each period, I attempted to 
understand the voting behaviour, by looking at those changes in socio-economic 
structures. The last two decades (1980-1992 and 1992-2002) helped me to 
analyse how these changes are reflected in the social bases of the AKP. In order 
to do the latter, I looked at pre-election and post-election surveys, statistical 
155 
 
yearbooks and empirical scholarly work which provided data on voter profiles 
by income; gender; age; education; occupational category and place of residence 
(urban as opposed to rural).  
 I also obtained data from the in-depth interviews that I conducted with 
the members of economic institutions, NGOs and companies. The interviews 
helped me to obtain tacit information that I could not find in the surveys. The 
details on the usage of methods will be given in the section 2.3.  
3.2.2 Methodology and Research Orientations   
  In this section, I explain why my research methodology should not be 
considered a mixed research methodology in spite of the fact that some 
quantitative data has been used. In addition, I analyse how the ontological and 
epistemological positions of the research oriented the research methodology. 
 While I opted for both quantitative and qualitative approaches to data 
collection (Bryman, 2004; Bryman, 2006) (Deacon, Bryman et al., 1998), in 
order to maximise the breadth and depth of my results, the main scope of my 
research is evidently based on qualitative research methods, namely in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews and archival research. Nonetheless, I used existing 
quantitative data in order to analyse the socio-economic structural changes in 
Turkey. This data only contributed to the study as a development function 
(Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989, p.255); that is, it aimed to provide a better 
understanding of the sociological changes since 1980s to the reader, and to 
inform her/him about the development of the Turkish economy and social 
structure over a period of time.   
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 Each piece of research was oriented by initial positions to guide the 
research process: “There is an interrelationship between the core concepts of 
social science “ontology, epistemology, methodology and sources” (Grix, 2002, 
p.175) (Bryman, 2008, p.21). This direction and logical link had to be coherent 
during the whole research process.  
 I chose a qualitative research methodology, which directly influenced my 
ontological and epistemological positions. My ontological stance is constructive, 
as I look at the social phenomena from the eyes of social actors or, in more 
sophisticated terms, I take into account observations of social actors who 
construct their own realities. Given that the social world is formed by multiple 
realities (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003), as a social scientist, I gained access to 
people’s common-sense thinking and their social world from their point of view 
(Bryman, 2008, p.16; Schutz, 1962, p.59). Hence, my research position was 
constructive, since my main research interest lay in the actors’ constructions and 
interpretations of their social world (Silverman, 2001). 
 This constructivist ontological stance guided my epistemological position 
as a researcher. My epistemological position is interpretive, given my attempt to 
understand the social world from the people’s actions and their point of view 
(Bryman, 2008, p.16; Bryman 2001, p.13; Grix, 2002, p.178). The social actors 
had different points of view regarding the political party I investigated. For 
instance, representatives of NGOs (such as Başak Sanat Evi and Halk Evleri) 
based their arguments on the AKP from a different perspective than party 
members and representatives of NGOs, since they worked at field level. 
Similarly, the representatives of oppositional parties (e.g. the CHP, the BDP, and 
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the SP) had different attitudes towards the ruling party than the representatives 
of the AKP. Due to their oppositional positions, they perceived socio-economic 
implications of AKP’s projects in a more objective way. Due to this 
epistemological stance, I had the opportunity to examine their actions
85
 and their 
own interpretations
86
 and thereby to extract solutions for them.  
 Initially, I adopted a general theoretical framework, in order to guide my 
data collection process. As discussed previously, it consisted of the Lipset-
Rokkan cleavage structure and Kahraman’s refined centre-periphery relations 
model. After the data collection, due to my initial ontological and 
epistemological positions, I followed an inductive approach for the analysis of 
my data. As a result, I did not impose theories on my data but I built theories 
after my data analysis (Bryman, 2008, p.11). Another important issue, as pointed 
out by Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.3) (Silverman, 2005, p.78), as I did use an 
inductive approach to the research, the data analysis helped to build up theories 
(Bryman, 2008, p.6).  
 Therefore, I used grounded theory; in the sense that research data helped 
me to reach theories rather than that I imposed a general framework like in 
positivist research (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.19). Then, I tried to work on 
theory building which was the delicate part of the work and it helps to reflect, 
think, match and blend theories. To be more concise, in chapter 4, I first looked 
at the changes in social structures. Then, by looking at these changes, I tried to 
understand the voting behaviour during these five different periods mentioned 
above. Initially, I thought that voting behaviour would be linked directly to the 
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 In terms of actions, for instance, the Halk Evleri had a more activist stance. 
86
 The representatives of the AKP had a tendency to market their own accomplishments whereas 
other oppositional parties were more realistic and critical about the AKP’s accomplishments. 
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changes in social structures thereby; I expected that the class-based theories 
would be the suitable approaches. However, after analysing the data, I realized 
that due to dynamics existing in Turkish society, I realized the necessity of 
building up different theories other than usage of class-based voting theories 
(e.g. rational and expressive).  
 When I analysed the impact of the socio-economic structures on the 
electoral success of the AKP, there were many variables to be taken into 
account: changes in socio-economic structures and changing voting behaviour.  
In particular, I needed a theory to link socio-economic transformation to the 
voting behaviour. In building theories under the influence of my data, I adopted 
Weberian class analysis in my research. The main reason behind this choice that 
Weberian theory was more suitable for the analysis of changes in socio-
economic structures in Turkey. As demonstrated in section 2.7, Turkish societal 
sctructure is often analysed by dual models (which are based mostly on status) 
rather than class models. Thus, Weber’s Class analysis allows for more 
complexity due to his emphasis on non-class social attributes such as status and 
group power as represented by political parties.  
 To be more specific, the Turkish context has seen the emergence of a 
vast numbers of wage-earning, white collar workers (e.g. in the banking, finance 
and insurance sectors, public and private service sector etc) due to the changes in 
the economy and society since the 1980s. On the other hand, there is another 
middle class or intermediary strata (e.g. self-employed craftsmen, tradesmen or 
“petty bourgeoisie”) whose income depends on their performance and ability to 
sell the products of their labour directly to consumers.  
159 
 
 Due to the differing characteristics (such as education and social 
background), these two middle classes (non-manual wage earners and small, 
self-employed craftsmen and traders) cannot be assigned to the same middle 
class category. Therefore, I need to take into account Weberian class theory and 
assign the newly emergent strata, as well as the strata of tradesmen to different 
social strata according to their status. I have therefore used the term 
“intermediary classes” (For an illustration of these different strata, see Appendix 
Part E, Figure 1). 
 Even though I argue that I use grounded theory in my data analysis, I 
also took into account the initial general theoretical framework (i.e. Lipset-
Rokkan and centre-periphery relations models) while looking at the 
consolidation of the AKP within Turkish society. In doing so, I considered 
concepts such as centre-periphery relations or historical bloc in order to analyse 
my data. Consequently, it is important to point out that the relation between 
theory and data analysis is not a clear cut process for qualitative researchers.   
3.3 Methods  
3.3.1 Semi-structured In-depth Interviews   
 In the previous section on the methodology, I explained how the general 
theoretical framework guided my sample and recruitment of interviewees.  
 Given the importance of the in-depth interviews in the qualitative 
research strategy, I interviewed 36 actors in total. During the field research, I 
encountered a few obstacles to gaining access to some of the participants, 
especially high-ranking political party members. I got accessed them mainly 
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through well-placed gatekeepers – for example through by academics, by 
personal acquaintances.  
 Moreover, as a result of contact with interviewees through gatekeepers, 
trust was established with interviewees much more quickly.  In interviews where 
the gatekeepers were not used, I had to set up a trusting relationship between 
myself and the participant. In these cases, I gained access to them by developing 
a personal relationship.
87
 Depending on the amount of trust built up in a 
particular relationship, I was introduced to further potential interviewees, for 
example, others within a particular party or institution. For this reason, snow-
balling interview techniques helped me to complete the recruitment of 
participants (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.33). 
 Another important issue was related to the time frame for fieldwork. I 
scheduled and completed my interviews between December 2010 and the end of 
June 2011, which coincided with the pre-election period.
88
 Therefore, the 
election period caused slight difficulties in getting access to political party 
members, as they were required to participate in various meetings. On the other 
hand, due to the elections, the chances of finding party staff at any time of the 
day in their party offices was high and the interviewees were quite enthusiastic 
about their party politics and their own party vision. Ironically, this timeline 
helped me to reach many people, due to their workload and preparations. 
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 In those cases, I sent emails to the interviewees. In case I did not get an answer from them, I 
called the party or the NGO. Then, they oriented me to reach the representative I was looking for 
and after I talked to this representative on the phone, they were asking me to send to him/her an 
email about my project. Then, they were calling me back or I was calling them in order to 
arrange an appointment. In some other cases, I visited local branches (for the parties), I presented 
myself and then I talked about my research. After a short conservation, I was telling them that I 
would like to make interviews with representatives of their institution. In consequence, I got 
accessed to them by establishing a personal relationship with him/her. 
88
 The parliamentary elections occurred on 12
th
 June 2011. 
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  Moreover, I had the opportunity to collect many party leaflets and 
brochures from the parties as well as from the street stands to add to the archival 
research. Hence, on the one hand, the election period postponed completion of 
the interview list, but on the other hand, party members were present in their 
offices, and they were mostly keen about their work and their party strategies.  
 The interview process led me to reach concealed information regarding 
the AKP. The interview sample was created by different categories of 
informants (including ones who were critical of the AKP). Therefore the 
interviews did not only provide positive views of the AKP, but also critiques of 
the party. The majority of interviews took place as one-on-one, face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews. My questions were both general open-ended 
questions and more specific. For instance, I started with general questions such 
as the main circumstances which led to the emergence to the AKP in 2002. 
Then, depending on the interviewee, I asked questions regarding the economy 
during the AKP’s tenure, the AKP’ social projects, the AKP’s relations with the 
EU. Regarding timing; interviews lasted between half an hour and three hours, 
depending on the participants’ time constraints. Furthermore, I had some 
problems during the interview stage, when some of participants did not want to 
sign the informed consent form because they were afraid for unknown reason to 
sign any paper. I tried to explain to them that informed consent was to protect 
interviewees. In cases I failed in getting signatures, I did not make interviews 
with these representatives.   
 In addition, I did not record all the interviews, as the participants did not 
approve the usage of a voice recorder. Therefore, only 16 out of 36 interviews 
162 
 
were recorded. Since most of the participants did not give their consent for the 
use of the voice recorder, I had to keep careful notes during those interviews.
89
 
As pointed out by many scholars (Hannabuss, 1996; Seale and Silverman, 1997; 
Wellard and McKenna, 2001; MacLean, Meyer et al., 2004), the transcription of 
recorded interviews is an important stage of the qualitative research method, 
because it was the initial stage before finding out main themes of the thesis. The 
main obstacle mostly occurred due to the lack of voice recorded data which 
would have enabled me to use more direct quotes in the analysis chapters. 
 The qualitative data obtained from 36 interviews (details related to 
profiles of interviews can be found in Appendix Part B, Table 1) had to be 
organized to extract data for answering research questions. As mentioned in 
earlier section 3.2.2, I adopted an inductive approach to data analysis. In this 
way, I obtained the possibility to build theories according the data I obtained 
(Hannabuss, 1996; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Bryman, 2008). My analysis was 
also backed up by scholarly material on voting behaviour and empirical research 
on voting patterns and behaviour in Turkey. In the previous section, I discussed 
the way I built up theories out of data; therefore now, I will present the way in 
which I classified, evaluated and interpreted this semi-structured interview data. 
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 Moreover, as soon as I finished the interview, I arranged my notes so that later on, I was able 
to write them properly especially converting the key words to comprehensible sentences. I 
transcribed 12 voice recorded interviews in the computer as the voice recorder was a digital one.  
Regarding the language of interviews, I conducted my interviews in Turkish, transcribed them 
and did my analysis in Turkish. Due to time concerns, I did not have opportunity to translate all 
the transcribed interviews from Turkish to English. When I found useful quotes or important 
notes afterwards I translated them from Turkish to English and used them in the suitable sections 
(Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.153).  
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 For the classification of the data, I did not follow a rigorous coding 
technique, such as usage of software to analyse the data. Initially, I immersed 
myself into the data, in order to identify and differentiate the main issues and 
themes. Because my interviewees were already divided into different categories, 
the task of identifying issues, themes and subthemes was made easier. I then 
reflected on which interviews and themes would be useful for which chapter. For 
instance, my interviews with members of the trade unions and business 
associations were mostly useful for Chapter 4 as I looked at the social bases of 
the AKP and the impact of the economic factors on development of AKP 
support. However, it was not a clear-cut process since some interview data was 
also useful for Chapter 5 where I considered the political discourse and 
consolidation of the AKP. 
 Furthermore, manual coding was made easy on account of the different 
political positions of the interviewees toward the party. Opposition party 
members and NGOs had a more critical and distanced approach toward the AKP 
whereas the AKP members were committed to the marketing of their own 
political party and concealed many of the drawbacks of their party. Therefore, 
the predetermined interview categories helped me to be more critical towards the 
data analysis. While manually coding the data, I was not guided by the stories 
glorifying the AKP since I also heard the other side of the story. In this way, as 
pointed out by scholars writing on the data analysis processes (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 1994, p. 173), at the data analysis stage, the data should be split into 
pro-topic and anti-topic ones.  
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 In my case, as pointed out earlier, the cleavage-structures already 
provided me the opportunity to possess somewhat this dual quality. For instance, 
given that the Halk Evleri had a more oppositional approach, towards the AKP, I 
had already known that this interview could be grouped as anti- the subject of 
the thesis. On the other hand, since the interviews I conducted with the 
representatives had more glorifying stories, I considered them as ‘pro’ the 
subject of the thesis. Due to this initial divide, it was easier to code and interpret 
these different views on the subject, and thereby develop more critical concepts 
and themes for the analysis of my data.  
 Regarding the data analysis, it was to an extent useful to immerse oneself 
into it but this rich data was so attractive that in the early stage of analysis, I had 
a tendency to use most of it for the thesis, rather than being selective. 
Consequently, initially my research began to be guided by my data rather than 
my research questions. I was, to an extent, being guided by this cumbersome 
data which has been referred to as an “attractive nuisance” by some scholars 
(Miles, 1979 cited in Bryman, 2008, p.538). This so-called attractive nuisance 
led me to add key policy issues to Chapter 5. The theme of policy issues 
emerged frequently during my interviews and so it was incorporated into 
Chapter 5, on the consolidation of the AKP. 
 In addition to immersion in the data, another technique helped me to 
reflect on my research: that of keeping a fieldwork diary or field notes. While I 
did not keep a meticulous fieldwork diary, I made notes after each interview on 
my experience in order to record my own thoughts relating to the whole of the 
interview process, including my relations with the interviewee and the interview 
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content (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.33). For instance, compared with male 
interviewees, the female participants were more intimidated by the use of the 
voice recorder and wary about giving informed consent. Before arranging an 
appointment time, they were more concerned to obtain information about my 
research topic as well as my educational background.  
3.3.2 Archival Research Method  
 Archival research was another stage of the qualitative research of which 
a part was carried out in tandem with my in-depth interviews, especially where 
“grey literature” collection was concerned. As mentioned in the previous 
section, after each interview, I asked interviewees if they had any brochures, 
leaflets, reports or other publications to give and many were willing to provide 
me with such sources of information. As the interviews took place during an 
election period, I had the opportunity to collect numerous brochures, leaflets, 
and other publications from the party stands in the streets.  
 As far as non-scholarly sources are concerned, I looked at the 
newspapers, periodical press including national and international sources. 
Among the national newspapers, I looked at Radikal, Hürriyet, Hürriyet Daily 
News, Milliyet, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, ODA TV, TV 24 and Today’s Zaman. 
Among International newspapers and periodical press, I have looked at the 
Guardian, Le Monde, Economist, BBC and Der Spiegel (See also Appendix Part 
D for more detailed information on sources).  
 In addition, I looked at the scholarly research. They are mostly books in 
both Turkish and English. As mentioned out in Literature review, there is a great 
amount of country studies related to Turkey. In addition, there is also great 
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number of articles in journals. The journals I used were various since I looked at 
different policy areas while looking at the AKP’s social projects. Therefore, I 
looked at different types of journals. 
 Moreover, I used at internet based resources for instance, SGYK sources, 
WWHR, World Bank, IMF, KEİG, Resmi Gazete, Başbakanlık, İstanbul 
Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Halk Evleri, Diyanet, TBB, İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 
SETAV, Eurozine, Silk Road, TEPAV, Stratfor, Washington Institute.  
 The archival research did not concern only party publications, but also 
newspaper and periodical articles, papers from political seminars and so on. For 
a social researcher, any source can be a source of inspiration for data 
interpretation. In a way, I believe such grey literature provides can “turn lights 
on” in the researcher’s mind.  
 Following the data collection, I organized material according to different 
themes, issues, topics. My data was obtained from the NGOs in city squatter 
areas, brochures from various parties and booklets from political seminars. 
Categorization, classification and filing of this data constituted an important 
process. Initially, I classified this material according to the institutions 
concerned. Later, I realized that this was not a good analysis technique since I 
had a tendency to describe the data as it was. Afterwards, I classified material 
according to themes in order to reach a better analytical framework. Therefore, 
each document was filed according to theme rather than a specific institution or 
party. For instance, the leaflets taken from the women’s branches of the two 
main political parties, the AKP and CHP, and from feminist organizations were 
placed under the category of the gender relations.  
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 The documents I received from the institutions were useful to support 
participants’ views and interpretations.  
3.3.3 Analysis of Quantitative Data and Reliability of Data  
 I used quantitative data in order to provide a better understanding of 
economic developments and socio-economic transformations in Turkey from 
1923 to 2002 (as mentioned above through five different chronological sections). 
Access to this data was unproblematic, given that most of the survey data and 
reports were freely available from the web sites of survey companies and the 
Statistical Institute of Turkey. In order to obtain the required quantitative data 
which was not available online, I directly approached research organisations and 
survey companies or obtained them through well-placed intermediaries or 
gatekeepers.   
 Firstly, I used post-elections and voter profile surveys, in order to 
demonstrate the sociological profile of the AKP’s electoral base. In addition, I 
took into account empirical work on the socio-economic bases of Turkish 
political parties carried out by scholars. Moreover, a number of the scholarly 
works that I consulted were written by Turkish authors. Some of these were 
useful in providing partial information on the social classes in Turkey, 
particularly during the period 1960-1980. 
 In addition to survey data and scholarly work, I used the data from 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). The main obstacle that I encountered was 
the unavailability of data on socio-occupational categories before 1988. I 
therefore visited the library of the institute in order to learn how to obtain 
alternative data.  For instance, I was advised to consider data for employed 
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people in agriculture, industry and in the services sectors since 1923. I also used 
TÜİK data on regional social indicators which provided a local and provincial 
picture of socio-economic transformation. 
 Furthermore, for the analysis of the quantitative data, I used data from 
the Turkish Statistical Institute that is available for the period 1923-1988. This 
data is not based on population census or labour surveys, but on a data revised 
by Bulutay (1995) according to specific restrospective techniques. This is the 
only data related to labour characteristics of Turkey during this period. Even 
though it is a revised data by Bulutay (1995), it should not be considered as an 
unreliable source. Important scholars such as Pamuk (2009) and Kongar (2011) 
have used this data comprehensively in their works. It is also important to add 
that Pamuk is a leading scholar in the economic history of the Ottoman Empire, 
Middle East and modern Turkey. In his work, where he analyses “Intervention 
during the Great Depression, Another Look at the Turkish Experience”, he uses 
the data prepared by Bulutay (1995) (Pamuk, 2009, p.171).   
3.4 Ethical Issues  
 This research has been designed and conducted in accordance with the 
University of Warwick’s statement on the ethical conduct of research. As a 
social researcher, I was aware of potential risks to my safety. Therefore, during 
the design and conduct of research, I took into account issues related to my 
safety, and I adopted precautions in order to minimize exposure to any risk. For 
instance, before the meeting with any interviewee, I informed people close to me 
about my interview location.  
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 Before the beginning of the interviews, the informed consent form (see 
Appendix Part C) which stated the aim of the research and the care taken over 
data storage and usage was distributed to the interviewees. Hence, the 
interviewees were able to decide whether or not they wanted to participate in the 
study. In addition, I made sure that the research participants’ physical, social and 
psychological well-being was not influenced negatively during the research 
process, due to my trustworthy relations with informants.  
 Nonetheless, I encountered quite a few problems in gaining informed 
consent as some of participants did not want to sign the forms. Even though I 
explained to them that the informed consent forms protected the interviewee, 
they were afraid to sign any document. However, the majority of participants 
signed the informed consent. It is noteworthy that high-ranking party members 
were comfortable in giving their signatures; whereas the low-ranking ones (e.g. 
neighbourhood leaders) were not willing to sign any papers and felt that they 
needed to ask permission from a high-ranking member. In such cases, I gave up 
interviewing the person. This experience demonstrated the strict hierarchical 
relationship between low-ranking members and high-ranking party members. In 
the case of informants from the NGOs and trade unions, they were not unwilling 
to sign the paper. However, it is also important to mention that the interviews I 
conducted with representatives of NGOs and trade unions were from the high-
ranking members of the NGOs, and they did mind signing informed consent.   
 I also encountered obstacles to the usage of the voice recorder. Many of 
the interviewees preferred to talk about politics and society without leaving any 
trace of what they said.  
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 In these cases, I respected participants’ wishes and I kept the notes 
instead of using voice recorder. 
 In addition, in establishing contact with interviewees, many were more 
willing to receive phone calls rather than emails. This also related to many 
interviewees’ fear of leaving any trail of statements. A number of interviewees 
looked upon my research as part of a journalistic report, rather than an academic 
project. 
 Throughout the interview process, I was aware of the importance of 
respecting the anonymity and privacy of research participants.  The data 
obtained from them was anonymised and stored securely thus ensuring that the 
confidentiality of the participants was protected. Moreover, the gaining thrust 
and recruitment of interviews was influenced by the insider-outsider dilemma. 
As a student carrying out research in a British university, and hence as an 
outsider, it was easier to gain access to interviewees. During the interviews, 
many representatives were keen to learn about the university I studied at and my 
educational background, as well as my supervisors’ research areas. As a Turk, 
and hence occupying an insider position, it was easy to find gatekeepers as 
compared to non-Turkish people. Other than this, it did not help me particularly.  
 Finally, one high-ranking party official that I tried to reach through a 
gatekeeper wanted to learn not only about my research project, but to have a list 
of my interviewees. In this case, I informed the gatekeeper that I would not share 
such information with third parties, and therefore did not carry out the interview.   
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3.5 Conclusion  
 This chapter has discussed my reasons for adopting a qualitative 
methodology in this study, and despite usage of some quantitative data, it 
demonstrates why the methodology is remained as qualitative methodology and 
not mixed methodology. I also discuss the reasons of my research orientations; 
my epistemological stance and ontological position. This stance and positions 
are important, as they influence the data collection process before and during the 
fieldwork. To collect my data, I conducted in depth, semi-structured interviews 
with 36 key informants. I also collected data from survey companies and a 
statistical institute. Regarding archival research, I collected brochures, leaflets, 
party programmes, party manifestos, trade union booklets and parties’ annual 
reports.  Negotiating access to the informants sometimes proved difficult without 
gatekeepers; in these cases, it was more demanding to reach them (e.g. time to 
get access to them; developing a trusty relationship). In the next two chapters, I 
will discuss the findings of my research. 
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Chapter 4 Social Bases of the AKP 
4.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter, my aims are to demonstrate the evolution of the Turkish 
economy, to explore the changes it has undergone and to show how these 
economic developments have impacted upon social stratification and voting 
behaviour in Turkey in the course of the eight decades following the 
establishment of the Republic. Turkey has had four main periods of 
industrialization: 1923-1950; 1950-1960; 1960-1980 and 1980 to the present.   
 I adopt this industrialization scheme in order to highlight the impact of 
these different periods on the socio-economic structures in Turkey. Any changes 
in socio-economic structures should have, in turn, influenced the voting 
behaviour of different professional groups, and thereby led to changes in 
political party preferences.  
 I will firstly look at the period 1923-1950 and analyse whether the 
implemented economical policies had any impact on the socio-economic 
structures. Secondly, I will highlight the period 1950-1960 by discussing the 
impact of the agricultural policies and changes in the socio-economic structures 
on voting behaviour. Thirdly, I will highlight the period 1960-1980, 
characterized by early industrialization policies (import substitution policies) as 
well as the emergence of concomitant working class movements. Fourthly, I will 
look at the neoliberal restructuring since 1980 and its impact on the new 
intermediary strata, in order to understand the voting behaviour of the emerging 
social categories and the subsequent victory of the AKP. 
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4.2 The Planned Economy, Agrarian Voters and the Single-Party Regime: 
1923-1950 
 In this section, I first discuss the main industrialization attempts during 
the period 1923 – 1950. Then, I examine how this period’s economic 
programme impacted on the socio-economic structures, and in turn, influenced 
the politics in specific voting behaviour.  
4.2.1 Planned Economy and Agrarian Society  
 As mentioned out in Chapter 1, at the time of the establishment of the 
Republic, Turkey did not yet have a record of industrialization like that of 
western countries which had already accomplished the industrial revolution in 
the 19th century.  Turkey had in addition lost her capitalist class which used to 
be made up, to a great extent, of Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities 
(Mehmet, 1998, p.129). Therefore, during the whole history of the early 
Republic, that is, from the very beginning, in 1923, until the early 1980s, the 
Turkish nation state tried to create its own capitalist class through state-driven 
policies. During the 1923-1950 period, as the country was ruled by a single-
party regime, the state managed to establish several SEEs (State Economic 
Enterprises)
90
 in order to create its own industry and capital: in short, its national 
economy (Ahmad, 1993, pp.98-99). The sectors which were promoted and run 
by the state were mostly agriculture, textiles, food plants (such as sugar cane 
factories), mining (especially minerals), railways, shipping, steel, physical 
infrastructure, banking, manufacturing, tobacco and tourism (Ahmad, 1993, 
p.97; Mehmet, 1998, p.130). 
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 The state aimed to boost the private sector and carry out the economic venture which could not 
be done by the private sector (Ahmad, 1993, p.97).  
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 Nonetheless, it is argued that the extent of industrialization achieved in 
this period was exaggerated, and the SEEs contributed to the urban and national 
economy only in limited measure. The main reason behind this was the inability 
to attain a high level of growth, with about twenty industrial plants
91
 in a country 
with a population of 18 million (Pamuk, 2009, p.173). Therefore, it has been 
argued that the main reason behind the successful growth rate observed during 
the period 1929-1930 was not due to industrialization but to both the surpluses 
of agricultural sector
92
 and protectionist
93
 policies, with tight fiscal and monetary 
policies (Pamuk, 2009, pp.177-178). 
 Consequently, despite attempts at industrialization during this period, 
Turkey remained a rather agriculturally-based economy, and substantial changes 
in the socio-economic structures did not materialize. 
  The attempts at rather minor outcomes of industrialization, therefore, did 
not enhance social mobility within the rural population towards big cities. It was 
pointed out that during this first period, urban workers remained part-time 
farmers, and did not quit their villages completely but remained attached to their 
native environment (Pamuk, 2009, p.188; Koç, 2010, p.117). 
The fact that the country remained an agricultural economy is 
exemplified by employment levels in three sectors (agriculture, industry and 
services) during this period.  In spite of industrialization attempts, employment 
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 A law (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu) to subsidize industry was accepted in 1932 and many SEEs 
were established during the 1932-1939 period (Pamuk, 2009, p.173). 
92
 Due to its prioritization, agriculture became the main sector that contributed to the economy in 
Turkey. Consequently, Turkey had become a wheat exporter by the end of 1930s (Pamuk, 2009, 
p.177). 
93
 Protectionist policies such as the restriction of imports contributed drastically to powerful 
fiscal performance in the 1930s (Pamuk, 2009, pp.177-178). 
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remained very high in the agriculture sector (Figure 1). The constancy of 
employment in non-agricultural sectors can be also seen in Figure 2, where 
construction has been omitted from industry data. Thus, the data in the Figures 1 
and 2, as well as in Figures 3 and 4, indicate that the change in employment rate 
has been very low, and inconsistent in the non-agricultural sectors. 
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Figure 1. Employment by Sector Type during the Period 1923-1950 in 
thousands (Raw Data: Construction added to the Industry
94
) in thousand 
Source: TÜİK 
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 There are two different approaches to calculating the industry. According to the TUIK, 
construction is excluded from industry. According to the DPT, construction is   included in the 
industry. 
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Figure 2. Employment by Sector Type during the Period 1923-1950 in 
thousands (Raw Data: Construction not added to the Industry)  
Source: TÜİK 
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Figure 3. The Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1923-
1950 (Construction added to the industry) as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
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Figure 4. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1923-1950 
as a % (Industry without the construction) 
Source: TÜİK 
 Employment data thus demonstrates that the impact of changes in the 
economy on Turkish social stratification was minor during this period. 
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Figure 5. Share of each Sector within Total Employment as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
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Figure 6. Share of Each Sector within Total Employment as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
 
 
 Furthermore, the labour force was dominated during this period by 
unskilled occupational workers, mostly manual workers and farmers. Figure 5 
and Figure 6 show the share of each sector within total employment during the 
period 1923-1950. Although a slight reduction takes place in the share of 
agricultural sector, the latter still remains high (on average contributing to the 
total employment rate 87.08%) along with a slight increase in the share of 
industry sector (with construction 2.17%
95
 and without construction 1.74%
96
). 
The services sector (which includes financial, insurance, real estate and business 
services) seems to have remained constant at a very low level, with an average 
of 5.84% contribution to the total employment figure. 
 As pointed out in the chapter 1, austerity measures taken during war time 
adversely influenced all the social groups from big land owners or industrialists 
                                                     
95
 Demonstrates average increase in share of industry sector with construction. 
96
 Demonstrates average increase in share of industry sector without construction.  
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down to farmers and workers, due to heavy taxes (Pamuk, 2009, p.189) leading 
to a general discontent over government policies. 
There emerged though some groups among tradesmen and industrialists 
(which constituted a minority group of the society) who benefited from the war 
years owing to both the informal market and inflation. Hence, they constituted 
the war profiteering of the tradesmen and industrialists (Çavdar, 2008a, p.447). 
In addition to the “war profiteer” group of tradesmen, the big land owners and 
medium-sized farm owners also made a profit during this period. However, due 
to the new “land reform” policy of the CHP (not least, in order to attract small 
farmers without land to its side), the big land owners also withdrew their support 
from the CHP (Çavdar, 2008a, p.448). 
 During the war, the main economic burden was laid on workers, small 
farmers, small tradesmen and craftsmen.  As a result of the economic 
restrictions, the CHP had also lost the support of small and medium farmers 
(Pamuk, 2009, p.197). In addition to these economic restrictions, workers’ rights 
and welfare were rather ignored, since the regime did not want the propagation 
of left-wing policies due to anti-communist state ideology. The policies were 
thus more for the sake of the state than that of the workers and farmers. Thus, 
the CHP’s policies resulted in a loss of support of workers too. 
4.2.2 Agrarian Voters and Single-Party Regime  
By the time
97
 Turkey adopted the multi-party system; social strata had 
almost formed a coalition front against the CHP. However, the CHP continued 
to keep its strict stance towards basic freedoms: that is, human rights, freedom of 
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 Turkey adopted multi-party system in 1946, hence, after the Second World War.  
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expression of organization, and of thought (Çavdar, 2008a, p.448). 
Consequently, as mentioned previously in chapter 1, the coalition of big 
landowners and industrialists, as well as other social strata, moved to the DP. 
 While analysing the relationship between the Turkish voting behaviour 
and change in socio-economic structures during the period 1923-1950, it was not 
possible to establish a direct causal link between them in a way that was similar 
to that which existed between the voting behaviour and class identity and 
awareness present in the Western democracies (Alford, 1964, p.36). As may be 
seen from figures 1-5, the majority of employment was in the agricultural sector 
(on average 87%). Thus, the society remained highly agrarian during the period 
1923-1950. Despite attempts at industrialization during this period, it failed to 
impact significantly on the socio-economic structures of Turkish society.    
 Indeed, it is rather unlikely to claim that a different type of social 
stratification took place as a result of industrialization efforts during the period 
1923-1950. Rather, it is possible to talk about an initially unaltered socio-
economic structure, which later on, due to war economy, became distorted with 
the emergence of underprivileged social strata (e.g. small farmers who even lost 
their land, due to lack of essential means for farming (Pamuk, 2009, p.211)) and 
social strata (e.g. tradesmen, industrialists, big land owners) which had benefited 
from the distorted war environment. Nonetheless, this change did not have any 
drastic impact on social mobility, as occurred in western countries. Thus, the 
social strata remained more or less the same, i.e. contained their own strata 
(Figures 4 and 5 provide us with a picture of the change in the employed 
categories).  Consequently, the economy policies of the state did not result in 
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any noteworthy change in socio-economic structures, and therewith, related 
voting behaviour during this period. 
 Indeed, institutional characteristics did not allow reflexion of changes in 
of the existing voting behaviour: During the period 1923-1946, the Turkish 
political party system was dominated by a single-party regime, and the 
opposition groups against this regime did not have institutional channels of 
democracy for expressing themselves. 
 In summary, an industrial revolution or a strong industrialization did not 
happen in Turkey during the period 1923-1950, as compared to European 
democracies. Moreover, the war economy impacted adversely each stratum of 
society. Lastly, the institutional characteristic of the single party system during 
this period did not allow institutional channels for democratic expression to 
function. Hence, due to these peculiarities of the political regime, it is difficult to 
appraise the political tendencies of the population caused by the socio-
economical policies of the state in this period. Rather, the discontent of social 
strata over the regime and rising requests for a change as main (pressure) factors 
gave rise to a process that ended up in the adoption of the multi-party system. 
Hence, it is not surprising to see the formation of an initial opposition group 
right within the CHP at the end of the war. This opposition group was the initial 
expression of social bases’ demands in terms of an institutional expression, and 
led subsequently to the establishment of a multi-party system. Because of the 
subtle coalition which used to exist during the single-party regime among the 
bureaucrats, the army and the bourgeoisie broke up after the war (Özbudun, 
2000, p.20; Çavdar, 2008a, pp.446 - 448).  
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 The beginning of the political party system in 1946 did not yet result in 
any immediate change in the ruling political party. Indeed, the anticipated 
success of the DP did not materialize in the first multi-party election because of 
the presence of hidden traps in the existing electoral law for the newcomers.
98
 
 As I initially remarked, the lack of class politics makes the respective 
analysis of the Turkish political party system during this period somewhat 
irrelevant. However, such an analysis becomes possible for the following period 
if the establishment multi-party system. It may be argued that in the Turkish 
political party system, disparate social strata only obtained an alternative to 
translating their class interests after 1945 (Alford, 1964, p.37). Four years after 
the democratic channels opened up, the social strata were finally able to express 
themselves through the democratic elections. Consequently, the legislative 
elections of 1950 resulted in a strong success of the DP, which gained 55.2% of 
the vote, while the CHP only obtained 39.6% (Kaynar et al., 2006, p.56). 
 To conclude, the institutional factors seem to have outweighed the socio-
economic changes in terms of their impact on the voting behaviour during the 
period 1923-1950, and consequently in this first period of the Republic of 
Turkey with its both socio-economic and institutional distinctions, a direct 
causal link between the change in the socio-economic structures and the voting 
patterns was missing. 
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 In the elections of 1946, secret grading and open voting occurred whereas in the elections of 
1950, secret voting and secret voting happened.  
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4.3 Agricultural Mechanisation, Peasants’ Dissatisfaction and the 
Emergence of a Two-Party System: 1950-1960 
 In this section, I now analyse the changes in the economy and how these 
changes influenced the society during the period 1950-1960. To undertake this 
analysis, I firstly examine the economic developments which occurred under 
four categories: agriculture; infrastructure; foreign trade and commerce; 
continuation of the state economy.  I then look at how economic development 
impacted upon society and how changes in social structure influenced the voting 
patterns.   
4.3.1 Economic Developments  
 After its electoral victory of 1950, the DP focused mostly on the 
agriculture sector. Given that the farmers, industrialists and landowners were the 
main social bases of the DP; the prioritization of agriculture was not surprising.  
The DP government’s main concern was the production of agricultural goods 
and minerals. As a result, industrialization was to some extent neglected during 
the DP government (Ahmad, 1993, p.115).  
 Improvements in the agricultural sector were achieved through the 
mechanization of farming, which was based on the import of cheap farm 
machinery. The import of farming machinery was facilitated owing to the 
Marshall Funds.
99
  Consequently, Turkey became for some years a wheat 
exporting country. Nonetheless, this boom in agricultural production was not 
sustainable, and in the second half of 1950s, Turkey began to import agricultural 
products again (Ahmad, 1977, pp.134-135). 
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After World War 2, Turkey joined NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and tried to 
keep close ties with the Western Allies especially with the US. The US’s most important 
contribution in this period took place through the Marshall Funds (Ahmad, 1977, p.135). 
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 In addition to developments in agriculture, important progress was 
achieved in building up the infrastructure (e.g. highways) within the country. As 
with the progress in agriculture, the progress in infrastructure was financed by 
the foreign aid. In consequence, due to the extension in the road network remote 
villages in Anatolia became linked to the urban world (Ahmad, 1993, p.115). 
 The DP government aimed to maximize gains in the short-term. The 
foreign trade was already liberalized in 1946 by the CHP government, and the 
DP itself also advocated a liberal economy. However, it pursued unplanned, 
populist economic policies based on political, rather than economic 
considerations. These policies inevitably led to deficit financing and foreign 
trade deficit, and the implementation of the rather ambitious programmes 
launched by the DP needed a great amount of imported commodities. This 
policy resulted in the course of only a within few years to liquidation of the gold 
reserves:  high inflation and a severe debt crisis were the consequences due to 
deficit financing of imports. In consequence, the DP government was beset by a 
huge foreign debt which became hazardous for both industry and trade (Ahmad, 
1977, p.138). 
 Before its electoral victory, the DP had promised to implement liberal 
capitalism in Turkey (Ahmad, 1977, p.129). However, there were no private 
firms willing to participate in the privatization of the SEEs (Ahmad, 1977, 
p.130). Therefore, the DP returned back to policies, with emphasis on statist 
economy, contrary to its initial promise to liberalize the economy and even 
further, expand the SEEs for the sake of populist outcomes (Mehmet, 1998, 
p.135). Under the statist scheme of the DP, many enterprises were inaugurated 
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despite high production costs (e.g. cement) or despite the lack of a justified need 
(e.g. sugar cane) (Mehmet, 1998, pp.135-136). The mismanagement in the SEE 
sector led to unprofitable results and the state enterprises began to be run by  
clientelistic and nepotistic networks that were dominated by “featherbedding and 
favouritism” due to unnecessary and unsuitable personnel appointments of party 
adherents (Mehmet, 1998, p.137).  
4.3.2 Changes in the Socio-economic Structures  
 Thus far, we have seen the main changes in the economy during the 
period 1950-1960. I now seek to analyse how the changes in the economy were 
reflected in the socio-economic structures in Turkey. First, I will look at the 
changes in employment opportunities in the rural areas, demographic patterns 
and the income of social strata. Second, I will discuss the impact of these 
changes on the voting patterns by the end of the 1950s. 
 Taken as a whole, the DP government brought about many positive 
developments in agriculture, with the introduction of mechanization, 
improvement in irrigation, usage of fertilizers and through the highway network 
construction (Yenal, 2010, pp.106-107).  
 In addition, for the first time in the history of the country, these policies 
embraced the masses rather than small privileged groups. Therefore, the DP 
government’s policies drastically influenced the whole of Turkish society. 
Despite these positive developments, they also brought a number of negative 
outcomes which have affected Turkish society until present. A major negative 
outcome was the aggravation of unemployment in rural areas, since the 
agriculture shifted from labour-intensive strategy to the capital intensive 
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strategy. The rural unemployment which was always a problem in Turkey 
(Ahmad, 1977, p.136) got worse and the traditional rural labour market distorted 
(Mehmet, 1998, p.135). 
 When figures 7 and 8 are taken into consideration, the employment of 
people by agricultural sector followed a smooth path during the first post-war 
decade. After 1956, employment in the agriculture sector decreased and did not 
resume an upward trend until 1960. 
 
Figure 7. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1950-1960 
as a % (Construction component added to the industry). 
Source: TÜİK 
 
 According to Figures 7 and 8, employment rates in the services sector 
exhibit peaks during the first half of the decade followed by a decline towards 
the end of the decade. The industry sector also shows also a peak in the first half 
of the decade, with a decline and subsequent fluctuations during the second half 
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of the decade. The slight fall in the agricultural sector by an average 1.9% 
through the decade, and fluctuations in the industry, might reflect the shift of the 
labour force in agriculture to the industry sector as workers. During the period 
1946-1961, the income of industrial workers was higher than that of small 
farmers or small land owners: hence this might have yielded an increase in 
employment in the industry sector (including construction) (Koç, 2010, pp.137-
138).  
 While considering Figures 9 and 10, the share of services sector in total 
employment demonstrates a slight, but gradual increase during this period. New 
job opportunities became available during this period; for instance, the banking 
sector developed and recruited more employees (Koç, 2010, p.140). However, 
the supply of the skilled labour force being really low might have prevented a 
faster increase in employment in the services.  
 
Figure 8. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1950-1960 
as a % (Industry without the construction) 
Source: TÜİK 
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Figure 9. Share of each Sector within the Total Employment during the 1950-
1960 as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
 
 
Figure 10. Share of each Sector within the Total Employment as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
 
 The mechanization of agriculture is considered to have enhanced the 
mass migration from rural areas to towns and cities which occurred in the 1950s 
(Koç, 2010, p.136). From 1950 to 1960, the population of big cities increased by 
about 10% each year. More than one million people quit their land; hence 
migration affected the whole country. Migration was not new, but the type of the 
migration was different. In previous decades, the farmers were still attached to 
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their villages, but in the 1950s, they completely relocated in order to find jobs in 
the recently emerged industry branches. Nonetheless, the capacities of the 
industries were just too low to recruit these unskilled labour forces. As a result, 
only a minor part of the migrants had the opportunity to find a permanent job in 
industry. The majority became temporary workers or street sellers (Zürcher, 
2008, p.330). 
 Even though demographic and employment problems arose due to rural 
unemployment and the rural exodus, the economy as a whole witnessed rather 
high growth rates. The increase in GDP was reflected also in the wages. Hence, 
during the period 1946-1961, almost all the social strata
100
 in the country became 
better off, as compared with the war period (Koç, 2010, p.174). However, the 
social group which benefited most were the big landowners, due to the increase 
in mechanised agricultural production (Zürcher, 2008, p.330).  
 In addition to the big landowners, urban workers also benefited from 
economic progress. Their real wages increased, together with an improvement in 
their working and living conditions (Koç, 2010, p.174). In the cities, profits grew 
faster than wages and salaries: hence merchants and the industrialists constituted 
the occupational category which benefited most in the cities. The economic 
progress was, however, hampered from 1955 on by the acceleration of 
inflation
101
 which mostly affected the wage earners. Nonetheless, when the 
situation of different social strata are compared with the World War II time, their 
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  Including the displaced agricultural workers 
101
 The reasons behind the inflation included the DP’s policies on “cheap farm credits, huge 
subsidies for agricultural goods, and virtual tax exemption for farmers” which resulted in a class 
of wealthy farmers and brought dynamism to the country side. This rural prosperity enhanced 
consumption, and created a demand which the economy could not meet. This high demand 
drastically increased food prices and “created an inflationary trend which dislocated the entire 
economy” (Ahmad, 1977, p.117). 
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standard of living had considerably improved by the end of the decade (1950) 
(Zürcher, 2008, p.330). 
4.3.3 Socio-Economic Changes as Reflected in Politics and in Voting 
Behaviour 
 As mentioned in the chapter 1, the 1950s were dominated by the majority 
government of the DP. At the legislative elections of 1950 and 1954, the DP 
obtained 52.67% and 57.61%, respectively, whereas it witnessed a decrease in 
its votes to 47.87% in 1957. The CHP’s votes were rather constant: 39% in 
1950; 35% in 1954 and 41.1% in 1957.  Lastly, the DP was closed as a result of 
the military intervention in 1960. In this context, I analysed whether the socio-
economic changes during the decade underpinned the voting behaviour and 
politics in Turkey. For this analysis, I look at changes in society, working class 
and party system, respectively, and discuss how voting behaviour during this 
decade occurred.  
 First, as demonstrated in section 4.3.2, the changes in socio-economic 
structures did not yield a radical increase in employment in industry and the 
service sectors. Thus, despite improvements in economy and mechanization of 
agriculture, the country remained an agrarian society. As a result, peasants 
continued to vote for the DP during this decade. The peasants’ strong support for 
the DP in the 1950s is also backed up by an interview that I conducted with 
Abdullah, representative of the AKP. Abdullah argued that:  
....At that time, in the 1950s, if we have to talk about sociological 
class division, we should talk about rural and urban blocs as two 
main types of class in Turkish society of 1950s. Menderes gave the 
way to the agrarian people so that they also played a distinctive role 
within the system. He allowed them to vote. In addition, their vote 
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(referring to agrarian people) allowed them to have power in the 
state administration (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
Thus, as seen from the quote from Abdullah, in the early 1950s, after a 
long period of suppressive single-party regime where there was no political 
alternative, the DP was considered as a political party which would finally 
answer to the needs of agrarian people. 
 Second, when the DP came to power, it promised to bring new rights for 
the working class. However, the only concrete change was the establishment of 
the Trade Union Türk-İş (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) in 1952 (Kongar, 2011, p.627). 
Otherwise, the DP did not bring other rights to working class, as mentioned in 
section 1.3; the working class was deprived of the right to strike to express their 
discontent with the DP government in the late 1950s. Given that the rights of 
working class were not fulfilled, the working class stopped supporting the DP 
after the elections of 1957 (Taş, 2004).102  
 Third, the elections of this decade did not occur according to 
proportional representation. Therefore, the existing electoral rule did not allow 
for the expression of oppositional voices in the parliamentary level. Due to lack 
of proportional representation, the main oppositional party CHP, despite its 
votes that remained at a reasonable level of about 40% in all three legislative 
elections, barely had the opportunity to challenge the DP at parliamentary level. 
Thus, the main opposition reflected the centre of the society which is formed by 
ruling elites (military and civil bureaucrats). Moreover, the DP’s majority in the 
political system allowed the party to restrain the rights of oppositional groups 
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 (Taş, 2004)  
 http://www.mevzuatdergisi.com/2004/04a/02.htm 
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(e.g. workers, intellectuals). Given the increasing authoritarian stance of the DP, 
urban industrialists, working class, civil and military groups cooperatively 
established an opposition front. As a result, the military intervened in 1960 on 
27
th
 May.  
 When I analyze the voting behaviour throughout this decade, I notice that 
the DP, despite setbacks in its policies and its increasingly autocratic way of 
ruling, had managed to keep its votes at a level of about 48% in the legislative 
elections of 1957. This showed clearly the rural segment of the population that 
constituted the bulk of the electorate (periphery) still supported the DP.  
 Despite this rather impressive electoral support, the DP government was 
overthrown only three years later by the military, following a contentious period 
with the CHP, and student and worker protests against its policies that resulted 
in casualties. It is noteworthy that the circles (i.e., students, workers, and 
university staff) that went in open conflict with the DP government represented 
only a small segment of society. However, being highly influential pressure 
groups, they managed to create a wide public opinion against the DP 
government in prompting military intervention.  
 Furthermore, it is of importance to note that plurality voting emerged, 
despite relatively close percentages of votes of the DP and the CHP (48% versus 
41%) in the elections of 1957. Previously, chapter 2 explained why the dual 
models were appropriate for the analysis of Turkish politics (Kongar, 2008). As 
seen the political party system of 1950-1960, the centre and periphery model is a 
more a suitable approach in analysing the Turkish party system, rather than 
class-based theories.  Thus, the ‘centre’ of the model (the ruling elites of the 
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Turkish society) expressed its voting in the CHP whereas the ‘periphery’ 
expressed itself in the DP. 
 Furthermore, due to plurality voting, 48% of the DP led to 424 
parliamentary seats and 41% of the votes resulted to 178 seats of the CHP. This 
unjust outcome due to plurality voting was certainly a main cause of the political 
tensions. It gave the DP a political power that was not proportional to its 
percentage of votes. Misuse of this power by the DP and provocative actions of 
the opposition party, the CHP, together led to severe political tensions, and 
eventually to the first disruption in the multiparty regime.  
4.4 Early Industrialisation (Import-Substitution Industrialisation), the 
Urban Working Class and Multi-party Politics: 1960-1980 
 In this section, as with previous ones, I will first demonstrate the 
development of the Turkish economy during the period 1960-1980. Secondly, I 
will look at the change in employment in different sectors in order to understand 
if there is a significant shift among the sectors to indicate changes in socio-
economic structures. In addition, I will look at other indicators such as the 
constitution of 1961 and increase of trade unions as pressure groups to 
understand those changes in the socio-economic structures.  Lastly, I will 
analyse whether these socio-economic structural changes underpinned the voting 
patterns of this period or otherwise.  
4.4.1 Economic Developments 
During the period 1960-1980, the economy continued to be guided by the 
planned economy, and more specifically the ISI (Import-Substitution 
Industrialization) regime (Mehmet, 1998, p.137). On the other hand, as 
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mentioned in the previous section 4.3, the coalition between the urban 
industrialists; the civil and military bureaucracy and the working class which had 
been effective as pressure group in the closure of the DP had drifted apart after 
military intervention. Thus, when the political system and its normal multi-party 
structure were restored, the industrialists resumed to be a supporter of the AP 
which was ideologically the follower of the DP (Sunar, 2004, pp.128-129).  
During this period, the ISI economic model was adopted as a 
development strategy, and the Turkish capitalist class continued to thrive under 
the sway of the state, or rather the AP government. Due to the state’s protection, 
the industrialists obtained more power and joined the same line as “the centrist 
political, bureaucratic and military elites” (Mehmet, 1998, p.137). Thus, the 
period 1960-1980 was characterized by state protection and state subsidies until 
the military intervention/resolution of 24
th
 January 1980.  
4.4.2 Changes in the Socio-economic Structures 
When employment according to sectors is taken into account, most 
people began to work within the services sector (Figure 11).  It is argued that 
this increase complied with the plans of economic development and the 
bureaucrats of those years tried to implement a growth model by supporting the 
sector of services (Kongar, 2011, p.529). Thus, due to employments under the 
services sectors, new urban worker strata began to emerge during this period. 
 Meanwhile, employment in agriculture in real terms remained almost 
unchanged, in contrast to changes in the services and industry. Figure 12 also 
demonstrates the constancy in agriculture in comparison to services and 
industry, showing important fluctuations during this period.  
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Figure 11. The Employment by the Sector Type during the Period 1960-1980 in 
thousand (Raw Data)  
Source: TÜİK 
 
 
Figure 12. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during Period 1960-1980 as a 
%   
Source: TÜİK 
 
 Another important indicator is seen in the Figure 13 according to which 
agriculture’s share within total employment dropped significantly during this 
period. The shares of services and industry in turn increased smoothly during 
this period. The decrease in agricultural employment and increase of 
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employment in both industry and services demonstrate that Turkey began to shift 
from being an agrarian economy to an economy slightly closer to that of 
industrial countries.  
 
Figure 13. The Share of each Sector within the Total Employment as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
 
 The decrease in the share of agriculture and increase in the share of 
industry and services also serves to explain the continuing migration patterns 
that began in the 1950s. Migration to urban cities also continued to increase in 
this period. The urban population rate increased from 45.3% in 1960 to 63.3% in 
1980 (Kongar, 2011, p.530). This change in urban population also reflected, 
aside from a decrease in rural labour force, an increase in urban strata, which 
was mostly formed by occupational categories such as technical staff; sales 
personnel or trade staff; self-employed; entrepreneurs; managers; administrative 
staff; domestic workers and those who  worked in personal services (Kongar, 
2011, p.530). 
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Moreover, the socio-economic structure was strongly affected by the 
constitutional changes of 1961 which provided more freedom to political views 
within society. As mentioned in chapter 1, due to these changes, workers, 
students found opportunities to express themselves through trade unions and/or 
student associations. It is seen that there was a high increase in workers with 
trade union adherence (1963: 296.000 and in 1980: 1.300.000).  
When the ratio of trade union adherents to all wage earners is analysed, 
the ratio reached a peak in 1975, with 42.8% during this same period. The 
working class during this period was highly active politically peaking, and 
together with the students, they organized many strikes and demonstrations, and 
developed a collective action mentality (Kongar, 2011, p.630).  
On the one hand, political liberation and the establishment of new firms 
resulted in the emergence of new urban intermediary strata. On the other hand, 
industrialists kept close ties with the AP. Nevertheless, as emphasized in chapter 
1, the AP’s policies,   targeting only metropolitan industrialists, did not satisfy 
small-sized firms of provincial areas, mostly Inner Anatolia (Yavuz, 2003, 
p.209). Therefore, their discontent was reflected in the formation of a new 
institutional framework.   
4.4.3 Socio-economic Changes as Reflected in Politics and in Voting 
Behaviour 
 An analysis of the post-1960 political system through the perspective of 
voting behaviour, as used for the analysis of the Western societies, is difficult to 
adopt in the case of Turkey. The main reason behind this difficulty is the 1960-
coup d’état, which disrupted the democratic regime and its normal evolution in 
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Turkey. It interrupted not only the democratic continuity of the political party 
system, but also brought it off its course. 
  Even though the military intervention had aimed to eradicate the DP with 
the support of the opposing social bases, the legislative elections of 1961 (where 
the AP obtained a high level of votes) demonstrated the backlash of this 
intervention.  It turned out that despite discontent with setbacks in terms of of 
the socio-economic policies of the increasingly suppressive DP government, the 
majority of society did not approve of this intervention. The legacy of the DP 
still continued under a new political party, the AP, which obtained 34% of the 
votes in the first legislative elections after the 1960 military intervention. The 
rather high level of votes of the AP votes in these elections demonstrated the 
reaction and/or unchanged political view of a certain segment of society.  
 In addition to military intervention as a distorting aspect, another factor 
which complicates my analysis is the mismatch between the class categories as 
formulated by Western scholars and class categories which exist in Turkish 
society. Contrary to voting patterns in Turkish society, as emphasized in chapter 
2, the most important factor affecting party commitment was the notion of class 
(Butler and Stokes, 1974 cited in in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99).  
Despite this mismatch, between Turkish society and western societies’ class 
structures, voting behaviour according to sociological factors is observed due to 
two main factors namely the socio-economic dynamics and the liberal 
constitution of 1962.  
 First, the socio-economic dynamics since 1950s such as agricultural 
mechanization, working opportunities in the cities and consequently, rural 
199 
 
exodus were no doubt the triggering factors in the creation of an urban labour 
force. Nonetheless, this labour force was unable to express itself during the late 
1950s, due to the authoritarian DP government. In addition, even though it 
wanted to express its concerns about the late 1950s’ inflationist policies, it was 
deprived of the right to strike, demonstration and any other means of organized 
the expression of opinion.  
 Second, as pointed out in the background chapter 1, the constitution of 
1961 proved to be decisive in the burgeoning of the labour class, and thereby 
labour parties, since it entailed clauses enabling opening of trade unions, right of 
strike, right of organization for workers. From 1961 until 1980, the number of 
members in trade unions, as aforementioned, increased drastically (Kongar, 
2011, p.630). 
 Therefore, voting behaviour during the post-1960 period was rather 
closely related to the changes in socio-economic structures. Thus, the socio-
economic changes in the 1950s appeared to have initiated a process that gave 
rise to the formation of a proper labour class in Turkey in the following decade. 
 Consequently, the TİP success in the legislative elections of 1964103 
showed that a political party which defended the rights of workers found a 
corresponding base in the electorate. Moreover, the transformation of the CHP 
into a centre-left political party in the 1970s should be considered in the light of 
social dynamics since 1950s. 
 To analyse the labour force and transformation of its interests from the 
point of voting behaviour theories based on the class mobility, voting behaviour 
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 Representation of TİP as independent deputies 
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in Turkish society does not reveal the voting behaviour of class mobility, as 
class mobility cannot be attributed to the creation of urban jobs as a consequence 
of an industrial revolution.  
 Upward mobility seems to have occurred mainly due to agricultural 
mechanization which distorted the economic balance in rural areas and forced 
rural labour force to migrate to big cities. Hence, the social dynamics such as 
rural migration did not occur because of the abundance of occupational 
opportunities in urban areas but rather because of lack of available jobs in rural 
areas. Thus, upward mobility in Turkish society arose due to different dynamics 
as compared to societies that had an industrialization experience.  
  Aside from this specific side of urbanization and economic 
transformation, upper mobility occurred, in the sense that once people moved to 
the cities, they became wage earners and able to move to the upper social 
classes. As a result, the 1960s and 1970s’ political success of the left parties can 
be linked to these available upper mobility opportunities in Turkey.   For 
instance, the CHP’s electoral success in the legislative elections of 1973 
reflected the changes in socio-economic structure and their effect on voting 
behaviour. The analysis of the support basis of the CHP in the early 1970s 
indicated that it was formed “by the working class and the poor living on the 
peripheral areas of cities (hence migrants from rural areas); market-oriented 
small peasantry which increased their living standards since 1960s and young 
urban professional middle classes” (Ayata, 2002, pp.104 -105). 
 As a result, the ideological shift towards the left-wing and a discourse 
along the lines of social democracy and welfare economy found their answer in 
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the new emerging strata within Turkish society, which flourished a result of 
socio-economic transformation since the 1950s. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
other factors such as adherence to trade unions contributed to voting for the 
CHP. It has been argued that the unionized groups in the manufacturing sector 
became the leading force for activism of the CHP (Ayata, 2002, pp.104-105).  
 When the voting behaviour of newly urbanized intermediary strata and 
the working class are analysed, it may be argued that they had a higher tendency 
to vote for the CHP, due to a class perception or social adherence to CHP. 
Therefore, the voting behaviour in favour of the CHP during this specific period 
can mostly be explained by the expressive theory, which considers voting more 
as a social than as an instrumental act (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985 cited in 
De Graaf and Nieuwbeerta, 1995, p.999). I argue that the electoral preference for 
CHP fits better into the expressive theory, because newly urbanized intermediary 
classes as members of trade unions found better opportunity to express 
themselves in the CHP of the 1970s.  
 The argument that expressive theory explains the voting tendency 
towards the CHP is supported by the fact that the CHP members were, in 
general, also members of trade unions. Hence, as has been pointed out with the 
expressive theory, members were linked to each other by a culture of shared 
class (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985 cited in De Graaf and Nieuwbeerta, 1995, 
p.999). 
 As pointed out above, small merchants of provincial cities were not 
satisfied with the AP’s prioritization of the big industrialists. Thus, they looked 
for another political party that could adequately address their economic needs, in 
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line with the provisions of the self-interest theory. Hence, these small merchants 
and tradesmen anticipated more support from the MSP that openly declared to 
do so. Therefore, from 1973 on, the MSP also took a share of right-wing votes in 
the legislative elections.  
 When the voting behaviour in favour of the extremist parties (e.g. 
Islamist) is analysed, the driving force towards the MSP seems to be better 
explained in terms of a self-interest theory (as emphasized by De Graaf, 
Nieuwbeerta and Heath (1995, p.999)) than a class-based theory. The petty 
bourgeoisie of Anatolia could not find its place in the late 1960s under the AP; 
moreover, they were mostly discriminated against by state elitists. Thus, the 
voting behaviour in favour of the MSP in the 1970s can be explained by the self-
interest theory, since the party’s social basis (petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia) 
expected that the MSP would bring more opportunities to the economic arena.  
In addition, there were two more parties in this period: the AP and the MHP.
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The AP continued to attract the votes of rural groups and also big industrialists 
and businessmen; in other words, conservative centre-right wing votes.  
  In considering these two decades, we may see that the society of this 
period provides a case that is more suitable for class analysis than the previous 
periods. This class-based voting behaviour already emerged in the 1970s as a 
consequence of the social transformation. Therefore, I argue that in the society, 
class notions began to flourish in Turkey in the 1970s and to affect voting 
decisions. Nonetheless, the social bases of the newly urbanized intermediary 
classes were drastically deteriorated through the military intervention of 1980 
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 I did not look at the MHP as it was beyond my research.  
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and the following military administration (1980-1983) and the turbulent years of 
the 1980s. 
4.5 Export-led Growth Economic Model, Emergence of New Intermediary 
Strata and Rise of the AKP in 2002 
In this last section of chapter 4, I investigat how economic 
developments in the early 1980s combined with the conjunctural changes to 
voting behaviour in the last three decades. For the reader’s convenience, the 
section is split into three consecutive chronological periods: 1980-1991, 1992-
2001 and 2002-2012. In the first period, the post-military intervention decade is 
evaluated through an investigation of changes in the economic policies and their 
impacts on society as well as on voting behaviour. Second, the decade of the 
1990s is analysed in order to understand further the forerunner of the AKP, that 
is, the RP and its electoral success in the 1994 local elections as well as in the 
1995 parliamentary elections. Third, the decade of the AKP is considered. 
4.5.1 The Economic Policies and their Impact on the Periphery, Changes 
in Socio-economic Structures and their Reflection on Voting Behaviour during 
the Period 1980-1991 
 In this section, I firstly demonstrate the neoliberal restructuring of 1980s 
in the Turkish economy. I also take into account the main macroeconomic 
indicators in investigating the reflections of the adopted economic model on the 
general economy during the decade. Then, I look at employment by sectors, as 
well as the evolution of occupational categories from the period 1980-1990, in 
order to assess how the economy impacted socio-economic structures. In 
analysing the change in socio-economic structures, I also look at the migration 
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from rural areas to big cities, in order to identify the impact of the dynamics of 
the era related to socio-economic structures. After this analysis, I discuss how 
these changes in socio-economic structures translated into politics, and more 
specifically into voting behaviour.  
4.5.1.1 Economic Policies and their Impact on the Periphery 
 In the 1980s, the developing countries were strongly advised to adopt an 
export-led growth model, by virtue of the economic success of Japan, Korea, 
Singapore or Taiwan that were the champions of this model (Gibson and Ward, 
1992, p.341). Turkey, also as a developing country, was expected to follow this 
new growth strategy. Therefore, in order to implement the corresponding 
transformation in her economy, Turkey went through a series of stabilization 
programmes with the support of the IMF and WB (Yenal, 2010, p.131; 
Saraçoğlu, 1994, p.63).  
 With deep economic problems with very high inflation rates, as well as a 
big foreign trade deficit, Turkey adopted this global model of economic 
development through export-led growth with a parliamentary resolution on 24
th
 
January 1980, as pointed out in the chapter 1. Through these policies, the export 
of goods and opening up of Turkey to foreign markets became the central issue. 
Over the last 30 years, Turkey’s economic system has been guided by these 
resolutions, which were subsequently reinforced by the coup d’état of 12th 
September 1980.   
 As a result of this export-led growth model, many SMEs were 
established in the following period, in accordance with the fact that their scale 
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and labour-intensive production system could easily integrate with global 
markets (Gümüşçü, 2010, p.7).  
 As shown in the previous sections, industrialization was not a new 
concept in Turkey.  During the period 1950-1980, cities such as İstanbul, Bursa, 
Kocaeli, İzmir, Ankara and Adana (See Figure 14) had, indeed, achieved the 
necessary transformation and become the new industrial centres (Pamuk, 2009, 
p.276; Tuskon, 2011).  
 
Figure 14. The map which illustrates the industrial cities, established during the period 
1950-1980        
Source for Map: Web
105
 (Accessed on 23/04/2012) (Baydın, 2012)  
The number 34 indicates İstanbul; the number 35 indicates İzmir; the number 41 indicates 
Kocaeli; the number 16 indicates Bursa; the 6 indicates Ankara and 1 indicates Adana. 
 Pamuk considers these industrial cities as the first group, that is, the first 
generation, of industrial cities (Group I). They were followed by Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, 
Sakarya, Balıkesir, Eskişehir, Manisa and İçel as Group II industrial cities which took the 
advantage of their proximity to the primary industrial cities (Group I) (Pamuk, 2009, 
p.276) (See Figure 15). 
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 (Baydın, 2012) 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9b/MapTurkishProvincesNumbers.svg 
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Figure 15. The map which illustrates the industrial cities, close to the first group of 
industrialized cities 
Source: Web (Accessed on 23/04/2012) (Baydın, 2012) 
Number 10 indicates Balıkesir; the number 45 indicates Manisa; number 39 indicates Kırklareli; 
number 59 indicates Tekirdağ; number 54 indicates Sakarya, number 33 indicates İçel and 
number 26 indicates Eskişehir. 
 Furthermore, Pamuk considers the cities which bourgeoned due to the export-led 
growth in the 1980s as Group III (Figure 16). These emerging cities also had social 
dynamics.  
 
 
 
Figure 16. The map which illustrates the main industrial cities, established after 1980 due 
to export-led growth 
Source: Web (Accessed on 23/04/2012) (Baydın, 2012) 
Number 20 indicates Denizli; number 42 indicates Konya; number 38 indicates Kayseri; number 
44 indicates Malatya; number 46 indicates Kahramanmaraş and number 27 indicates Gaziantep. 
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 As has been argued, the rise of these cities in Anatolia
106
 has led to the 
establishment of a rather strong Anatolian bourgeoisie in Turkey, and at the 
beginning of the 2000s, this growing bourgeoisie constituted an important class 
which, together with the changing political arena, provided the basis for the 
political rise of the AKP (Teazis, 2011, pp.122-123). I will return to this group 
while discussing the social bases of the AKP.  
 In addition to the development of SMEs, important developments 
occurred in the whole economy following the resolutions of 24
th
 January 1980. 
The liberalization of external trade, currency exchange and capital markets 
resulted in the opening of the Turkish economy to the global economy and 
participation in global competition (Yenal, 2010, p.131). 
 The economic programme resulted in a remarkable improvement in 
Turkey’s economic situation; the most striking feature of the economic recovery 
was the dramatic growth in the export of goods and services (Saraçoğlu, 1994, 
p.75; Pamuk, 2009, p.277). The ANAP ruling period (1983-1991) brought 
dynamism to the Turkish economy (e.g. privatization of the SEEs; liberalization 
of the credit market and establishment of a capital market in real terms) and 
contributed to the exposure of the economy to global competition (Yenal, 2010, 
p.136). 
 Furthermore, the neoliberal restructuring of 1980s initially brought many 
positive developments to the Turkish economy. However, the macroeconomic 
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 Anatolia is the mainland of Turkey. According to maps above (Figures 10-13), cities such as 
İstanbul, Kocaeli, Bursa, Tekirdağ and Kırklareli are considered as the cities which belong to 
Marmara region. Cities such as İzmir, Manisa and Denizli belong to Aegean Region. Cities such 
as Ankara, Kayseri, Konya and Eskişehir belong to the Inner Anatolia region. Cities such as İçel, 
Adana and Kahramanmaraş belong to Mediterranean region.  A city such as Gaziantep belongs 
to South-Eastern Anatolia region. A city such as Malatya belongs to Eastern Anatolia.  
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indicators began to give negative results in the second half of the 1980s and 
inflation increased from 30% in 1986 and to 1988 to 68%.  
 Due to continuous inflation, the wages continued to increase and as a 
result, public expenditures consumption increased drastically, and public 
investments declined (Yenal, 2010, p.137). This negative change was also 
observed in government fiscal deficit and external trade deficit. The inflation 
phenomenon which drastically affected Turkish society in the 1990s was not 
solved until the mid-2000s (Figure 17) (Mehmet, 1998, p.206). 
 
 
Figure 17. Inflation Average Consumer Prices 1980-2010 
Source: IMF   
 
  In addition to inflation, unemployment has been another macroeconomic 
indicator which has affected, and still affects the whole of society. The 
unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labour force displayed 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s a rather fluctuating course, at a level of about 
8%, and an elevation to a level of about 10% in the 2000s, with a peak value of 
14% in 2009 as an aftermath of the global financial crisis and following the 
recession in Turkey (Figure 18).   
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Figure 18. Unemployment Rate as a Percent of Total Labour Force 1980-2010 
Source: IMF   
 
4.5.1.2 Socio-economic Changes during the Period 1980-1990 
 An analysis of this decade according to changes in rate of the 
employment in the main three sectors reveals (Figure 19) a constant (no change 
in rate) course in the first half of the 1980s in the employment rate in agriculture, 
followed by fluctuations at the end of the decade. The rate of employment in the 
services sector demonstrates in the 1980s a rather stable annual increase of 
around 4%, followed by annual fluctuations after 1988 which still remain at 
around 4%. The rate of employment in industry, with and without construction, 
in turn displays through the first seven years of the decade annual increases of 
around 3%. In the last three years of the decade, the rate of employment in this 
sector declines slightly, but resumes in early 1990s a strong upward trend, 
reaching a growth of nearly 7% in 1992.   
 In addition to the percentage change in these three sectors, it is important 
to look at the share of each sector within the total employment as it provides a 
better insight into the dynamics of employment within the country (Figure 20).  
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This approach reveals that in the period from 1980 to 1992, a consistent and 
gradual decrease occurred in employment in the agricultural sector.  
 Concomitantly, a reverse trend was apparent in the sectors of services 
and industry, with a gradual increase over the same period.  In addition, the 
increase in the share of services within total employment turned out to be higher 
than that of the industry sector. Even with inclusion in the construction, the 
industry’s share within total employment remained below the share in services. 
Thus, the services became, over time, the main employer, followed by industry 
and agriculture as a reflection of the marked changes in the labour market 
(Figures 20 and 21). 
 
Figure 19. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1980-1992 
as a % 
Source: TÜİK 
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Figure 20. The Share of Each Sector within the Total Employment as a %  
Source: TÜİK 
 
 Above, I have demonstrated the changes in the employment patterns 
according to different sectors during the period 1980-1992. It is also important, 
however, to look at the employment according to occupational categories to 
assess better changes in socio-economic structures.  
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Figure 21.  Evolution of Sectoral Employment (Share of Total in %) in the 
 Period 1980-2008. 
 
 Thus, the share of employment in the agriculture sector  as compared to 
total emploment declined during the period 1980-1992 from around 53 % to 45 
% (Figure  20). As emphasized above, services have an upward trend throughout 
the era. To be more specific, workers in trade, sales and crafts increased their 
share within the total employment. Similarly, the professionals, administrative 
and clerical workers also increased their share during this same timeline. On the 
other hand, share of industry and manufacture workers remained constant. As a 
result, Turkey started to turn into a services-based economy. Among the 
services, especially the employment of salespersons and craftsmen started to 
increase during this period. As will be explained in the next section, this increase 
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in services reflected the development of intermediary strata that is formed by 
various different areas of services (e.g. craft, trade, sales, and service).  
 As pointed out in the previous sections 4.2 and 4.3, migration had 
already started in Turkey in the 1950s, with agricultural mechanization. In the 
years after 1980, migration to the big cities continued to increase and contribute 
to the population increase of metropolitan cities. However, the reasons behind 
migration had changed. Whereas in the 1950s, migration to big cities was a 
consequence of agricultural mechanization, in the 1980s, it was due to the 
increasing conflict in South-Eastern Anatolia. Thus, people of Kurdish origin 
were forced to leave their rural homes and they moved to other places, especially 
metropolitan cities in Western regions, i.e., İstanbul and Mediterranean and 
Aegean coastlines (Antalya, Mersin (İçel)) (Sağlam, 2006, p.42).  
 As may be seen from table 1, the population in these metropolitan cities 
increased significantly during the period 1985-1990. All of these cities showed 
nearly the same increasing trend in population between 1985 and 1990. The 
main reason behind the increase in population of these cities was due to the 
increase in migration.  
 By way of illustration, the figure 22 demonstrates the net migration 
rate
107
 to İstanbul during the period 1975-2000. As can be seen from this figure, 
there was a significant increase in net migration rate between 1985 and 1990. All 
of these cities showed almost the same pattern of immigration between 1985 and 
1990 (Table 1 below). However, even though the ethnic dimension was 
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 Net migration rate: Difference between the numbers of immigrants and emigrants at the 
midterm of a time interval (usually annual) per thousand inhabitants. 
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important in this period, forced migration,
108
 aside from the urban appeal, was 
not the only reason behind people moving into the cities. Another push factor 
was the decrease in employment opportunities in the rural areas due to decline in 
agriculture production’s share within the total economy (from 24.8% in 1980 to 
16.8 in 1990, then to 14.8% in 1995 and to 13.4% in 2000 (TÜİK statistics). 
 
 
Table 1. Population of 7 Metropolitan Cities during the Period 1975-2000 
        Source: TÜİK Census Data 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Net Migration Rate to İstanbul during 1975-2000 
      Source: TÜİK 
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 Forced migration is a term which is used to explain “anyone who is internally displaced or 
who is forced to leave his/her place of settlement, a new life is an “obligation” ” (Kurban et al., 
2007, p.6).  The forced migration also emphasizes that internal displacement occurring due to 
concerns for national security in Turkey thereby it was more than an obligatory displacement; it 
was a displacement by use of force (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6). 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/9327b591-52c8-4392-8dc2-
821a2c1a764a/zgoc_yuzlesmek_ENG_kitap_24_10_08_pdf.pdf 
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4.5.1.3 The Impact of the Socio-Economic Changes on the Voting 
Patterns during the Period 1980-1992  
 After the military intervention of 1980, the party system was engineered 
by the military government. Thus, the closed parties of the previous decade were 
not allowed to enter into the elections up until 1987.  As mentioned in the 
chapter 1, under such restrictions, the ANAP’s electoral victory marked the 
beginning of its tenure for the rest of the decade. The two other parties that were 
allowed to participate in the legislative elections of 1983, were the HP (the 
Halkçı Parti - the Populist Party) and the MDP (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi - 
Nationalist Democracy Party), founded by a retired general under 
encouragement of the junta, but which did not prove to politically viable in long-
term. The legislative elections of 1987 were held shortly after the constitutional 
referandum, allowing for the removal of the ban on political leaders.
109
   
            In the previous section 4.4, I discussed how the voting behavior was 
shaped by new social strata of that era, and voting behaviour is related to class-
based voting and social mobility. When this decade is analysed from the point of 
view of voting theories, it may be observed that the main centre-left party, the 
SODEP, continued to address the lower strata (workers, urban strata services 
workers, civil servants of that era). Nevertheless, the other major centre-left 
party (the DSP after removal of the ban on parties)
110
 did not repeat the CHP’s 
electoral success of the 1970s.  
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 The constitutional referendum was held on 6
th
 September 1987. The changes (lifting of the 
bans) approved by a tight difference: 50.2% (for) versus 49.8% (against). The referendum 
outcome prompted Prime Minister Turgut Özal to call for early legislative elections that were 
held on 27
th
 November 1987.  
110
 As the ban on political parties was removed, each leader of the previous decade established its 
own political party. Thus, at the political party level, three centre-left political parties emerged 
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  In the literature, voting behaviour changes may be seen to be based on 
two factors: class dealignment and partisan dealignment. Class dealignment 
refers to one’s loose attachment to one’s occupational category and weakened 
voting tendency towards the party representating one’s own social/occupational 
group/category class (Crewe et al. , 1977 and Dunleavy, 1979 cited in Evans, 
Heath and Payne, 1991, pp.99-100). Partisan dealignment, in turn, refers to the 
gradual decline in the attachment to one’s own political party (Crewe, 1983, 
p.193).  Partisan dealignment may explain the decline in voting behaviour 
towards centre-left parties in the 1980s, and later on, in the 1990s in Turkey. 
However, the main reasons in the Turkish case were the military intervention of 
1980 and attempts to eradicate left-wing ideology. Thus, as mentioned before in 
chapter 1 and previous sections of this chapter, the social strata which used to 
constitute the basis of the centre-left parties were detached from their previous 
parties, since the necessary links (e.g. trade unions) between them were 
disrupted. 
  On the other hand, as pointed out in chapter 1, the ANAP’s electoral 
success was due to its hybrid discourse, which attracted votes of different strata 
which had been deprived of their representative parties. The ANAP’s liberal 
economy discourse of the ANAP mostly attracted the big urban industrialists and 
urban businessmen and new urban professional strata, and in particular, small 
medium enterprises owners in Anatolia (the burgeoning Anatolian capitalists).  
                                                                                                                                              
and competed for the same constituency until the 1990s. The outcome of the legislative elections 
of 1987 was as follows: the ANAP 36.4%, the SODEP 24.6%, the DYP 19.1%, the DSP 8.5%, 
the RP 7.2%, and the MHP 2.9%. It should be noted that despite the short period of time that was 
available for the banned leaders to get their new parties reorganized, they proved to be rather 
competitive and brought down the ANAP’s electoral support to a modest to modest level of 36% 
in these elections.   
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 In the oppressive political atmosphere of the 1980s, voting behaviour 
was mainly characterized by the economic interests of the new social strata 
which wanted more integration to the global economic system. As pointed out 
before, the ANAP responded to the needs of capitalists who wanted to expand 
their businesses and integrate into the market economy. Özal himself was the 
technocract who implemented 24
th
 January Parliamentary Decisions aiming at 
the liberalization of the Turkish economy. The argument regarding the ANAP’s 
response to the needs of new emerging social strata is also emphasized by the 
the high-ranking member of the AKP:   
Later on, Menderes’s bringing the political system to agrarian 
society also manifested when Özal became prime minister. So, at 
that time (1980s), in fact, a class differentiation in sociological terms 
did not occur like in the 1950s as urban versus rural classes, but class 
differentiation was mostly based on upper, middle class and lower 
class. Thus, following the footsteps of Menderes, Özal aimed at 
providing ethnically, ideologically and culturally distinct groups 
with opportunities similar to those ones that the elites used to enjoy 
(Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 Thus, Özal’s advocating of the free market economy addressed the 
anticipations of the businessmen and tradesmen, and thereby, the intermediary 
strata and upper strata of the country. The economic theory of political 
behaviour (Downs, 1957 cited in De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, 
p.999) claims that people vote for the party which, they expect, will be of 
greatest value to them in the near future. In consequence, the voting behaviour in 
terms of Downs’ “rational and self-interested” aspirations (Downs, 1957 cited in 
De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999) explains the main voting 
preference of the intermediary and upper strata’s voting towards the ANAP.  
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 Furthermore, the ANAP came out of the legislative elections of 1987 as 
the first party despite competition from the political leaders of the 1970s who 
had returned to active politics. The ANAP’s second electoral success appears to 
be related to the lasting support it received from the upper and intermediary 
strata of the society. As emphasized in chapter 1 and the beginning of this 
section, the ANAP government opened the Turkish economy to international 
economic order and brought the economic opportunities to the periphery. During 
my interview with Mehmet from the TEB (Türk Ekonomi Bankası - Turkish 
Economy Bank), he asserted that the ANAP government was by far the most  
reformist government in terms of its economic policies, which resulted in the 
integration of the Turkish economy  after opening up the global economic 
system (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1). In addition, as mentioned above, 
during this period, export levels increased significantly, and new industrial 
branches and SMEs emerged, extending and diversifying the industrial output.  
          In summary, the ANAP consolidated its regime, since it addressed the 
anticipations and needs of its main electorate basis (mostly small medium 
enterprises, shop owners, services and also white collars from urban areas). 
Therefore, the preference for the ANAP on the part of voters in the 1987 
elections was based more on the self-interested aspirations of these strata.  
 However, the ANAP went into decline after the local elections of 1989 
and later, in the parliamentary elections of 1991. I pointed out in chapter 1 the 
structural reasons behind this decline. In brief, this was due to removal of the 
ban on the leaders of the closed parties terminating the unchallenged position of 
the ANAP; Özal’s, the ANAP’s charismatic leader’s election to the presidency 
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(leaving behind in the party a leadership vacuum); a deterioration in the 
country’s economic performance with increasing inflation and unemployment; 
and an increase in terror activities, with a subsequent, almost unmanageable 
rural migration.  
         Aside from these dynamics, as Mehmet has argued, the ANAP’s prime 
minister’s move to the presidency and his retreat from an active political role 
and later on his death resulted in disruption to the country’s upward pace in the 
economy, and in a decline in support for SMEs. Mehmet calls this period, ‘the 
lost decade in Turkey’ (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 Therefore, the upper and intermediary strata of Turkish society that had 
benefited from the ANAP’s supportive SME policies and its infrastructural 
projects seemed to withdraw their support for the ANAP after the prime 
minister’s election to the presidency. Thus, the ANAP seems to have lost its 
main social bases (upper strata and intermediary strata), due to loss of its 
visionary leader and economic recession
111
 (e.g. inflation; unemployment). As a 
result, the voting behaviour of the ANAP’s electorate seems to be based on self-
interested motives, as stated by Downs (1957) (Downs, 1957 cited in De Graaf, 
Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999). 
                                                     
111
 There were two additional factors which contributed to the decline of the ANAP: increase of 
corruption; featherbedding, clientelistic network, priority to the circle of friends for the take-over 
of auctions (Yenal, 2010). Moreover, the economy had begun to recess: the inflation rate had 
doubled in the second half of the 1980s and reduced the purchasing power of many people. This 
was perhaps one of the main reasons behind the withdrawal of support from the ANAP. As a 
result, the party lost first the 1989 local elections and then 1991 parliament elections (Tanör et 
al., 2011, p.81). 
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4.5.2 Economic Developments in the 1990s, Emergence of New 
Intermediary Strata and Rising Trend of the RP  
 In this section, I first discuss the most important developments related to 
the economy during the decade.  I then analyse the changes in socio-economic 
structures as a consequence of the economic developments of the period.  
Following this, I will analyse how the changes in socio-economic structures 
underpinned the voting behaviour during this decade, and more specifically, 
voting for the RP.  
4.5.2.1 Economic Developments in the 1990s 
The 1990s were characterized by high inflation (see Figure 17), 
depreciation of TL and a fragile financial system.  Moreover, the period was 
characterized by depreciation in the TL and dollarization. People in Turkey, in 
order to prevent their investments and savings from depreciating, began to buy 
foreign currencies, especially dollars, in order to safeguard themselves.  
4.5.2.2 Emergence of New Intermediary Strata   
 During this period, employment according to different sectors 
demonstrates similar pattern as previous decades: while the share of employment 
in agricultural sector continued its declining course; share of services within 
total employment kept on increasing. Industry’s share within total employment 
remained as in the previous decade unchanged.  In addition, as seen from Figure 
23, in 1999, shares of agriculture and services within total employment 
intersected. Thereafter, a share of employment agriculture in employment kept 
on decreasing whereas services became (and have remained) the predominant 
sector of employment.  
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Figure 23. Sectoral Employment in Turkey (1993-2008)  
Source: TÜİK 
 
   This decade was thus marked by the further decline of employment 
related to agriculture and the further increase of employment in services, while 
employment in industry continued to be constant. In the next section, my aim is 
to link the economic changes and the change in occupational categories to 
politics in specific to the rise of the RP. 
4.5.2.3 The Impact of the Socio-Economic Changes and the Rising 
Trend of the RP  
 As mentioned before, this era was characterized by the emergence of RP, 
with its successful performance in the local elections of 1994, as well as the 
legislative elections of 1995. Meanwhile, this period witnessed, aside from the 
emergence of the RP, the decline of centre-left and centre-right parties.  I will 
discuss how aforementioned changes in socio-economic structures, together with 
the institutional changes (e.g. decline of left-wing parties), contributed to the rise 
of the RP.  
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 First of all, as seen in the previous sections 4.5.2.2 and 4.5.1, this period 
is mainly characterized by drastic changes in the economic conditions of the 
deprived masses (such as inflation; purchasing power parity; high 
unemployment level; the welfare disparities (Öniş, 1997, p.751; Figures 17 and 
18)). In a sense, the economic developments of the 1990s resulted in a continous 
crisis, and the state was unable to deal with aggrieved people. Hence, the 
unprivileged masses withdrew their support from the nation state, which had 
been unable to protect them from the unfavourable consequences of neoliberal 
restructuring 
 Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section 4.5.1, mostly due to 
increasing terror events, the cities received massive migration from rural areas 
during the period 1985-1990. As a result, the peripheral sides of big and/or 
metropolitan cities received an important flow of people during the late 1980s.  
However, in addition to the net migration rate, due to the much higher birth rate 
of people who came from rural areas, the urban population increased steadily 
through time. Thus, the urban population reached 59% at the beginning of the 
1990s; 65% at the beginning of the 2000s and 75% in 2008 (Koç et al., 2008, 
p.20).  
 Consequently, as pointed out in chapters 2 and 3, in Kahraman’s terms 
(2008); the ‘periphery at the centre’ was created. Hence, in big cities, new 
peripheral circles which had already been formed in the 1950s continued to 
expand in the 1990s. These new peripheral circles, which were established at the 
‘centre’ accommodated people who arrived from rural areas and began to work 
in manual labour. Thus, unlike the established and organized working class that 
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was close to the core through formal links with the state, this segment of the 
deprived masses or in other terms, manual lower strata, had a greater tendency to 
be guided by non-mainstream political movements. As pointed out in chapter 1, 
the efforts of pro-Islamist RP to mobilize a mass-based movement through a 
populist propaganda answered the aspirations of this social segment. Thus, the 
RP’s social bases were formed by this lower stratum, which comprised the 
working classes that were unable to find secure employment and were engaged 
in marginal activities (Gülalp, 2001, pp.444-445). 
 These deprived people were, apparently, better understood, especially by 
the RP. They were supported by members of the RP, and found themselves 
better served not through formal ways, but through RP-operated informal 
neighbourhood networks. The RP understood the expectations of the masses and 
they had more aptitude to reach them. The neighbourhood links and informal 
links were almost solely in the monopoly of the Islamic circles. Hence, political 
parties, like the RP, had much more opportunity to reach the masses than the 
others. In addition, as pointed out in previous sections, the centre-left 
associations and trade unions failed to reach those deprived masses as they used 
to do in the 1970s (Zürcher, 2003b, p.304 and pp.310-311).  
 Analysis of the voting behaviour of this lower stratum reveals that it first 
had a partisan dealignment (Crewe, 1983), due to lack of attachment to their 
previous parties (e.g. CHP and previously TİP). In this context, voters’needs (or 
voters of CHP and other left-wing parties in 1970s) were better addressed by the 
Islamic networks. Thus, to explain this phenomenon, the lower stratum did not 
act according to a class-based, but rather to a rational choice model. This lower 
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stratum (formed by marginal workers etc.) was not blindly attached to a political 
party, since it was aware that left-wing parties were not anymore able to meet its 
needs. Therefore, the members of this stratum directed their votes towards the 
RP, which better addressed their aspirations and provided services in their 
interrelations with their municipality, and also neighbourhood services.  
 As pointed out by Himmelweit et al. (1993, p.107) who emphasize on 
partys’ credibility related to their ability to realize their policies, in the case of 
the voting behaviour towards the RP, it can be argued that the RP’s discourse 
played an important role for voters to canalize their votes towards it. Thus, the 
lower strata’s voter patterns seem to be oriented by both economic factors 
(unemployment) and socio-pyschological factors (credibility of the RP’s 
discourse, Adil Düzen). 
 In summary, the vacuum created by the failure of the left (Zürcher, 2008, 
p.416) was filled by the RP’s policies, based on its populist discourse Adil Düzen 
(Just Order). Therefore, it is not possible to explain the voting behaviour of 
lower strata towards the RP in terms of social mobility theories. The RP 
answered the needs of the deprived strata by providing them with social 
assistance and support, but the party did not give a promise for significant social 
change.  
 The support that the RP received was not only from the lower stratum, 
but also from tradesmen and craftsmen, whose number and power steadily 
increased throughout the decade (Figure 21). As a result, the RP’s electoral 
support was based on a cross-strata coalition, since the RP also obtained support 
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from small farmers, blue collar workers, tradesmen and craftsmen (Gülalp, 2001, 
p.445; Özbudun and Hale, 2010, p.48). 
 As Figure 21 reveals, there emerged new intermediary strata formed by 
people whose occupational categories were related to services, trade, and crafts. 
Indeed, the social bases of the RP were, in part, formed by urban segments, 
mostly tradesmen and craftsmen living in the squatter districts of the 
metropolitan cities constituted the social bases of the RP (Bakırezer and 
Demirer, 2010, p.158). 
 Furthermore, the alliance of the social bases did not concern only the 
deprived masses and urban craftsmen, tradesmen but as well the peripheral 
segment of the capitalist class which was formed by small and medium scale, 
mostly provincial businessmen (Gülalp, 2001, p.444).  This pillar of the RP was 
also called the Anatolian capitalists which began to flourish due to the free-
market policies and globalization trend of the 1980s (Öniş, 1997, p.748). 
Nevertheless, this group felt excluded as it was not considered as a part of the 
real elite in the society (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-749). This upper capitalist strata 
used to support the ANAP.  
 Furthermore, Özal’s move112 to a politically passive role as the president 
of the Republic resulted in the standstill of the economic reforms that had been 
of great benefit to this emerging bourgeoisie. Seeing its source of financial 
interests being closed, this emerging bourgeoisie apparently withdrew its support 
from the ANAP, which under new leadership rapidly diverged from Özal’s 
visionary policies. Thus, this group began to look for alliance with other parties, 
                                                     
112
 It is also emphasized that the ANAP took a more liberal political party after the 1990s (Mert, 
2007, pp.33-34). 
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especially the RP (Teazis, 2011, p.123). Actually, Erbakan, the RP’s leader 
himself had also been a greater supporter of the Anatolian capitalists and SMEs. 
  It is important to follow the shift of the emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie 
from the ANAP to the RP, since it shows that the upper strata acted according to 
their self-interest. Therefore, this group’s voting preferences for the RP in the 
1990s can best be explained on the basis of rational choice theory.  
 With the support of these three main strata (upper; new intermediary and 
lower strata) the RP obtained successful results in the local elections of 1994 and 
legislative elections of 1995. However, the RP’s further entrenchment into party 
system was blocked by the blow to the political system delivered by the 
postmodern memorandum of 28th February 1997 that resulted in the closure of 
the RP and put the Anatolian capitalists under the secular state’s guidance.  
 Therefore, especially, after the military memorandum, the upper strata 
(small and medium provincial capitalists) began to look for a new conservative, 
but moderate political party that was ready to pursue neoliberal free-market 
policies, and to further the integration of the Turkish economy with the global 
economic system, This party should create a socio-economic environment for 
further expansion of the Anatolian capital.  The Anatolian upper strata found 
what it looked for in the reformist branch of the National Vision (movement that 
became later on the AKP).  
4.5.3 The AKP Period from 2002 to the present: Social Bases of the AKP 
 The previous section demonstrates the main economic developments, the 
changes in socio-economic structures of Turkish society and how they 
underpinned voting behaviour during the period 1923-2001. This section will 
227 
 
now look at the period 2001-to present in order to understand how the change in 
socio-economic structures since the 1980s has contributed to the emergence of 
the AKP in 2002, and later on, its consolidation throughout AKP’s tenure. To do 
this, I first demonstrate how the economic conjuncture of the early 2000s 
impacted the socio-economic structures and how in turn they contributed to the 
emergence of the AKP in 2002.  
4.5.3.1 The Changes in Socio-economic Structures since 1980s and 
their Impact on the Emergence of the AKP in 2002 
 As may be seen from the previous sections, new intermediary strata 
started to emerge after the 1980s and especially 1990s. As can be seen from 
Figure 18, the economic volume, and consequently employment in occupational 
categories, related to services, trades, sales and crafts started to increase since 
late 1980s and kept increasing in the 1990s. I denoted this occupational category 
as the intermediary strata in the Turkish context (Appendix Part F, Figure1). The 
main socio-economic change in society occurred in the increase in services and 
drop in the agricultural categories since the 1980s, due to the economic policies 
of the 1980s. However, the new socio-economic structures, i.e., the intermediary 
strata, which emerged on account of these policies, were also severely affected 
by the 2000 and 2001 economic crises.  
 In this context, in 2002, the AKP appeared as a source of hope for these 
emerging intermediary strata, by promising economic stability and growth 
(İnsel, 2003, p.298). In addition, the AKP received a great amount of votes from 
the lower strata, which, in order to achieve its aspiration of rising to the upper 
strata, turned to the AKP (İnsel, 2003, p.299). These arguments regarding the 
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socio-economic reasons behind the AKP’s emergence were also highlighted by 
the high-ranking official of the TESEV, Zafer who told me:  
The social basis is important. Sociologically, the lower strata’s 
power is important. So what did people want? People in Turkey 
wanted more wealth, more freedom. They wanted to open up to the 
outside world because they wanted to sell their products to the 
outside world. This is important. The things in agrarian level are 
homogeneous. Everything is similar. Everything looks alike. But, in 
the middle class, everything is different. Difference brings up 
individualism. Individualism brings up freedom (Zafer, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1).  
 
This new intermediary strata also needed a new political and economic 
discourse. Among the interviewees, different social actors in society (e.g. both 
oppositional voices, such as members of the CHP women branch and youth 
branch and relatively more pro-AKP actors, such as the representatives from 
TESEV and from the Hak-İş trade union) shared similar views about the 
necessity for a new political and economic opening ensuring the economic and 
political aspirations of society in 2002.  
Moreover, they agreed that the AKP succeeded in reading the needs and 
aspirations of these new intermediary strata. For instance, İbrahim from the CHP 
youth branch highlighted that:  
...AKP attempted to give this message especially to the youth.  ... 
AKP said that AKP is the party of change. AKP is the party which 
has beat the status quo.... (İbrahim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
Similarly, Ayşe from the CHP women branch asserted that:  
Before 2002, Turkey needed an opening. Turkey is a conservative 
country. It is easier to get votes from the conservative segments. 
That’s why someone from the conservative groups has to come up. 
In the meantime, the centre-right parties were not convincing 
anymore because of corruption and the 2001 crisis. The coalition 
government took important austerity measures on economic grounds. 
In addition, this economic programme required continuity (Ayşe, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
229 
 
 
Moreover, my argument that is related to the changes in socio-economic 
structures and AKP’s perception of these social changes was supported by the 
representative of the TESEV, Zafer, who told me:   
Here, we also have to mention Tayyip Erdogan’s strong perception... 
So, he perceived the change in Turkish society. According to those 
changes, he produced policies. Hence, Tayyip did not create the 
AKP. AKP’s sociological basis created the AKP. Tayyip Bey had 
understood the aspirations and requests of that sociological basis 
(Zafer, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 In a similar way, Nedim from the Hak-İş pointed out the AKP’s answers 
to the needs and aspirations of the intermediary strata. He emphasized that: 
The AKP, compared to previous political parties, brought an 
important amount of projects. ... It looks simple but it does not 
matter if a project is simple or not. What he (referring to Tayyip 
Erdoğan) said: “I will bring freedoms and rights”. He named it. So 
he named the EU. In the economy, it was obvious that he would 
introduce a particular vision of the economy. Also, he mentioned 
that he would make roads and houses (Nedim, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1). 
   
 Before it came to power in 2002, the AKP not only got support from the 
lower segments of the society that wanted to move up socially, and the 
intermediary strata, but it also received important support from the upper strata 
as well as business circles. The main reason behind the AKP’s support from 
various strata is based on the post-economic crisis period and also on the AKP’s 
non-Islamist discourse.  
 Similar to other social strata, the economic crisis also impacted the 
professionals and white collar workers who constituted the upper intermediary 
strata of the societal scheme. They too aspired to a new start that would bring 
about economic stability. In this environment, the new political party, the AKP 
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which was established by the reformist branch of the FP, developed a political 
discourse that fitted the needs of different strata: upper, intermediary and lower.  
 In this environment, as compared to the RP that advocated a socio-
economic system based on Islamic values, the AKP carefully avoided a pro-
Islamic discourse. It aimed to appeal to people by emphasizing policies based on 
a free-market economy and integration with the global economic system, and 
thereby promised to bring economic stability. 
  As a consequence, the AKP did not win the elections in 2002 as an 
Islamist party, but as a centre-right political party and its votes reached 34.26%. 
If the AKP had maintained a religious, pro-Islamic discourse, it would not have 
attained such a vote capacity (Öniş, 2010, p.266). Most likely, its votes would 
have been confined to 20-25% that correponded to the RP’s vote capacity 
(21.38% in the legislative elections of 1995). This argument is supported by the 
views of an AKP member, Abdullah, who claims that: 
The MSP tradition really was a conservative tradition and it was not 
adapting to the new system in an easy way. It was not keeping up 
with the change. I also think that they could not read this. Because 
the changes in global situations, conditions... Changes in the 
conditions without losing your own identities, you can make new 
political readings, new interpretations. However, the RP’s traditional 
branch could not do it. Because they could not do it, Abdullah Gül 
from the reformist group was defeat by Recai Kutan (the 
traditionalist group within the RP) during the presidential elections 
of the party. When Abdullah Gül was defeated, it was understood 
that in the same political party, they could not do things that they 
wanted and that’s why they established a new party [that is, the 
AKP]. The traditional branch of the RP could not have understood 
that there was no possibility to do politics without taking into 
account Turkish reality, global conditions and Turkey’s electorate 
profile. Imagine a political party in Turkey which targets only pious 
conservative peoples’ votes, it can not come into power. It can get 
only 20% of the votes... or a maximum of 30% of the votes 
(Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
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Similarly, Engin from the SP pointed out that:  
If the AKP had imitated the RP’s road map, especially with regard to 
economic issues, there would have been no chance that the AKP 
would have come to power with such a high percentage (Engin, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
Furthermore, even though the AKP came to power due to its non-Islamist 
discourse and its economic discourse targeting different strata, notably the AKP 
attracted votes from people with low income and low education levels, as well as 
of conservative business circles that felt aggrieved and excluded by the secular 
elite. On the other hand, under its new leadership, the centre-left party of 1970s, 
the CHP had meanwhile become the party of relatively wealthy and educated 
segments of the upper-middle strata (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, p.159).  
  The education levels of social bases tend to go in line with income 
levels. If the A & G research company’s pre-election survey of 2002 October is 
taken into account, it was found that the AKP; the DYP; the DEHAP;
113
 the SP 
and the DSP received the majority of their votes from voters who had low socio-
economic status, as compared to the CHP, which received votes from the the 
upper social groups (A&G Araştırma, 2002, p.25).  However, given that the 
majority of the social triangle is formed by the population segments with low 
socio-economic status, it can be concluded that the AKP receives votes from the 
majority and the CHP from a minority of the population.  
 An analysis of the voting behaviour of different strata towards the AKP 
reveals the predomination of economic motives in their voting. First of all, lower 
strata appear to act in line with the rational choice theory and vote for the AKP 
                                                     
113
 The DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi - Democratic People’s Party) was a Kurdish national 
political party, but it was closed down in March 2003 and followed up by the DTP Demokratik  
Toplum Partisi - Democratic Society Party.  
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in expection that the AKP’s policies will elevate their societal levels. Thus, the 
lower strata voted according to self-interest theory. The pre-election survey of 
the 2002 legislative elections verifies this voting behaviour, according to 
economic factors. According to this survey (A&G Araştırma, 2002), 50.6 % of 
lowest strata (D-E group)
114
 believed that they had not yet seen the worst of the 
economic crisis. In a way, they desperately looked for a way out. The survey 
thus put forth the fact that the economic conditions of 2002 were of primary 
importance for these social strata and their votes for the AKP in the legislative 
elections of 2002 November (A&G Araştırma, 2002).   
  As with  lower strata, the intermediary strata and also upper 
intermediary strata (e.g. small and medium enterprises owners) expected the 
AKP to  bring economic stability and growth, and also further integration with 
global economic order (İnsel, 2003, p.298). As a result, the intermediary strata 
also voted for the AKP out of economic considerations.  
 
 
                                                     
114
 Social Status Groups in the Survey A&G Araştırma (2002), the D-E represents the lowest part 
of the society.  
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Source: Data for export level and GDP are from TÜİK and Elections results from Web sites 
Genel Seçim and Belgenet 
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Figure 25. Export-Orientated Provinces and Support for AKP in 2002 
Legislative Elections  
 To provide a concrete example, the AKP obtained higher votes than the 
average (34.46%) in those provinces with mostly export-based economy.  As 
seen in the Figure 25, export reliance in AKP strongholds
116
 was almost twice as 
high as that of control provinces. This demonstrates that upper strata and 
intermediary strata also acted according to a rational choice of theory, rather than 
other voting theories.  
               The economic factors thus worked as glue that fixed the votes of 
different strata to the AKP. As compared to RP, the AKP did not scare society 
with Islamist discourse; on the contrary, its pro-Western and pro-EU discourse 
                                                     
115
 (Genel Seçim, 2002) 
 http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=14 
116
 The number 1 denotes regions with higher support (more than 35% support for the AKP) 
(dummy=1) are Siirt, Konya, Erzurum, Kayseri, Kahramanmaraş, Düzce, Yozgat, Malatya, 
Çankırı, Kırıkkale, Kütahya, Çorum, Aksaray, Giresun, Karabük, Sivas, Samsun, Rize, Tokat, 
Trabzon, Sakarya, Nevşehir, Bolu, Kocaeli, Afyon, Gümüşhane, Niğde, Elazığ, Isparta, Ordu, 
Adıyaman, Bursa, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Amasya, Karaman, Ankara, İstanbul, Kilis. The number 
0 (thus, dummy = 0) denotes regions with lower support (less than 35% support for the AKP) are 
Yalova, Balıkesir, Kırklareli, Sinop, Bingöl, Osmaniye, Kırşehir, Kastamonu, Zonguldak, 
Manisa, Hatay, Eskişehir, Bartın, Bayburt, Burdur and Uşak. The export volumes are calculated 
for each of the provinces as the percent of total exports (real prices) over regional GDP in order 
to identify the degree of foreign trade dependency for each of the 81 regions. Therefore the value 
of total exports from that region is divided over regional (real) GDP. 
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and its ideological stance as a conservative democracy, appealed to various strata 
of society in 2002. As a consequence, the main factor behind AKP’s emergence 
was based on its promises of economic stability and growth.  
                The growing capitalist class and deprived masses at the metropolitan 
cities under the influence of the demographic patterns, economic programmes 
and rapid modernization helped the AKP to emerge. As may be seen in the next 
chapter, the AKP addressed the needs of its target population through its social 
and economic policies during its tenure as the government party.  
4.5.3.2 The AKP’s Feed-back into its Social Bases and the AKP’s 
Consolidation in 2007 
 The period 2002-2007 was characterized by the AKP’s first ruling 
tenure. As mentioned above, the AKP obtained a majority of its votes from the 
emerging new intermediary and lower strata of the society, but also in part from 
other strata. (The strong backing that came from liberal circles was, in particular, 
noteworthy). In the legislative elections of 2007, the AKP consolidated its 
electoral victory by increasing its votes to 46.6%.  
 At the 2007 elections, the AKP received its votes again from each 
stratum of society, but mostly from intermediary strata. According to a pre-
election survey of the Konda research company, the AKP received most of its 
votes from the two lowest strata, whereas the CHP received a high percentage of 
its votes from the intermediary and upper intermediary income strata. (Konda 
Research, 2007, p.16). 
 Bekir Ağırdır (2007a) has made an analysis of these results on the basis 
of income levels and he has come to the conclusion that the AKP gets “55% of 
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the votes of the poorest segments, 54% of the second, lower middle income 
segment and 43% of the mid-level income segments, 35% of the upper-middle 
income level and 23% of the votes of the wealthiest segment. It is noteworthy 
here that besides getting the majority of its votes from the poorest segments, the 
AKP addresses the rich segments of the society as well (Ağırdır, 2007a, p.12).  
 It is also important to look, for comparison, at the voter basis of the CHP 
that receives only 8% of its votes from the lowest income, 33% from the upper 
middle income class and 50% from the highest level income (Ağırdır, 2007a, 
p.17).  
 When the analysis is done according to occupational categories (A&G 
Araştırma, 2007), the AKP obtains votes from the farmers (more than average) 
and housewives (the group which especially supports the AKP with 48.5%) and 
from the craftsmen, tradesmen (40.2%). The CHP, in turn, gets most of its votes 
from private sector employees (A&G Araştırma, 2007, p.7).   
 Another survey made by the Konda Research (2007) comes to similar 
results as the A&G Araştırma (2007). It shows that the AKP gets above average 
votes from lower strata (workers and people in marginal sectors, such as street 
sellers and house-cleaners). On the other hand, the CHP receives votes from 
upper intermediary strata (public servants, public servant employers, and self-
employed people) (Konda Research, 2007, p.15). According to Konda’s survey, 
the CHP fails to attract the votes of farmers and lower strata (marginal sector 
workers). The MHP, which was the third party to get into parliament in the 2007 
elections, mostly attracts the votes of the public servants, small scale retailers, 
businessmen and students (Konda Research, 2007, p.15).  
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 It may to be of importance to clarify the reasons behind the AKP’s 
perception as a political party of deprived masses, in place of the CHP. A look at 
the past political election results from this perspective reveals that already in the 
1995 legislative  elections, the RP, but also MHP, received votes from deprived 
people. On the other hand, the CHP, even then, was the address of the votes 
from the educated (Akarca and Tansel, 2008, p.645). Thus, it is plausible to 
claim that the division of the political spectrum as an Islamist-secularist, which 
had already begun in the early 1990s, continued to exist in the 2000s.  
 Thus, it is not surprising to see such a division between the educated, 
wealthy voter basis of the CHP and the uneducated and deprived voter basis of 
the AKP. Öniş (1997) sees those people who do not have secure jobs as the 
losers of globalization, and claims that these unprivileged people constituted a 
social basis for Islamist parties in 1994. Another reason behind this divide was 
the fact that as mentioned before, the leftist parties could not grasp the needs of 
these people, as their links to them via trade unions or left-wing institutions that 
were broken by the 1980 coup d’état could not be restored  in the following 
decades. Hence, they could not trace these people and address their needs (Koç, 
2010).  
 In addition, Keyder (2005, p.128), deindustrialization has resulted in the 
growth of marginal jobs in the metropolitan areas. The voters of the AKP are 
formed mostly by this marginal sector. This is an important indicator of the link 
of the AKP’s basis to the migration to and deindustrialization of the 
metropolitan areas. 
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           Thus, since 1980s Turkish society seems to have been in a process of 
evolution towards a Western type society where the parties are based with the 
social bases.  This process was strongly affected by the socio-economic 
transformation of the last three decades, the military memorandum of 1997 and 
as well heavy economic crises of 2000 and 2001. Consequently, this 
transformation is reflected also in the voting behaviour of the Turkish society. In 
such a context, the most suitable option for the voters turned out to be the AKP 
that won in 2002 34.43% of the votes and then increased its share of vote in 
2007 to 46.58% and in 2011 to 49.8%.  
When the voting behaviour in 2007 elections is analysed according to 
voting behaviour theories, it is realized that economic stability throughout the 
period 2002-2007 helped the AKP to consolidate itself. Therefore, the AKP’s 
constituency which was mainly lower strata and intermediary strata were content 
with the AKP’s five-year performance. Başlevent and Akarca (2010) also argue 
that the main driving force during this period was the economy.  In addition, 
Cem (the high-ranking member of a big holding company), Melek (the high-
ranking representative of the MÜSİAD), Mehmet (the representative from the 
TEB), Vedat (a high-ranking official at the TOBB) as well oppositional party 
member Ayşe (CHP women branch), all agreed that the AKP followed a 
consistent economic programme during its first tenure, and appropriately 
addressed the needs of its social bases (Cem, Melek, Mehmet, Vedat and Ayşe, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1). This in turn led to the AKP’s consolidation.  
 To be more specific, Melek argued that the AKP dealt with high 
inflation; the government also supported the banks and worked for the building-
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up of the banks. She also considered privatizations, consistent price stability 
policies and high economic growth rates as successful developments during the 
AKP’s first ruling tenure (Melek, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 Mehmet from the TEB pointed out that: 
The AKP government behaved in a very rational way and they 
continued the stability programme which began during the coalition 
government. In 2004, they renewed the IMF stand-by agreement 
again. It was a suprising and unusual event in Turkey’s 80 year 
economic history. The fact they successfully implemented the same 
standby agreement for three years was a first success. Afterwards, 
the fact that they signed a new standby agreement with the IMF was 
a really unusual thing. At that time, the AKP’s economic policy 
brought stability and was reflected in the market and also in 
businesses. People began to investment again. If you look at the 
growth rate of Turkey, especially during 2004-2007, you will also 
realize that foreign investment exploded in Turkey. Hence, foreign 
markets started to trust in Turkey (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 
1).  
 
  Mehmet also highlighted privatization during the AKP’s ruling 
tenure and asserted that: 
Privatization was an important part of the economic policies. The 
privatization which could not happen under the previous 
governments occurred with successs and determination during the 
AKP’s ruling tenure (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 Similar to both Melek and Mehmet, Vedat from the TOBB considered 
that the policies until 2007 were implemented within a good macroeconomic 
plan and new policies were implemented for further developing private sector. 
After 2007, he asserted that politics outweighed economic policies (Vedat, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 Moreover, regarding the economic policies during the AKP’s ruling 
tenure, Cem pointed out that:  
It is always necessary to make a benchmarking thereby to compare 
the past with the present. Interest rates fell. Interest rates came down 
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to completely different levels from the chronic interest rates of 
before. Inflation fell. Even during the crisis moments, growth rates 
are ok. There was unemployment but there already was. There was 
an informal economy. But it was bigger in the past. Now, more than 
ever before, the government managed to place the informal economy 
under its control (Cem, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
   Among the oppositional social actors, the representative of the CHP 
women branch, Ayşe mentioned that in 2002, stabilization was achieved. There 
was a need for the continuation of stability. The AKP government prized the 
firms which have a high level of export potential as Özal did in the 1980s (Ayşe, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
  Similar to CHP member, the support for emerging bourgeoisie was also 
emphasized during the interview with the high-ranking official from the TEB; 
Mehmet asserted that the AKP during its ruling tenure continued similar policies 
as the ANAP such as subsidies to the SMEs (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 
1). 
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Figure 26. The Macroeconomic Indicators of the Period 2000-2011 
Source: Collected from high-ranking official of the MÜSİAD 
The red dot line indicates the current account deficit as a percentage of the GDP (%) 
The red straight line indicates the unemployment rate (%) 
The blue bold line indicates the GDP growth (Base Year 1998) (%) 
 
 The centre and the periphery concepts, as described in chapter 2, have 
been extensively used to analyze Turkish society (Mardin, 1973; Kongar, 1985). 
However, a consideration of the AKP’s emergence and consolidation solely 
through this concept may not prove to be sufficient for an analysis of the socio-
economic dynamics in the late 1990s. Expanded versions of the centre and 
periphery concept taking in account further fragmentations, i.e., in terms of 
‘centre at the periphery’ and ‘periphery at the centre’ (Kahraman, 2008), may in 
turn be of better use in helping acquire insight into the outcomes of this rather 
complex socio-economic transformation.  
 In consequence, as with voting behaviour in 2002, the voting behaviour 
of different strata may be explained by the rational choice theory where people 
vote for parties that would bring them the most. As the AKP received votes from 
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different strata, the factor that brought them together is apparently not a specific 
ideology or class identification, but rather, the economy. The decrease in the 
AKP’s votes in the local elections of 2009 seems to confirm such an 
explanation. Indeed, these elections were held as the repercussions of the global 
economic crisis of 2008 were also felt in Turkey. As may be seen in Figure 26, 
the Turkish economy followed a downward trend in 2008-2009.
117
  Even this 
temporary stagnation was reflected in voting preferences, in particular in the 
export-oriented sectors and regions in the Western part of Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 
2009, p.298).  
 Thus, the AKP’s magic lies in the economic programme that it has 
consistently followed as the government party to the advantage of its disparate 
constituency. During my interview with a member of the AKP youth branch, 
Zehra also underlined this point and added that: 
The AKP gives significant importance to two segments of the 
society: either to wealthy ones, or to the poor ones. In our country, 
there are more poor people than rich. Hence, it gives houses, etc. to 
the poor or it provides them with a job. In the meantime, it also helps 
businesses (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 Indeed, the AKP met the economic needs of the lower strata by its social 
policies and the needs of intermediary and upper strata by keeping the economy 
on track. Finally, it may be important to highlight once again the difference 
between the AKP’s and the RP’s policies. The RP was interested in addressing 
the needs of its ideological constituency only, whereas the AKP, with its less 
radical stance and its consistent economic plans, met the needs and expectations 
of broad segments of the society. Therefore, the voting behaviour of the 
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 The distribution of votes in the local elections of 2009: the AKP 38.8%; the CHP 23.1%; the 
MHP 16.1%; the DTP 5.7% and the SP 5.2%. 
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electorate here was not marked by sociological or attitudinal factors, but mostly, 
economic factors. 
4.6 Conclusion of the Chapter 
 Throughout this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how changes in 
socio-economic structures underpinned the voting behaviour of different strata 
throughout time (e.g. 1923-1950; 1950-1960; 1960-1980 and 1980 to the 
present). The voting behaviour in Turkey, except during the years 1960-1980, 
has been guided more by economic factors than others (e.g. sociological, class, 
attitudinal).  
 Furthermore, a specific feature of the Turkish politics after adopting the 
multiparty in late 1940s has been its regular interruption nearly every ten years 
by military interventions: the coup d’état of 1960; the coup by referendum of 
1971; the coup d’état of 1980; and the postmodern memorandum of 1997. Each 
time, these interventions disrupted the evolution of the political party system and 
the socio-economic dynamics in the country: for instance, the 1980 coup d’état 
abolished the left movement of the 1970s through closure of left-wing political 
parties and trade unions and the suppression of the working strata. Consequently, 
in the following decades, new workers’ strata came under the influence of the 
Islamic political parties, and began to translate their aspirations through the rise 
in political Islam.  
  On the other hand, the military intervention of 1980 and its neoliberal 
economic programme, as specified by the parliamentary resolution of 24
th
 
January 1980, impacted socio-economic structures in such a way that new 
intermediary strata and the so-called Anatolian (or Islamic) bourgeoisie 
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emerged. As explained above, these intermediary strata rigorously flourished 
from the early 1990s on and acquired considerable financial and political power. 
They played a decisive role in the emergence of the AKP in 2002 and formed an 
important part of the AKP’s constituency. However, the lower strata which had 
been negatively affected by the neoliberal policies since the 1980s, and by 
economic crises, also voted for the AKP, since they considered that the AKP 
would provide an opportunity to mitigate their problems and help them elevate 
their life standards and social levels. Thus, social mobility factors played an 
important role for the lower strata.  
 In its first ruling tenure, the AKP government displayed a successful 
economic performance, resulting in economic stability and growth. The AKP’s 
electoral victory of 2007 thus verified our initial hypothesis that Turkish voters’ 
behaviour is primarily determined by economic considerations and not 
ideological factors.  
 The analyses carried out in the framework of a line of pre- and post-
electoral surveys have revealed that the social bases of the AKP correspond to a 
kind of cross-alliance among the different strata of society (lower-intermediary 
and upper strata). Thus, aggrieved people (lower strata) on the one hand and the 
emerging wealthy conservative class (upper strata) on the other have been found 
to be the main supporters of the AKP. This once again underlines the fact that 
the AKP has not come to power and consolidated its votes as a pro-Islamic 
political party, but rather with its prospects of economic stability and growth, as 
well as integration with the global economic order. Similarly, its consolidation is 
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based on the stabilization of the economy and its strong social policies in various 
areas.   
 By way of positive feedback, the AKP seems to adequately address the 
requisitions and anticipations of its two main supporter groups through its social 
and economic policies. I will explore these policies and explain how they have 
contributed to the consolidation of the AKP’s votes in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 Consolidation of the AKP And Significance of Its 
Electoral Success within Turkish Society and Political Party 
System 
5.1 Introduction 
 In chapter 4, I tried to show the socio-economic dynamics which guided 
the emergence of the AKP and how the AKP responded to these dynamics with 
its economic projects. The AKP has not only claimed to answer the needs of its 
intermediary strata (e.g. petty bourgeoisie) by improving their standards of 
living through economical progress. It also used other tools such as strong social 
policies to address the needs of disadvantaged populations (e.g. manual workers) 
when the economic developments were not sufficient to cover up their needs.  
These policies contributed to the electoral success of the AKP in 2007, as well in 
2011. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to highlight the social policies 
introduced by the AKP, in order to demonstrate how they contributed to party’s 
political consolidation and entrenchment in Turkish society.  
 Following the analysis of key social policies, I will move on to examine 
the AKP’s rights-based discourse; that is, an understanding of the initial pro-EU 
discourse of the AKP and of how the AKP appealed to various ideological 
groups in society, which in turn contributed to its electoral victory in the second 
legislative elections of 2007. In analysing its consolidation, I will focus 
specifically on changing the dynamics between the historical bloc and the AKP, 
in order to reveal to what extent the diminution of the historical bloc’s power has 
contributed to the AKP’s entrenchment in the political system (including 
executive; legislative). 
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Third, I will demonstrate how the Gülen Movement has contributed to the 
AKP’s success, and at the same time infiltrated the bureaucracy. This part will 
illustrate the grass-roots Islamist movement’s interrelation with the AKP and its 
contribution to the AKP’s strength, in order to assess and understand Turkish 
society.  
 Finally, I will analyse the significance of the consolidated AKP for the 
Turkish political party system and society - one of the key research questions of 
this thesis relating the AKP’s impact on Turkish society and the Turkish political 
party system in the long-term. 
5.2 The AKP’s Social Policies and their Impact on its Consolidation  
 In this part of the chapter, I will first look at the AKP’s women and 
gender equality policies by considering policies of the AKP related to the female 
employment. Then, I will look at the policies related to social assistance to 
investigate their impact on the AKP’s consolidation. Third, I will look at the 
AKP’s policies on health system in order to assess whether the health policies 
consolidated the AKP’s ruling tenure or not.  
5.2.1 The AKP’s Women and Gender Equality Policies: Female 
Employment on the Axis of Neo-liberalism and Social Conservatism 
 Women in Turkey greater enjoy freedom when compared to women in 
other parts of the Muslim world, due to a history of secularization and 
modernization.
118
 However, women’s situation in Turkey is still far from 
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 Women in Turkey are to an extent more privileged than other women, especially in the 
Muslim World, due to the fact that women’s rights were extended through the introduction of the 
Swiss Civil Code already in 1930. Thereby, women got equal rights in divorce and child 
custody, while polygamy was abolished. Furthermore, Islamic dress was outlawed for public 
employees and, in schools and universities (Keddie, 2007, pp.82-83). 
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attaining the level of industrialized countries. Female labour force participation 
is, in this respect, a good indicator of women’s status in a country.  
 From 1988 to 2008, female labour force participation has declined 
considerably in Turkey, and as of first quarter of 2012, it is the lowest among 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries 
with 28.2% (World Bank, 2009a, pp.x-xi; see Appendix Part F, Figure1). 
Demographic and socio-economic reasons
119
 certainly account for this low rate. 
Equally, however, it may be regarded as the outcome of the socio-economic 
policies of a government with a relatively long tenure period, and also its stance 
on the issue of women and gender equality.  
 Thus, in my opinion, female employment is an appropriate starting point 
for the analysis of policies of the AKP. Women in Turkey are in a 
disadvantageous situation in many areas such as education, health and work. 
However, female empowerment begins by female employment, which provides 
economic freedom; social security and confidence to women. Therefore, it is 
crucial to consider female employment to analyse the gender equality policies of 
the AKP. In addition, it may be of help to assess an important aspect of the 
socio-economic performance of the party; provide insight into its socio-
economic philosophy and worldview; but also into the position and role it 
ascribes to women in the society it has in mind. While looking at those variables, 
it will be also possible to understand the female support for the AKP during the 
last decade.  
                                                     
119
 Females used to participate in labour force as unpaid agricultural workers. Due to 
urbanization, females’ participation in the labour market in rural environment has drastically 
decreased last decades. In addition, as females who used to work in agricultural labour market 
are poorly educated, they face constraints in entering urban labour market (World Bank, 2009a, 
pp.x-xi). As a result, the female labour participation rate has decreased since 1988 to 2008. 
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 The governments make use of the available legislative and executive 
means in order reach their political goals. Laws, programmes and projects 
represent the tools they use in implementing their policies.  Hence, it is 
important to start to the analysis by looking at the legislative changes during the 
AKP’s ten-year tenure, as compared to previous decades’ legislative practices 
(1990s and early 2000s). Some legislative advancement occurred in the 1990s 
for improvement of women’s rights in both economic and social areas. In 1990s, 
the provision in the former Civil Code which made employment subject to the 
permission of the husband was annulled (Article 159). By amendment of this 
article 159, one of the obstacles against the women’s employment was removed 
(Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.276; WWHR, n.d.).120 Similarly, in 1998, women obtained 
the right to make tax statements independently of their husbands.  
 In terms of institutional framework, in 1990, KSMG (Kadının Statüsü 
Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for the Status and Problems of Women) 
was established as a national body. In 1991, the General Directorate was linked 
to the office of Prime Ministry and carried out its activities up to 2011 under a 
State Ministry in charge of Woman and Family Affairs (Şenol et al.121, 2005, 
p.37).   
 The early 2000s was marked by directives of the EU for adopting the EC 
acquis. In 2001, with the amendment of the Civil Code, many changes regarding 
the women’s rights occurred.  It is important to pinpoint the article 154 of the 
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 (WWHR (Women for Women’s Human Rights), n.d.) Their Campaign for Full Gender 
Equality in the Civil Code:   
http://www.wwhr.org/category/the-campaign-for-full-gender-equality-in-the-civil-code 
121
 (Şenol et al. 2005) Equal Opportunities for Men and Women Monitoring Law and Practice in 
Turkey: 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eowmturkey_0.pdf 
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civil code which was read as “the marriage is legally represented by the 
husband, assigning the man as the head of the household” was amended 
(Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.279). The amended law introduced equality between 
husband and wife in the household (TBMM, 2001).
122
 
 After succeeding in the elections of 2002 November, the first AKP 
government followed the previous government’s work on EU acquis 
communautaire. As a result, in 2003, the new Labour Law (No.4957)
123
 which 
included “the principle of equal pay of equal value; equal treatment as regard 
employment; protection of pregnant and breastfeeding women from dangerous 
and night work; the reversal of the burden of proof on the employer in case of 
sex-based discrimination in the workplace; and non-discrimination against part-
time workers” was accepted by the parliament (Şenol et al., 2005, p.10; 
Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.280). In addition, the same law brought provisions 
recognizing the issue of sexual harassment within the workplace. Similarly, the 
new Penal Code was approved as a result of EU directives in 2005 (Şenol et al., 
2005, p.10).  
 Furthermore, in 2009, a law (No.5840
124
) was approved in order to 
establish a parliamentary commission on equal opportunities for men and 
women. In addition, the Prime Ministry issued a circular (2010/14 number
125
) on 
‘Female Employment’ in order to arrange provisions “ensuring gender equality, 
tailoring vocational  training and non-formal  education to the needs of women, 
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 (TBMM, 2001)  Türk Medeni Kanunu (Turkish Civil Code)  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4721.html  
123
 İş Kanunu No.4957 (Labour Law No.4957) enacted on 22 May 2003 
124
 (TBMM, 2009) 
 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/kanunlar_sd.durumu?kanun_no=5840 
125
 (Başbakanlık, 2010) Circular  of Prime Ministry (2010/14 Number) 
 http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/genelge_pdf/2010/2010-0010-006-6321.pdf#page=1  
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and increasing  access of working mothers to child care services” (World Bank, 
2009b
126
; Başbakanlık, 2011, p.10127). 
 A comparison reveals that in terms of legislation, there were in both 
decades (1990s and especially early 2000s) attempts to enhance women’s rights 
and gender equality. The governments in the first decade appeared to aim at 
cancellation of laws which used to cause main constraints against female 
employment. Similarly, the AKP government laid out provisions for 
guaranteeing gender equality in the workplace.  
 However, these advances in legislation and provisions brought about by 
the AKP government have not resulted in any significant change regarding 
female employment (see Appendix Part F, Figure1). In particular, they have not 
prevented female employment’s further decline which has been an outcome of 
demographic and socio-economic transformation (World Bank, 2009b). 
 As may be seen from Table 1, there has been a decline in female 
employment rate from 30.6% in 1988 to about 25.6% in 2004, followed by a 
slight increase after 2006/2007. Thus, as of 2010, female employment rate is 
found at a level of around 25%. It remains to be seen whether this increasing 
trend will keep on. Moreover, it is not possible to conclude that this slight 
increase is due to legislative improvements. Thus, it can be argued that the ten-
year tenure of the AKP has not been greatly effective in increasing female 
employment. This seems to be the result of some contradictions in the party’s 
gender equality policies. Therefore, I will first take into account these 
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  (World Bank, 2009b)   
http://go.worldbank.org/6RSZO7YY80 
127
  (Başbakanlık, 2011) Türkiye’de Kadının Durumu (Women’s Situation in Turkey) 
http://www.kadininstatusu.gov.tr/upload/mce/eski_site/Pdf/tr_de_kadinin_durumu/trde_kadinin_
durumu_2011_temmuz.pdf  
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contradictions between labour market policies and women’s rights in the work 
place. Second, I will consider the apparent conflict between policies for 
promoting female employment and family and religious policies which push 
women into home. 
 When the AKP’s policies are taken into account on this specific policy 
area, a conflict between provisions for female employment and women’s rights 
at work place is observed.  I now illustrate how this contradiction has been fed 
by the AKP’s neoliberal economic agenda. This contradiction is first seen as a 
tension between labour law and women’s rights in the work place with flexible 
labour. Secondly, the same law and other provisions on gender equality orient 
women towards cheap and more female-based works for the sake of female 
employment.  
 In dealing with AKP’s women agenda, it cannot be claimed that the 
previous governments pursued repressive policies against women’s initiatives. 
However, there were laws to that effect and a tendency to ignore the social 
security of female workers. But, the agenda of conservative society and cheap 
labour without social security became more significant together  with the AKP’s 
tenure (based on the interview with the representative of Halk Evleri, Lale, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1) (Aydoğanoğlu, 2011).128 
 To better understand the AKP’s women policies, it is of importance to 
consider them from the perspective of the requirements of neo-liberalism. As 
pointed out in the previous chapter, the economic system shifted from a more 
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 (Aydoğanoğlu, 2011) 
http://www.ozgurlukdunyasi.org/arsiv/40-sayi-220/342-akp-ve-calisma-yasamindaki-baslica-
degisiklikler  
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welfare-based
129
 economic system to a neoliberal economic system in 1980s. As 
a result, women’s working conditions and the AKP’s policies need to be 
understood within this new economic framework. The party has not been willing 
to implement policies dealing with the negative repercussions of the neoliberal 
economic system in the society. Rather, it has implemented policies that better 
fitted the cheap labour concept of the neoliberal state model.  
 As can be seen in the legislative changes, the AKP attempts to encourage 
female employment within the economic system; nevertheless, by promoting 
employment, it calls for a flexible and cheap female labour force. Women, 
therefore, find themselves in a precarious position in the labour market, in 
particular, when the welfare state’s safety net is reduced to female labour force 
lacking social security (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p.561 and p.567). Coşar and 
Yeğenoğlu argue that the new labour law (2003) replaced welfare concept by 
workfare and enhanced women’s submission to work under insecure conditions. 
Therefore, a contradictory relationship between promotion of female 
employment and removal of women’s social rights exists (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 
2009, p.2).  
 In line with Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2009), the act No.6111 (known as the 
‘Bag Law’130 that brought new changes to the labour law 2003) appears to 
enhance female employment by providing flexible and unsecure jobs to women. 
KEİG (Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi - Women’s Labour and 
                                                     
129
 The welfare system of Turkey was never a Keynesian welfare system, but more a welfare 
state existing in semi-peripheral countries. 
130
 The ‘Bag Law’ or ‘Bag Bill’ means amending several laws at the same time (Aslan-Akman, 
2005, p.10). The amendment to previous labour code was amended under the ‘Bag Law’ in 
February 2011. It was published at the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete, 2011). 
 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/02/20110225M1-1.htm  
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Employment)
131
 platform and other organizations on women’s rights considered 
drawbacks of the act No.6111 (KEİG, 2008132). In particular, it is argued that the 
article 14 of the labour code 4857 had already included provisions regarding 
flexible work opportunities. Under the light of the current amendment, these 
flexible work opportunities have been extended by introducing new clauses such 
“work by call; work at home and remote work”133 (Çağlayan, 2011).  
 Similarly, the current draft act on amendment named “Yeni Teşvik Yasası 
ve Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi134” aims to provide flexible work opportunities for 
women. Under this strategy, the AKP government projects to increase female 
employment to 30% by 2023 (Özgentürk, 2012).
135
 Nevertheless, KEİG (2012) 
asserts that the new plan of the government aims to augment female employment 
by canalizing women to cheap, labour-intensive and female-dominated works 
rather than by supplying advanced and long-term solutions. KEİG (2012) 
illustrates their argument by taking into account the Minister of Labour and 
Social Security’s views on female employment: “Textile is a labour-intensive 
and female-dominated sector. By providing this type of female employment in 
the South-eastern and Eastern regions, the government aims to compete with 
China, Pakistan and Bangladesh and Vietnam” (KEİG, 2012).136 
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 KEİG is a newly established platform of NGO academics, local authorities, labour unions and 
semi-public institutions to promote a gender perspective in labour and employment issues. 
132
 (KEİG, 2008) Press Release of KEİG regarding the ‘Bag Law’  
http://www.keig.org/BasinAciklamasi.aspx?id=13 
133
 (Çağlayan, 2011)  http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/127447-kadin-istihdami-ama-nasil 
http://bianet.org/bianet/emek/127660-kadinlarin-torba-yasaya-esastan-itirazi-var 
134
 Yeni Teşvik Yasası ve Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi: New Enhancement Law and National 
Employment Strategy 
135
 (Özgentürk, 2012) Teşvik Kadını Es Geçti (Enhancement Law Passed Over Women)  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1088834&Yazar=JA
LE-OZGENTURK&CategoryID=101 
136
 (KEİG, 2012) Press Release of KEİG regarding Draft of Act called ‘New Enhancement Law 
and National Employment Strategy’  http://www.keig.org/BasinAciklamasi.aspx?id=18 
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 In line with the government’s strategies for flexible and cheap female 
employment, the government’s promotion of female employment includes a 
sexist side by orienting women only towards female-dominated sectors. These 
policies for promoting female-dominated sectors are conflicting with women’s 
rights. The AKP’s adherence to this logic is observed in the Prime Ministry’s 
circular notice
137
 (Başbakanlık, 2010) which aims to concentrate on female-
based sectors and canalize women towards those sectors by providing them 
necessary skills.  
 In Turkey, women are oriented towards vocational schools since there is 
a more chance to find jobs for graduates from vocational schools than simple 
high schools (Tansel, 1994, p.308). Therefore, occupational segregation is not a 
new concept within the Turkish labour scheme. However, policies promoting 
these female-based works seem to be in alliance with the current government’s 
policies on social conservatism which consider the main duty of women as 
motherhood. They implicitly orient women towards as well home-based works 
(Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.283; Kılıç, 2008, p.498).  
 As a result of home-based jobs, women are allegedly provided the 
opportunity to reconcile work and family, thus in long-term traditional relations 
are not challenged (Kılıç, 2008, pp.495-496). In addition to this reconciliation of 
work and family life, “women obtain more easily the work consent of their 
husbands or fathers. However, the jobs which are either at home or in female-
dominated environments like those in the garment industry provide  no social 
                                                     
137
 (Başbakanlık, 2010) Circular of Prime Ministry (2010/14 Number) 
 http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/genelge_pdf/2010/2010-0010-006-6321.pdf#page=1 
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security benefits at all” (Dedeoğlu, 2000, p.160). With the lack of social 
security, as mentioned before, women’s rights in work place are neglected too. 
 In line with Kılıç (2008) and Dedeoğlu (2000), these traditional roles and 
emphasis on female-based jobs have been emphasized by the representative of 
Woman Branch of the AKP İstanbul who gave another perspective to these 
female-based jobs (Leyla, Appendix, Part 1, Table 1). She referred to the 
İSMEK138 (İstanbul Büyükşehir Meslek ve Eğitim Kursları - İstanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality Vocational Training Courses) as an example for 
vocational training and claims that throughout these courses, the local branches 
have become like a ‘Halk Üniversitesi’139.  
 The İSMEK comprises predominantly local and short-term projects that 
are restricted and do not help women to enhance their skills and/or acquire new 
competencies. Thus, the courses
140
 are limited to handicrafts, clothing and 
textile, marketing and retail and like.  For instance, the designed professions for 
women are highly stereotypic and apparently determined by a conceptual 
framework that is biased and sexist. As a result, these courses seem to confine 
women to the professional roles ascribed to them within the patriarchy of 
neoliberal system. In short, these policies appear to lack far-sighted and 
comprehensive programmes with goals such as bringing about societal changes 
                                                     
138
 İSMEK (İstanbul Büyükşehir Meslek ve Eğitim Kursları): are the vocational training courses 
which are provided by İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İSMEK, n.d.). 
http://ismek.ibb.gov.tr/ismek-el-sanatlari-kurslari/webedition/File/ekitap/ismekkatalogweb.pdf 
(in English) http://ismek.ibb.gov.tr/ism/kurumsal.asp (in Turkish) 
139
 Halk Üniversitesi: People’s University 
140
 Some examples for Vocational Technical Trainings: Vocational Technical Trainings: 
Gardening, Hairdressing, Computerized Model Designer, Computerized Style Designer, Skin 
Care, Leather Confection, Tutoring Motherhood, Tailoring, Home Services, Home Textile, 
Home Management etc. Examples for Handicrafts: Wood Dyeing, Wood Engraving, Glass 
Dyeing, Glass Ornament and Chinaware Dyeing, Drawings with Pebble Stones, Leather 
Equipments, Pattern Designing etc. (İSMEK, n.d., p.22). 
http://ismek.ibb.gov.tr/ismek-el-sanatlari-kurslari/webedition/File/ekitap/ismekkatalogweb.pdf 
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by empowerment of women. Instead, they only aim to lead women to 
professions within the required cadre which can only offer cheap, limited and 
cumbersome employment opportunities.  
 In addition, by promoting this type of works for women, the patriarchal 
system is not challenged. As Kılıç (2008) and Dedeoğlu (2000) pointed out, 
these female-based jobs give opportunity to create reconciliation between homes 
and work, thereby without challenging women’s traditional roles. The 
integration of women to neoliberal system without a challenging patriarchal 
system was also emphasized by Lale from Halk Evleri
141
 who argued that 
women have been left out in unsecure environment by labour rights and 
conservative values: 
Through these tactical policies, women are pushed into economic 
insecurity and confined to the family, husband and/or father. Hence, 
women are additionally deprived of social security and enforced to 
ever increasing levels of dependency. The women have become 
unsecure within the neoliberal economic system that was 
strengthened by supporting policies of the AKP (Lale, Appendix Part 
B, Table 1). 
 
 Furthermore, she supported the aforementioned idea of an alliance 
between neo-liberalism and promotion in female employment, stating: 
Even though women may obtain a job, the cheap labour force role 
that they are compelled to assume does not change their position in 
the society. So, they go to work in firms/workshops/or other public 
places ….. All the secondary roles they are imposed to play arise 
from this mentality and the tacit hostility against the very notion of 
women’s emancipation (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
                                                     
141
 Halk Evleri: “People’s Houses were initially local educational establishments for 
disseminating Kemalist message in provincial towns” (Zürcher, 2003b, p.233). It was closed 
down many times in 1950, 1980. Currently, instead of a Kemalist message, the Halk Evleri has a 
more socialist approach advocating people’s social rights (such as rights for housing, education; 
health; woman; disabled; environment and labour rights) (Halk Evleri, 2011). 
http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/sites/default/files/indir/20-04-2010-he-brosur.pdf  
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 In the above, I have attempted to show how the labour market policies 
and women’s rights in the work place challenge each other.  In addition, I have 
discussed how these policies for promoting female employment orient women 
towards specific, female-dominated jobs by keeping the patriarchal system 
unchallenged. I now elaborate more on the tensions between this patriarchal 
system’s values and policies for female employment.  
 As mentioned in the background chapter, the AKP has put forward 
conservatism
 
together with democracy as one of its main characteristics, in order 
to distinguish itself from other political parties which all somewhat have a 
conservative vein. However, conservatism
142
 
 
constitutes the main body of its 
politics, as well as its engine, which is itself understood as a novelty in Turkish 
politics (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, pp.462-463).143 
 When the AKP’s social conservatism and its female employment policies 
are analysed, they may be seen to be in harmony with its neoliberal economic 
agenda. As mentioned before, within the neoliberal system, women face two 
options: either they have to work in unsecure jobs or to remain at home for 
childcare (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p.566). Therefore, by enhancing female 
employment policies, the AKP does not remove the traditional role ascribed to 
women (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, pp.462-463). In this context, women are allowed 
to work as long as they are kept attached to their homes and do not neglect their 
main duty: motherhood.  
                                                     
142
 Akdoğan who is the ‘ideologue’ of conservative democracy defines conservatism as a 
‘synthesis of and a ﬁne tuning between tradition and change’ (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, pp.462-463; 
Akdoğan, 2004, p.45-46). 
143
 However, while taking into account AKP’s social policies, I will use the term social 
conservatism, a political ideology or moral ideology that asserts that government and/or society 
are responsible of “encouraging or enforcing traditional values”. 
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 The AKP’s emphasis on family values and social norms is plainly seen in 
the views asserted by the representative of Woman Branch of the AKP, Leyla in 
İstanbul:   
The very core of the society is the woman; the family. And that’s 
why; it is essential to look after woman. If you reach the woman; 
ultimately you reach the family. If you protect woman, eventually 
you protect family (Leyla, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 Hence, the AKP utilises conservative discourse thoroughly by 
emphasizing the conservative family ideal; the Turkish family structure; home as 
the primary site of women; mother’s care for children’s well-being as their 
primary job.  
 The AKP’s strong emphasis of the family and social conservatism may 
also be illustrated with the change of the State Ministry of Women and Family 
Affairs into the Ministry of Family and Social Policies following the 
parliamentary elections of 12
th
 June 2011 (Arın, 2012; Sevinç, 2012; Belge, 
2011).
144
 It may be argued that the AKP, after its consolidation, no longer feels 
the need to hide its conservative discourse and, as a sign of this change, reduces 
the women to a subordinate item under the issue of family and social affairs.  
 The elaboration of women’s issues within the family concept is not the 
only constraint against the AKP’s policies on female policies, there is also an 
important focus on religious values in dealing with problems regarding family 
and women issues. Arat (2010) argues that through the concerted efforts of the 
public bureaucracy, education system and civil society organizations, Islamist 
                                                     
144
 (Arın, 2012)   
http://www.reflectionsturkey.com/?p=239 
(Sevinç, 2012) 
 http://www.reflectionsturkey.com/?p=671 
(Belge, 2011) 
 http://bianet.org/english/women/130607-women-policies-erased-from-political-agenda 
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norms are being propagated in the society. Hence, under the pressure of religious 
values, only secondary roles are ascribed to women. Therefore, the guidance of 
these faith-based offices serves to propagation of Islamist norms and, 
consequently, submission of women to the patriarchal religious system (Arat, 
2010, p.882). 
 The propagation of Islamist norms and emphasis on the family constitute 
obstacles against female empowerment by the representative of the CHP Woman 
Branch, Ayşe, who pinpointed that when women face problems vis-à-vis the 
family, the remedies that are offered to them are shaped by the religious and 
conservative discourse (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1). The same 
representative illustrated this back-up of the conservative discourse with 
religiosity by the orientation services given to women within a conservative and 
religious perspective; and in this context; she highlighted the ‘aile irşatları’145 
that were established and run by Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Diyanet146, 2010, 
p.24) (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  In these orientation offices, according 
to the CHP Women Branch representative, the inquiries are answered with 
reference to the verses from the Qur’an. She asserted that the main debate 
focuses on the reduction of the place of woman to the family, so the women 
issue is discussed only within the family perspective.  
 Even though in the last decade, women in Turkey have been mostly 
limited by those two options (home as a mother versus cheap labour conditions 
                                                     
145
 Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları:  Family and Guidance Offices  
Initially, in 2003, at six pilot cities, there were these family and guidance offices. As of 2009, the 
number reached to 53 (Diyanet, 2010, p.24). 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dinhizmetleriweb/irsat/pdf/kadinVeAileyeYonelikCalismalar.p
df 
146
 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı: Presidency of Religious Affairs 
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in terms of employment opportunities), it does not mean that the AKP has been a 
non-friendly political party towards women. Indeed, the AKP has attracted 
women since 2002, according to A&G and Konda Research’s surveys; women 
are more likely to vote for the AKP at both 2002 and 2007 parliamentary 
elections (Konda Research, 2007, p.15; A&G Araştırma, 2007, p.7).  Why has 
the AKP, a socially conservative party succeeded in getting women to its own 
side? Women’s support for the AKP has been well illustrated by the member 
from the CHP’s women branch, Ayşe. She argues that: 
According to the concept of secularism, being pious was not 
bringing any additional benefits to the CHP. There has not been a 
political party where headscarved ladies had the opportunity to 
express themselves. ... However, the AKP addressed a larger base 
especially for women. ... Women in the AKP did not only become 
members because of their husbands, but because there was not any 
alternative place for them to express their opinions. According to a 
research in 2010, women who are between 20 and 25 years old, 
whose monthly income is less than 500TL or 1000TL, whose 
education is defined by the 8-year obligatory education, who are 
relatively conservative, who are on the edge of urbanization and 
who desire modernization, they do not know which party to vote 
for. There is a large segment like this. They (AKP) said to these 
women that “modernization is your right and I am with you”. 
That’s why votes for the AKP increased that much. But, still this 
segment is still searching. There is a social climbing. They do not 
belong completely to the AKP. Their decisions can change; they 
are looking for their own benefits (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 
1). 
 
Furthermore, during its ruling tenure, the AKP has kept answering to the 
needs of its female constituency by providing specific social projects to them. 
The AKP’s brochures together with the interviews I conducted with the 
members from the AKP women’s branch have often highlighted social policies, 
specifically the ones targeting women and children (Leyla and Derya, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1). 
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 To be more specific, among the interviews that I conducted among the 
AKP women’s branches in İstanbul and Kadiköy, they emphasized the 
establishment of women’s health centres, disability funds for both disabled 
people and their mothers and cash aids only for women for their children’s 
education and health expenditures (e.g. vaccinations) (Leyla and Derya, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 Thus, even though the congruence between socially conservative policies 
and a neoliberal economic agenda look initially contradictory, indeed both of 
them work in harmony. Women living on the peripheries of the urban areas have 
been enjoying AKP’s socially conservative policies which target women’s health 
and their children’s health as well as their social life. In this way, since AKP’s 
socially conservative policies outweigh the negative repercussions of the cheap, 
unsafe labour conditions, since AKP’s policies bring safety to their home lives, 
women feel safer and they keep forming the female constituency of the AKP. 
In sum, women are encouraged by the AKP to work at labour-intense 
and female-based occupations. The vocational training courses at local level also 
orient women towards these female-based occupations which can be done at 
home and at female-dominant sectors. This cheap, insecure female-dominated 
labour occupation not only fit in with the requirements of the neoliberal 
economic setting, but also with the traditional roles of women, to motherhood 
within the patriarchal system since flexible works allow women to reconcile 
both work and house work. The AKP within its conservative ideology often 
advocates the role of woman within the family and importance of motherhood. 
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Consequently, the AKP makes use of the alliance of neo-liberalism and social 
conservatism in accordance with its own worldview.  
In addition, emphasis on family and religious values has become 
dominant in providing remedies for women’s (e.g. domestic violence) and/or 
family problems.  Lastly, even though the AKP’s socially conservative policies 
and its neoliberal agenda look contradictory, they do not form a contradictory 
scheme for the female constituency of the AKP. Despite the cheap and unsafe 
labour conditions, women feel safer due to the AKP’s policies targeting the 
specific needs of women. Thus, women keep supporting the AKP at the ballot 
box. 
5.2.2 The Social Assistance Policies of the AKP and their Impact on its 
Electoral Consolidation  
 In the previous section, I sought to demonstrate how the policies related 
to female employment have developed during the AKP’s tenure by pinpointing 
contradictory set of the AKP’s policy agenda. In this section, I will analyse the 
main developments related to the social security in Turkey. Within the social 
security theme, there are three main headlines (pensions, health insurance and 
social assistance) (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.213).  
 For this project, I will focus only on specific area related to the social 
security provisions or in other words social assistance. Through this section, I 
will first give the historical account of the social security system in Turkey. 
Then, I will document legislative changes related to the social assistance policies 
during the AKP’s tenure. I will then discuss how these new legislations and 
projects on social assistance have impacted on the society as well as on its 
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electoral consolidation within the party system. Finally, I will evaluate the social 
assistance policies of the AKP from a clientelistic perspective and continuity in a 
grievance in the society.  
 Before moving to the AKP’s social assistance policies, it is important to 
summarize the evolution of the welfare system in Turkey. During the single-
party period, the fight against poverty was not considered to be the 
responsibilities of the state. Social help mostly occurred through institutions of 
benevolence. The origin of these (benevolent) institutions (“vakıf”) can be traced 
far back to the Ottoman era, but they have preserved, despite the religious values 
they cherish, their importance also in the Republican era. These institutions, 
however, were no more independent from the state; their activities took place 
under the state guidance (Buğra, 2008, p.98).  
 Thus, although statism
147
 was well one of the fundamental pillars of the 
state ideology, it did not comprise the poverty issue. The founders of Republic 
and other notables regarded the poverty as a rural problem, i.e., a problem of 
peasants who, though forming the majority of society, were deliberately kept by 
the state at their villages (Buğra, 2008, p.98). Furthermore, during the single-
party period, there was no rights-based approach; poor people were considered 
to be responsible for their own poverty (Buğra, 2008, p.98). 
 On the other hand, there was already a social security system in the early 
Republican era, also having its roots in the Ottoman Empire (Buğra, 2008, 
p.100). This system mainly comprised state retirement funds for public servants, 
but the private sector of that time also had its funds for pension expenditures.  
                                                     
147
 Statism is one of the pillars of the state ideology, but it never adopted policies associated to 
welfare state idea.  
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The welfare system in the 1940s and 1950s was influenced by the ideas of 
solidarity which prevailed in the immediate Post-World War II period and 
international agreements, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
and Convention No.102 on the Minimum Norms of the Social Security (1952)).  
 Consequently, the SSK (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - Social Insurance 
Institution) for all workers and private sector employees was set up in 1946. This 
was followed by the establishment of a retirement/social security fund for public 
servants: the ES (Emekli Sandığı - Government Employees Retirement Fund) in 
1952. Another noteworthy improvement was, after the adoption of the multi-
party system, the establishment of the Ministry of Labour in 1945 (Buğra, 2008, 
p.160). 
 After 1960s, the debate on social security issues assumed ideological 
character; the discussions were accordingly made in the framework of left-right 
divide (Buğra, 2008, p.178). This contentious period, however, produced in 
1971 another comprehensive social security institution, i.e., the Bağ-Kur 
(Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ile Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - 
Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Self-Employed).  
Another important development occurred in the 1970s: introduction of the Law 
(No.2022) on Payment of Pension to the Elderly People in Need (65 years old 
and over). This law was the first regulation on social assistance which was state-
based and had a distinct coverage (Metin, 2011, p.186).  
 In the mid-1980s, the law no: 3294 Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Teşvik Kanunu 
(the Encouragement of Social Assistance and Solidarity Law) was introduced  in 
order to emphasize rights-based social provisions. The aim of this law was to 
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enhance a more equitable redistribution and to encourage social assistance and 
solidarity. Through this legislation, the government attempted to place people 
who were devoid of any social security in a social security programme. 
Moreover, based on this law, the SYDTF (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı 
Teşvik Fonu - Social Solidarity Fund) was established and administrated by a 
general secretary under the   Prime Ministry (Metin, 2011, p.186). 
 In the 1990s, an important development occurred during the coalition 
government of the centre-right wing party (DYP) and the centre-left party 
(SHP): with the introduction of the Green Card System that allowed people 
without access to formal means of human security system to benefit from certain 
services of the state health and social welfare institutions (Buğra and Keyder, 
2006, p.213). Moreover, on an ideological basis, the projects related to social 
security in 1990s and in early 2000s were implemented in line with the IMF’s 
requirements (e.g. June 1998 Staff Monitoring Agreement
148
; 23
rd
 December 
1999 Standby Agreement
149
; 18
th
 January 2002 Stand-by Agreement
150
) 
(Erdoğdu, 2010, p.662). 
 As pointed in the background chapter, the AKP government adhered 
firmly to the requirements of the IMF, and also made another stand-by 
agreement with the IMF in 2005.
151
 Based on this 19
th
 Stand-by agreement with 
                                                     
148
 (IMF, 1998) on 26
th
 June 1998 Memorandum of Economic Policies: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/062698.htm 
149
 (IMF, 1999a) on 23
rd
 December 1999 Standby Agreement: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1999/nb9983.htm         
 (IMF, 1999b)  on 09
th
 December 1999 IMF Approves US$4 Billion Stand-By Credit for Turkey: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/pr9966.htm 
150
 (IMF, 2002a) on 18
th
 January 2002 Letter of Intent of the government of Turkey: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2002/tur/01/index.htm 
(IMF, 2002b)  on 4
th
 February 2002 Approval of the Standby-Agreement: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0207.htm 
151
 (IMF, 2005)  
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the IMF, the AKP government started to make necessary reforms on social 
security. Therefore, developments during the AKP’s ten-year tenure did not 
come out of blue; indeed they revealed a continuity that was, in particular, 
observed in social aid and welfare as reflection of the international agreements 
requiring a minimum involvement of state in social policies (Erdoğdu, 2010, 
p.662).  
 Even though the AKP period has been in continuity with this historical 
background; it is also characterized by some important distinctions. These 
distinctions were based on the increasing social provisions provided through 
state-operated mechanisms by prioritizing social solidarity concepts rather than 
citizenship rights. In addition, after its first legislative electoral victory, the AKP 
had to deal rigorously with poverty and deprivation which had attained a severe 
degree after the economic crisis of 2001 (Buğra, 2008, p.218). As mentioned 
before, the SYDTF used to operate under the Prime Ministry as a secretary. In 
2004, it was restructured as a general directorate and it acquired a more 
institutionalized form as the SYGM (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel 
Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for Assistance and Solidarity) (Metin, 2011, 
p.188).  
  The AKP is distinguished from the previous centre-right parties in terms 
of its social solidarity concept, wrapped in Islamic colours. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the AKP’s market-based economic policies have not been in 
contradiction with the AKP’s benevolent social policies, given that the 
destructive and depriving market economy agenda necessitates these benevolent 
                                                                                                                                              
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05412.pdf 
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social policies charity remedies (Çelik, 2010a, p.65). As a consequence, its 
social solidarity concept with values of social conservatism came into sight in 
the institutional arrangements (e.g. World Bank, IMF) which suitably fitted the 
neoliberal economic agenda (Erdoğdu, 2010, p.684; Köse and Bahçe, 2010, 
p.495).   
 As mentioned above, in 2004, the AKP made amendments to the existing 
law (no.3294)  and introduced the law (no.5263) in order to link the SYDTF as a 
general directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity to the Prime Ministry 
(SYGM, 2012).
152
 Thus, it was called as the SYGM (Sosyal Yardımlar ve 
Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate of Social Assistance and 
Solidarity). In addition, with the law number 3294, the law allowed the SYGM 
to establish foundations SYDV (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakıfları -  
Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations).  
 Thus, according to article 19 of the law (no.3294), the SYGM obtained 
the authority to establish foundations in each province and district in order to 
provide aid (in cash and in goods) (SYDV, 2012).
153
 In addition, the governors 
of the civilian administrations (mülki idare amirleri) are presidents of these 
foundations.  
 I will now discuss the AKP’s reforms related to social assistance from a 
clientelistic perspective. The political clientelism, by definition, means “the 
distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in 
exchange for political support” (Hopkin, 2006, p.2). In the AKP’s case, it is 
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 (SYGM, 2012)  
http://www.sosyalyardimlar.gov.tr/tr/html/477/Tarihce/ 
153
 (SYDV, 2012) 
http://www.sosyalyardimlar.gov.tr/tr/html/513/Sosyal+Yardimlasma+ve+Dayanisma+Vakiflari 
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argued that through this new social assistance scheme, the NGOs and local 
governments started to play a key role in social assistance services. However, 
the interesting part of the scheme was the act of channelling the social assistance 
to the NGOs and the local governments. More importantly, through this scheme, 
the state started to act like an NGO by establishing itself as a benevolent 
foundation (Metin, 2011, p.95). A representative of the AKP, Hasan, also 
highlighted to me the distribution of aid through these foundations:  
We detect the poor people through the governorship, headmen. 
Then, we provide fuel aid. Through social assistance foundations, 
we provide various grants ... we contribute to children’s 
educational expenditures....In addition, we give credits through 
state banks. We give a lot of credits through social assistance 
foundations. We provide them with opportunities (Hasan, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 During the AKP’s tenure, the social assistance institutions which have 
increased their activities most have been those institutions which were covered 
under the SYDTF law. In this scheme, the state has established an organized 
network of foundations in order to deal with the poverty problem.  Even though 
aid was provided from state resources, the SYDVs which behaved as benevolent 
NGOs appeared to act on behalf of the AKP as an extension of its political 
continuity (Metin, 2011, p.191). 
 The SYGM and its Fund Councils
154
 were naturally expected to operate 
on objective grounds; however, given the difficulty of auditing, the SYDVs’ 
activities were open to political influence
155
 (Metin, 2011, p.191).   
                                                     
154
 The income of the SYGM’s Fund comes from: 10 % of the funds which were established or 
will be established according to laws and decrees; 2.8 % of the collection of income and 
institutional tax revenues; 50% of the traffic penalties; 15% of the RTÜK’s; other allowances; 
donation and aids are transferred to the SYDT Fund. The income of the fund approached 1.6 
billion in TL in 2007 (Çelik, 2010, p.76).  
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 Another problematic side of this issue is considered to be the SDYGM’s 
bias for canalising transfers to its foundations. It is observed that during the first 
ruling period of the AKP, the transfers from the SYGM to its foundations are 
significantly higher than the other transfers (the ones to the KYK (Kredi ve 
Yurtlar Kurumu - Credit and Dormitories Foundation) and to Ministry of Health) 
(Köse and Bahçe, 2010, p.506). The transfers from the budget to the SYGM 
were further highlighted by one AKP representative, Abdullah, who perceived 
these transfers as a result of the AKP’s good governance as compared to 
previous governments before the AKP. In this context, he asserted that:  
Before, people who were dealing with those affairs (social), used to 
spend the budget for the wrong purposes. ... Now, the AKP works 
in a disciplined way and money allocated to this scheme becomes a 
larger sum and is redistributed to the nation. ... So, for instance 
imagine, there are large sums of money which come from the 
national lottery or from horse racing.... These are directly 
transfered... to the social assistance... In addition, all the aid is 
currently being organized and gathered under one roof in order to 
make this scheme automated (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 It is also argued that the SYGM has become one of the important bases 
for the AKP’s biased social assistance politics. The subjectivity of the policies is 
emphasized by the fact that the majority of foundations have a discriminatory 
approach in providing aid as a distinct political support (Köse and Bahçe, 2010, 
p.506).  Indeed, the majority of these foundations display a religious and 
conservative stance, also raising doubt over the objectivity of the operations. 
 Similarly to Köse and Bahçe’s reference, Çelik also emphasizes the 
biased side of the distribution of fund resources in terms of social assistance 
                                                                                                                                              
155
 Historical Account of this Fund: By the end of 1990s, the regulations within this fund were 
not taken very seriously. Accumulated amount under this fund was sometimes used as a fund 
transfer to budget in order to finance other deficits. In 1995, the accumulated money in the 
SYDT fund was 32.5 billion TL. Only 3.4 billion TL was used for people in need (Buğra, 2008, 
p.212). 
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through foundations (Çelik, 2010a, p.506). The distribution of aid occurred in 
line with the directives of the civilian authority appointed by the AKP 
government, i.e., the governor of the province, who as the director of the fund 
took decision. The detection of people in need and aid amount were thus also 
open to political influence (Çelik, 2010a, p.76).  
 The economic activities of local administrations demonstrated an 
important increase in the areas of social assistance. The main reason is the 
development of neo-liberal economic understanding. Therefore, during the 
AKP’s tenure, the poverty problem was assigned to the NGOs on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, to general benevolence (Metin, 2011, p.195). Also, in 
another way, the poverty problem was assigned to the local administrations. 
Thus, social assistance was transformed into a tool for political continuity 
through the mediation of local administrations and municipalities (Metin, 2010, 
p.196). 
 The importance of party’s local governments on the social assistance was 
also highlighted during my interviews in which emphasis was placed on the 
mode of the distribution policies. Selma from the NGO called Başak Sanat 
Vakfı156 emphasized that the implementation of these social policies was realized 
mainly through the intermediation of the organization/party organization 
(teşkilat/parti teşkilatı) (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1). Indeed, this was not 
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 Başak Sanat Vakfı - Başak Culture and Art Foundation: “It aims to carry out various activities 
to discover, support and promote artistic abilities of poor and/or low-paid young people and to 
eliminate difficulties they face in building their personal capacity. It is also aimed at orienting 
young people to be more productive in taking part in the social life as healthy individuals and 
engaging in scientific research in the field of culture and art” (Başak Sanat Vakfı, 2011). 
http://www.basaksanatvakfi.org.tr/basak/index.php/workshops-mainmenu-39/39?task=view 
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surprising, since the majority of local governments were being controlled by the 
AKP.  
 In addition, the AKP’s roots in the Milli Görüş contributed to the party’s 
success in social policies because within this vision, the highly emphasized 
benevolence and charity understanding underpinned social assistance approach 
(Metin, 2011, p.193). Indeed, they have been particularly successful in 
mobilizing charitable donations and channelling them to impoverished people 
(Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.224).  
 In addition to Milli Görüş’s impact on the AKP’s social assistance 
scheme, the repetition of vote distribution of the AKP at both legislative and 
local elections is emphasized. Possession of both local and legislative 
administration contributed to the concentration and activation of party mentality 
within the whole country (Metin 2011, p.196). 
 In addition to this representation of party mentality at the legislative 
level, it is argued that most AKP municipalities are formed by units which 
provide social assistance similar to the SYDTF (Metin, 2011, p.196). Through 
these units, social assistance (e.g. food, housing, fuel for heating) is distributed 
based on needs that are not well defined or not merit-based.This has made social 
assistance schemes undermining of other sources of authority. For example, the 
headman of a neighborhood told me:  
We are the headman of a region and we come from the society. We 
are independent people and we are not linked to any political party. 
In our country, muhtars can bring democracy in the most transparent 
way. A muhtar knows everyone in a neighborhood: the ones who go 
to military service, the educational levels of children and they also 
live in this same area. However, those ones (referring to the AKP) 
make agreements with their supporters, their partisan constituencies. 
So, if you ask me how many people get social aid in my 
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neighborhood, I can’t give any reliable answer because they hide this 
information. If you claim that you advocate a social state policy, it 
has to be transparent. Among the institutions, it is important to know 
if the families which receive social assistance, do really need this aid 
or not. It has to be explained, information has to be provided. This is 
the most important difficulty we have. They take into consideration 
the neighborhood leaders of parties rather than a person which is 
elected through democratic means. Hence, representatives from a 
ruling political party or local government… whoever they say, they 
get into a dialogue through a network and as a result of interviews 
that they do, they distribute aid to the persons they find suitable. The 
problem is not about their political ideologies. We only want a 
transparent service approach to the society. So, the party’s (referring 
to the AKP) neighborhood units evaluate and locate the places for 
the distributions of aid and then they chose the ones which are 
suitable for them. Us, muhtars, we don’t participate in this evaluation 
and locating process so we don’t participate in those meetings and 
interviews. Only these people who will take aid have to get a paper 
approving their poverty from us. However, there is no scheme for 
measuring poverty levels. We have to get access to states’ websites 
and we have to see, we have to be able to research their concrete and 
moral connections in order to realize if a citizen is poor and 
aggrieved. Because we don’t see how poor they are, we provide 
them poverty papers according to their own declarations. Then, it 
does not become transparent (Mustafa, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 For instance, it is argued that food aid and aid for heating fuel in Ankara 
reached 400,000 people. Previously, in 2001, the same aid used to reach 37,000; 
later in 2002; it reached 180,000 people and in 2006; it reached to 365,000 
(Yıldırım, 2010, p.102). This increase in the number of people that have access 
to social assistance justifies the parallelism between the local government aid 
and the aid by the government (Metin, 2011, p.196).     
 The parallelism between the aid and the increase in the votes of the AKP 
seems to justify our argument on the clientelistic network as one of the main 
reasons for AKP’s consolidation. Çelik (2010a, p.69) argues that this clientelistic 
network has flourished because the AKP government prefers, instead of 
implementation of a social state, rather to adhere to a benevolent approach which 
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is disorganized, informal and under the influence and orientation of party 
mechanism. The AKP is clientelist, Çelik (2010a) asserts, because between the 
citizen and power-ruling power, it does not establish a connection of rights-
responsibilities, instead a clientelistic. The citizen takes the aid and in return 
supports the party; it returns it as a vote (Çelik, 2010a, p.69). This vote buying 
process and widening the party’s constituency was often mentioned during the 
interviews that I conducted with the the AKP, the business groups and the CHP 
representatives.
157
 
 To be more concise, a member of the AKP main branch from İstanbul, 
Murat had implicitly emphasized the necessity of answering the needs of lower 
income segments of society and, hence, the absolute need for the development of 
the political mechanism when a political party wants to be a ruling government. 
He added that there is a desire to bring the thoughts of the society to the ruling 
government and thus the aim is to reach a wider social basis. For this, Murat said 
that the AKP promised a wealth increase to social groups who are living under 
the poverty line. Hence, he argued that the AKP has developed promises in order 
to answer to the demands of a large part of society (Murat, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1).  
 Meanwhile, the representative of the TEB believed that:  
… this social assistance is a strategy which is being used for its 
(AKP’s) own constituency because there is an assistance culture in 
Islam. Let’s say that they have exaggerated this existing social 
assistance. Besides, they have developed it as a propaganda element, 
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 For instance, During my interview with Levent as a CHP Youth Branch representative in 
İstanbul, he had given me an apparently common example of the AKP aid; an old lady used to 
collect aid (food; coal for heating) from the AKP organization, in return, she used to feel felt 
obliged to give this aid back through voting to AKP even though she was not a particular admirer 
partisan of the party (Levent, Appendix Part B, Table 1).   
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as a strategy for their own partisan constituency (Mehmet, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1). 
 
Similarly, Ayşe from the CHP women branch considered this distribution 
of goods and services to people as a means of attracting persons to the AKP in 
an illegitimate way (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
In addition, Çelik (2010a) asserts that this clientelistic relationship
158
 
carries paternalistic characteristics, since it limits collective rights, and it 
restrains organization and inculcates obedience (Çelik, 2010a, p.70). Similar to 
Bahçe and Köse (2010), Çelik (2010a) considers main tools of the AKP as the 
Green Card, municipalities, SYDTF, private sector, benevolent entities; 
communities; foundations. Making use of the state resources, the AKP 
contributes to relieve the lives of poor and lowest classes, and gets the credit as a 
benevolent entity (Çelik, 2010a, p.70). 
 Despite this clientelistic side of these policies related to the social 
assistance, these policies addressed the needs of the lowest strata. As pointed out 
in the previous chapter 4 on the social bases of the AKP, it is a cross-strata 
alliance party, receiving votes from both the richest and lowest social strata. 
Unemployed people and people who do not have regular employment contribute 
dramatically to the votes of the AKP and as pointed out in the chapter 4, this 
cross-strata coalition contributed to the emergence of the AKP in 2002.  
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 Çelik’s statements observations on the clientelistic side seem to have been confirmed; it can 
also be found on Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement that expressed his disappointment over the 
outcome of after the local elections of 2009 in Antalya. The prime minister Erdoğan’s statement 
after the elections of 2009 demonstrate his expectation of votes due to his support for Antalya 
municipality:  
“I find enormously the outcome of the local elections as a very abnormal 
one. I went personally 28 times to Antalya for the inauguration of services. 
During our tenure period, Antalya has seen services that it has never seen 
during its history. This means that they do not acknowledge our services. I 
saw this. That’s why I am sad” (En son haber, 2009). 
http://www.ensonhaber.com/politika/195881/erdogan-antalyaya-nankor-diyor.html 
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 As pointed out in the background chapter, the AKP inherited an economy 
that had just come out of a severe crisis and revealed socio-economic structure’s 
characteristics with deepened problems of poverty and unemployment. In this 
way, when the AKP came into power, its first responsibility was to reduce 
impact of the negative outcomes of the crisis at the societal level.  In its struggle 
against socio-economic problems, such poverty and unemployment illustrates 
the way social policies should be taken in hand (Boratav, 2009, cited in Metin, 
2011, pp.193-194). 
 Even though these transfers can be considered as populist, they have 
influenced the lives of people within the country during the first ruling period of 
the AKP. For instance, the cash transfers from the SYGM to the poor families 
occurred under the condition that poor families sent their young children to 
school; pass them through health control and vaccinate them (Buğra, 2008, 
p.234). People who benefited from this scheme during the first tenure of the 
AKP as a proportion to the country population was 3%, and this ratio was more 
than 14% in the Eastern region and South Eastern region. It can be thought of as 
a reason for the serious increase in the votes of the AKP in the legislative 
elections of 2007 (Buğra, 2008, p.234). 
  This positive side of social aid was highlighted in the interviews that I 
conducted with representatives from the AKP youth branch and the AKP 
İstanbul main branch headquarters. For example, an AKP representative called 
Zehra told me:  
Society suffered a lot during those periods, so people asked for a 
helper, someone who saves them from this painful period. I listened 
to the discourse of Tayyip Erdoğan, as he was saying this... “I can’t 
correct everything promptly; you have to give me 2 to 3 years”. ... 
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They (the AKP) did most of their social policies during the second 
term (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 She further added that: 
If you can’t provide jobs for people, then you have to provide 
something else given that the country was going through a recovery 
process.  ... I dont know if (they were implementing this approach) 
for votes or something else. But, from this stance, it is good… At 
least, they work, at least they provide your momentary needs. For a 
real social state, they have to give you a job, goods, everything you 
need. Since they can’t give you everything you need, at least it is 
necessary to fulfill partially your needs. If they don’t do the real 
social state part, if they don’t provide aid, then there may have worse 
situations (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).   
 
 Similar to Zehra, the representative of the AKP from the main branch 
İstanbul, Murat, called this type of social assistance as emergency interventions. 
The main remedy is to help under privileged segments of society. He added that 
if a part of society is hungry, then the aim is to get food to them now as the 
results of investment projects will take longer. He believes that such social plans 
need to go through foundations and institutions which are visible on the media 
(Murat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 Thus, as pointed out by the representatives from the AKP (Zehra and 
Murat), in this post-crisis context, underprivileged people needed aid more than 
ever. The AKP addressed the demand of these people despite the drawbacks of 
the system. Thus, the AKP’s consolidation and attraction of its votes from the 
poor was not surprising on the basis of this type of policies.  
 The AKP has not managed to completely eradicate poverty from the 
country, given that it receives an important amount of votes from the lowest 
strata. In addition, when the data is analysed on the income inequality 
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(Aktifhaber, 2012; Turkish Weekly News, 2012)
159
, it is seen that the divide 
between the poor and rich inequality has widened during the AKP’s period. As 
with this continuation of poverty, it is also argued that the AKP will not 
eradicate the poverty since it is getting important votes from the aggrieved 
segments of the society. Therefore, the AKP would prefer to keep up with a 
benevolent charity system through a foundation mechanism, rather than a social 
rights-based system (Çelik, 2010a, pp.79-80). As a result, the emphasis on the 
benevolent system seems to be the main reasons behind the AKP’s consolidation 
within the electoral system.  
 Furthermore, through the AKP’s social assistance scheme, the struggle 
against poverty can be to some extent overcome. Thus, the AKP’s tangible 
projects (food aid) influence the daily lives of the poor; thus, voters at the lowest 
strata vote for the projects which relieve them. However, this type of struggle 
(through poverty alleviation programmes) does not eradicate completely 
poverty; instead it reinstates the poverty (Metin, 2011, p.195). In this context, 
where poverty and inequality are so deep rooted and insecurity increased, urgent 
relief projects only increase the labour workers’ misery and the poor’s need and 
dependency (Çelik, 2010a, p.80). 
 Similar to Çelik (2010a), a member of the CHP Youth Branch, İbrahim 
argued that the AKP’s social policies were designed as a tool to make people 
dependent on the party:  
…between 2002 and 2010, the AKP exploited poor people living in 
shanty towns, ...  and accomodated them to the charity culture, rather 
                                                     
159
 (Aktifhaber, 2012) 
http://www.aktifhaber.com/turkiyede-gelir-dagiliminda-ucurum-662271h.htm 
(Turkish Weekly News, 2012) 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/131131/despite-growth-income-inequality-persists.html 
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than coming up with solutions. It took them (referring to the poor) 
and registered them for assistance funds and caused the bureaucracy 
which is formed for assistance funds to collapse. Today, as far as I 
know, there are 14 types of assistance funds, these are the ones that I 
known of. For instance, one citizen may be receiving funds from 4 
different bureaucratic funds whereas another is being forgotten. But, 
the AKP did this for its own followers; it did it for its own political 
aims. So, it said that “I am not going to solve those people’s 
problems. I dont have such a goal. These people’s unsolved 
problems are important for me”. ... So, this is a complete rent-
seeking account, not a social policy. Social policy is not like this. In 
addition, the gap between the richest and poorest layers of society 
has drastically increased during the AKP’s ten years in office. Thus, 
the AKP attempts to solve the social security problem by offering 
mini-solutions to those people who live in despair. It deliberately 
avoids challenging specific problems in apprehension of possible 
reactions of its constituency (İbrahim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 Similar to the perceptions of both İbrahim and Mustafa above, the 
representative from the TOBB asserted that this social assistance scheme has to 
be rights-based (Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1). He added that currently there 
are too many types of aid: there is aid from foundations, from municipalities and 
from state and there is no evaluation of these schemes, nor is there a possibility 
to measure how poor someone is (Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 Moreover, a representative from the NGO Başak Sanat Vakfı indicated 
that poverty wages makee people still more dependent on charity-based policies, 
and that these people bear many hardships in order to retain their wages. She 
added that such underprivileged people are made to believe that any aid is a 
favour (lütuf) for them (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 The drawbacks of the system, take us back to the research question of 
why the votes for the AKP still remain so high; and if the income equality is still 
high, to the question of people still vote for the AKP at the elections of 2011.  
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 Despite the critiques towards the AKP’s policies, Buğra (2011) 
emphasizes that also previously the social assistance system had not been rights-
based. Therefore, she argues that the AKP’s system aimed to relieve the lives of 
the poor that have never benefited from the rights-based social assistance fund. 
In this context, they do not get liberated from the poverty through alms. Still, for 
people who do not know how to feed their children (given the poverty for 
children is really high in Turkey), they cannot say no to that aid (Buğra, 2011). 
This statement also is supported by results of a pre-election survey (2011) 
according to which  65.4% of the voters agree that social assistance bring votes 
to the political parties (Çevikcan, 2011).
160
  
 In addition, a more recent pre-election survey demonstrates that the third 
satisfactory project of the incumbent party is considered to be the 
accomplishments in social assistance (on a scale of 100, the satisfaction with 
improvements in social assistance reached to 55.9) (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, 
p.49).
161
 In another survey which was conducted in November 2011, satisfaction 
with improvements in social assistance reached to 66.6% on a scale of 100 
(Sabah, 2011).
162
   
 In summary, the AKP government has brought about changes to social 
assistance which already exists as a specific fund. Due to institutional scheme of 
the SYGM, the auditing of the foundations and the fund is quite difficult; 
therefore, the system is open to political influence. The same scheme does not 
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 (Çevikcan, 2011)  
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/belirleyici-tema-basari-algisi-olur/serpil-
cevikcan/siyaset/yazardetayarsiv/11.04.2011/1375911/default.htm 
161
  (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49) 
http://www.genar.com.tr/files/2011-%201-N%C4%B0SAN-
Secim_yarisi_baslarken_nisan_2011.pdf 
162
 (Sabah, 2011)  
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/11/18/ak-partinin-oy-orani-yuzde-511 
280 
 
give assurance regarding the distribution of aid (cash or goods) according to a 
merit-based approach.  In addition, through this scheme, the AKP government 
does not establish a connection of rights-responsibilities between citizens and 
ruling power. Instead, it asserts a clientelistic scheme through which the citizen 
takes aid and in return, supports the party. 
 Despite these drawbacks, the AKP’s social assistance keeps satisfying 
underprivileged groups who constitute a wide segment in society (TÜİK, 
2012).
163
 As a result, despite its drawbacks, the AKP government’s social 
assistance projects are critical for this wide segment of society. In this context, 
the AKP’s consolidation of its ruling tenure through increasing social assistance 
does not seem to be an unreasonable claim. 
5.2.3 Policies of Health Care of the AKP and their Impact on the AKP 
 As with the changes in the social security and social assistance, during 
the AKP’s tenure, the projects related to the health care system have been 
influenced by the neoliberal economic agenda of the AKP, as well as the 
international agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. For this section, I 
will give first changes and reforms implemented during the AKP in Health 
System by comparing them with the past.  After the presentation of facts related 
to health care, I will elaborate how the health care reforms have impacted on 
society, and in turn on the consolidation of the AKP. While doing this analysis, I 
will also take into consideration the underpinning characteristics of the AKP 
which are neoliberal agenda, privatization and populist side of its projects.  
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 Given the whole population’s 18% live under the poverty limit, the importance of social 
assistance is crucial (TUİK, 2012). 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10902 
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Since the beginning of the AKP’s emergence, many reforms have been 
implemented for the health care system. Consequently, the Turkish health care 
as well as welfare system have gone through a significant transformation. In this 
section, my primary aim is to look at the changes in health care system. 
However, since the health care and welfare systems are highly interrelated, I will 
also include the aspects of welfare system related to healthcare.  
When the reforms in both health and social security areas and the factors 
behind them are analysed, it may be seen that they did not either come out of 
blue during the AKP’s tenure. Indeed, the roots of the reformist policies of the 
AKP go back to 1980s and 1990s and, as pointed out by scholars, this was 
already an ongoing process in the Turkish social security and health  scheme 
(Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz, 2010, p.639; Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.225). The 
AKP’s accomplishment was the effective implementation of the social projects 
that had been previously prepared in line with the requirements of the World 
Bank, IMF and the WTO (Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz, 2010, p.652).  
Health care in Turkey used to be dominated by a centralized state system 
run by the Ministry of Health. In 2003, the governing AKP introduced a 
sweeping health program aimed at increasing the ratio of private to state health 
care services and making health care available to a larger share of the 
population. 
 Private healthcare has blossomed in Turkey in the last decades as 
reaction to the long queues and lack of personal service in state-run hospitals. 
Private hospitals have nowadays contracts with various insurance companies that 
offer to the holders of private insurance better health care services. Through the 
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health reform, it is observed that the health care reforms have also increased the 
efficiency in the state-owned hospitals as compared to the private hospitals (Gök 
and Sezen, 2011, p.137).  
Indeed, the AKP’s tenure is characterized with important legislative 
achievements in the area of health and social security.  According to the law 
(No.5283), some public institutions and agencies were transferred to Ministry of 
Health.  As a result of this unification, access to university hospitals as well as to 
private hospitals began to be provided to each citizen (Akdağ, 2010, p.23).  
 The respective legislation that has been compiled under the Social 
Security Reform (2008) comprises two already enacted laws and a draft law. The 
first of the enacted laws is the Social Security Institution Law
164
 (No.5502
165
) 
that has come into effect in 2006 and resulted in the reorganization of the three 
previous social security institutions, i.e., the SSK, the ES and Bağ-kur, under the 
SGK (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu - Social Security Institution) (OECD, 2008, 
p.44). For a long time, the separation of health benefits according to employment 
status used to lead to important differences of coverage and quality among three 
different institutions (Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010, p.754).  
This legislative arrangement aimed to eliminate the discordance arising 
from the rather uncoordinated operations of three different independent 
governmental organisations that actually were in charge of the same mission. 
The aim of this health care programme was to increase the quality in health care 
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 (Mevzuat, 2006) Law No.5502  
http://www.ttb.org.tr/mevzuat/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=401&Itemid=28 
165
 “In 2006, Law 5502 was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This law, 
which was meant to accompany Law 5510 (Law on Social Security and Universal Health 
Insurance), aimed at unifying the three different social security and health insurance schemes 
(SSK, Bağ-Kur and Emekli-Sandığı) into one unified social security institute” (OECD, 2008, 
p.47).  
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system by allowing a faster, more efficient and equitable delivery of social 
services (Akdağ, 2010, p.3; Deloitte166, 2010). 
In addition to the Social Security Institution Law, in 2008, the Social 
Insurance and General Health Insurance Law (No.5510) has brought all citizens 
of the Republic of Turkey (plus asylum-seekers and foreigners (who stay more 
than one year) without an insurance in their home country) under health 
insurance coverage. The third supplementary legislation, i.e., the Sosyal 
Yardımlar ve Primsiz Ödemeler Kanunu (Social Assistance and Welfare 
Payment Law), once enacted, will complete the process of the Social Security 
Reform (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2008).167 It is envisioned to provide 
governmental support to elderly, disabled or lone individuals or such with a 
documentable income that is below one third of the minimum wage (İş ve Sosyal 
Güvenlik, 2008).         
 Within the context of the historical evolution of the Turkish health care 
system, it is important to recollect the introduction of the Green Card
168
 scheme 
in 1992.  As aforementioned, the Green Card scheme had been introduced in 
order to provide health services to poor people who did not benefit from any 
social assistance programme “either as direct contributors or dependants” (Buğra 
and Keyder, 2006, p.223). This scheme and, in general, Turkish health care 
system attained completion with the adoption of the Social Insurance and 
General Health Insurance Law that also covers the Green Card holders 
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 (Deloitte, 2010) 
 http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/publications/Documents/HEALTHCARE.INDUSTRY.pdf 
167
 (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2008)  
 http://isvesosyalguvenlik.com/anasayfa/dosya11.htm 
168
 Green Cards: Health care entitlements are issued to Turkish citizens who are not unable to 
pay for their health services. In order to be entitled to the green card, they have to declare their 
revenues in a detailed way (Kısa and Younis, 2006, p.766). 
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(Mevzuat, 2008).
169
 As of 1
st
 January 2012, the Green Card Programme was 
integrated to the General Insurance (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2012). 
A further important development occurred in the health care system, 
affecting the health care workers more than patients: the full-time employment 
law (tam gün yasası). The full-time employment law (No.5947) concerns 
medical doctors who work both at the university or public hospitals and 
additionally in their private praxis or private clinics. Under the new legislation 
(No.5947), doctors are obliged to work full-time at the university/public 
hospitals, that is, to opt either for the academy/government or private sector 
(Akdağ, 2010, p.23).  Before the AKP’s tenure, the percentage of the physicians 
without private affiliations was 11% in December, 2002. After the 
implementation of the regulation that introduced performance-based additional 
payment, this percentage became 89% in July, 2010. One month after the 
partial
170
 approval of the full-time law by the Constitutional Court, the ratio 
reached to 92% (Akdağ, 2010, p.124).  
In addition to legislative improvements, the AKP government has 
introduced several tacit arrangements that facilitate life for patients. During the 
AKP’s tenure, considerable increases were attained in health care budget, 
number of hospital beds, emergency cars, and health centres (Akdağ, 2010, p.39, 
pp.42-43 and pp.75-76). 
 Health service facilities provided to the Green Card holders were also 
extended. Previously, the Green Card programme did not cover medicines but 
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 (Mevzuat, 2008) 
http://www.ttb.org.tr/mevzuat/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=620&Itemid=35 
170
 In 2010, the Constitutional Court did not approve some of the articles of the full-time 
employment law (Akdağ, 2010, p.124).  
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only doctors and hospital visits (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.223). In 2005, 
outpatient care and pharmaceuticals were provided to Green Card holders.
171
 In 
2006, the pharmaceutical positive list
172
 was integrated across all health 
insurance schemes, including that of Green Card holders (Yıldırım and Yıldırım, 
2011, p.187). The SGK patients qualified for getting their medicines from the 
free contract pharmacies (AKP Brochure, 2007, p.14). Medicaments and/or 
medical material were provided to hospitalize patients directly by the hospital 
administration instead of by their attendants, as is the case now (AKP Brochure, 
2011, p.23). 
 Additionally, the KDV (Katma Değer Vergisi - Value added tax) at 
medicament prices was reduced, and additional regulations were introduced at 
the pricing system. These measures resulted in an important reduction in 
medicament prices (Akdağ, 2010, p.22).  
 Among the critical views regarding the AKP’s health policies, as with 
poverty alleviation, it has been argued that health policies are implemented in 
Turkey as a requirement of the international agreement with the IMF and the 
World Bank and to a lesser extent, with the EU. Yet it is also argued that these 
international agreements which are characterized by the neoliberal economic 
agenda have a market-driven approach, and omit rights-based social scheme. It 
is further argued that for countries that follow this global order, access to and 
benefit from health services is no longer rights-based, since the health sector is 
                                                     
171
 “The coverage of the green card has been widened for low-income groups; the health services 
and the pharmaceutical expenses of the green card holders within the scope of “outpatient 
services” are also now covered by the state” (Akdağ, 2010, p.22). 
172
 “Positive list defines drugs that are reimbursed by public funds (positive list)” (Nguyen-Kim 
et al., 2005). 
http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/IrdesPublications/QES099.pdf 
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turning into a new and highly profitable sector of the global capitalism. Second, 
it has been asserted that in those countries where these profitable models are 
adopted, despite payment of their allowances, citizens do not get access to a 
health system as should be the case. As a result, at both national and global 
level, health conditions of societies are deteriorating (Sütlaç, 2011).
173
 
  This act of omitting a rights-based system through the neoliberal 
requirements was also underlined by the representative of the Halk Evleri, Lale 
(Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1) who made a critique of health care and social 
security systems from a historical perspective. She ascribed the flaws in these 
systems to the establishment of the neoliberal economic system since 1980s.  
She stated that the neoliberal system had already begun in the 1980s. She added 
that: 
....The interventions to that effect actually began in the post-1980, in 
the post-1995 and in 2000s and continued by picking up the pace 
especially on two issues:  education and health. Health, during the 
previous periods, represented, in particular, in people’s minds the 
basic public services area. In order to draw this area into the free 
market, many international agreements were signed (international 
trade agreements with GATT, MAI, IMF and World Bank, 
respectively. These agreements with supplementary amendments 
were readily adopted, extended and rapidly implemented by the AKP 
(Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 In addition, regarding the lack of social rights within health sector, Buğra 
(2011) draws attention to the Green card programme. She emphasises that a 
scheme according to which, depending on their income, people are entitled to 
obtain health benefits, cannot be considered as a social-rights scheme. The 
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 (Sütlaç, 2011)   
http://bianet.org/bianet/dunya/133213-saglik-alani-kapitalizmin-isgali-altinda 
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negative picture drawn above is shared by the representative of the  Başak Sanat 
Vakfı, Selma, described the AKP’s health policies such as assistance to the poor 
and elderly; family aid and/or health care service to the Green Card holders as 
sheer show (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
Additionally, the performance-based health system is criticized. In 
particular, the law on full-time employment law naturally caused great upheaval 
among health workers and medical doctors since the full-time increases the 
burden of health sector on the practitioners, doctors and health care workers. 
There are two main results of this increasing burden. First, the time provided to 
patient decreases and quality drops (Özcan, 2009).
174
 Second, the health care 
workers work under unsecure conditions with lower payments and within this 
scheme, so they are deprived of their basic rights (Çakır, 2010).175 
Accordingly, the TBB (Türk Tabipler Birliği - Turkish Medical 
Association) as very powerful pressure group has disapproved the procedure of 
full-time employment with the objection that it will bring unsecure working 
conditions to the health workers (TTB, 2010).
176
 They have been trying ever 
since with all means and also support from different circles the annulment of this 
legislation. Nonetheless, it should be admitted that the full-time employment law 
eliminated a source of conflict of interest in the health care system. 
As with the TBB’s opinion, Selma from Başak Sanat Vakfı asserted that 
the public services were transformed into an economic sector (Selma, Appendix 
                                                     
174
 (Özcan, 2009) 
 http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/115547-tam-gun-yasasiyla-doktorun-hastaya-ayirdigi-zaman-
azaliyor 
175
 (Çakır, 2010) 
 http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/119449-doktor-guvencesiz-isci-hasta-da-kaziklanacak-musteri-
oluyor 
176
 (TTB, 2010) 
 http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/pdf/Ek-Haberler/haber-2118.pdf 
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Part B, Table 1). Thus, hospitals were conceived of as sites of business where 
the primary concern was about the income and expenditures, and not the health 
and well-being of the patient. Accordingly, the performance was assessed in 
terms of the numbers of patient examinations, treatments and/or medical tests 
and the amount of income arising from these activities. Therefore, even though 
the AKP was proud of its reforms, the change in the working mentality and 
conditions, she said, had resulted in a loss of quality in health care. She added 
that even though formalities were reduced, doctors simply could not solve 
patients’ problems by only allowing about five minutes to each patient, due to 
the automated system (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 Above, I have attempted to provide facts related to health care system 
and then the critique of the NGOs of the health care reforms.  My aim now is to 
demonstrate how the AKP’s reforms on health care sector have impacted the 
AKP’s consolidation despite this critical stance. 
 First of all, similar to poverty alleviation case, the AKP’s reforms 
attempted to reach a broader part of the population. As mentioned in the poverty 
alleviation, a minority of society were highly protected by social benefits (in 
terms of pensions and access to health care) whereas the majority of the society 
used to remain deprived of these social benefits. Buğra (2011) asserts that 
despite the drawbacks of the health care system and lack of a rights-based social 
system, as compared to the past decades, currently, the majority of people have 
access to the health care system. Therefore, even though health care workers 
suffer from this new health care scheme, the majority of the society is satisfied 
with the developments in health care (Buğra, 2011). Therefore, the AKP’s re-
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consolidation of its votes is, in part, linked to the amelioration of health care 
services for the majority of the society, which is the AKP’s core constituency.  
             The representative of the TOBB, Vedat (Appendix Part B, Table 1) 
further supported the view expressed by Buğra (2011) and asserted that there 
used to be a big gap between the number of highly protected people and the 
number of people without any social security adherence. Therefore, he argued 
that while trying to equalize them at the mid-point, protected people who are the 
minority tend to protest, whereas unprotected people who make up the majority 
are satisfied with the improved situation. Thus, he said, that the number of 
people who are satisfied with the health scheme is higher now since satisfaction 
with healthcare reform reflected the view of the masses rather than the minority 
(Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 While looking at the issue from the perspective of voters’ bases, the 
AKP’s core constituency is formed by this majority of unprotected people.  The 
losers of the reformed health system, in turn, are the health care workers which 
do not make core constituency of the AKP. Therefore, even though before the 
elections of 2011, the AKP’s social policies were highly criticized by the 
oppositional groups such as the medical associations, they did not make any 
challenging impact on the outcome of the elections, since the majority was 
satisfied with the AKP’s policies in the health sector.  
                The satisfaction of the majority’s with changes in health sector is also 
confirmed by surveys. A&G survey on the health issues demonstrates that as of 
2007, 62.7% of people are satisfied with the unification of the SSK and Public 
Hospitals, and they agree that this unification increased the quality in services 
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(A&G Araştırma, 2007b, p.6).177 68.3% of people find the distribution of 
medications by the private pharmacies rather than social security institutions’ 
pharmacies as appropriate (A&G Araştırma, 2007b, p.7). Regarding full-time 
employment for health workers, 58.7% of people do not approve of those 
professors of medicine work in their private practise and/or in private hospitals 
(A&G Araştırma, 2007b, p.4). The reform in the health sector has often been 
emphasized in my interviews I conducted with various representatives of the 
AKP, the NGOs.  
 For example, a representative of the AKP from Kadiköy neighbourhood 
youth branch asserted that:  
We asked them, ‘so, in health issues, is your mother still waiting in a 
queue at the hospital?’ We did it like that. Look, here are 
opportunities; come and learn from them. Let’s use this together 
(Faruk, Appendix, Part B. Table 1). 
 
 Furthermore, a high-ranking representative of the AKP, Abdullah, 
illustrated further the changes in the health sector with regards to the 
comprehensiveness of health insurance and health reforms for the advantage of 
the society. He asserted that:  
Now, there is also general health insurance in Turkey. All of the 
citizens in Turkey now benefit from this insurance scheme. I 
administered the pilot in Diyarbakir. That’s when I understood what 
a great and expensive project it was. I was saying that it could not be 
implemented in Turkey easily. But, the AKP did it.  
For instance, for all the people having the SGK, now it is the same… 
You remember, in the past, there were many bureaucratic things, 
there were many procedures. Now, all of them were improved. Now, 
you give your Turkish Identity number, then you go to the 
consultation room; you give your identity number, you get your 
medications and you go back home.   As I work at the university, I 
have been discussing a lot with medical doctors.   
                                                     
177
 (A&G Araştırma, 2007b) 
http://www.agarastirma.com.tr/pdfler/saglik-arastirmasi.pdf 
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Now, this full-time employment law came out. This is really for the 
sake of the people. ... If a doctor works at the university, he/she 
works at the university and he/she can’t open his/her own clinic 
outside. ...In the past, they used to go to their own clinics in the 
afternoon. ... Thus, if you wanted the doctor to deal with you, you 
had to go to his own clinic and pay him extra money for the 
consultation. As a result of the full-time employment reform, the 
AKP removed this scheme. It was a really important thing. ... this is 
something for the people’s advantages (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1).  
 
 In addition, a more recent pre-election survey demonstrates that the most 
satisfactory project of the incumbent party is considered as to be the 
improvement in health care (on a scale of 100, the satisfaction with 
improvements in health care reached to 65.5) (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49).178 
In another survey which was conducted in November 2011, demonstrates that 
the improvement in health care reached to 77.6% on a scale of 100 (Sabah, 
2011).
179
  
 In addition, Buğra (2011) draws attention to the other political problems 
existing in the first half of 2011 and argues that imprisoned journalists or 
increasing terror activities do not have a significant impact on the choice of 
parties as compared to other tangible projects. This statement is also approved 
by Genar’s research, which found out that majority of people vote according to 
party’s accomplishments (86.4% on a scale of 100) (Genar Araştırma, 2011b, 
p.11).
180
  
                                                     
178
  (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49) 
http://www.genar.com.tr/files/2011-%201-N%C4%B0SAN-
Secim_yarisi_baslarken_nisan_2011.pdf 
179
 (Sabah, 2011)  
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/11/18/ak-partinin-oy-orani-yuzde-511 
180
 (Genar, 2011b, p.11) 
http://www.genar.com.tr/files/2011-%204-HAZ%C4%B0RAN-Secim_2011.pdf 
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 Consequently, despite the critique of the AKP’s health care policies, the 
majority of people take into account tangible social policies which affect their 
daily lives.  This also is seen when the AKP’s brochures are taken into account, 
and it is understood that the AKP reinforces its tangible policies while making a 
comparative approach between past (2002) and (2011). Since people enjoy the 
tangible policies such as decrease in price of medications and easy access to 
doctors, they do not seem to be concerned about the social rights of health care 
workers and lack of social-rights policies (Çalışlar, 2011; Oxford Business 
Group, 2008).
181
 The public response to the AKP’s performance in health care 
has been, as to be expected, positive and also one of the decisive factors in the 
consolidation of the AKP’s political power. Such arrangements182 serve to 
impress the affected individuals, especially those who come from the lowest 
segment of the society.  
By way of illustration, we may see the views of a middle-aged and low-
skilled worker, Zeki, who works in a carpet shop in İstanbul. He explained that 
once health cards had to be changed six months and to get that formality done 
was each time very cumbersome for his old mother (Zeki, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1). However, he commented, now health care service can be obtained by 
presentation of the identity card number alone, thanks to reduced bureaucracy in 
the health care system. He added that for people who have to live under very 
                                                     
181
 (Çalışlar, 2011; Oxford Business Group, 2008) 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1070255&Yazar=OR
AL-CALISLAR&CategoryID=98 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/helping-health-care-national-medical-system-has-
undergone-challenging-shift 
182
The novelties in the health care system on account of the following benefits: reduction of 
queues, bureaucracies and medicament prices; easy access to hospitals and doctors; 
establishment of equitable health services; provisions providing children and individuals less 
than 18 years free access to health care facilities and the full-time employment law. 
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modest conditions solely tangible projects that address their needs count. The 
hot political debate (e.g. constitutional change; conflicts among ruling party and 
opposition parties) does not interest them at all. A representative from the Hak-İş 
trade union also highlighted the positive side of the reforms to the health 
scheme:  
What the AKP said before it came in power, was that I will do 
houses and roads first... Its second project is the reform of the health 
sector. It was a big thing. What I saw there, the AKP targeted a 
project and followed through on this project. So, it did many health 
reforms. ...It completely destroyed the existing scheme.  For 
instance, in health, the AKP... shut down the SSK .... Tayyip 
Erdoğan walks by seeing the picture (Nedim, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1).  
 
 In addition, wider accessibility to health centres was mentioned by 
various interviewees. Muzaffer from Kadiköy main branch asserted that a 
narrow group (e.g. pharmacists, health care workers) constitutes the losers in 
these health care reforms whereas a majority wins (Muzaffer, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1). Besides, the AKP main branch İstanbul, Murat, and deputy from the 
AKP, Naci, highlighted that previously, people were not able to get access to 
hospitals. Murat asserted that the ones who had money used to go to private 
hospitals  and others used to suffer from both insufficent financial sources and 
long queues in the corridors of the hospitals. However, now the whole hospital 
system was organized (Murat and Naci, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
Furthermore, similar to Murat and Naci, Zehra as an AKP member, 
expressed that: 
For instance, in the past, you were not able to go to hospital. Now 
you can go to hospital. Now, all the private institutions and SSK 
institutions were merged and we can go to any of them. Actually, 
some things in the health sector are not perfect.... But, since 2002, 
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many things have really changed. Roads, health, and education; 
many things have changed... (Zehra, Appendix PartB, Table 1).  
 
As a result, as with the AKP’s social assistance system, changes in health 
care sector have appealed to the majority of society which has been unable to 
access health care services. Therefore, improvements in health care sector have 
satisfied more than half of society. Despite the improvements for the majority of 
society, health care reforms have resulted in losses for health care workers. 
Nevertheless, given the health care workers do not constitute the main electorate 
basis of the AKP; it has not influenced the AKP’s electoral consolidation. Even 
though the AKP receives votes from each strata of society, since its policies 
fulfil the needs of the majority of the population, the AKP continues to sustain 
its electoral success at both the 2007 and 2011 elections.  
5.3 Impact of the AKP’s Rights-Discourse on its Consolidation 
 My aim in this section is to demonstrate the phases that the AKP’s rights-
discourse has gone through in the course of its tenure. To do this, I will first 
document the changes in the legislations, important reform packages and 
constitutional amendments during the AKP’s two tenures (2002-2010).  I will 
then investigate in section 5.3.1.1 whether the AKP’s progressive discourse and 
its concrete legislative reforms have contributed to the AKP’s consolidation in 
legislative elections of 2007 or not. After the analysis of the first tenure, I will 
examine how the AKP’s second tenure’s democratic initiatives (for Kurds) and 
constitutional amendment have affected its electoral success in legislative 
elections of 2011. 
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 5.3.1 Changes in Legislations, Reform Packages and Constitutional 
Amendments 2002-2010 
 Historically, the MGK played a vital role in the relations between the 
civil governments and the military since its inception in 1961. It was 
strengthened with additional powers after the military intervention 1980
183
 
(Narlı, 2009, pp.441-442). As pointed out in the chapter 1, the MGK was also 
responsible for the post-modern coup of 1997. Although it had a mixed 
composition comprising the president of the state, chief of the general staff and 
members from both the council of ministers and general staff, it was always 
dominated by the military, with a high-ranked officer assuming the task of MGK 
secretary. 
 As indicated in the chapter 1, the AKP’s pro-EU discourse did not come 
out of blue; indeed, the preceding changes in the pro-Islamist discourse prepared 
the ground for the rise and flourishing of the AKP.  With this change in the 
discourse, party elites thought they would be able to solve their problems vis-à-
vis the military (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.475). Following  its electoral victory in 2002, 
regarding civil control over military, the AKP was keen to continue to 
                                                     
183
 “Established after the 1960 coup, the MGK had the right to ‘recommend to the cabinet the 
necessary basic guidelines regarding … decisions related to national security’. After the 1980 
coup, the 1982 Constitution expanded the powers of the MGK. Article 118 of the 1982 
Constitution established the MGK as a body with 10 members, evenly divided between civilians 
(the president, prime minister, and ministers of defense, internal affairs and foreign affairs) and 
military officers (the Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the army, navy and air force, 
and the general commander of the gendarmerie). Under Article 118, the Council of Ministers 
must consider, ‘with priority, the decisions of the MGK concerning necessary measures for the 
protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the 
peace and security of society’. The MGK’s decisions were as powerful as decrees and they were 
more than recommendations to civilian parliamentarians and the executive” (Narlı, 2009, p.441-
442). 
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implement the harmonisation packages
184
 that  aimed to integrate the Turkish 
legislation into the EU legislation within the frame of the EU’s ‘acquis 
communautaires’ (Hale and Özbudun, 2011, p.57). The first three harmonisation 
packages had been already adopted and brought in force by the previous ANAP-
MHP-DSP
185
 coalition government in 2002.  The remaining six out of the nine 
harmonisation packages were accepted during the AKP’s first tenure. When 
these reforms are analysed, it may be seen that the AKP introduced reforms that 
dealt primarily with the structure and function of the MGK as well as other 
aspects of the army (Hale and Özbudun, 2011, p.61).  
 Under the guidance of 7
th
 Harmonization Package
186
 (No.4963), 
important changes occurred in the articles 4, 5, 9, 13, 15, 19
187
 regarding the 
composition of the MGK and the MGK Genel Sekreterliği (MGK Secretary 
                                                     
184
 It should be noted that three of the EU harmonisation packages had been already accepted 
during the ANAP-MHP-DSP coalition government (1999-2002 November) (AB Genel 
Sekreterliği, 2007, p.7-9). 
185
 ANAP-MHP-DSP period:  is the coalition government between 1999 and 2002 (28th May 
1999 –18th November 2002). 
186
 The 7
th
 Package of Harmonization (Law No.4963) came into effect after being published in 
the Official Gazette on 7th August 2003 (Resmi Gazete, 2003a). 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/08/
20030807.htm/20030807.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/08/20030807.h
tm 
187
 “The 7th Harmonisation Package brought amendments to the Law on the MGK (Law 
No.2945, 1983) and brought the following changes. The package re-defined the functions of the 
MGK in an amendment to Article 4; and it abrogated Articles 9 and 14 of the Law on the MGK 
and the Secretariat General of the MGK which empowered the Secretariat General to follow up, 
on behalf of the President and the PM, the implementation of any recommendation made by the 
MGK. It amended Article 13 and limited the competencies of the Secretariat General to the 
functions of a secretariat of the MGK. With the amendment of Article 5, it increased the time 
period between regular MGK meetings from one to two months. It cancelled the prerogative of 
the Chief of General Staff to convene a meeting. It amended Article 15 to revise the appointment 
procedure of the Secretary General of the MGK; the Secretariat General is to be appointed upon 
the proposal of the PM and the approval of the President, allowing a civilian to serve in this 
office. It removed Article 19, which provided that ‘the Ministries, public institutions and 
organisations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified 
and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the MGK’. 
Finally the 7th Harmonisation Package abrogated the confidentiality of the staff of the 
Secretariat General of the MGK. Accordingly, the scope of the MGK’s involvement in political 
affairs is now confined to national security issues: the MGK is to determine the national security 
concept, develop ideas about security in accordance with the state’s security approach and 
submit these views to the Council of Ministers” (Narlı, 2009, pp.443-444). 
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General) (AB Genel Sekreterliği, 2007, pp.72-73). Moreover, amendment to the 
Sayıştay Kanunu Ek Madde 12 (Court of Auditors Supplement Article 12) was 
included to the 7
th
 Harmonization Package in order to “provide the institutional 
and legal framework for full accountability of the military to the parliament” 
(Narlı, 2009, p.453). Two other amendments related to the military’s 
accountability were the Law on Public Financial Management and Control (Law 
No.5018 (10
th
 December 2003)) and “the constitutional amendment package 
(passed in Parliament in May 2004). Through the latter, the Sayıştay (Court of 
Auditors) “has had wider mandate to inspect accounts and state property owned 
by the Armed Forces without any exemption and secrecy consideration” (Narlı, 
2009, pp.454-455). 
 In addition to the changes reinforcing civil power on military, some 
important steps were taken also on the issue of minority rights at the turn of 
century. Initially, under the orientation of EU requirements, the ANAP-MHP-
DSP coalition government introduced a comprehensive constitutional 
amendment regarding rights and freedoms. Due to EU requirements, a 
comprehensive amendment in the constitution which covered 34 articles was 
implemented in 2001 (Ergin, 2010a and 2010b).
188
 The 2001 Constitutional 
amendment changed the general approach to the restriction on fundamental 
rights and liberties (Özbudun, 2007, p.180).
189
  The 2001 Constitutional 
amendment occurred under the 3rd Harmonisation Package (Law No.4771).
190
 
                                                     
188
 (Ergin, 2010a and 2010b) 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/14083333.asp 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/14093839.asp 
189
 In addition, it brought important changes with respect to “personal liberty and security, 
privacy of individual life, inviolability of the domicile, secrecy of communications, freedom of 
residence and travel, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, 
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 Later on, in 2003, the AKP, with the introduction of the 6
th
 
harmonisation package
191
 (Law No.4928), rather extended the scope of these 
already adopted minority rights (3
rd
 Harmonisation Package Law No.4771). It 
should be noted that the initiative of the coalition government itself was the 
primary revolutionary action regarding the minority rights. The AKP, in turn, 
only broadened the minority rights by “permitting relaxing restrictions on 
broadcasting on Kurdish language by amending the article 4 of law on the 
establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Television stations, sanctioning the 
broadcasting (on both private and public radio and television stations), in 
languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens traditionally in their daily lives” 
(Özbudun and Hale, 2011, p.60; Hughes, 2011, p.59). “In the context of the Act 
on Foreign Languages and Dialects, citizens of Turkey have obtained 
opportunity of benefiting from existing language course facilities which are 
related to traditional dialects” (Salmoni, 2003; Hughes, 2011, p.59).  This act 
was especially important for Kurdish minorities (Salmoni, 2003; Hughes, 2011, 
p.59). In addition, parents obtained the chance to give Kurdish names to their 
children.  
 After 2009, the AKP announced a new democratisation package. This 
initiative mostly aimed to solve mostly the Kurdish issue, but it also covered 
                                                                                                                                              
freedom of assembly, the right to a fair trial, and a restriction on the death penalty to certain 
categories of crime” (Özbudun, 2007, p.180). 
190
 The 3
rd
 Package of Harmonization (Law No.4771) came into effect after being published in 
the Official Gazette on 9th August 2002 (Resmi Gazete, 2002). 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2000/09/
20020809.htm/20020809.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2000/09/20020809.h
tm 
191
 The 7
th
 Package of Harmonization (Law No.4928) came into effect after being published in 
the Official Gazette on 19th July 2003 (Resmi Gazete, 2003b). 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/07/
20030719.htm/20030719.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/07/20030719.h
tm 
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some issues regarding the Alevis and the Roma community in Turkey (Aydın-
Düzgit, 2012, p.3). In the context of Kurdish issue, the AKP undertook 
initiatives for extending cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurdish minority. 
For instance, a full-time, state-run Kurdish-language television channel began 
broadcasting on 1
st
 January 2009 (Avcı, 2011, pp.417-418). The Kurdish 
initiative was also based on some concrete measures related to Kurdish 
language. For instance, using original Kurdish names of places was permitted. A 
faculty of “Living languages” where Kurdish language and literature, (but also 
Persian, Arabic and Assyrian) can be taught was opened (Güzeldere, 2010, 
p.10).  
 In addition to state broadcasting, following a regulation on private 
broadcasting (On 13th November 2009), the restriction for broadcasting in other 
languages than Turkish was removed. As a result, on 23
rd
 February 2010, private 
TV and radio receive license for 24-hour broadcasting in Kurdish, Zazaki and 
Arabic (Güzeldere, 2010, p.11). On 9
th
 April 2010, the restriction to only using 
Turkish at political rallies was lifted, so that during election campaigns 
candidates could speak in other languages. This removal of restriction 
contributed to decrease in hundreds of court cases against Kurdish politicians 
(Güzeldere, 2010, pp.11-12).  
 During the first tenure of the AKP, the government did not reveal any 
attempt regarding Alevi rights. In the second tenure of the AKP, out of 341 the 
AKP deputies, only three were from the Alevi sect (Haber5, 2007).
192
 The AKP-
Alevi relations have become more dynamic after 2007 (Köse, 2010a, p.9). At the 
                                                     
192
 (Haber5, 2007) 
http://haber5.com/siyaset/akpnin-alevi-milletvekilleri-konustu 
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high levels, the AKP began to approach the Alevi issue through symbolic 
gestures (Köse, 2010a, p.9).
193
. Even though some Alevi leaders responded 
positively to the AKP’s initiative, a majority within the Alevi community did not 
consider the AKP’s approach as sincere. Later, the Alevis have raised three main 
identity-based claims. First, they want that the cemevis obtain legal status as 
worship places. Second, they demand removal of compulsory religious courses 
in schools. Third, they claim a restructuring in legal status and services of the 
Diyanet (Köse, 2010b, pp.153-154). Nevertheless, these demands have not 
reached a solution as of 2011.  
 As pointed out in the chapter 1.9, the AKP’s hegemony was counter-
challenged by the army’s e-memorandum on 27th April 2007. However, the AKP 
overcame this issue and became successful at the elections of 22
nd 
July 2007. In 
the context of civil-military relations, it is important to give information on the 
closure case against the AKP and two Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) 
cases. On 14th March 2008, the AKP faced a new and very serious crisis: the 
chief prosecutor of the Republic asked the Constitutional Court to open a case 
for the closure of the AKP. The reason for this closure case was the AKP’s anti-
secular activities such as the proposal of the AKP for a constitutional change to 
allow lifting the headscarf ban (Aydın-Düzgit, 2008, 2).194 195 This closure case 
                                                     
193
 The Prime Minister calls himself a student who was mistreated by his teacher in the 
classroom.  
 
194
 It is also important to mention the decision of the ECHR’s decision on headscarf in 2004.  
Leyla Şahin in 1998 filed a lawsuit to the ECHR in which she claimed that Turkey violates 
freedom of religion (the ECHR’s Article 9-1on Freedom of Religion) due to its ban on wearing 
headscarf at the universities (Aydın and Aydın, 2004; ECHR, 2004). 
(Aydın and Aydın, 2004) 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=9958  
(ECHR, 2004) Official decision of the ECHR on this lawsuit 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61863 
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that aimed at the AKP’s very existence, however, was rejected on July 30, 2008 
by a narrow majority of votes of the court members (Hale and Özbudun, 2011, 
pp.74-75).  
   Only three months after the rejection of the closure case of the AKP 
came the start of the Ergenekon
196
 case that has developed in the course of time 
to the largest and most controversial court case in the recent history of Turkey 
(Heper, 2011, p.245). The Ergenekon case thus represented the first effective 
action against this “deep-state” organization and indirectly against the immunity 
of the military. Therefore, it was initially hailed as a milestone in the 
“demilitarization” process in Turkey.  
 Two years later, the Ergenekon case was followed by the Balyoz
197
 
(Sledgehammer) investigation that had now the army as its direct target. On 21st 
February 2010, high-ranked members, nearly 200 serving and retired and mostly 
                                                                                                                                              
195
 After its victory in 2007, the AKP started to lift the ban on headscarf (female university 
students who wear headscarves were not allowed to enter to the classes at the universities). The 
AKP tried to lift this ban by making amendment in the constitution. Attempts for removing this 
ban yielded to a controversial discussion in society such as Islamisation of society. In this 
atmosphere, the Chief Prosecutor who was filing the closure case, he took into account the 
headscarf debate as anti-secular activities of the AKP (Aydın-Düzgit, 2008, 2). 
http://aei.pitt.edu/11590/1/1659[1].pdf 
196
 Ergenekon case: Allegedly, Ergenekon is the name of a criminal “deep-state” organization 
with connections to state security structures and the army. In the indictment drawn up by the 
state prosecutor, this organization was accused of being involved in political crimes, murders and 
conspiracies with the aim to destabilize the AKP government (Jenkins, 2009, p.10). 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0908Ergenekon.pdf 
Deep-State: “The deep state is Turkish shorthand for a faceless faction inside the Turkish state 
that has, some claim, held the reins of real power throughout the republic's 84-year history. The 
deep state is held to be based in the army, but closely linked with MIT (the national intelligence 
service), the judiciary, and (since the 1960s) the mafia” (Freely, 2007). 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-06-freely-en.html 
197
 Balyoz Case: Balyoz Harekatı (Sledgehammer coup plan) is the name of an alleged Turkish 
secularist military coup plan in order to overthrown the elected government of Turkey (in 2003) 
(Bal, 2010).  
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3321/balyoz-operation-ii-squash-blossoms.html 
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high-ranked members of the Turkish army were accused of having plotted in 
2003 a coup against the AKP government (Ocak and Kılıç, 2010).198 
  Both the Ergenekon and Balyoz
199
 cases have been still on-going as of 
early 2012; however, there are already serious doubts about the fairness of the 
investigations associated with these cases (Avcı, 2011, p.414). The Ergenekon 
investigation has attained an almost unmanageable scope, on account of the 
length of the indictment and number of the suspects. A wide spectrum of 
prominent persons including high-rank army officers, politicians, university 
professors and columnists have been detained on accusation of being active 
Ergenekon members.  The common denominator of these individuals that come 
from actually very different political groups is the fact that they have been 
opponents of the AKP government. Both investigations are criticized of the 
manner they are conducted and of the very long and unjustified pre-trial 
detentions (Bilancino, 2012).
200
 It increasingly raises the impression that they 
primarily aim to suppress the opponents of the AKP government. 
 Moreover, on political grounds, the AKP’s second tenure was marked by 
the AKP’s new civilian constitution initiatives. As mentioned in the background 
chapter, the constitution of Turkey goes back to the constitution of 1982 which 
was prepared and adopted during the tenure of the military government. Due to 
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 (Ocak and Kılıç, 2010) 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=982238&Date=25.
02.2010&CategoryID=97 
199
 As of 21
st
 September 2012, the court finalized and “the three top former commanders of the 
Turkish Armed Forces on were sentenced to life imprisonment due to their attempts of 
overthrow the elected AKP government of Turkey between 2002 and 2006 (Yetkin, 2012).  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/a-historic-court-case-under-a-political-
shadow.aspx?pageID=449&nID=30731&NewsCatID=409 
200
 (Bilancino, 2012)  
http://www.equilibri.net/nuovo/articolo/turkey-changing-balances-between-military-power-and-
state 
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continuous critics of this undemocratic constitution, the AKP government 
attempted to make a new constitution in its second tenure period (Avcı, 2011, 
p.418; ICG, 2008, p.2).
201
 However, the allocation of seats
202
 in the parliament 
did not allow the AKP government to make much progress in this initiative 
(Avcı, 2011, p.418). Indeed, the AKP established an independent commission in 
2007 with the mission to prepare a draft version of the constitution (Avcı, 2011, 
p.418).  However, this attempt to prepare a new constitution was put aside due to 
AKP’s closure case in 2008 (on 14th March 2008).  
 Later on, on March 2010, the AKP submitted a partial amendment 
package to the TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey) (Gönenç, 2010).
203
 However, in the parliament, this 
package of 26-articles was not approved by the majority in parliament and hence 
the constitutional package failed to be enacted automatically (Avcı, 2011, 
p.418). Therefore, the articles were put to a referendum on 12th September 
2010. The package had a variety
204
  of articles. The most important and 
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 (Avcı, 2011, p.418; ICG, 2008, p.2)  ICG’s Critics on the Constitution 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/197_turkey_and_europe___the_decisive_year_
ahead 
202
 Due to Turkish electoral system, even though the AKP obtained a greater vote in the elections 
of 2007 (46.6%) as compared to the elections of 2002 (34.6%), the AKP’s seats at the parliament 
dropped from 363 deputies to 341 deputies in 2007. In order to amend constitution, 2/3 of the 
parliament which is equivalent to 367 deputies has to be in consensus with this amendment 
(Duman, 2011). 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=74894 
203
  (Gönenç, 2010) 
 http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-
0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_of_Turkey.pdf 
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 On 13th May, the package which covered twenty-six articles was published in the Official 
Gazette. 
 Gönenç points out about the articles 24, 25 and 26 of the referendum package as following: 
 “The Article 26 is the commencement article. Article 25 adds two interim provisions to the 
Constitution, which mainly explains how the new regulations concerning the composition and 
competences of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of the Judges and Prosecutors 
shall be applied, in case of the amendment package enters into force after its approval in the 
referendum. Article 24 of the package, in turn, repeals the “Provisional Article 15” of the current 
constitution, which provides judicial immunity for the leaders and top officials of the 12 
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controversial ones were related to the judiciary, that is, the changes in the 
structure
205
 of the AM (Anayasa Mahkemesi - Constitutional Court) and the 
HSYK (Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu - High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors) rendering them to the control of the AKP government (Economist, 
2010a; Avcı, 2011, p.418).206 The articles regarding structural changes in the 
AM and the HSYK, as expected, caused a big disputation, and led to allegations 
that the AKP planned to obtain control over the judiciary. Despite the 
controversy, the referendum was held on 12
th
 September 2010, and the results 
showed a majority support of 58% in favour of the proposed changes in the 
referendum package (Avcı, 2011, p.418). 
5.3.1.1 Impact of AKP’s Rights-Discourse during its First Tenure on its 
Consolidation in  the Legislative Elections of 2007 
 Above, I have documented the changes in legislations regarding the civil-
military relations; the minorities and constitutional amendments during the 
AKP’s first two tenures (2002-2010). In this section, I now seek to demonstrate 
how the AKP’s progressive discourse during its first ruling tenure appealed 
different ideological segments under the same umbrella. Then, I will discuss 
how the AKP’s position at the presidential elections of 2007 has contributed to 
                                                                                                                                              
September 1980 Coup as  well as those civil and military bureaucrats serving under the military 
regime” (Gönenç, 2010, p.1). 
 Gönenç (2010) split the rest of the articles (excluding articles 24, 25 and 26) into six main 
categories: i) Judiciary; ii) Fundamental rights and duties; iii) Executive; iv) Legislature; v) 
general provisions and vi) financial and economic provisions. 
205
 Structural changes regarding appointments of the judges in the AM and the HSYK. 
206
 (Economist, 2010a)   
http://www.economist.com/node/16994644?story_id=16994644 
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its consolidation. In analysing this, I look at the dynamics between the historical 
bloc
207
 and the AKP.  
 An analysis of demands of the different ideological segments reveals that 
their common aim was to reduce the military role and expansion of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. As pointed out in the contextual chapter 1, the AKP’s elites 
had found out that they had, with the EU, a common cause in dealing with the 
authoritarian elements of Turkey.  Therefore, they considered the EU as an 
appropriate ally in challenging the military and establishing democratic 
governance within which the Islamists would be regarded as a legitimate player 
(Dağı, 2005, p.32). Hence, the EU was for them the external anchor in dealing 
with the military’s impact in Turkey.  
  The internal anchor was, in turn, constituted by the liberal intellectuals of 
the country (Dağı, 2005, p.32). The AKP received important support from them 
as it was trying to reduce impact of military’s structure. Due to the military’s 
dominating role in the society and politics, liberals demanded demilitarization 
and more democracy in the country. They believed that the AKP’s pro-EU 
stance would bring democracy to the politics and society in Turkey.  
 Additionally, by emphasizing the EU criteria, the AKP did not only 
appeal to the Islamists’ demands, but also to the Kurds who had much suffered 
from the military’s interventions. The latter believed in the AKP’s progressive 
discourse and pro-EU stance, since they believed that they could thereby obtain 
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 Historical bloc: As mentioned before in the methodology section, historical bloc is a notion 
developed by Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971, p.137). For Turkish context, it has been used for the bloc 
that is formed by the military, judiciary, bureaucracy and CHP. The historical bloc has been 
strong in the Turkish political party system since the establishment of the Republic. It is argued 
that after the AKP’s emergence in 2002, the historical bloc has tried to overcome the AKP not 
through legislative elections, but through allegedly organized coups and closure cases.  
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more rights and freedom regarding their Kurdish identity. Similar to the 
Islamists, their main demand was the restriction of the military’s role and to 
obtain more identity rights. Also, most of the Kurds believed that the EU could 
be a tool to achieve these goals. The AKP’s initial rights-discourse together with 
the EU anchor was welcomed by various interviewees. For instance, Abdullah 
from the AKP asserted that:  
The AKP became the speaker for all of those sectors which were in a 
disadvantageous situation. This is like a big social opposion 
movement; it spoke in order to develop a counter stance against the 
status quo, against a political environment which is shaped by 
domination. Since the AKP’s political agenda came up with this 
rising oppositional movement, it became very successful (Abdullah, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 Therefore, the AKP had developed a highly emphatic discourse that was 
based on the human rights and freedoms. Those
208
 slogans were also recollected 
in the interviews that I conducted with a representative from a prominent trade 
union:  
There was a problem in the development of human rights and 
freedoms. For example, in 1996, the 28th February post-modern 
coup d’état happened.  ... The AKP said that it would deal with the 
issues of rights and freedoms. ... In addition, as a direct reflection of 
this project, the AKP also said that it will give importance to the EU. 
......So, for instance they said Cyprus...They said that “I will do 
things related to Cyprus (Nedim, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
The representative from the Başak Sanat Vakfı, Selma, in turn, asserted 
that the Kurds’ belief in the AKP’s pro-EU stance and its emphasis on the 
human rights was the major reason of their initial support to the AKP. She 
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 On the other hand, the slogans that were brought forth by the AKP’s propaganda in 2002 
stressed the fundamental rights and freedoms (hak ve özgürlükler). The billboard slogans in 2002 
were formulated to that effect: “I trust: the only party which will protect rights and freedom is 
the AKP” and “Turn on the lights to remove the bans!” (Billboard Slogan, 2002).  
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further pointed out that due to the AKP’s pro-EU discourse; they were 
convinced that there would be an implementation of rights and freedoms to 
comply with the EU framework (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 Accordingly, when these three main groups are taken into account in 
terms of cleavages (state-church and centre-periphery), the common glue which 
brought them together was the AKP’s promise for reduction of the centre’s 
power within the politics (e.g. military’s role and secularist state’s role) and 
diminution of secularization and homogenization attempts of the state (e.g. 
freedom of expression including freedom of religion and freedom of using its 
own language). From the cleavage structure, the AKP succeeded in appealing to 
the demands of these different ideological groups in the society.  
 During the first ruling period of the AKP (2002-2007), the AKP’s 
discourse was in parallel to its amendments in legislatures. In the election 
manifesto of 2002, the AKP claimed to make necessary changes in fundamental 
rights and freedoms in line with the Copenhagen Criteria (AK Parti Seçim, 2002, 
p.4).
209
 In line with this progressive declaration, as pointed out above, six 
harmonization packages were accepted between 2002 and 2004. This enabled 
the AKP to make the necessary changes in the MGK structure and to establish 
civilian control over the military.  
 Moreover, it is important to draw attention to the AKP’s practical and 
pragmatic approach in implementing these EU legislations in a period, as the EU 
enjoyed a high standing in the Turkish public opinion and people were rather 
enthusiastic over a prospective EU membership of Turkey.  In this way, the 
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 (AK Parti Seçim, 2002, p.4) AKP Election Manifesto 2002 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/secimler/2002-genel-secim 
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AKP’s democratization approach addressed a broad electoral segment 
constituted by various, rather disparate social bases of the society. While doing 
this, the AKP succeeded in promoting its pro-EU discourse. 
  During its first term, the AKP made use of the existing political 
atmosphere in order to create the impression that it was the only political party 
dealing with human rights and democratization in the last two decades. 
However, the process of democratization had already begun in the early 1990s, 
albeit with initially modest progress (Solo, 2010, p.77).
210
  This view is 
supported by a high ranking official of the TÜSİAD in who asserted that 
democratization did not start with the EU and, indeed, the discussion about the 
relationship between individuals and the state already began in 1980s with the 
syndicate movements, foundations and NGOs. According to him, a long period 
of continuous high inflation, ethnic terror and weak coalition governments 
prevented the achievement of noteworthy progress in democratization during the 
1990s (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 Regarding the relationship between the AKP and the EU, the same 
member believed that the AKP used the EU as an anchor, benefitting from the 
previous coalition government’s concrete success at the Helsinki Summit of 
1999 when Turkey was recognized as a candidate on equal levels with other 
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 Solo argues that the 1990s and era of globalization contributed drastically to Turkey’s 
democracy and civil society since liberalization and individualism developed. For instance, law 
banning private radio and television stations was eliminated and the subsequent growth of the 
media has been important in the sense that the media makes government and civil service more 
transparent and accountable to citizens.  
Also, in 1999, he pinpoints other milestone issue which is Turkey’s obtaining status for 
candidacy of EU membership at the Helsinki Summit. As a result of this acceptance, it is argued 
that this candidacy contributed to Turkey’s civil society organizations and democracy for further 
cooperation with the EU (Solo, 2010, p.77). 
Hence, the EU was already an important external anchor for the expansion of civil society in 
Turkey. 
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potential candidates (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1). As previously stated, the 
AKP continued to implement the projects which the previous coalition 
government had been already initiated. Thus, one of the main reasons for the 
AKP’s appeal to different ideological groups was its consistency in continuing 
the legislative amendments that had been already initiated in the years 2001 and 
2002 (Özbudun, 2007, p.180).  
 The continuation of the EU reforms under a party with Islamist roots 
attracted votes, in particular of those segments of society that demanded more 
democracy and fundamental rights. In contrast to the AKP’s discourse, which 
emphasized human rights and democracy, the stance of the main opposition 
party was in parallel with the military authorities’ stance. The CHP which 
appeared to deny its socio-democratic discourse of the 1970s failed to present a 
progressive image in terms of political freedom and human rights. Rather, it 
assumed a conservative position that was characterized with a strong anti-EU; 
pro-military; pro-authoritarian and inward-looking discourse (Öniş, 2006, 
p.131). Actually, the AKP enjoyed during its first tenure a legislative period with 
only a single opposition party present in parliament.  
 The opposition provided by this party, namely the CHP, was weak and 
confined to a self-appointed mission of being the safeguard of secular values, of 
accusing the AKP of having a hidden agenda of introducing Islamist values and 
an Islamist way of life into the society. The CHP pursued, in addition, close 
cooperation with the judiciary and military in order to block the AKP’s 
executive and legislative activities. The CHP failed to develop new concepts and 
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to come up with new progressive projects with the potential to incite excitement 
in society.  
The CHP’s failure to adapt to the new conjuncture was also highlighted by 
different social actors. A representative from the CHP women branch outlined the 
CHP’s mistakes during the first term of the AKP. She asserted that at that time, 
the CHP criticized the AKP from a secularism point of view and failed to 
understand the bigger picture, which was not about secularism and the AKP. She 
further added that the CHP should have been able to see the other characteristics 
of the AKP, beyond religion. That is why the CHP remained weak in the 2007 
legislative elections and 2010 referandum (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 Similar to Ayşe, the representative of the SODEV, Soner, argued that an 
excessive focus by the CHP on secularism, particularly the headscarf, resulted in 
a reaction by the electorate, who were reminded of their Islamic identity. In 
addition, he pointed out that the lower income segments of society were irritated 
by this discussion over secularism and the headscarf. Moreover, the CHP’s 
secularist and nationalist approach slowly transformed itself into an anti-EU 
stance, which was perceived as an anti-democratic stance (Soner, Appendix Part 
B, Table 1).  
 Cem, a high-ranking representative of a holding company, believes that 
the CHP failed to understand the overall electorate and contrasted this with the 
vision of the AKP. Cem argued that:  
Since the 2000s, there has been a really brave government and it has 
been questioning all of those common taboos and it makes a mess of 
those taboos. ... When I say taboo, I refer to the derivatives of the 
concept of nationalism that date back to the 1920s. ... We were 
forming a buffer state for the Western countries against any 
communist attack from the North. Afterwards, after the end of the 
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Cold War, there was not a need for this. Since there was no such 
need, politically as a society, we began to question those taboos. The 
taboos which have been established up to that time became obsolete. 
... the country went into an identity crisis. ...  After this, in the 2000s, 
there came a party that established a vision, a government that 
knows what it is going to do and it attempts to establish a re-
organization of the society (Cem, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 Finally, as an AKP representative, Hasan, argued:  
With the AKP, the level of democracy and of politics has increased. 
So, now, people’s expectations are higher. That’s why the MHP, the 
CHP and other political parties are behind in the political 
competition and unable to increase their levels. They still consider 
themselves as the guardians of the Republic era, and they are trying 
to do politics with the mentality of 1930s (Hasan, Appendix Part B, 
Table 1).  
 
  In addition to this weak political opposition offered by the CHP, the e-
memorandum of 27
th
 April 2007 helped the AKP to gain support from various 
ideological segments. With the 2007 presidential elections, the civil-military 
relations went into a new phase, given that the already existing tension between 
the military and the AKP government had turned into an open conflict. The 
problem between the government on one hand and the military and the judiciary 
on the other had existed since the emergence of the AKP in 2002. However, as 
aforementioned, the conflict came to open manifestation with the e-
memorandum. As the previous president of Turkey’s tenure of office was close 
to termination in April 2007, the AKP tried to nominate one of its senior 
members for the presidency (Avcı, 2011, p.413). Nonetheless, such a nomination 
meant that the future president’s wife would wear headscarf, and this was 
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inacceptable for the secular front
211
, since the residence of the president had 
always been regarded as the indication of secularism in the country.  
  As pointed out in the chapter 3, the Turkish state had been guided 
throughout its history by this historical bloc (elitist and militarist bloc). In 2007, 
this historical bloc vehemently tried to prevent the government from electing a 
president with Islamist background. Firstly, an attempt was made, through a 
particular interpretation of the constitution, to raise the claim that the AKP was 
not eligible to elect the president because of the constitutional constraints 
(Özbudun and Hale, 2011, pp.62-63). This constitutional crisis marked the 
beginning of the conflict between the AKP government and the bloc. This 
followed the release of the e- memorandum at the website of the General Staff of 
Turkey (Kahraman, 2008, p.233; Avcı, 2011, p.414). 
  Yet the e-memorandum helped the AKP increase its credibility and its 
image of strength not only within the country, but also internationally, e.g., vis-
à-vis the EU and the USA. The AKP exploited the e-memorandum in a dual 
way. First, by not giving in and, on the contrary, standing up to this challenge, it 
demonstrated its political power and won a decisive victory over the military. 
Secondly, it cleverly played the role of the victim, presenting itself as the 
government party that the Jacobean state, judiciary and military together tried to 
deprive of its democratic right to make a nomination for the presidency (Yavuz, 
2009, pp.252-253).  
  According to the representative of the SODEV, Soner, since the AKP 
could not elect the president of Turkey in April 2007, it presented itself to both 
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 The secular front that comprised the CHP, the military and the judiciary, e.g., the 
Constitutional Court corresponded to the historical bloc of the society that had existed since the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. 
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domestic and international groups as a victim by claiming that they (CHP; 
judiciary; army) was not allowing them to democratically elect the president and 
they (CHP) only wanted military interventions. He further added that as a result 
of this unjust treatment, the AKP government presented themselves as the true 
democrats while accusing the main opposition party as the pro-military 
intervention party. As a consequence, he asserted that the AKP carefully used 
this unjust treatment (Soner, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 As pointed out in the chapter 1.9, this first confrontation resulted in the 
AKP’s decision for early parliamentary elections of 2007. The results of the 
elections, in turn, contributed to the consolidation of the AKP because of the 
increase in its votes. Thus, as mentioned above, the AKP skilfully played the 
victim political party within the country and abroad. The AKP was regarded a 
political party that only attempted to carry out the presidential election by 
democratic means but was blocked in its attempt by the historical bloc. The 
propaganda
212
 of the AKP in summer 2007 was, remarkably, based on a 
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 For instance, one of the AKP’s slogans referred to the previous leaders who had previously 
also had problems with the historical blocs (first, the leader of the DP, then the leader of the 
ANAP and then the leader of the AKP) and denoted them as the Stars of the Democracy 
(Demokrasinin Yıldızları) (AKP Library, AKP General Headquarters).This slogan was 
characteristic of how the AKP made use of the democratic discourse to gain more votes in the 
elections of 2007. In the context of its conflict   with the historical blocs, this slogan seemed to 
work very well for the AKP. In addition, the AKP attacked the secular CHP with its slogans of 
2007 and accused it of making an alliance with the military against the democracy (Appendix 
Part F, Figures 7 and 8).  
 The stance of the CHP itself found support only from the secular segment of the society.  
Hence, a polarization arose between the Islamists and secularists (Turam, 2008, p.40). Secular 
segment organized rallies (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri/Rallies of the Republic) in order to advocate 
secularism and values of the Republic (Toktaş and Kurt, 2008, p.5). The reactions were initially 
directed against the Islamists’ pro-EU stance; however, the division was deepened by the 
controversies of the elections of 2007 (Çınar, 2006, p.486) and turned into a conflict, not only 
between the secularist and Islamist segments of the society, but also between the proponents of 
the state and those of the market (Tuğal, 2007).     
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discourse of democracy and democratization. As a result, the AKP harvested all 
protest votes (Toktaş and Kurt, 2008, p.6).   
 In a sense, the AKP’s electoral success was understood as an outcome of 
the democratic reaction of the voters to external interventions in politics. The 
AKP was seen in this picture as a party that tried hard to implement democracy 
within the political party system, but hindered in its pursuit by the historical bloc 
in Gramscian terms. In addition, the injustice done to the AKP attracted different 
ideological groups by “purging Islamically oriented deputies from the list of 
nominated deputies” for 2007 legislative elections (politically deprived people 
such as the Kurds, left-wing people and people who had suffered under the 
military tutelage after the military intervention of 1980; liberal intellectuals) 
(Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.124 and p.131).  
  Even though the e-memorandum appeared to be perceived as an unjust 
treatment of the AKP by some authors (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007; Toktaş and 
Kurt 2008), pre-elections surveys demonstrate that even before the e-
memorandum, the AKP was in anticipation of an increase in its votes, due to its 
good governance and the stable policies it had pursued in the economy (A&G 
Araştırma, 2007a; Ağırdır, 2007a).  Therefore, AKP’s accomplishments on the 
economy and social policy appear to outweigh its progressive discourse.   
  Therefore, the primary factors which enhanced its consolidation were 
based on its achievements in the economy and its accomplishments in social 
policies. After these achievements, its completion of the pending legislations and 
its discourse on human rights and democracy (especially on the issue of e-
memorandum) contributed to the AKP’s electoral success in 2007. 
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5.3.1.2 The Impact of Democratic Initiatives (for minorities) and 
Constitutional Amendment on the AKP’s Consolidation in Legislative Elections 
of 2011 
 Following the elections of 2007, the AKP not only consolidated its 
legislative majority but also managed to get the party’s nominee elected as the 
president of the State.  This meant the conquest of the highest political position 
of the secular Republic by a party with Islamist roots. However, besides its 
symbol of secularism, as indicated in chapter 1, the president of Turkey was 
entitled to important legislative and executive powers. Indeed, the former 
president had impeded the AKP’s legislative initiatives each time he was 
suspicious of a hidden agenda.  In addition, as pointed out in the chapter 1.9, the 
AKP called for a referendum for constitutional amendment regarding the direct 
election of the President. The amendment was accepted with 69.8% of the votes.  
 As a result, the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007 elections 
that were held according to the rules of the democratic parliamentary regime 
confirmed the consolidation of the AKP. Nevertheless, the historical bloc was by 
no means ready to give in. As pointed out in the contextual chapter, all the 
parties which were considered by the military as threat to the Republic were 
eventually banned. The two main threats that were specified by the National 
Security Policy Document were ethnic separatism and Islamic fundamentalism 
(Pezzati, 2012).
213
   
 Consequently, as mentioned in the background section of 5.3.1, the AKP 
faced a closure case. This closure case that aimed at the AKP’s very existence, 
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  (Pezzati, 2012) 
http://securityobserver.org/the-ergenekon-case-the-balance-between-democracy-and-
authoritarianism/ 
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however, was rejected by a narrow majority of votes. The AKP thus avoided 
getting banned, and the decision of the constitutional court became for the party 
a source of self-confidence. Moreover, the elections of 2007 and outcome of the 
closure case against the AKP had shown the limits of the power of the historical 
bloc.  
 As mentioned in 5.3.1 in detail, only three months after the closure case, 
the Ergenekon trial was revealed. Since most of arrested people were opponents 
of the AKP government, the trials were considered as the revengeful acts of the 
government. In addition, this impression gets support from the prime minister’s 
claims that in the course the investigations “Black and white will be detected” 
(Yenişafak, 2011).214 Such remarks indicate a rather revengeful positioning of 
the AKP. More importantly, these investigations are increasingly regarded as “a 
major move, not as …towards the consolidation of the pluralistic democracy in 
Turkey, but towards an authoritarian one party state” (Jenkins, 2009).215 The 
closure case against the AKP seems to have significantly contributed to the 
consolidation of the AKP’s regime within the political party system. In addition, 
the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases brought about the dismantling of the historical 
bloc. On the other hand, these investigations (especially the Balyoz trial) helped 
the AKP to deal with the military tutelage and restricting the power and 
respectability of the military. 
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 (Yenişafak, 2011)  
http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?t=17.02.2011&i=303490 
215
 The changing attitude of the domestic as well as international public opinion finds its 
expression also in several recent reports, e.g., Turkey 2010 Progress Report of the EU (European 
Commission, 2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf 
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 In such a context, the AKP’s attempts to change the constitution became 
more legitimate. As mentioned above, problems such as the obstacles  in 
electing the president and closure cases originated, in general, from the 
jurisdiction and, in particular, from  the constitutional court. The constitutional 
amendment that was accepted with the referendum of 12
th
 September 2010 
served the purpose of getting this important power of the historical bloc under 
control. However, before moving to this important amendment, I will discuss 
whether the Kurdish and Alevi initiatives brought concrete returns to the AKP 
from these electorates.  
 Democratization efforts such the Kurdish initiative or the Alevi initiative 
gave rise to a certain reserved rapprochement between the corresponding 
segments of the society and the AKP government. As pointed out in section 
5.3.1, even though most of the AKP’s discourse was pragmatic, the minority 
groups were also pleased of being accepted by the state.
216
 The same strategy 
was also observed in dealing with the left and right nationalist groups and, for 
instance, in speeches addressed to these groups by the prime minister. This 
pragmatic and even opportunistic strategy was supported by the highly 
marketing side the AKP.  
As for the rights-based discourse: the populist and pragmatic approach of 
the AKP only temporarily succeeded in convincing people. It turned out that the 
AKP was not willing and/or able to implement radical reforms on this issue of 
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 In addition, initially these positive improvements in cultural issues have received praise by 
45.6 according to a survey conducted by A & G Araştırma (Research) (Tamirak, 2009a and 
2009b) 
http://aksam.medyator.com/2009/08/25/haber/guncel/6185/gerilim_duserse_destek_artacak_.htm
l 
http://aksam.medyator.com/2009/08/26/haber/guncel/6208/bolunmekten_korkmuyoruz_ayrilmay
a_karsiyiz.html 
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fundamental rights. Thus, the improvements implemented by the AKP remained 
confined to the improvements mentioned in 5.3.1 (for example in broadcasting; 
unrestricted use of Kurdish culture and language). Similarly, the representative 
from the NGO Başak Sanat Vakfı, Selma, stressed how the AKP’s initial rights-
discourse and Kurdish initiative turned into a partisan monotype-attitude and an 
Ottoman imitation. She further added that after the slowing down in EU 
relations, the rights-discourse became completely reversed (Selma, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1).   
 The representative of the trade union Hak-iş also shared similar ideas as 
Selma regarding the lack of progress by the AKP in implementing rights, 
arguing that: 
For instance, Kurdish, Alevi initiatives were stressed but progress 
was not reached. It did not work. Kurdish, Alevi, Roma iniatives... 
for those ones, the AKP could not produce any project, it does not 
have any project. The AKP does not know those areas very well 
(Nedim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).     
 
 Furthermore, the democratic initiative was overshadowed by the closure 
of the DTP on 11th December 2009 by the constitutional court (Önderoğlu, 
2009).
217
 In addition to party closure, 37 party members (including two MPs) 
were banned from politics.  
            On the other hand, the rather solution-seeking attitude of the AKP 
government in the Kurdish problem was absent in the Alevi issue. Thus, the 
AKP government has been reluctant to exempt Alevi children from the religion 
course in schools in spite of the decision of the ECHR in this direction, to 
recognize Alevism as a distinct religious entity and Alevi places of worship 
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 (Önderoğlu, 2009) 
http://bianet.org/english/minorities/118850-pro-kurdish-dtp-closed-down-by-constitutional-court 
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(“cemevleri”) to be distinct from mosques. It is likely that this reluctance has its 
roots in the Sunni Islam background of the AKP government and its concerns 
about possible reactions from its own political base in the case of the 
implementation of an Alevi reform. Thus, in the context of the Alevi issue in 
particular, the AKP has not been able to surpass itself and its own Sunni frame 
of mind in order to provide the Alevis expanded freedoms (Demir and Gamm, 
2010).
218
 A representative of the EDP, Ferhat, believed that the lack of progress 
on Alevi issues was due to the absence of Alevis in the AKP and “if there were 
Alevis at the organizational framework of the AKP, this democratic initiative 
would have worked” (Ferhat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).   
  Meanwhile, a representative of the BDP, Barış, said that, whilst it looks 
as if the Alevis’ needs are being satisfied, but the aim is to integrate the Alevis 
into the monotype system (Barış, Appendix Part B, Table 1).   
 According to Lale from Halk Evleri:  
Problems related to suppressed rights is in harmony with the 
neoliberal regime. The neoliberal regime has a strategy to integrate 
suppressed groups into the system. For instance, in Turkey, by 
providing a democratic image for their Alevi initiative, the aim is to 
discipline people into believing in the Alevi belief and to integrate 
this disciplined Alevi community into the system. In the same way, 
they are trying to create benign Kurds and they believe that with this 
compliant Kurdish representation, they have an orientation to solve 
the Kurdish problem (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 In contrast to its setbacks in the Alevi and Kurdish openings, the AKP’s 
constitutional amendment package appealed to broad segments of the society. As 
pointed out above, the judiciary still had strength regarding control of 
                                                     
218
 (Demir and Gamm, 2010) 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=vicdan-baykara-speaks-out-on-
alevis-kurds-and-akp-initiatives-2010-10-27 
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legislatives. Therefore, the usage of referendums
219
 by going to the people was, 
indeed, skilfully exploited by the AKP to overcome the conflicts with its 
opponents.  I argue that the AKP, by going to the referendum, consolidated itself 
and legitimized its regime whenever it encountered a challenge that it could not 
tackle by itself. The referendum
220
 of 12
th
 September 2010 was such a move, in 
order to change the constitution with the aim of removing the judiciary’s and the 
military’s control over the government.  
 During its tenure, the AKP regulated the checks and balances of Turkey 
that had been in power in terms of tutelage since 1980s and changed this system 
to its benefit. In addition, the existing problems that originated from this tutelage 
not only concerned the main electorate of the AKP, but also the left and right 
groups who had greatly suffered under military interventions. Therefore, the 
referendum package was supported by the MHP’s idealist base (ülkücü) 
(especially in Central Anatolia) and from liberal-left civil society organization 
(Ete et al., 2011, p.11).
221
   
           With the approval of the constitutional changes presented to the 
referendum on 12 September 2010, the AKP not only stabilized its position, but 
also removed the final obstacles that came from the tutelage of the historical 
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 In 2007, the AKP took the issue of the direct election of the president by nationwide voting 
(the two-round system) to referendum and presented it as part of its democratisation agenda to 
both the EU and liberals. 
220
 In addition, it is noteworthy that the AKP’s referendum attempts began after the consolidation 
of economy and continuity of its social policies. Therefore, the AKP seemed to have drawn 
lessons from the past. By giving priority to social policies and economy, it kept its target 
population on its side. Its achievements in governance, economy and social policies were the 
source of its political strength, and to lesser degree also its rights-discourse. They also accounted 
for the continuity of its electoral victories. Hence, the answer to my research question lies within 
the AKP’s strong governance and success in its socio-economic policies. 
221
  Detailed analysis of voter behaviour shows that the AK Party received support from  non-AK 
Party voters, from the MHP’s idealist (ülkücü) base (especially in central Anatolia), and from 
liberal-left civil society organizations, which do not consider CHP as a truly “left” option 
(Economist, 2010b). 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/09/turkeys_constitutional_referendum 
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bloc. In addition, the AKP used a remarkably pragmatic strategy to appeal to the 
those people who had been aggrieved during the military intervention of 1980. 
First of all, the referendum date coincided with the date of the military 
intervention: 12
th
 September 1980 was the date of the intervention and 12
th
 
September 2010 was the referendum that aimed to remove the military tutelage 
and to amend the constitution of 1982 that the military junta had imposed.  
             The AKP used different types of pragmatic strategies in order to get the 
societal support it needed in attaining its goals. Thus, until 2006, the AKP 
supported the EU membership, and that helped the AKP government introduce 
amendments into the MGK legislation with the great support that the liberals 
provided. After its consolidation, however, the EU reforms became scanty and 
the AKP blamed the halt in the EU reforms and membership negotiations on the 
EU countries (Avcı, 2011, p.417). This time, the AKP obtained, through the 
above explained strategy, the public support that was required for getting control 
of the judiciary.  
 The interviewees also referred to this strong pragmatic and marketing 
side of the AKP during the 2010 Referandum. Ayşe from the CHP women 
branch asserted that the AKP is able to read political situations very well. She 
added that, even though the AKP did not suffer from the 12th September 1980 
military intervention, the AKP winked at both the nationalist idealists and 
nationalist socialists before the referrendum for the constitutional amendment by 
exploiting Ahmet Kaya
222
 and people who suffered morally from the military 
intervention of 12th September. She also stressed that the AKP had adopted a 
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 Ahmet Kaya is a famous Kurdish singer who was accussed of singing in front of a poster of 
the PKK and was sentenced to three years in prison.  
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marketing-oriented approach before the referandum. She illustrated how the 
AKP used a variety of social advertisments and created a diversity of posters. 
She also mentioned that the AKP developed different discourses for different 
regions. For instance, while they adopted a nationalist discourse in İstanbul, they 
prepared a completely different slogan for the South-Eastern region to appeal to 
the Kurdish population (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 This pragmatic side of the AKP during the referandum was also brought 
up by a representative of the youth branch of the AKP from the Kadiköy 
neighbourhood:  
For instance, on 4th July 2010, we organized a running competition 
called the ‘Democracy Run’. Hundreds of people ran this race. At 
the beginning of the Democracy Run, we wrote the starting date as 
12th September, 1980, (the date of the military intervention) and the 
final date as 12th September 2010 (the referandum date). At the final 
point, we also prepared a ballot box for the referandum and after 
finishing the race, each participant had to vote yes or no for the 
referandum. After the competition, we counted the votes in the ballot 
box and the number of yes votes was the majority (Faruk, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1). 
 
 After its consolidation, the AKP preferred to regulate the checks and 
balances existing in Turkish politics by means of yet another referendum, i.e., 
the referendum of 12 September 2010. It is, therefore, argued that the AKP made 
use of these steps towards democratization in order to intensify its own power 
and, for this reason; was keen on receiving broad public support (Ulugay, 2012, 
p.118). Through the use of this opportunistic strategy, the AKP first eradicated 
the military tutelage and then consolidated its political position (Ulugay, 2012, 
p.118).  
 The referendum package was prepared in such a way that it involved 
changes in the structure of the AM, the HSYK,  the yargıtay  (supreme court) 
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and the danıştay (council of the state), giving them access of the AKP 
government. The president Abdullah Gül, who had been one of the founders of 
the AKP, now had the authority to determine the compositions of these judiciary 
bodies to a great extent. The AKP had cleverly designed the referendum 
package: the clauses providing the AKP almost absolute authority over the 
judiciary were cleverly disguised under amendments such as the items aiming at 
further democratization, compliance with European legislation, and lifting the 
protection of the coup leaders of 1980. Given the AKP had already executive 
power, the judiciary elections were also linked to the president’s, hence the AKP 
government’s appraisal. Consequently, the AKP obtained, through the 
referendum, the nearly limitless authority that it had been striving for all the 
time. The marketing and propaganda performance during the referendum not 
only further consolidated the AKP’s political position, but also provided a good 
starting point for the next parliamentary elections held on June 12, 2011 (Avcı, 
2011, p.418).   
           The parliamentary elections of June 12, 2011, resulted for the third time 
in a successive row in the victory of the AKP that additionally achieved to 
increase its percent of vote from 46.7% in the parliamentary elections of 2007 to 
49.8%. This rather impressive achievement, however, was not sufficient to 
provide to the AKP the 2/3 majority
223
 of the seats in the parliament.  
 The parliamentary elections of 2011 were, in a sense, the end point of the 
rather long and consistent course of consolidation of the AKP. It had by then 
gathered all three (executive, legislative and judiciary) powers under its 
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 Thus, the AKP with 327 seats was slightly short of the necessary number of 330 to propose 
constitutional changes to a referendum alone (Duman, 2011). 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=74894 
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authority, and this fact was confirmed once again by the results of these 
elections.  In short, the AKP cleverly exploited the issues of human rights and 
democratization in attaining its political aims. However, the way it acted in the 
course of its ruling period, and its discourse and actions that frequently changed 
according to the circumstantial requirements, raised doubts about its sincerity 
over these fundamental issues and/or its ability to make corresponding 
amendments.  
5.4 The Role of the Global Muslim Network (Gülen Movement) on the 
AKP’s Political Success 
 The Gülen Movement is considered to be one of the global Muslim 
networks that is active in an area extending from Kenya to Kazakhstan and 
beyond with emphasis on “the service to the common good” (Stourton, 2011).224 
It is also argued that the Gülen Movement and the AKP (both possessing 
socially conservative values based on Sunni Islam) have been in an alliance of 
“convenience or symbiotic coexistence during the AKP’s term in power 
(Armstrong, 2012).
225
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 (Stourton, 2011)  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361 
Gülen Movement is also considered as a Hizmet (services) movement (Kurucan, 2010). 
http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/18724/12/ 
The movement is also distinctive, with its emphasis on education and interfaith dialogue.  
Around the globe, many schools were established. The movement is considered as the Gülen 
Movement since the service movement is initiated by Turkish intellectual and preacher Fethullah 
Gülen (Vural, 2008). 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=144416 
In addition to Gülen schools around the global, the Gülen movement is active in interfaith 
dialogue.  
The Gülen Movement has also activities in other areas such as media, finance and health 
(Zalewski, 2012).  
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2115391,00.html 
225
 (Armstrong, 2012) 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/william-armstrong/temporary-alliance-akp-fethullah-
g%C3%BClen-and-religion-in-turkish-politics 
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 In such a context, it is important to take into consideration the role of the 
Gülen Movement in the AKP’s emergence, successful ruling period and finally 
in its consolidation.  To do this, I first plan to look at the Gülen Movement and 
its relationship with political parties before the AKP in section 5.4.1. Second, I 
demonstrate the Gülen Movement’s role in the AKP’s political success by 
analyzing their common economic and political interests.  
5.4.1 The Gülen Movement: Moderate Islamism   
 The Gülen movement claims to be a moderate Islamist network and 
strictly opposes to radical tendencies. Moreover, it aims to keep good relations 
with the state. Historically, the Gülen Movement became stronger and more 
noticeable after the military intervention of 1980, as the junta adopted the 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis that describes the Turkish identity in connection with 
the Sunni Islam as state ideology (Toprak, 2005, p.179). The Gülen Movement 
thereby emerged as the Islamic movement against religious fundamentalism 
(Gözaydın, 2009, p.1218). 
  In addition, the Gülen Movement, as compared with radical Islamic 
networks, kept a distance from Islamic parties and instead, where political 
advocacy was concerned, preferred to support the centre-right political parties 
such as the ANAP in the 1980s and 1990s (Gözaydın, 2009, p.1218). The 
Movement’s projects were implicitly supported by the Prime Minister Özal who 
was considered to be its sympathizer. Due to its state-backed projects, the 
movement increased its power significantly since 1982: for example, two 
hundred Gülen schools have been opened since 1982 and in addition, university 
of Fatih, hospitals, charities and a television channel (Samanyolu TV) (Park, 
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2008, p.4; Criss, 2011, p.48). The rather impressive expansion of the movement 
abroad is also being followed with awe, admiration or scepticism in Turkey 
(Zalewski, 2012). 
          5.4.2 The Relationship between the AKP and the Gülen Movement 
 As pointed out previously, the RP that advocated the Milli Görüş 
ideology of the 1980s and 1990s and also political Islam did not appeal to the 
Gülen Movement because of its radicalism. In addition, in contrast to the Gülen 
Movement, the RP did not accept global free-market economy as an economic 
and political reality of our time. Hence, the Gülen Movement was not willing to 
support the RP. Indeed, in the 1990s, it was only the Gülen Movement that 
advocated the pro-globalization and moderate Islam (Kuru, 2005, p.265). Later, 
when the AKP was established according to the principles of globalization and 
moderate Islam, the Gülen Movement became its natural supporter. 
 The troika of Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç was 
considered as the reformist branch of the FP or in Kuru terms, it symbolized the 
group of late Milli Görüş members226 (the reformist group which came close to 
the Gülen Movement) (Kuru 2005: 272).  This relationship became more 
obvious when this troika began to participate in the Abant Workshops
227
 that 
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 Kuru considers that the Islamic movements had different tendencies. The RP initially had 
close ties with another Islamic movement called the Nakşibendi Order and later developed the 
Milli Görüş Movement. The Milli Görüş Movement itself went through an evolutionary phase in 
the late 1990s. The troika is considered to belong to the late Milli Görüş Movement, according to 
Kuru. They do not advocate radical views as the Milli Görüş Movement. In a sense, this 
reformist group has adopted the pragmatic side of the Gülen Movement (Kuru, 2005, p.272). 
227
 There is a foundation called the GYV (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Derneği - Journalists and 
Writers’s Foundation). Since 1994, the GYV organizes events promoting love, tolerance and 
dialogue. Under the GYV, there are six platforms which are Abant Platform, Intercultural 
Dialogue Platform; Dialogue Eurasia Platform, Medialog Platform and Women’s Platform 
(GYV, 2011). 
http://www.gyv.org.tr/Hakkimizda/Detay/19/About%20the%20Foundation# 
Abant Platform: The Abant Platform was established in order to discuss dogmatic issues which 
have not been discussed in Turkish political life. Throughout this platform, the main principle is 
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were organized by the Gülen Movement (Kuru, 2005, p.272).  In addition to 
them, another platform of interactive dialogues was the Zaman Gazetesi, the 
newspaper of the Movement (Kuru, 2007, p.145). 
The shift from the Milli Görüş to the Nur Movement mostly occurred 
after the post-modern coup d’état of 28th February 1997.  The military 
intervention thus caused a transformation within the Milli Görüş Movement. The 
emerging movement moved away from the anti-globalization and strict Islamist 
stance and assumed a more pragmatic and “mild Islamist” approaches that also 
approved market economy. In a sense, the 28th February intervention gave way 
to a significant change in the mindset of the Islamic movement in Turkey by 
leading it towards a milder stance that became open to contemporary economic 
concepts, such as globalization and market economy (Kuru, 2005, p.273). 
  Although the Gülen Movement itself was negatively affected by the 
military’s post-modern coup d’état, it remained at the side of the state, hence the 
military. Therefore, it was greatly distanced from the Islamist party. In addition, 
the Gülen Movement always advocated interfaith dialogue and had close ties 
with the EU and the USA. It is likely that the Movement’s good international 
connections contributed to the favourable reception of the AKP abroad. The 
Gülen Movement’s support gained further importance after the AKP’s electoral 
victory in 2002. If one wonders how the AKP initiated close ties with the EU 
and the USA, the answer may lie in the Gülen Movement with its pragmatic and 
                                                                                                                                              
based on the democracy’s strengthening throughout “differences being in dialogue”.Throughout 
this Abant platform, various workshops are being organized in order to discuss various topics 
such as the Kurdish problem, Islam and Secularism, military coups (Gulen movement, 2009). 
http://www.fethullahgulenmovement.org/press-room/169-news/3407-abant-platform-coups-are-
greatest-obstacle-to-democratization.html 
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moderate stance and its dialog with the Western world. Thus, an alliance was 
formed between the AKP and the Gülen Movement during the first years of the 
2000’s (Kuru, 2005, p.272). 
 The alliance between the AKP and the Gülen Movement revealed itself 
in many areas: economy, politics and social issues. I look at first their alliance in 
economic issues and then I investigate political ones.  
 First, the Gülen Movement participants have established many 
international business links such as “the TUSKON (Türkiye İş Adamları ve 
Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists); the İŞHAD (İş Hayatı ve Dayanışma Derneği - Association for 
Solidarity in Business Life) and the AGİAD (Anadolu Genç İş Adamları 
Derneği - Anatolian Young Businessmen Association)” (Çelik, 2010b, p.56). 
“Regarding business interests, many commentators suspect a patronage link 
between the AKP government and quite a number of business groups which are 
possessed by the Gülen Movement participants” (Gözaydın, 2009, p.1219). For 
instance, it is claimed that some business groups owned by the movement 
followers have increased their power through the state tenders and privatization 
of state enterprises. The distribution of tenders to the party adherents and/or 
followers of the Gülen Movement are another way of power shift (Stratfor 
Global Intelligence, 2010).
228
 
 Later, in the period preceding the elections of 2007, the Gülen 
Movement’s media outlets (daily Zaman, Bugün and TV stations) (all put out) 
were found of making  propaganda in favour of the AKP government and at the 
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 The close relationship between the Gülen Movement and AKP has served to the vantage of 
the businesses owned by the Gülen followers in state tenders (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2010). 
http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/islam-secularism-and-battle-turkeys-future 
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same time of displaying a hostile attitude towards the opposition parties and the 
military (Gunter and Hakan, 2007, p.293). Hence, the connection between the 
AKP and the Gülen Movement seems to have operated smoothly, as long as it 
addressed the anticipations and interests of both sides. 
Another type of crony capitalism may be seen in the media sector. The 
AKP also consolidated itself in terms of media power. As of 2012, the 
oppositional voices in Turkey were greatly reduced. Media power Doğan 
Holding was accused of having failed to pay appropriately the taxes associated 
with the transactions that took place in 2005 and 2006. Hence, it was urged to 
pay a bulk sum of 4.8 billion TL (3.2 Million$) comprising the unpaid tax, the 
fine and default interest in 2009 (Altaylı, 2009).229  In this regard, the high-
ranking official of a holding company, Cem, said that:  
Imagine that the previous president of the TÜSİAD was Arzuhan 
Doğan, who was also a member and a partner of Doğan Holding. 
How can she highlight things she does not approve of while the 
Doğan group is under blockade by the government? (Cem, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1).  
 
From this time on, the secular media seems to have become more silent 
due to financial intimidation. Zaman and other media organs belonging to the 
Movement or other Islamic organizations are, in turn, prospering. The state 
media organizations, such as TRT (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu - 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), themselves are under the control of 
the AKP government and broadcast, in general, programmes that  have a more 
conservative and religious focus.  
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 (Altaylı, 2009)  
http://fr.reuters.com/article/idUKGEE5AO0AS20091125 
330 
 
 Second, their symbiotic alliance revealed itself in various political issues. 
In May 2006, the AKP administration (in response to the EU pressure for 
Turkey to democratize its legal system) amended the criminal code provisions 
regarding views expressed in public speech. With this amendment, Fethullah 
Gülen was exempted from the charges raised against him in 2000.
230
 
 Moreover, an important output of the alliance between the AKP and the 
Movement was the infiltration of ministries and important institutions with 
people who belonged to the Gülen Movement and its social network. The most 
important institutions staffed by people of the Gülen Movement are claimed to 
be the Ministry of Education and the Police (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.129). 
The military’s reaction to the AKP was, in part, due to this infiltration and 
systematic replacement of the secular cadres with the nationalist and Islamist 
groups. Ayşe, the representative of the CHP women branch, also stressed that 
the Gülen Movement has been infiltrating state institutions, at all levels, over the 
past 8 years. (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 Cronyism based on association to the Gülen Movement or other Islamic 
circles became increasingly prevalent in the highest ranks of the state 
bureaucracy after the election of Abdullah Gül the presidential office. As pointed 
out in section 1.9, the constitution of 1982 vests the president with extraordinary 
power such as appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, University 
rectors, Chief Justice, President of Higher Education Council (Criss, 2011, p.47).   
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 The Supreme Court ratified Fethullah Gülen’s acquittal from the charges raised in the 
framework of the anti-terrorism law No.3713 called the TMK (Terörle Mücadele Kanunu – Anti 
Terror Law) (Todays Zaman, 2008). 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-146098-event-of-the-week-renowned-islamic-scholar-gulen-
cleared-of-all-charges.html 
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 Thus, in the period following the elections of 2007, nearly all 
appointments to these supreme ranks of bureaucracy occurred in line with the 
criterion of being a member of an influential Islamic network. This kind of 
appointment procedure that ignored the criterion of merit thus justified the 
concerns originally expressed by the military.  
 In addition, the representative of the Halk Evleri, Lale, argued that, 
through these appointments, the AKP is reshaping state institutions:  
It is the network of cemaat organizations, especially the Fethullah 
Gülen, which has been accomplishing operational roles while 
implementing a transformation in those institutions. Being dependent 
on the AKP and being supported by the AKP, they fulfill their 
operational roles in the media, in the military and, especially, the 
police. So, for instance, in opposition to the military, they have 
constituted an expanded police organization, which is still 
flourishing. In these transformed institutions, security doctrine has a 
primary role .... The media belongs to this structure, the judiciary, 
and the YÖK are in their hands. As a consequence of this new 
structure, the AKP, which used to play the victim and opposition to 
the status quo, now has obtained complete power (Lale, Appendix 
Part B, Table 1).  
 
 The symbiotic relationship between the AKP and the Gülen Movement is 
still on-going, as of beginning of 2012. Ηοwever, the interests of the two seem to 
diverge occasionally and cause in-house confrontations. Such a conflict has 
come to manifestation in the context of the Ergenekon case. The large number of 
the detainees and unusually long pre-trial detention times are attributed to the 
actions of the prosecutors allegedly from the Gülen Movement who aims to 
intimidate secular individuals and to discourage the secular groups and 
organizations in their activities (İnsel, 2009).231 There are, however, also 
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 (İnsel, 2009) 
 http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=932026 
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counter-arguments claiming that such accusations of “the Gülen Movement are 
raised in order to undermine the Ergenekon case” (Doğan, 2012).232  
 Another recent confrontation between the AKP government and the 
Movement broke out, as the state prosecutors who were again allegedly 
members of the Movement called the undersecretary of the MİT (Milli İstihbarat 
Teşkilatı - National Intelligence Unity) to testify over the MİT-PKK  
negotiations. Since the undersecretary was a close associate of the prime 
minister, this call was understood in public opinion as a move directed at the 
prime minister himself (Karaveli, 2012; Arsu, 2012).
233
 The AKP that finally got 
rid of the secular judiciary seems to have to deal now with the judiciary that is 
under the control of the Movement.  
 The question arises as to how the political staffing that took place during 
the AKP’s ten year tenure will be reflected in society in the long-term. Given the 
above mentioned incidents encountered in the course of the Ergenekon and 
Balyoz cases, the Movement is implicated in striving for its own consolidation, 
aside from that of the AKP. In the light of the confrontations that broke out 
between these forces in 2012, it is questionable whether their coalition may last 
long. Of the three forces in Turkey, i.e., the AKP, the Gülen Movement and the 
military (Hürriyet, 2009) the military power seems to have been eliminated as of 
2011.
234
 Hence, in the near future, the share of political power in Turkey will 
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 (Doğan, 2012) 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=044727DCB2D425A
C34975E53055B5510?newsId=270535 
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 (Karaveli, 2012) 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120220A.html 
(Arsu, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/world/europe/turkey-intelligence-chief-must-testify.html 
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 (Hürriyet, 2009) 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=10911934 
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most likely be settled on the basis of the relationship and/or confrontation 
between the Gülen Movement and the AKP.  
 In summary, the AKP and the Gülen Movement have been in co-
existence since the reformist branch of the FP went over to set up the AKP after 
the FP’s closure. Throughout the AKP’s term in power, the AKP and the 
Movement have reciprocally supported each other in both political and 
economic terms. However, as pointed out in previous section 5.3.1.2, the 
military’s power has been in decline since the early 2009 due to Balyoz trials. In 
addition, as a result of referendum of 2010, the AKP has eradicated secular 
judiciary from the state cadres. Currently, the AKP and the Gülen Movement 
have remained as the two main powers. However, their discord on the above 
mentioned issues raises doubts about their long-term co-existence and 
cooperation.       
5.5 Feedback Effect of the AKP’s Ten-Year Tenure into Turkish Society 
and the AKP’s Impact on the Long-term Restructuring of Turkish Party 
System 
 In this section, my aim is to discuss the significance of ten-year tenure of 
the AKP in Turkish society and political party system. In order to engage in such 
a discussion, first there is a need to look at the AKP’s significance at the societal 
level. As pointed out in the contextual chapter, the Turkish political party system 
has evolved in terms of the existing and emerging cleavages since the beginning 
of multi-party system. Therefore, it is important to look at the AKP’s 
entrenchment into the society from the perspective of cleavage structure.   
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 In using this approach, I also demonstrate how the AKP’s policies have 
influenced the existing cleavages in society (e.g. centre-periphery; secular-
Islamist; Kurdish-Turkish; left-right). After looking at changes at societal level, I 
move on to the AKP’s significance at the political party system. My main aim is 
to answer the question of how the AKP may impact on the long-term 
restructuring of Turkish political party system. As mentioned above in chapter 1, 
the party system in Turkey revealed a high level of fragmentation, especially in 
the 1970s and in the 1990s. Given this historical background, my main aim is to 
evaluate whether the AKP is a mould breaker in the Turkish political system and 
whether and how it may impact on the long-term restructuring of the Turkish 
party system. 
5.5.1 The AKP’s Entrenchment into the Society and its Influence on the 
Existing Societal Cleavage Structures  
 In looking at the AKP’s impact on the societal cleavages, I take into 
account the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure that was explained in the 
theoretical framework of the chapter 3. Therefore, I will look at the societal 
changes from four different cleavages structures: state-church; centre-periphery; 
land-industry and owner-worker. 
5.5.1.1 State-Church  
 As mentioned in the theoretical framework, I incorporate state-church 
cleavage into the Turkish context in order to illustrate the division between 
secularists and Islamists/conservatives (or simply anti-secularists). As pointed 
out in the contextual chapter, this division evolved throughout the Turkish party 
history; initially it was based on a division between the ruling elites and the 
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masses. Later on in 1960s and 1970s, the division became distinct as a left-wing 
and right-wing cleavage. After 1990s, the division has emerged in form of a 
cleavage between the secularist and Islamist groups (anti-secularists). The 
AKP’s tenure brought a new dimension to the secularist-Islamist cleavage.  
 Initially, the AKP’s ideological stance has been more moderate than the 
previous Islamists parties such as the RP and the FP. Therefore, as pointed out in 
the contextual chapter 1, the AKP did not get votes as an Islamist political party, 
but more as a centre-right political party. Thus, it did not come out as a product 
of a secular-anti-secular cleavage. On the other hand, the Islamists who used to 
be considered on the excluded or the peripheral side of the society were brought 
by the AKP’s tenure closer to the centre; thus, they obtained access to power in 
almost all levels of the society.  
 The Islamists’ movement to the centre and their progressive discourse 
were perceived by the secularist groups as a threat to their own and the state’s 
existence. Indeed, the secularists assumed an opposing stance towards the 
Islamists, and instead of adopting a more progressive discourse, they adopted a 
more “protectionist, security-based language and more inward-looking” 
(Keyman, 2010, p.325).  
 At the societal level, the Islamists’ integration with the centre and their 
political and social claims began to cause reactions of secularist circles. This 
occurred especially during the presidential elections of 2007. As mentioned in 
5.3, the secularists did not want a president with Islamist background. 
Consequently, in 2007 spring, secular middle classes organized big rallies 
(Cumhuriyet Mitingleri - Republican Rallies) in order to demonstrate their 
336 
 
discontent with the AKP’s candidate for presidency. During the demonstrations, 
the main emphasis was on the threat from the side of the AKP for secular 
lifestyles and the secularity principle of the state. In chapter 4, I explained the 
social bases of the AKP and the CHP. It was seen that most of those who voted 
for the CHP were well-educated individuals. On an occupational basis, they 
worked in specialized sectors such as banking; insurance; law, and/or as medical 
doctors, teachers or university staff.  They participated in the Republican Rallies 
and considered themselves as the middle class who defended their worldview 
(Yavuz, 2009, p.244). 
 The concerns of the secularist circles over the threat towards their life 
style were later to be confirmed on different occasions.  I will here mention 
some typical incidents that disclosed the AKP’s normative stance in this issue 
and in particular point to the alcohol issue, because it symbolizes the dispute 
between the secularists and Islamists the positions of both sides. 
 Most AKP’s members apparently do not drink alcohol; they fulfil their 
religious obligations.
235
 Concerning the lifestyle aspects, they have more in 
common with the members of the previous Islamist political parties of 1990s, 
such as the RP and the FP.  
            In course of its tenure, the AKP’s own understanding of everyday life 
came to manifestation on several occasions. Thus, after its consolidation in 
2007, the party was more self-confident and expressed freely its opinion on 
different issues of life style and made persistently attempts of intervention, e.g., 
on alcohol consumption. While the AKP administration initially expressed its 
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 They fast during the Ramadan; they pray regularly each day. Compared with the members of 
the previous centre-right governments, they use this Muslim discourse with more emphasis 
337 
 
opinion on this issue carefully and, in general, in pretext of its concerns on the 
public health, the AKP members were more direct. But in the course of time, the 
party leadership also assumed a normative attitude.
236
 
 After the AKP’s consolidation in 2007, attacks towards secular lifestyle 
(e.g., alcohol issue) started first through increases in taxation on alcoholic 
beverages and bureaucratic difficulties raised in issuing alcohol (purchasing) 
licence or permission for recreational places that serve alcohol. These problems 
emerged especially after the AKP-enacted changes in the local government 
legislation in 2008 (Tait, 2008).
237
  Thus, the AKP’s worldview came to 
expression in other areas of life as well. Even though representatives from all 
levels of the AKP asserted that the AKP does not attack anyone’s freedoms and 
worldviews, the interviews I conducted with the representatives of NGOs and 
business people put forward opposite arguments. For instance, the representative 
of the TÜSİAD, Rıza, mentioned that: 
The conservative stance has to be better understood. They (the AKP) 
make implicit comments about individual rights and freedoms. The 
legislation regarding alcohol is worrying. There is no ban. It is said 
that they tolerate people who drink. If you tolerate the other one, this 
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 For illustration, in 2010, the Prime Minister started to make prescriptive suggestions to people 
who drink alcohol (“Instead of drinking wine, they should better eat grapes”) and later on, even 
pejorative remarks about them (based on interview conducted with the representative of SODEV 
(Soner, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
237
 (Tait, 2008) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/16/turkey.islam 
The RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - Radio Television Supreme Council) began to 
control the programmes according to this conservative worldview. For instance, they penalized 
the programmes that emphasized sexuality. Similarly, they censored scenes of old movies that 
involved sexuality. They blurred the images of smoking from the scenes or they put a bib voice 
for the swear words. To justify these actions, they made use of the usual argument of the 
conservative political parties: the well-being of children and family structure. Another important 
issue was the regulation of internet usage in 2011 according to which access to web sites were 
restricted based on user types (Vatan, 2008; RTÜK, 2010).  
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/RTUKten_dizi_ve_filmlere_alkol_yasagi__158220_11/158220/11/
Haber#.UIld2G_A9IE 
http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=c38dfe40-f79f-4799-993e-
9006244bcd94 
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means that “you are an infidel; I am not committing a sin”. ... 
However, this statement related to tolerance means that “I am 
tolerating for the time being and this can change over time”. Respect 
is one thing, tolerance is another” (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 In addition to the division between secularist and conservative circles, 
the division also reveals in terms of sectarian division as Alevi-Sunni. As pointed 
out in section 5.3, the AKP has not shown that much of effort’s discourse when 
it comes to the rights for the Alevis. In this case of Alevis, the AKP’s vein on 
Sunni-Islam becomes more prevalent. As explained in the section 5.3, the AKP 
government is not willing to recognize Alevis’ denominational identity rights 
and to turn its positive discourse over Alevis into actions. Hence, its discourse is 
reciprocated by the Alevi community with distrust and accusations of 
insincerity.  A representative of the CHP, referring to the AKP’s stance 
towards the Alevis, argued that the AKP’s dominant view of Islam is the Sunni 
interpretation. Thus, she added that with regards to the Alevi issue, the AKP had 
a standpoint which claims “Of course, we will teach Islam (referring to Sunni 
interpretation of Islam and not Alevi belief) too” (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 
1). A representative from the NGO Halk Evleri, Lale, and a member of the EDP, 
Ferhat, argued that the AKP has not put into practice any of the Alevi demands 
Alevi and not a single result was obtained from the workshop on Alevis” (Lale 
and Ferhat, Appendix Part B, Table 1). Therefore, the alienation of the Alevis 
seems to give rise to a deepening Alevi-Sunni cleavage as well.  
 Thus, during the AKP’s tenure, the division between secularist and 
conservatives circles resulted in polarization among them and deepened the 
existing division. 
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5.5.1.2 Centre-Periphery 
 As mentioned before in the contextual chapter and the theoretical 
framework of chapter 3, the cleavage of Lipset-Rokkan on centre-periphery is 
incorporated into thesis as a Kurdish-Turkish cleavage. Similar to the state-
church, it has changed significantly throughout the Turkish party system. For 
instance, up until 1990s, Kurdish citizens did not develop an identity-based 
discourse and they highlighted left values more than their identity claims. Since 
2000s the Kurds have emphasized more their Kurdish identity rather than left 
values or freedom claims (Keyman, 2010, p.319).   
 During the AKP’s tenure, Kurds and their identity claims have found 
more reception than ever before. Nevertheless, the fact that Kurdish problem has 
not been solved yet and terror acts of the separatist organization PKK have 
steadily increased in intensity and violence have given rise to the emergence of a 
new division in terms of centre-periphery or more specifically in terms of 
Kurdish-Turkish division. Therefore, as pointed out by Kalaycıoğlu and 
Çarkoğlu (2009), the conservatism does not only exist in terms of anti-secular-
secular divide but aside from the secular-anti-secular cleavage due to rising tide 
of conservatism, a new cleavage appears to emerge on the basis of identity 
claims (Keyman, 2010, pp.324-325).
238
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 As a result of this increasingly conservative discourse, at the societal level, Kurdish and 
Turkish identities have become more predominant. Therefore, it is more common that families in 
the West do not prefer to have neighbours coming come from the Eastern Anatolian (Keyman, 
2010, pp.324-325). Similarly, after the death of soldiers because of increasing terrorist attacks of 
the PKK, lynching towards the Kurdish people and demonstrations against Kurdish people have 
become more distinct during the AKP’s tenure. As a result, the conservatism has started to reveal 
itself not only in terms of secularists and Islamist, but also in terms of Kurdish and Turkish 
identities. 
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5.5.1.3 Land-Industry 
 Another cleavage in terms of Lipset-Rokkan is the land-industry.
239
 As 
pointed out in the methodology, I looked at this cleavage from Gallagher et al.’s 
point of view (2005). When the AKP’s ten-year tenure is analysed from the 
land-industry cleavage, the AKP has expanded its own capitalists not only the 
Anatolian capitalists but also generally the petty bourgeoisie. As a result, 
previous small tradesmen and merchants (such as Kiler group
240
) have become 
owners of big holdings or corporations. One of my interviewees, Veli, gave the 
example of the Kiler group, which was initially a small retail group and now 
takes part in big tenders, having significantly expanded during the AKP’s ruling 
tenure (Veli, Appendix Part B, Table 1). As a result, the AKP’s tenure has 
resulted in an expansion in new business and capitalist groups. On the other 
hand, the AKP’s tenure has also satisfied the big capital’s needs due to economic 
stability and growth over the last decade. 
5.5.1.4 Employer-Worker   
 The fourth employer-worker cleavage is taken into account as the AKP 
government’s impact on underprivileged social groups in the metropolitan cities. 
As pointed out in 5.2, underprivileged people have benefited significantly from 
the policies in health care system and social assistance. The AKP government 
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 Initially, when I take into land-industry cleavage, I did not take into consideration the land 
side of the cleavage and I focus mostly the industrial and business pressure groups’ impact on 
the AKP. However, it is important to pinpoint the AKP government’s policies on agricultural 
policies.  The AKP government does not seem to have addressed the anticipations of the 
agricultural sector. The farmers complain of high production costs, insufficiency of subsidies and 
exploitation by middlemen. Thus, a land-industry cleavage does exist and lead to diminution of 
the agricultural since this sector does not dispose over sufficiently powerful pressure groups to 
affect the public opinion and to impose its demands (Aysu, 2012). 
http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/130329-tarimda-akp-gercekleri-ve-ciftci-gercekleri 
240
 Kiler group in 2008 obtained an important tender and it got involved in construction sector 
too (Sabah, 2008). 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/04/25/haber,67B1E3F96CE741A380E94CC6AC6C9164.html 
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has cleverly concealed through these policies the effects of its neoliberal 
economic agenda that has in general resulted in deterioration of workers’ rights. 
What has been said above in 5.2.1 in the context of female employment holds 
also for male labour force which is often compelled to work in temporary jobs 
under unsecure conditions and without social security. The workers seem to be 
helpless against this neoliberal regime, due to the inability of the trade unions 
that have been systematically intimidated and attenuated over the last three 
decades. Since this issue does not lie within the scope of my research I do not go 
further in detail. Here, I want to confine myself to a very recent analysis of how 
Islamist and neoliberal worldviews appear to be reconciled by the Anatolian 
capital (Boratav, 2012).
241
 Thus, devout, hard-working and parsimonious 
employers have become role models for their workers inculcating them to 
devotion, loyalty and resignation (to God) (tevekkül). Nevertheless, this relation 
seems to be increasingly constrained due to opposition of these devout workers 
against being exploited by their employers.     
 In summary, in terms of state-church cleavage, the AKP’s ten-year 
tenure has brought Islamists/conservatists to the centre and marginalized 
secularist circles. Due to the AKP’s intervention into secularists’ lifestyles, the 
existing polarization between secularists and Islamists has intensified. This 
polarization in turn has resulted in the segregation of people, according to their 
life styles in their own communities. Hence, as Ağırdır (2010) stated each person 
has started to live in its own aquarium without interacting with others.
242
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 (Boratav, 2012) 
 http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=akp-isci-sinifindan-nasil-oy-aliyor-0809121200 
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  (Ağırdır, 2010)  
http://t24.com.tr/yazi/bizim-akvaryum/2668 
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Similarly, the division between Kurds and Turks has also become stronger and 
led to a similar kind of segregation. This preference according to worldview 
and/or ethnicity reduces the chance of multiculturalism and pluralism in the 
society. In terms of land-industry, it is clear that AKP has preferred to prioritize 
the latter. As a natural consequence of its neoliberal policies, the AKP has 
assumed a similar attitude also in employer-worker divide. The last two 
cleavages presently remain latent, but may intensify and become sources of new 
conflicts in case of a future setback in the pursued neoliberal economic policies.  
5.5.2 AKP’s Impact on the Long-term Restructuring of Turkish Party 
System 
 In the above, I have tried to show the AKP’s main feedback effect in four 
main cleavages of Turkish society. In this section, I discuss how strong the 
AKP’s impact on the long-term restructuring of the party system may be. To 
undertake such an analysis, first I discuss the current party system in Turkey, 
given that it displayed a high level of fragmentation in the past decades 
(Özbudun, 2000, p.77). Then, I draw attention to continuity that I consider as the 
main requirement for a long-term path to a competitive party system. Provided 
that this condition is fulfilled, I discuss potential dynamics (e.g. the changes in 
the main opposition party CHP) in order to make hypotheses for the long-term 
structure of the party system.   
 First, as pointed out in chapter 1, the AKP has consolidated itself in 
legislations of 2007 and 2011. As a consequence, its electoral success in 2011 
has led to a two-bloc system, with the AKP garnering 49.5% of the votes on one 
side and the remaining three parties on the opposing side, namely the secular 
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CHP (25.9% of the votes); the right-nationalist MHP (12.9% of the votes) and 
the Independent
243
 deputies as representatives of the Kurdish Movement 
(account for 6.58% of vote). Thus, the fragmented parliamentary system of 
1990s that could only function by formation of coalition governments, has 
transformed into a single-dominant party system (Sayarı, 2007; Çarkoğlu, 2011). 
In addition, there has been a marked shift in ideology towards the right of the 
spectrum (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu, 2009, pp.91-92). 
 This two-fold party system has started initially in 2007, and seems to be 
stabilised with the legislative elections of 2011. Regarding long-term 
restructuring of the party system, the interventions into political relations have to 
be taken into account. As previously pointed out, the Turkish party system has 
witnessed three military interventions, one post-modern memorandum and an e-
memorandum. These interventions have disrupted the evolution of Turkish 
political party system. For instance, the emergence of the ANAP in 1983 was 
linked to banned parties of 1970s, and it was an intermediary solution in the 
transition to democratic system. Indeed, it did not manage to survive long after 
the establishment of the parliamentary regime.  
 The AKP’s emergence in turn was the outcome of the transition period 
following the post-modern coup d’état of 1997. In addition to this background, 
given Lipset-Rokkan’s emphasis (1967, p.2)244 on continuity of parties, parties 
obtained the opportunity to compete freely at the parliamentary level only if 
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 It is important to mention that the independent deputies as representatives of the Kurdish 
movement are elected as independent deputies in order to bypass the 10% electoral barrier 
(Cagaptay et al., 2011, p.6). After they are elected as independent deputies, they take their 
political party positions. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote15.pdf 
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 “Parties do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizen at each election; they each 
have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate” 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.2). 
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there was no external intervention into politics. In this competitive system, then, 
the party which best achieves the needs of the society becomes the main party. 
The AKP itself has become a mould breaker within the Turkish party system 
because it managed to terminate the period of coalition governments with its 
electoral victory in 2002. Secondly, having made the best out of the chance 
provided by this electoral victory, the AKP consolidated its position in the 
subsequent legislative elections, thanks to its accomplishments during its tenure.  
However, its impact on long-term restructuring will depend on the continuity of 
party system. Therefore, given that this condition of continuity is fulfilled, I 
draw attention to dynamics on the main oppositional party.  
 Even though the AKP has consolidated its electoral power in legislative 
elections of 2011, some dynamics have also occurred on the opposition side, 
especially on the CHP (Economist, 2011).
245
 Since 2009/2010, there have been 
changes in the CHP in terms of its institutional framework (e.g. the party leader 
has changed; the party code was amended in order to enhance intra-party 
democracy on 4
th
 April 2012) (Ulugay, 2012; Celep, 2010; Radikal, 2012).
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 (Economist, 2011) 
http://www.economist.com/node/18774786 
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 Under the leadership of previous leader Deniz Baykal (who was the president of the party 
from 2000 up to 2010 May), the CHP could not develop a convincing discourse for the AKP’s 
target electorate (Ulugay, 2012, pp.93-94). The CHP took a position close to the military, the 
constitutional Court or the judiciary that are opting to protect the secularism and their lifestyles.  
In addition, in the previous CHP, the CHP defended its own view with an archaic ideology; 
kemalism which was used for the modernization of the Turkey in the 1920s. They considered 
that they needed another Atatürk to save the secularists from these problems or they need 
another war of independence (which was done against the Imperialist powers) (Ulugay, 2012, 
pp.94-95). This explains why the CHP failed to win the hearts and minds of the people that asked 
mainly for solutions to poverty and unemployment. Therefore, the CHP failed to expand its 
electorate more than its own social basis (educated; intermediary strata formed mostly by white 
collars). 
(Celep, 2010) 
http://setadc.org/policy-briefs/253-kilicdaroglus-chp-what-lies-ahead 
(Radikal, 2012) 
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 In addition to an institutional opposition, there is a need for a grass-roots 
opposition. As of 2012
247
, such an opposition does not exist, but some protests in 
the society give these oppositional signals. In this context, a representative of the 
Halk Evleri, Lale, points out that:  
All the groups that are in opposition, such as the working class, 
labour, poor and unprivileged social segments, democrats, 
communists and so on... Throughout this period, these people have 
grown in number and gained ability to act in an effective way in 
order to oppose what is happening.  At the moment, this opposition 
is very fragmented and weak. However, Turkey’s social opposition 
has been slowly flourishing. Hence, the AKP, which represents a 
coalition between the market-based economy and reactionary 
politics, is facing a serious public opposition. Even though it is 
invisible, ... the AKP... has now seriously authoritarian tendencies. It 
does not hesitate to use fascist practices. Moreover, measures that 
the AKP has used so far to direct the society have also begun to 
weaken. ... Another example; when they go to demolish the house of 
a person who voted for the AKP, who is pious and conservative... As 
a consequence, he can come against his political party which he used 
to vote for, against Tayyip Erdogan who he used to admire. These 
transitions can be incredibly fast (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1). 
 
 Since 2010, the AKP has adopted a more authoritarian approach; as 
compared to 2002, it has lost to a great extent the support of liberal intellectual 
(Birch, 2012).
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 The trials of Ergenekon, Balyoz, KCK (Kürdistan Topluluklar 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1080002&Categor
yID=78 
(CHP, 2012)  
http://chpbrussels.org/2012/04/04/turkish-news-folder-4-april-2012/ 
247
 Protests started on 28th May 2013 in order to demonstrate opposition against the urban 
development plan for İstanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park. However, the peaceful protesters who were 
occupying the park, were attacked by the police on 31st May in the early morning. Subsequently, 
police’s outrageous attacks on the peaceful protesters sparked the Taksim Gezi Park protest. 
Thus, supporting protests and strikes took place accross Turkey by protesting a wide range of 
concerns which were mostly freedom of press, freedom of expression, freedom of assemby and 
the government’s instrusion in every aspect of life, especially on the secular life styles.  Police’s 
use of excessive force through tear gas and water cannon continued till 11th June. As a result, 4 
people were killed, many of them injured. Over three thousand were arrested and many were 
kept in custody. 
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 (Birch, 2011) 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62831 
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Birliği - Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan)249 and the imprisonment of 
journalists and academics raises critique in both national and international media 
because the AKP is suspected of being involved in these trials. Hence, the AKP 
is held responsible for the problems, e.g., long and apparently unjustified 
detentions, disorders in trial proceedings, associated with these trials (Tisdall, 
2012).
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 In this context, thus far, as a highly empowered government party, the 
AKP has not shown much willingness to get in a cooperative dialogue with the 
opposition groups including the civil society organizations. Rather, it is being 
criticized for ignoring and looking down on them, and, moreover, of assuming 
an increasingly authoritarian attitude (Koplow and Cook, 2012).
251
 
 In this context, it appears rather difficult for the opposition parties to 
compete presently with the AKP. Nevertheless, in a democratic and competitive 
political party system, an opposition party (e.g., the main opposition party, the 
CHP or any party in the long-term) that inspires with its projects, policies and 
actions confidence in the electorate may offer a serious challenge even to a 
powerful party such as the AKP.  
 Regarding the establishment of an oppositional group in Turkey, Zafer 
considers the issue from a demand and supply mechanism and argues that:   
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 KCK trials   
(Önderoğlu, 2010) 
 http://bianet.org/english/english/122260-kurdish-initiative-continues-120-detentions 
250
 (Tisdall, 2012) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/25/turkey-sledgehammer-coup-trial-verdict 
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 (Koplow and Cook, 2012) 
On the contrary to its initial discourse, it has started using a similar discourse as its Kemalist 
opponents, since it consolidated its institutional structure. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137754/michael-j-koplow-and-steven-a-cook/the-turkish-
paradox 
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When will the AKP lose its power? ...  When the AKP fails in 
fulfilling the ideological needs of its main constituency, it will lose 
its ruling tenure. It will happen. Let me tell you this. I don’t know at 
which election but this will happen. Then, the real opposition will 
emerge at that time because it will begin to criticize the things that 
the AKP did; it will... ask them “why did you do less? why don’t you 
expand freedom? Why don’t you further negotions with the EU?” 
When a political party starts to criticize the AKP’s policies because 
of the insufficiency of the AKP’s policies, then a real oppositional 
party will emerge. So, there is no need to look at the political parties 
but, there is a need to look at the aspirations of the society (Zafer, 
Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 
 The AKP is still being guided and dominated by its party leader Tayyip 
Erdoğan. Even though the AKP’s organizational structure is strong, the absence 
of such an almighty leader will be likely to create a vacuum that will not be so 
easily filled. The authoritarian structure and lack of pluralism have so far 
hindered the emergence of new leadership candidates in the AKP (Yavuz, 2009, 
pp.102-103). The interviews with representatives from different ranks of the 
AKP stressed specifically Tayyip Erdoğan’s charisma. Among them, it is 
important to look at the statement of a member of the AKP from the youth 
branch in order to realize the importance of the leader factor:  
I don’t think that the AKP will continue after the prime minister. As 
a matter of fact, all levels of the party, such as the main branch, 
district, provinces, everything happens with the statements of the 
prime minister. As soon as the prime minister says something, things 
begin to work. In fact, everything depends on him. He directs 
everything in a greatly planned way. He guides things in districts and 
provinces. His strong eloquent skills also help him to guide people. 
In addition, he can mobilize young people with even one statement. 
For instance, 1 minute after the event, young people became agitated 
and went to the airport to welcome him after the meeting in Davos
252
 
(Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).   
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 Davos incident: In 2009, at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Prime Minister Erdogan 
had an angry exchange over the Gaza War with Israeli President Shimon Peres. During the panel 
discussion, the moderator favoured Mr. Peres’ remarks about the Israeli military campaign in 
Gaza. Thus, Erdogan said “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill” to Peres and 
afterwards, he walked out in anger.  
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 Similarly, Veli argues that the prime minister has all the power. For 
instance, if a minister is not successful, then he does not add him to the 
candidacy list. Veli says that there is an immense pressure on AKP members 
from the Prime Minister (Veli, Appendix Part B, Table 1).  
 In summary, given that there is no more intervention, the long-term 
restructuring of party system may not be based solely on the AKP but also on the 
performance of the rest of parties. In a competitive environment ensured by the 
continuity of the parliamentary system, any party that comes up with some 
projects offering better solutions to the needs of the society has the chance of 
challenging the government party, in our case the AKP. Aside from a small 
segment that votes out of ideological considerations, the majority of the Turkish 
electorate seems to have the ability to identify the appropriate party addressing 
its anticipations and needs and mostly addressing their economic expectations 
(Başlevent and Akarca, 2010). In a competitive party system, external shocks 
like economic crises, increasing terror acts or social dynamics originating from 
the existing cleavages may any time strain even a dominant party and let the 
electorate look for other alternatives. The continuity of the political party system 
is here the prerequisite for finding proper solutions to problems. 
5.6 Conclusion of the Chapter  
 In chapter 5, I have tried to answer my research question related to the 
AKP’s consolidation in both the legislative elections of 2007 and 2011. In order 
to answer this question, I have first taken into account the social policies of the 
AKP in three main areas: woman and gender policies; social assistance and 
health care policies. The woman and gender policies appeared to be of 
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importance in order to examine whether and how the AKP reconciled the 
policies for increasing female employment with its neoliberal agenda and social 
conservatism. In this approach, I did not want to demonstrate the women’s 
contribution to the AKP’s consolidation, but to provide the main characteristics 
which have underpinned the AKP’s projects and legislative regulations 
regarding female employment. Nevertheless, I have come to the conclusion that 
these policies have so far encouraged employment in flexible, unsecure and 
female-dominated job occupations. This seems to be in line with the AKP’s 
worldview that the primary site of the woman is her family and the primary task 
that of motherhood.  
 Then, I chose two important policy areas: social assistance and health 
care services. In social assistance, important legislatives were accepted such as 
the SYGM’s new institutional framework. I first explained these legislatives 
related to social assistance, but then I provided a critical appraisal of the 
clientelistic side of the activities of the foundations established under the general 
directorate. The activities of the SYGM have reached. In this scheme, as I found 
out, the AKP’s projects on social assistance find a broad appreciation of the 
electorate. The drawbacks of their clientelist side do not mean much for the 
voters, since what counts for them is the fulfilment of their needs.  
 As with social assistance, the AKP has implemented important 
improvements in health care by unifying, standardizing and extending the health 
care services. These regulations have satisfied the majority of society, since they 
attained for the first time access to efficiently provided health care services. The 
achievements in both social assistance as well as health care directly addressed 
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the needs of broad segments of society, and thus contributed to the AKP’s 
electoral victories in 2007 and 2011. 
 In addition to the projects above, the AKP’s pro-EU stance and its 
emphasis on fundamental rights and freedom also appealed to different segments 
in society, in particular in its first tenure period. As a result, the AKP received 
the support of both liberal circles and deprived groups such as Kurds, Christian 
minorities and conservative people that felt discriminated by the state. The 
AKP’s stance before the military on the occasion of the e-memorandum was also 
greatly appreciated by the majority of society. However, the AKP’s efforts 
towards democratization and improvements in human rights and freedom did not 
produce a great breakthrough. In terms of its impact on the AKP’s consolidation 
in 2007, the party’s commitment in these issues was still minor, as compared to 
the impact of its economic performance and its concrete social projects. 
  On the other hand, the AKP’s call for the referendum for constitutional 
amendments received the support of again various ideological groups (e.g. 
religious; nationalist and left). As a result, the constitutional package was 
accepted in September 2010 by the majority of society. In addition, this success 
in referendum resulted in a positive feedback for the legislative elections of 
2011. However, as with the legislative elections of 2007, the decisive factors of 
the electoral victory were again economic economy, health care reform and 
social assistance projects. Thus, it can be asserted that without the socio-
economic achievements, the AKP would have not consolidated its tenure during 
the last decade.  
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 From the very beginning on, the AKP had two powerful supporters with 
which it was in a close relationship of mutual benefit. The first of these was the 
Anatolian capital that prospered further with the help of the pursued neoliberal 
economic policies and powerful economic growth of the country. It remained the 
AKP’s closest and most faithful ally throughout its tenure. The other supporter 
was the Gülen Movement, and I now analyse the role of the Gülen Movement on 
the AKP’s consolidation. Since the AKP’s emergence, the Gülen Movement has 
become an increasingly important force within Turkish politics. The Gülen 
Movement seems to have initially helped the AKP in setting up its relations with 
the Western world: the EU and the USA. Subsequently, a close symbiotic 
relationship developed between the AKP and the Gülen Movement, both of 
which shared similar views in terms of neoliberal free-market economy and 
globalization and advocated a moderate version of Islam. Moreover, although 
never openly declared, many influential AKP members were at the same time 
members of the Gülen Movement. This tight interrelationship allowed the 
companies from the Gülen Movement to have an ever greater share of state 
tenders and the Movement, to systematically infiltrate into the bureaucracy, 
police and judiciary. However, this relationship has recently shown serious ups 
and downs. Thus, the question arises as to what may come out of this co-
existence, of the common interests of the two no longer match.  
 After discussing the consolidation of the AKP in both 2007 and 2011 
legislative elections, I attempted to answer another research question related to 
the AKP’s feedback effect into the society. From the perspective of cleavage 
structures, the AKP has influenced Turkish society in many aspects. First of all, 
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the AKP has steadily prioritized conservative circles, displaced the secular 
elements out of the bureaucracy and thus marginalized the secularist segments of 
the society. This process has become distinct, especially since its second tenure 
(2007-2011). In addition, the AKP which used to conceal its conservative 
worldview has started to intervene in a secularist life style. These interventions 
have deepened polarization within society, and considerably hardened the 
(secular-Islamist) cleavage fronts. A similar cleavage exists as the Alevi-Sunni 
cleavage because of the AKP’s persistence in denial of the Alevi demands for 
recognising and granting their confessional rights. Aside from this division 
between secularists and anti-secularists, the Kurdish identity claims have 
become louder, not least due to a failed Kurdish initiative of the AKP 
government. The secessionist terror activities that have gained in intensity have 
caused, if not a polarization, at least alienation between Kurds and Turks. In 
economic terms, as aforementioned, the AKP has developed its own capitalist 
class and economic pressure group keeps supporting it. On the other hand, the 
AKP and the big secular metropolitan capital seem to tolerate each other, despite 
their distance, simply because of their mutual dependence. Lastly, regarding 
employer and worker relationship from the perspective of Lipset’s deprivation 
hypothesis, the AKP’s projects have satisfied the needs of underprivileged 
people. As a result, the AKP has satisfied majority’s needs and thus of its target 
electorate thereby ensuring its electoral victories of 2007 and 2011.  
 As for the AKP’s impact on the long-term restructuring of party system, I 
argue that the AKP presently brought the dominant party system in Turkey. The 
long-term restructuring of the party system requires the continuity of the 
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presence of competing parties. However, due to the Turkish party system’s 
experience with military interventions; a competitive party system has not yet 
evolved properly in Turkey. Therefore, if the present party system is given this 
chance, it will very likely come to a state to appropriately translate the needs, 
anticipations and demands of the different fractions of society.  
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Conclusion                      
 This research has set out to investigate the emergence and consolidation 
of the AKP and its significance in the Turkish political party system and society, 
and has aimed to answer the five core research questions. Among them, first, 
this research attempted to answer the question related to what changes in 
structures of Turkish society elucidate the emergence and electoral success of 
the AKP in 2002. Second, it aimed to answer the question related to the 
contribution of long, medium and short-term economic factors on the rise of the 
AKP. Third, the thesis attempted to answer the question on how political 
conjuncture of the early 2000s helps the AKP to succeed electorally in 2002. 
Fourth, the aimed to answer the question regarding the impact of the 
establishment of the AKP in Turkish politics as an indicator long-term 
restructuring of the Turkish party system. Fifth, I attempted to find answers the 
research question on whether the entrenchment of the AKP in Turkish politics 
since 2002 represented a shift from secularism towards conservatism and 
religion in Turkey.  
 These research questions have been answered in chapters 1, 4 and 5 in 
order to examine the reasons behind the AKP’s emergence in 2002 and the 
consolidation of its regime in 2007. I have also analysed the significance of 
these developments for Turkish society and the party system. 
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What changes in the structures of Turkish society explain the emergence 
and electoral success of the AKP? 
This question is dealt with in Chapter 4. I investigate how the changes in 
the country’s social structure have occurred as a consequence of the economic 
restructuring and developments and in turn have affected politics; more 
specifically voting patterns. 
My investigation found that the main changes in Turkish society 
occurred after the 1990s due to the sharp decline in occupations related to 
agriculture (the rural exodus towards towns and cities) and due to the significant 
increase in the services sector, mostly in categories related to crafts, trades and 
sales. Those who entered these specific categories became part of what may be 
termed as intermediary social strata. Thus, the main evolution in social structure 
before the AKP period occurred in relation to these intermediary strata.  
Furthermore, the economic circumstances of early 2001 (e.g. severe 
economic crises of 2000 and 2001) impacted adversely on the living standards of 
these intermediary strata. Therefore, the AKP’s promises on economic stability; 
growth and integration into the global economic order (mostly the European 
one) attracted these strata in particular.  
From my findings I would conclude that the AKP did not come to power 
due to its Islamic roots but because of its promises of economic stability.  
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To what extent did long, medium and short-term economic factors 
contribute to the rise of the AKP? 
This question was dealt in chapters 1 and 4. In examining the evolution 
of Turkish economy over time, I found that medium-term economic factors 
(between 1980 and 2002), aided the rise of the AKP significantly. During this 
period, economic reforms were aimed at liberalization of the country’s economy 
through adoption of free-market and export-driven policies that were. These 
policies served the burgeoning Anatolian capitalists who constituted a powerful 
group and became an important source of financial support for political Islam. 
Thus, economic reforms in the medium term contributed to the rise of the AKP.  
Furthermore, the economic conjuncture of the early 2000s may be 
regarded as crucial when one analyses the impact of short-term economic factors 
on the AKP’s electoral success in 2002. The findings of this study reveal that the 
severe economic crises of 2000 and 2001 were main trigger factors leading to 
the electoral victory of the AKP. Moreover, the economic improvements which 
have taken place during the AKP’s tenure (2002-2011) have been analysed in 
order to explain the consolidation of the AKP in 2007 and in 2011.  
As for its consolidation, the AKP made the best out of its first electoral 
victory in 2002. It implemented the economic programme that the previous 
government had launched and thereby displayed fiscal discipline and efficient 
governance. This policy resulted in the decline of chronic inflation and also in 
significant economic growth and stability that proved to be sustainable over the 
next few years and, moreover, resistant to global economic crises.   
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To what extent did the political conjuncture of the early 2000s help the AKP 
to succeed electorally in 2002? 
 This question was dealt with in Chapter 1. In order to answer it, it was 
necessary to explore the roots of the AKP within Turkish society and the party 
system. Thus, the period from 1923 to the emergence of the AKP in 2002 was 
analysed in order to explain how the development of Islamist movements and 
parties in Turkey resulted in the emergence of the AKP.  
A vital incident during the development of Islamist parties and the 
Turkish party system in general is the military intervention of the 1980s and the 
neo-liberal economic policies which had at that time been deliberately advised 
by Turkey’s western allies as measures against the advance of the Communist 
Block. Hence the military intervention suppressed left-wing and labour 
movements, imposed an anti-democratic constitution and promoted political 
Islam as a remedy against the apparent communist threat in the country.   
The rise of political Islam was represented by the RP, which steadily 
increased its electorate, not the least by getting access to lower, once left-
orientated, strata of society which by then comprised mainly disadvantaged 
people who had migrated from rural areas to metropolitan cities and who lived in 
squatter areas without fixed employment and social security. In this situation, the 
role and function of the left and the trade union movement, which had not 
recovered from the devastating sequels of the military intervention of 1980, were 
assumed by the RP. Following the RP’s electoral successes, first in the 
municipal elections of 1994 and then in the legislative elections of 1995, the RP 
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came to power, albeit in a coalition government with the centre-right party (the 
DYP), in 1996. 
 However, the post-modern coup of 1997 brought about the end of this 
government and subsequently led to the RP’s closure. As a consequence of post-
modern coup, the Islamist political party was doomed to transform within 
Turkish political arena. Therefore, the post-modern coup and its reflections into 
Turkish politics should be considered as unique case within the Middle Eastern 
region. Therefore, the emergence of the AKP has to be considered within this 
unique case of Turkey with its post-modern coup and its outcomes.  
The post-modern coup produced moderation in the discourse of the 
Islamist parties that emerged in succession to the RP. Moreover, it caused the 
emergence of a still more moderate, reformist group with a pro-western (pro-
EU) stance, discourse of democracy and human rights that also laid emphasis on 
neo-liberal, free market-economics and globalization. This group was strongly 
encouraged by the Anatolian capitalist and Gülen Movement both of which 
advocated the economic policies that the AKP espoused in 2001.  
Once founded, the AKP received not only the support of the Anatolian 
capitalists and the Gülen Movement, but it also inherited to a great extent the 
RP’s electorate and organizational networks. Strong support was also provided 
by opposing groups, i.e. the centre-right electorate on one hand and liberal 
intellectuals on the other hand who hailed the party’s democratic discourse and 
pro-EU stance.  
Thus, a relatively broad segment of the Turkish electorate accepted the 
AKP, despite its Islamist origins, as an actor in the political party system and 
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even brought it to power. The fact that political Islam in Turkey followed the 
rules of democratic competition and never gave in to violent action explains the 
AKP’s acceptance by the Turkish electorate and the latter’s willingness to give a 
chance to the party. The willingness to allow an Islamic party into the 
institutions of a secular state was also helped by the endurance of a multi-party 
system over a period of nearly 60 years, barring temporary military interventions 
and rule. Besides, this multi-party system expressed cleavage-based political 
alternatives through various parties including the AKP. This most likely 
accounted for moderation and the narrowing of cleavages.   
 Finally, the political conjuncture of early 2000s also helped the AKP to 
succeed electorally. After a decade of coalition governments, economic 
stagnation and the severe crises of 2000 and 2001, people were looking for an 
alternative and a new start, and this was presented by the AKP. The deprivation 
factor (Lipset, 1960, pp.63-64) undoubtedly also played a role in the AKP’s 
emergence. The electorate punished the parties that constituted the coalition 
government prior to the 2002 elections. Thus, the Turkish electorate and political 
system, by allowing the AKP’s emergence, contributed to an event that at that 
time was without precedence in the Islamic world. Moreover, contrary to 
expectations, political dynamics in Turkey were influenced by economic factors, 
rather than by political Islam and its discourse. 
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Is the establishment of the AKP in Turkish politics an indicator of the long-
term restructuring of the Turkish party system? 
This question was dealt with in Chapter 5. Before demonstrating whether 
the AKP’s establishment indicated the long-term restructuring of Turkish party 
system, its consolidation within Turkish society and the party system was 
explored. The AKP’s implementation of successful reforms became the main 
source of its political strength in both the legislative elections of 2007 and 2011.  
Therefore, in order to demonstrate its ability to consolidate its political 
position, I examined health reforms and policies related to social assistance that 
were successfully implemented by the AKP government. On the other hand, the 
AKP’s performance on gender and equality issues, specifically female 
employment, was found to be inadequate, since women were offered the 
alternatives of either working as part of a cheap and temporary labour force 
without social security or that of remaining at home. As a conservative party 
with a neo-liberal agenda, the AKP followed a policy which had the effect of 
undermining women’s position in the labour market. 
The party’s positive performance in terms of human rights and 
continuation of the reform packages initiated by the previous government with 
the aim of conforming to EU legislation were also investigated. Minorities and 
citizens of Kurdish origin who began to benefit from these changes joined the 
mass of the AKP supporters. The official negotiations relating to Turkey’s EU 
membership constituted another achievement attributable to the AKP. Put 
together, all these factors ensured the AKP’s electoral victory of 2007. 
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   The AKP’s consolidation required, beyond electoral victories, mastery 
in challenging the historical block (composed of military, judiciary (e.g. 
constitutional court) and main oppositional party CHP). As revealed later on by 
the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, there were inconclusive initiatives to 
destabilize and overthrow the AKP government during its first tenure.  These 
initiatives, allegedly planned under the guidance of some high-ranking officials, 
were not implemented since they were not approved by the general staff.  Thus, 
there was either a mindset of change within the military and/or the AKP’s 
performance and popularity did not allow the military to take the conclusive 
steps of undermining the government, as it had done in previous decades.  More 
importantly, society no longer tolerated the idea of military interventions in the 
political system and this most likely played a decisive role. Consequently, the 
last military intervention was confined to a delicate e-memorandum posted on 
the general staff web site in April 2007.  
This so-called e-memorandum marked the tacit conflict that had been 
going on between the AKP and the military during the party’s first tenure. The 
AKP’s second tenure thus bore witness to an open conflict with the historical 
block which ended in the party’s victory. The reform packages that had been 
implemented by the AKP in order to harmonize Turkish legislation with the EU 
“acquis communautaire” proved to be of great help in this process which 
restricted the power of the military, i.e. its position in the MGK. Thus, the AKP 
gradually gained control of the military and the judiciary towards the end of this 
second period of government. The third electoral victory in 2011 made the AKP 
the dominant party. The party attained not only legislative but also executive 
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consolidation; that is, it acquired control of the bureaucracy, the majority of 
municipalities and also control of the judiciary (namely the higher courts).  
        The present situation in the political party landscape corresponds to the 
dominant party system with the AKP having won three successive legislative 
elections, each time increasing its share of the votes and without there being a 
credible challenge in the near future. Whether the political party system will 
retain this dominant position in long-term is difficult to predict.  
 Unlike other regions of the world where the dominant party system has 
proved to be sustainable over extended periods of time (e.g., Japan
253
, South 
Africa
254
), in the case of the AKP there are quite a few uncertainties. 
 To begin with, the continuity of this system requires the presence of a 
series of conditions in Turkey: internal stability of the dominant party, absence 
of anti-democratic interventions, absence of external alternatives (continuing 
weakness of the opposition parties) and stability in economy as well as domestic 
and international politics. Not least, electoral laws (in the sense of Duverger’s 
hypotheses on proportional representation) also have some bearing over the 
sustainability of such a dominant party system (Clark and Golder, 2006, pp. 681-
682).  
 In this context, proportional representation (including the 10% electoral 
barrier) has allowed the AKP, despite its impressive electoral victory, to increase 
its votes to a respectable 49%, and gain a parliamentary presence that is far 
greater than the number of seats required to propose direct constitutional 
changes. Nevertheless, the AKP also is short of the number required to change 
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 LDP  (Liberal Democrat Party) in Japan: 1955-1993; 1994-2009 
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 NP (National  Party)  in South Africa: 1948-1994 
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the constitutional change alone due to electoral laws (AKP is short of 2/3 to 
make necessary constitutional changes).  
 The AKP presently appears to be a well-governed party under a strong, 
efficient and charismatic leadership. However, this apparent strength conceals 
features that may turn out to be weaknesses in the near feature. This is associated 
with the strong leadership structure of the party. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the 
founder and president of the party and as the prime minister has until now 
dominated the AKP and has been decisive in maintaining good governance and 
high performance. However, the authoritarian structure and lack of pluralism 
within the party have held back the development of young politicians with 
prospects of leading the party with a similar authority and efficiency after him. 
             A clause in the AKP’s charter stipulates the restriction of the 
parliamentary tenure of each AKP MP to a maximum of three successive terms. 
This clause will likely raise such a problem since none of the senior members 
may stand for the legislative elections of 2015. Prime Minister, Erdoğan will 
very likely stand down before in 2014 for the presidency. Thus, the question 
arises of how the leadership vacuum will be filled and whether the AKP will 
face a similar fate (decline) as the ANAP, in 1991, after Özal left his party to 
become the president of the Republic.  
 Accordingly, the AKP’s pragmatic and opportunistic side which helped 
the different groups to come together under the same umbrella, with clientelistic 
and nepotistic networks, is the main cohesive factor that keeps the party 
together. In the AKP’s case, pragmatism and opportunistic features replaced a 
party ideology that should normally be the glue that keeps any party together.  
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Thus, as mentioned before, the AKP’s main glue has been its economic 
performance. Its dependence on economic stability is another risk factor which 
may challenge the prospect of continuing dominance. However, the economy is 
an area where many factors are at play. The economic policies of the AKP, such 
as tight fiscal control and good governance have proved to be highly successful 
so far. 
  External threats such as the effects of a global economic or ongoing EU 
debt crisis are certainly more difficult to manage. Armed conflicts in 
neighborhood regions also present a still greater challenge to the economic 
growth and stability, even without Turkey’s direct involvement. If a 
deterioration of the economy sets in, it is likely that the glue kept intact many 
different groups of interest under the AKP will melt. As pointed out before while 
answering the first research question, Turkish voters consider their pockets and 
the income entering into their household. As a consequence, this attitude 
requires the sustainability of economic performance for the long-term electoral 
success of the AKP.  
 As main key findings, AKP obtained a great amount of votes at the last 
elections. Thus, the AKP’s consolidation resulted in the emergence of the 
dominant party system in Turkey. As mentioned above, the AKP increased its 
votes, and now, it has both legislative, executive power and judiciary. Thus, the 
AKP can make amendments easily. Despite its significant power, the AKP fails 
in changing constitution on its own and it needs to collaborate with other 
political parties in order to change constitutional amendments. Therefore, despite 
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its successes in consecutive elections, the AKP did not succeeding in reaching 
absolute majority in parliamentary due electoral system.  
 Furthermore, due to the dynamics in Turkish society and the society’s 
self-interested voting behavior, internal dynamics in society may lead to a 
change in the party preferences of society. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 5, 
the AKP’s policies have resulted in the deepening of polarization among 
different cleavages within Turkish society.  
 In addition to domestic dynamics, the international conjuncture (e.g. 
relations with Syria, EU) may vacuum the AKP’s leadership. Together with 
electoral law, the domestic and international dynamics can always jeopardize the 
AKP’s long-term restructuring of Turkish party system. In this context, it is 
unlikely that this dominant party system will continue in the long term. 
Does the entrenchment of the AKP in Turkish politics since 2002 represent 
a shift from secularism towards conservatism and religion in Turkey? 
 The final research question was dealt in Chapter 5.  This final question of 
whether the AKP’s entrenchment in Turkish politics represents a shift from 
secularism towards conservatism and religion in Turkey needs consideration in 
the broader framework of stability in domestic politics. The establishment and 
maintenance of an environment of peace and reconciliation in a country is vital 
for the continuation of public support for a government party.  
 In answering the first research question related to the impact of changes 
in socio-economic structures on the AKP’s emergence, my findings demonstrate 
that the AKP did not gain power or consolidate itself, owing to Islamist 
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discourse. Nonetheless, the feedback effect on the society of the consolidated 
AKP since 2007 reveals its conservative world view.   
  During its third tenure, the AKP seems to have finally expressed an 
Islamist agenda. Full of self-confidence due to its defeat of the historical block, 
the AKP government has made some interventions into the secular way of life, 
and has attempted to impose its (Sunni-inspired) values, principles and 
worldview. This has become evident in its discourse, and legislative actions, 
especially in the area of education.  
             The disclosure of its Islamist agenda has already given rise to an 
increased polarization between the AKP government and the secular and Alevi 
segments of society. Moreover, the increasingly nationalistic and Sunni-Islamist 
discourse and rather combative style of the AKP in dealing with its political 
opponents has led to the emergence of equally confrontational opposition. Thus, 
as of 2011, the secular-anti-secular cleavage in Turkey has tended to become a 
central problem, due to the change in the AKP’s stance and policies. This 
cleavage is also reflected in the parliament.  
On the other hand, the separatist terror which has escalated during the 
AKP’s third tenure has (once again) aggravated the centre-periphery cleavage in 
the form of a Turkish-Kurdish sub-cleavage.  
            It remains to be seen whether the AKP, after having attained a peak of 
consolidation with the elections of 2011, will manage to stay there and 
successfully deal with the emerging problems or whether it will follow a course 
of decline. The factors discussed above will determine which option the Turkish 
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electorate will vote for in the few next years (2013 and 2014) when a series of 
critical elections and perhaps also referendum(s) take place.  
Methodological and Research Challenges  
 One methodological challenge that I faced was in the selection of 
interviewees. For example, it would be useful to have been able to interview 
members of the Gülen Movement or ask questions to other relevant informants 
about the impact of the Gülen Movement on the AKP. Additional information 
related to the Gülen Movement’s role within the AKP, would have contributed 
more originality to the thesis.   
 Furthermore, another difficulty of working on the AKP is that its 
political project is on-going. Therefore, it was difficult to analyse the projects, 
policies and discourse of the AKP without being influenced by daily news items 
related to the AKP in the different media organs which often ran contradictory or 
unsubstantiated stories depending on their respective political positions. It was 
also problematic to limit the time frame for the analysis of the AKP’s 
consolidation and its significance in society and party system. This cannot be 
analysed with certainty while the party is still in power.  
Final Remarks  
My research has revealed the difficulty of analyzing the development of 
the Turkish political system in terms of criteria that are specific to western 
(European) democracies. In my research, I adopted a purely Western theoretical 
model, the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure, and I applied it to the Turkish 
context by incorporating recent Turkish dynamics. The cleavages (state-church; 
centre-periphery; land-industry and employer-worker) have been shaped by the 
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evolution of institutions in Western European countries. Thus, it is necessary to 
recognize difficulties and mismatches between Turkish society dynamics and 
Western dynamics. Despite these existing drawbacks, the analytical framework 
which underpins my thesis has helped me to build a new taxonomy related to 
cleavages within Turkish party system.  Now, I will discuss how I incorporated 
each cleavage into the Turkish context by noting the changes and adjustments 
that I have made.  
 First, I have incorporated the state-church cleavage into the Turkish 
context as two different cleavages: Secularist-Islamist and Sunni-Alevi. The 
division between the church and the state is a concept which was born as a result 
of 1789 French Revolution. These two concepts in the French context indicate a 
strict division between the church (religious affairs) and the state (anything 
profane).  
 Since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey has been 
officially a secular country. However, when the distinction between the French 
case and Turkish case is made, it is observed that the government in 1937 did 
not separate completely state and any profane affairs. Instead, the government 
established the directorate of Religious Affairs through which it aimed to control 
religion (Islam) (Berkeş, 1998, p.19). 
 Meanwhile, the Turkish state imposed a secular education system 
through which the aim was to control the relationship between the nation-state 
and the individual citizen (Ware, 1996, p.187; Burdy and Marcou, 1995, p.13). 
Despite this crucial difference between the French and Turkish case, there is a 
possibility to incorporate this divide into Turkish context under the guidance of 
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Durkheim who considers that according to the secularism norm, anything 
profane has to be strictly separated from any consecrated norm (including non 
Christian religions) (Giddens, 1971, p.107). 
 In accordance with Durkheim’s theory, the state-church cleavage 
structures political developments in Turkey related to the tension between the 
secularists and Islamists. Throughout the thesis, I refer to different cleavages in 
order to stress between the secularists and Islamists. For instance, during the 
period of the 1970s, the left-right cleavage was more important than the 
secularist-Islamist cleavage. However, since the end of the Cold War, the left-
right cleavage became obsolete and it was replaced by tensions between 
secularists and Islamists. The main reasons behind this division are as following: 
first, due to conjunctural reasons (e.g. the end of the Cold War); second, the 
electoral success of the RP in the local elections of 1994 and, third, the 
consolidation of the AKP in 2007 and the gradual drift in Turkish society 
towards moderate Islamic and traditional values.   Thus, I argue that this 
cleavage of state-church has to be recognized as a secularist-Islamist cleavage.   
 Moreover, since the establishment of the Republic, Alevis have been 
excluded by the state, which advocates Sunni Islam. As mentioned in 5.3.2, the 
AKP started a democratic initiative for the Alevis. Even though the democratic 
initiative did not yield any concrete results, in society, Alevis have started to 
express themselves in a relatively more vocal way and they reveal more often 
their discontent with Sunni Islam. Hence, even though in previous decades (e.g. 
the 1970s), Alevis used to be adherents of left ideologies, currently, the Alevis 
do not express their discontent through a left ideology, instead, they criticize 
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directly the Directorate of Religious Affairs and its Sunni Islam discourse and 
they request the recognization of their own Alevi belief. Thus, AKP’s strong 
adherence to Sunni-Islam (especially after its consolidation) has made the Alevi-
Sunni
255
 cleavage more distinct.  In this context, I have classified a new cleavage 
called Alevi-Sunni Muslims. 
 As a last remark for the “Secularist-Islamist” and “Alevi-Sunni” 
cleavages, an overarching cleavage would not be possible because it is not 
possible to declare that all secularists are Alevis or all the Sunnis are Islamists. 
As a consequence, instead of state-church cleavage, I have introduced 
“secularist-Islamist” and “Alevi-Sunni” cleavages into the Turkish cleavage 
structure.  
 Second, while incorporating the centre-periphery into the Turkish 
political context, it is important to explain that Lipset and Rokkan developed the 
centre-periphery cleavage in order to demonstrate the conflict between 
homogenenous nation-state (centre) and ethnically, linguistically or religiously 
distinct groups (peripheral segments) which resist the homogenization efforts 
from the centre (Ware, 1996, p.186).  
 Regarding the incorporation of this cleavage into the Turkish context, 
instead of centre-periphery, I have suggested the “Turkish-Kurdish” cleavage. 
First of all, following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey’s 
political system implemented numerous reforms aiming to standardize language, 
                                                     
255
 Regarding the Alevi-Sunni cleavage, it can be considered as a response to the Islamization of 
the AKP. But, it happened more implicitly.  More than a response, the Alevis’ claims for their 
own belief has become more distinct. But, this cleavage always existed in society; it just came to 
the surface.   
 
371 
 
religion and education in order to control sub-national or peripheral units. The 
Kurds, since the beginning of the Republic, have felt alienated by the 
homogenization attempts of the Turkish nation-state. However, Kurds did not 
explicity express their identity requests until the 1990s. 
 Similar to the “Alevi-Sunni” cleavage and “Secularist-Islamist” 
cleavage, the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage used to exist under other cleavages, such 
as the left-right cleavage in the 1970s. As demonstrated in chapter 1, Kurds used 
to choose left-wing ideologies in the 1970s. Nevertheless, since the beginning of 
the civil conflict in the South-Eastern region between Kurds and the Turkish 
authorities, this cleavage has transformed into a Turkish-Kurdish cleavage. 
Especially since the 1990s, Kurds have developed further their ethnic and 
political identities and they have kept away from the mainstream political 
parties, including the centre-left political parties.  
 As a result, I have classified the centre-periphery cleavage as the 
“Turkish-Kurdish” cleavage. It is also important to add that the previous 
cleavages and “Turkish-Kurdish” cleavage overlap to a large degree. For 
instance, it is possible to identify further cleavages, such as “Alevi-Kurdish vs. 
Sunni-Turkish”; Alevi-Kurdish vs. Sunni-Kurdish”; “Sunni-Kurdish; Sunni-
Turkish” and “Alevi-Turkish vs. Alevi-Kurdish”. Even though those dynamics 
were beyond my research, the classification of cleavages can be further 
developed for further research.   
 Third, the land-industry cleavage emerged in England as a consequence 
of the Industrial Revolution. Since Turkey did not have an industrial revolution 
like in Western societies, it was difficult to incorporate this cleavage into the 
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Turkish context. Nonetheless, I incorporated this cleavage by taking into account 
Gallagher et al’s point of view (2005) and the cleavage was used in order to 
highlight the emerging Anatolian business circles and their institutional 
existence through the MÜSİAD and the AKP. Opposed to this emerging 
Anatolian business circles, I consider the business circles of the big metropolitan 
regions. In this way, the cleavage provides three meanings: geographical 
division (Metropolitan cities vs. Inner Anatolia); ideological positioning 
(secularist vs. pious) and their initial economic emergence (through state aid vs. 
free market economy). Therefore, I have introduced this cleavage as “Secular 
Metropolitan Big Industrialists vs. Conservative Provincial Medium-sized 
Industrialists” into the new Turkish cleavage-structure. 
Fourth, the employer-worker cleavage was developed in the Western 
context as a result of worker movements. In my thesis, I adopted this framework 
by taking into account Lipset’s relative deprivation theory and I considered the 
employer-worker cleavage as a division between the wealthier segments of in 
urban centres versus the peripheral segments of urban areas that are looking for 
economic development and social mobility. Thus, I adapted the employer-
worker cleavage to the Turkish context considering geographical and socio-
economic factors. I used Kahraman’s (2007) recent work on centre-periphery 
cleavage and named this cleavage as the “centre vs. periphery-at-the-centre”. 
The centre reflects the old elites of the society whereas the periphery-at-the-
centre means the underprivileged masses living on the periphery of urban areas. 
Therefore, I have the “Centre-Periphery-at-the-Centre” as the Turkish version of 
the “employer-worker” cleavage.   
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As a consequence, I have adopted a new cleavage structure related to the 
Turkish party system, which is formed by the “Alevi-Sunni”; “Secularist-
Islamist”; “Turkish-Kurdish”; “Secular Metropolitan Big Industrialists-
Conservative Provincial Medium-sized Industrialists” and “Centre-Periphery at 
the Centre” as the new taxonomy.   
 Now, I will use this new taxonomy in order to predict future 
developments regarding Turkish politics. While using this new taxonomy as a 
toolto predict future developments in Turkish politics, as of 2013, it is observed 
that the cleavages between secularist and Islamist will remain. However, due to 
recent changes in the educational system and due to the increasing religious 
motives in the educational system (e.g. the prime minister’s aims to create a 
pious generation); Sunni Islam will remain predominant in the Turkish context 
over the next 10 years.  Regarding the Kurdish-Turkish cleavage, as of 2013, 
peace attempts between Turks and Kurds are going well as compared to previous 
occasions. However, Turkey is situated in a risky geographical arena and there 
are other international factors which may distort these negotiations between 
Turks and Kurds. Even if Turks and Kurds succeed in the current peace 
agreements, this does not mean that peace will be achieved in the long term.  
 Supposing peace is achieved, the Kurdish problem has existed since the 
early 1980s and a whole generation has witnessed those difficult and traumatic 
years. Therefore, even though in institutional terms, a peaceful solution is 
obtained, it seems to be difficult to recover from the traumatic repercussions of 
the 30-year-civil war in Turkey on the society level.  
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The “Secular Metropolitan Big Industrialists-Conservative Provincial 
Medium-sized Industrialists” cleavage will continue in the long-term. Regarding 
the impact on the economy, the industrialists of metropolitan cities are still very 
strong. However, as mentioned before in 5.4, in 2010, one of the biggest media 
powers, Doğan Holding, was accused of having failed to pay sufficient taxes 
associated with the transactions that took place in 2005 and 2006. Hence, it was 
asked to pay a bulk sum of 4.8 billion TL (3.2Million$).  
If there are more attacks against large holding companies with regards to 
paying tax penalties, it might reduce their financial strength. However, in the 
long term, I argue that big industrialists will be the predominant economic group 
in Turkey. Provincial Medium Industrialists will flourish in the long term; 
however, I do not believe that they will challenge the big industrialists.  
 Regarding the “Centre-Periphery at the Centre” cleavage, the peripheral 
sections of society have become integrated into the centre through new urban 
gentrification projects and new contructions. The main question is how the 
educational level of those on the periphery will be in the long term. Currently, 
the masses in the periphery are in abundance in terms of number as compared to 
the centre; however in terms of skills, educational level, urbanization, they are 
still behind those of the metropolitan centre. Thus, if future generations living in 
these peripheral areas acquire more skills, then they would constitute a challenge 
to the centre not only in number but also in skills.   
 Consequently, this taxonomy can also highlight future developments in 
Turkish politics. Throughout the thesis, I have attempted to demonstrate how the 
AKP emerged as a result of changes in socio-economic structures since the 
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1980s, which led to the emergence of new intermediary strata. Similarly, I 
believe that future developments in Turkish politics will be based on changes in 
socio-economic structures and demographic factors in the long term. Therefore, 
it is crucial to look at the dynamics regarding the cleavage “Centre-Periphery at 
the Centre”, especially dynamics within the “periphery at the centre” in order to 
make future predictions related to Turkish politics.  
Further Research on the Overarching Cleavage  
Accordingly, an explanation of its evolution within the narrow analytical 
framework of class in terms of a left-right cleavage has proved to be insufficient. 
The diversity of existing (emerging and declining cleavages (e.g. left-right 
division can be considered as a declining cleavage), due to historical, socio-
economic developments, ethnicity and religion, has accounted for the very 
dynamism and heterogeneity of the Turkish political party system since the 
beginning of the multi-party era. Thus, a multi-dimensional approach (using the 
Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structures (1967) inspired by Talcott-Parsonian theory) 
proved to be more suitable and more relevant in analyzing the institutions of a 
society that has developed from a collapsed Ottoman empire in search of a 
national identity, and which did not bear witness to critical socio-economic and 
political ruptures such as the industrial revolution in Britain and the Revolution 
of 1789 in France.  
 Consequently, the AKP’s emergence needs to be seen not so much from 
the perspective of the last two decades, but from that of a much longer process 
which began with the establishment of the Republic in 1923 and which was built 
upon Ottoman heritage. As I have shown, this historical event (i.e. the collapse 
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of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of the Republic in 1923) caused deep 
divides in Turkish society in the sense of cleavages (e.g. between (urban) centre 
and (rural) periphery, state and church or secularists and Islamists).  
Thus, since its establishment almost 90 years ago, the Republic of Turkey 
has had to deal with the negative features (conflicts arising from the various 
cleavages) of the Ottoman Empire. The continuity between Empire and Republic 
has been expressed in the divisions between cleavages of (republican) centre and 
periphery (imperial heritage including); (secularist Republic) state and church 
(suppressed Ottoman religious institutions e.g. abolition of the system 
of Caliphate in Islam); land-industry cleavage (loss of bourgeoisie after the 
establishment of Republic and after the exchange of population in 1924). As a 
result, the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the establishing of the Republic as 
historical events impacted the evolution of cleavages during the republican era. 
Thus, given the shift between the Ottoman and Republican periods, it 
may be more appropriate to use an over-arching cleavage which comprises those 
mentioned above, even though the Republican period attempted to suppress 
Ottoman heritage in different areas of society by imposing requirements during 
the single-period regime (1923-1946). Following the beginning of the multi-
party era, the cleavages which were suppressed during the single-party regime 
became visible again. Thus, the right-wing (DP, ANAP), nationalist (e.g. MHP) 
and Islamist parties (MNP, MSP, RP, and FP) have expressed their respect for 
the Ottoman tradition. This respect for the Ottoman tradition has continued 
under the AKP. Thus, for example, the AKP takes particular pride in cherishing 
Ottoman traditions of social assistance.   
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 In the light of this Ottoman-Republican continuity, there are 
opportunities for further research into the AKP’s foreign policy regarding the 
EU or the Middle East. In addition, there is also space for further research in 
specific policy areas such as education, pensions system, and housing and youth 
issues.  
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Appendices 
Appendix Part A - Tables for Literature Review 
 
 
Table 1. Ware's Classification of Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party 
Party Systems 
Source: Ware, 1996, p.8 
 
 
 
 
Responsiveness 
of parties and 
party systems 
to changes in 
factors that 
created them 
            Sociological Institutional Competition 
Largely 
unresponsive 
Lipset and 
Rokkan 
Panebianco  
 
 Michels  
 Von Beyme 
 Sartori 
Duverger (parties) 
 Mair Epstein 
  Budge 
 
Duverger  
(party 
systems) 
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Table 2. Sartori’s Simplified Model 
Source: Ware, 1996, pp.168-170 
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Appendix Part B - Table regarding Key Informants Interviewed 
 
                                                     
256
 All of the names are pseudonyms. 
 Names
256
 Sex 
Age 
Group 
Organisation 
Represented 
Position held in 
Organisation 
Location of  
Organisation 
1 Leyla F 26-40 
AKP Provincial 
Presidency 
 
High-ranking 
Representative 
(Women Branch) 
Sütlüce İstanbul 
2 Ali M 26-40 
AKP Provincial 
Presidency 
 
High-ranking 
Representative  (Youth 
branch) 
 
Sütlüce İstanbul 
3 Faruk M 26-40 
AKP District 
Presidency 
 
Representative (Youth 
Branch) 
 
Kadıköy İstanbul 
4 Derya F 41-60 
AKP District 
Presidency 
 
Representative 
(Women branch) 
 
Kadıköy İstanbul 
5 Abdullah M 41-60 AKP Headquarters 
 
High-ranking 
Representative (Main 
Branch) 
 
Söğütözü Ankara 
6 Murat M 26-40 
AKP Provincial 
Presidency 
 
High-ranking 
Representative (Main 
Organization/Ana 
Kademe) 
 
Sütlüce İstanbul 
7 Cem M 41-60 
 
Big İstanbul based 
Holding 
 
High-ranking Official Levent İstanbul 
8 Mehmet M 60+ TEB 
 
High-ranking Official 
 
Kabataş İstanbul 
9 Ayşe F 60+ CHP Headquarters 
 
High-ranking Official 
(Women Branch) 
 
Söğütözü Ankara 
10 Hasan M 41-60 AKP Headquarters 
 
High-ranking Official 
(Main Branch) 
 
Söğütözü Ankara 
11 İbrahim M 26-40 CHP Headquarters 
 
High-Ranking Official 
(Youth Branch) 
 
Söğütözü Ankara 
12 Rıza M 41-60 TÜSİAD High-ranking Official 
 
Beyoğlu İstanbul 
 
13 Ahmet M 41-60 
 
Alevi Belief 
 
Grassroot Eminönü İstanbul 
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14 Ferhat M 61+ 
 
Eşitlik ve 
Demokrasi 
Partisi - Egality 
and Democracy 
Party 
 
Representative of the 
EDP 
Representative of 
Alevi belief 
Eminönü İstanbul 
15 Kemal M 26-40 İTO Advisor in the İTO 
 
Eminönü İstanbul 
 
16 Engin M 61+ 
SP Provincial 
Presidency 
 
High-ranking Official 
(Provincial 
Presidency) 
 
Topkapı İstanbul 
17 Melek F 26-40 MÜSİAD High-ranking Official 
 
Sütlüce İstanbul 
 
18 Barış M 41-60 
BDP Provincial 
Presidency 
High-ranking Official 
 
Bayrampaşa 
İstanbul 
 
19 Levent M 26-40 
CHP District 
Presidency 
 
Member of CHP 
Youth Branch 
 
Eminönü İstanbul 
20 Ziya M 41-60 
AKP 
Parliamentary 
 
Deputy 
 
Bakırköy İstanbul 
21 Veli M 41-60 
 
Warwick 
Academic 
 
Academic Coventry UK 
22 Mustafa M 41-60 CHP 
 
Headman of the 
neighborhood 
(muhtar) 
 
 
Kartal İstanbul 
 
23 Lale F 41-60 Halk Evleri High-ranking Official 
 
Kadıköy İstanbul 
 
24 Haldun M 26-40 
 
AKP Provincial 
Presidency in 
Aksaray (Inner 
Anatolia) 
 
High-ranking member 
(Main Branch) 
Eminönü  İstanbul 
 
25 Zehra F 20-26 
AKP District 
Presidency 
Member of the AKP 
 
Kadıköy İstanbul 
 
26 Zafer M 61+ TESEV High-ranking Official 
 
Beşiktaş İstanbul 
 
27 Selma F 41-60 Başak Sanat Vakfı 
High-ranking 
Representative 
 
Ataşehir İstanbul 
 
28 Melis 
Valide 
F F 
 
26-40 
40-60 
AKP Members of the AKP Kadıköy İstanbul 
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Table 1. Profile of Key Informants Interviewed (36) 
 
29 
 
Ömer 
M 
41-60 
DİSK 
 
High-ranking 
Representative of  the 
DİSK 
Şişli  İstanbul 
30 
Nedim 
M 
41-60 
HAK-İŞ 
 
High-ranking Official 
of the Hak-İş 
Kavaklıdere 
Ankara 
31 
Muzaffer 
M 
26-40 
AKP District 
Presidency 
 
Member of the AKP 
(Main Branch) 
Kadıköy İstanbul 
32 Çelik 
 
M 
41-60 
AKP District 
Presidency 
Neighborhood Leader  
 
Kadıköy    
İstanbul 
 
33 
Zeki 
M 
26-40 
Person from lower 
strata 
Assistant at a Carpet 
Shop 
 
Eminönü   
İstanbul 
 
34 
Vedat 
M 
26-40 
TOBB 
Official from the  
TOBB 
 
Söğütözü Ankara 
 
35 
Naci 
M 
61+ 
AKP 
Parliamentary 
Deputy 
 
Söğütözü Ankara 
 
36 
Soner 
M 
61+ 
SODEV High-ranking Official 
 
Erenköy  İstanbul 
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Appendix Part C - Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM
257
 
Project Title: The Emergence, Consolidation and Significance of the AKP in 
Turkey 
Name of Researcher: Miss Sevinç Bermek 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated ………………. for the above project. I may keep this information for 
my records and have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have 
wished to ask at this stage of my participation in the project. 
I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to: 
 [  ] Be interviewed  
 [  ] Voice recorded 
  
I understand that my information will be held and processed for the 
following purposes: 
[  ] Completion of a PhD thesis in Centre of Ethnic Relations at the 
School of Health and Social Studies 
 [  ] Presented in anonymised form in future seminars and conferences 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time (up to three months after the interview/ focus group 
meeting date) without giving any reason and without being penalised or 
disadvantaged in any way. 
________________  _____________ ___________________  
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
 
_________________   _____________ ___________________ 
Name of person taking          Date                                        Signature                        
consent if different from 
Researcher     
__________________ _____________  _____________ 
Researcher   Date    Signature 
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 Form was translated mot-a-mot to Turkish. 
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Appendix Part D - Available Data on Elections, Surveys, Archival Sources 
1. Available Data on Elections, Surveys 
1.1 Data on the Results of the Election 
1.1.1 Parliamentary election data
258
 
The results of the general elections are available for the elections of 
1950, 1954, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 
2002, 2007 and 2011. 
1.1.2 Local elections data
259
 
1.2 Data on Pre-election Surveys 
 Sonar Research Company;
260
 Estima Research Company
261
 and Metro Poll 
Research Company
262
 made pre-election surveys before the parliamentary 
elections of 2007.  
 Sonar had been preparing surveys not just one month before the elections 
but in May 2006; November 2006.  
 Metro Poll Research Company had an interesting pattern towards the 
surveys; it had started to analyse the political state of Turkey since 2007 January 
till 2007 September. In addition, it also chose specific region of the metropolitan 
cities İstanbul and Ankara for the surveys.  
 Estima made a survey on the tendencies of the voters in 2007 March.  
 There are other research companies such as Başkent Research Company; 
Odak Research Company and Anar Research Company; nevertheless, I have not 
found their data on collaboration (“7 Şirketin Seçim Anketi Sonuçları”, 2007). 
According to Haber 7, among all these research companies, only Anar and Odak 
have predicted the increase of the AKP’s votes and its victory with high 
percentage (around 40%).  
 Furthermore, Konda Research Company
263
 made a pre-election survey and 
it expected a victory of the AKP with 44% (“Konda’nin Anketine göre Yüzde 44 
Güçlü İktidar”, 2007). 
                                                     
258
 http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?alt_id=42 [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
259
 http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?alt_id=42 [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
260
 http://www.sonararastirma.com/secim-sonuclari.html [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
261
 http://www.estima.com.tr/raporlar.asp  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
262
 http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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1.3 Post-election Survey Data 
 The post-election survey data which is prepared by Sonar Research 
Company is as following: 
 Survey on the AKP’s 6th year at the office (2008);  
 Survey on the political tendencies in Turkey (2009 June); 
 Survey on the political tendencies in Turkey (2009 September) and  
 Survey on the political tendencies in Turkey (2009 October).
264
 
 The post-election survey prepared by the Konda research company is 
called New Period in politics.
265
 This survey can be considered more as an 
analysis of the parliamentary elections of 2007 rather than a post-election survey. 
2.1 Available Sources for Archival Research 
2.1.1 Minutes of the Parliamentary Debates 
 An example of minutes for a parliamentary debate is available on the 
website: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem21/yil2/bas/b099m.htm. The 
debate occurred on 25
th 
Mai, 2000 and the debate includes both the discussions for 
the legislation and the general discussion (e.g. suggestions of some deputies). 
2.1.2 Party Programmes 
  The AKP  
 Availability of the party’s regulation; programme; party’s declarations 
and party campaigns 
 At the web page of the AKP, the party regulation is available.
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 The party programme is accessible from the website.
267
 
 The party declarations and the party’s activities are available from the 
archive of news from 2003 to the present.
268
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 http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar.php [Accessed on June 2010] Currently Accessed through 
request 
264 
http://www.sonararastirma.com/secim-sonuclari.html [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
265
 http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar.php [Accessed on June 2010] Currently Accessed through 
request 
266 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
267
 http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
268 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/kategori/basin-odasi/158 
 [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/secimler/2002-genel-secim [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/secimler/2004-yerel-secim [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/secimler/2007-genel-secim [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/secimler/2011-secim-sarkilari-ve-dosyalari [Accessed on 20th 
October 2012] 
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 The party’s press releases have not been published at the website of the 
AKP. 
269
 However, they can be reached from the archives of the newspapers. 
 The SP 
 The analysis of the SP is important since when the predecessor of the 
AKP (the FP) was split into two parties in 2001; one group called reformers 
established the AKP whereas the core group of the FP established the SP. 
Therefore, the logic used for the in-depth interviews is valid for the archival 
research method. It is important to look at the discourse of the SP and its critique 
towards the AKP. 
 Furthermore, the SP’ increasing ‘success’ at the local elections of 
2009 was considered as a potential threat to the AKP at the long-term. 
 The party’s press releases; brochures and posters for the elections of 
2002 and 2007 are available from the website of the SP.
270
  
 There is also a section on the press meetings.
271
 
 The party programme is mentioned clearly from the website of the 
party.
272
  
 The CHP  
 The party programme for 2008 is available from the website of the RPP. 
273
 
 The speeches of the general president of the CHP (at the parliament; at 
the party meetings; at the election campaigns; on the TV; at the press releases) are 
accessible from the website.
274
 
 Some of the CHP brochures are accessible from the website.
275
 
 The MHP  
                                                     
269
 http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/arsiv/tumu/118/ [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/kategori/basin-odasi/158 [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
270 
http://www.saadet.org.tr/                        [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
271
 http://www.saadet.org.tr/basindan/          [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
272
 http://www.saadet.org.tr/dosyaarsivi/       [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.saadet.org.tr/kurumsal/program/678 [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
273
  http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=70                [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=173                            [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=74                           [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
274  
http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=74  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
     http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=1907  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
275  
http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=41050  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
     http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=173  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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 The MHP’s party programme; regulations and various publications on its 
vision are available at the MHP’s website.276 
 The MHP’s reports on the economy; agriculture; justice; privatization; 
corruption; poverty issue; unemployment and employment; the foreign policies; 
Cyprus and the EU are published at its website.
277
 
2.1.3 Archives of Main Newspapers 
 Radikal 
 The archive of the Radikal newspaper is available from 1998 Mai to the 
present.
278
 
 Milliyet 
 The archive of Milliyet is accessible online from 3
rd
 Mai 1950 to the 30
th
 
April 2004.
279
  
 Hürriyet 
 The archive of Hürriyet is available from 1997 7
th
 July to the present.
280
 
 Vatan 
 The archive of Vatan newspaper is available from 2003 1
st
 January to the 
present.
281
 
 Zaman  
The archive of Zaman newspaper is available from 1994 (but at the early 
years, there are some days when the newspaper is not available online) to the 
present.
282
  
 Cumhuriyet 
                                                     
276
 http://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_index.php  [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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[Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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 [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
277
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[Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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[Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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281 
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 The archive of the newspaper Cumhuriyet is available from 7
th
 Mai, 1998 
283
 to the present but, in order to reach this source, there is a need of subscription 
(with a fee) otherwise the source is not accessible  online.  
 Today’s Zaman 
 The archive of the newspaper Today’s Zaman is available from March, 
2004 to the present.
284
 
2.1.4 Archives of the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR] 
 They do exist also from the website of ECHR. 
285
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
283 
http://arama.yore.com.tr/cumhuriyet/w/ [Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
284 
http://www.todayszaman.com/  [Accessed on 20th October 2012]
 
285
 http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/Archives/ 
[Accessed on 20th October 2012] 
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Appendix Part E - Figure regarding Turkish Social Structure 
 
Figure 1. Illustration for Turkish Social Structure 
Source: This figure was produced according to the ILO statistics on occupational categories 
related to Turkey 
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Appendix Part F - Figures, Maps and  Pictures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 1988-2011 Female Employment Rate % 
Source: Statistics Institute of Turkey (TÜİK) from section on Employment, Unemployment and 
Wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Legislative Elections of 
2002 
Dark Brown: DEHAP (Kurdish votes) 
Grey: Independent votes 
Source: http://www.genelsecim.org/GenelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2002 
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Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Legislative Elections of 
2007 
Yellow Colour means independent votes (mostly for independent Kurdish deputies) 
Source: http://www.genelsecim.org/GenelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Legislative Elections of 
2011 
Source: http://www.genelsecim.org/GenelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2011 
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Figure 5. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Local Elections of 2004 
Source: http://www.genelsecim.org/YerelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Local Elections of 2009 
Source: http://www.genelsecim.org/YerelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2009 
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Figure 7. Demokrasinin Yıldızları/Stars of the Democracy 
The slogan of the AKP for the national elections of 2007 
Source: Billboard Photo taken from AKP library, AKP Headquarters in Ankara 
 
 
 
Figure 8. AK Parti Oradaydi! Muhalefet Neredeydi? 27 Nisan 2007-Cuma 
AKP was there! Where was the Opposition? 27
th
 April 2007-Friday 
Source: Billboard Photo taken from AKP library, AKP Headquarters in Ankara 
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